How Big Things Get Done: The Surprising Factors That Determine the Fate of Every Project, from Home Renovations to Space Exploration and Everything In Between - Bent Flyvbjerg

• The introduction describes two projects: the troubled California High-Speed Rail and a successful school project in Nepal. The author studies megaprojects and the psychology and power dynamics behind them.

• “Think slow, act fast” is key. Successful projects plan thoroughly then execute rapidly. The Empire State Building exemplified this. Failed projects “think fast, act slow”: rush in then drag on with problems. Denmark’s Great Belt Tunnel illustrates this.

• Megaprojects often go over budget and schedule, delivering fewer benefits. Only 0.5% succeed. Cost overruns average 62% due to extreme outliers, not normal distributions. Benefits are overpromised but hard to measure.

• Optimism bias and the planning fallacy contribute to failures. Success requires honesty, learning, flexibility, and accountability. Improvements are happening but human factors remain.

• Most projects have “fat tails” - a high chance of disastrous outcomes. Examples include the Big Dig, James Webb Space Telescope, Scottish parliament. Duration increases risks. “Black swans” and small events can cascade. Shorten duration and manage change.

• “Normal accidents” - minor events combine to cause major problems. The solution is quick completion, but rushing causes issues. “Think slow, act fast” - plan thoroughly, deliver quickly. Many fail by rushing into delivery, causing a “break-fix cycle.” Planning is key.

• The Pentagon was urgently needed in 1941. General Somervell proposed building it in a year. The site and design were poor but quickly approved, showing the “rush to commit” common in big projects. Big projects often go wrong from the start due to hasty commitments.

• Hasty decisions often lead to premature lock-in, ignoring better options - the “commitment fallacy.” Strategic misrepresentation and psychology (optimism, overconfidence) contribute. Question assumptions and consider alternatives before committing.

In summary, the key lessons are: 1) plan thoroughly, 2) move quickly, 3) avoid rushing in, 4) watch for extreme outcomes and manage risks, 5) question assumptions and consider alternatives before committing. Applying these lessons can help avoid the failures common to ambitious projects.

Thinking from right to left, or identifying goals first before determining how to achieve them, is critical for effective planning and problem solving. This approach helps maintain focus on the purpose behind efforts and find the best solutions. Some key points:

• Start with the desired end state or experience and work backwards. Called “backcasting,” “theory of change,” or “working backwards.” Used in many fields.

• Challenges include losing sight of the goal, unclear or jargon-filled expressions of the goal, and ignoring dissenting voices. Examples show how this can lead to failure.

• Tips for thinking from right to left:

1. Clearly define the goal in simple, easy to understand terms. This exposes any lack of clarity or logic flaws.

2. Use an iterative process to test and improve the goal and plan. Get input from others and incorporate feedback. Ensures shared understanding.

3. Keep the goal prominently displayed as a reminder of the purpose.

• Thinking from right to left, when done well, enables focused work directed at achieving meaningful outcomes. It helps avoid wasted effort by determining the best means to an end rather than selecting solutions first.

• Examples show how architects, planners, and tech companies use this approach. The Guggenheim Bilbao was shaped by the goal of revitalizing Bilbao’s economy through tourism. “Working backwards” from the customer experience aids product design in Silicon Valley.

• In contrast, failing to clarify goals and explore options can lead to inefficient processes, cost overruns, and poor outcomes, as seen in the home renovation example. Meetings and analysis that lack focus or depth create an illusion of progress while masking real issues.

The key message is that any project or effort should start by identifying goals and needs, not by rushing to solutions. Thinking from right to left, through an iterative process of evaluation and revision, helps enable this approach. It leads to work that is directed and meaningful rather than haphazard or superficial. With a clear focus on goals, better outcomes can be achieved.

• Have a clear goal and purpose to guide the work. Refer to this goal regularly to ensure work remains aligned with the overall aim. Be willing to abandon work that does not support the goal.

• Consider dissenting opinions open-mindedly. Addressing valid concerns leads to a stronger end result.

• Apply an iterative, experimental approach. Try options, get feedback, make changes, and continue improving. This helps anticipate obstacles and ensures the end product meets expectations.

-Develop plans fully before starting work. Think critically about the goal, consider options, evaluate obstacles, make revisions, and determine the right path forward before forging ahead.

-Use models, simulations, and other tools to experiment with different options risk-free. Make changes and determine what works best. This approach, used by Frank Gehry and Pixar, leads to successful outcomes.

-Experience and good judgment are extremely valuable but often overlooked in planning. Prioritize experience and expertise, especially for leadership roles. Pair inexperienced planners with experienced mentors. Test inexperienced teams before giving them greater responsibility.

-Balance experience with openness to new ideas. While experience is crucial, rigid thinking can also result. Adaptability and a willingness to consider different options and opinions leads to the most insightful plans and projects.

-Political interests and pressures frequently take priority over experience and good planning. This often compromises performance and end results. Maximize expertise and judgment whenever possible for the best outcomes.

-Testing in all its forms—simulations, models, experimentation, releasing and refining prototypes—is essential for good planning. Testing reveals flaws, ensures all parts of a plan are sound, and shows what really works. The more intensive the testing, the more robust the plan.

In summary, good planning is active, iterative, and focused on the goal. It prioritizes expertise, experiments, gets testing feedback, and makes evidence-based changes and revisions. With a willingness to abandon what does not work and consider new options, active planning helps achieve the most insightful and successful outcomes.

• Experience is invaluable for complex, ambitious projects but is too often dismissed in favor of novelty or a desire to be first. This leads to costly failures and overruns.

• Experience provides tacit knowledge - intuitive understanding and skills that are hard to articulate but make experts far more effective. Tacit knowledge comes from practice, not just information.

• Experienced leaders and teams have a “sixth sense” for risks and obstacles. They understand nuances and can steer around problems that would trip up novices. Experience turns knowledge into wisdom.

• Most projects benefit more from reusing proven approaches and hiring experienced people than trying unproven new methods. Only rare, first-of-a-kind projects justify a truly new approach. Even then, experience should be built through testing and iteration.

• Anchoring on the wrong assumptions or experiences often leads to poor forecasts and risk management. “Reference class forecasting” - looking at your project as one of a class of similar past projects - helps set the right anchor and leads to far more accurate predictions.

• Seeing one’s own project as unique leads to “uniqueness bias” and failure to recognize relevant experience and reference classes. Recognizing most projects are quite ordinary helps avoid unrealistic expectations.

• Experience does not prevent poor cost and schedule forecasts, which are often off due to inherent optimism and a tendency to see one’s own project as singular. Anchoring on reference classes and recognizing ordinariness helps address this.

• For projects to succeed, we must value experience, build it through practice and mentorship, start from reasonable anchors when forecasting, and recognize that most projects are far more ordinary than they seem. Experience turns knowledge into wisdom.

That covers the essence of the perspectives on experience, forecasting, and project success that were discussed in the summaries. Let me know if you would like me to clarify or expand on any part of this high-level summary.

• The author argues that data do not support Albert Hirschman’s theory that unforeseen difficulties often lead to better outcomes in ambitious projects. Although stories of successful “hero’s journeys” are appealing, they reflect survivorship bias and are not the typical outcome.

• Analyzing over 2,000 projects, the author found most with cost overruns do not deliver benefit overruns. On average, costs are underestimated and benefits are overestimated. Difficulties usually lead to worse, not better, outcomes.

• The author acknowledges the appeal of stories like Jaws and the Sydney Opera House. But the opera house’s designer struggled after resigning due to challenges, and the opera house’s construction was plagued with difficulties, delays and cost overruns. Stories alone do not prove Hirschman’s theory.

• Data show that “providential ignorance”—underestimating difficulties—usually leads to worse outcomes. While creativity may emerge to solve problems, outcomes are more likely to suffer than benefit. Unforeseen problems should be avoided, not embraced.

• Ambitious projects only appear successful in retrospect, after challenges have been overcome. We should not assume difficulties will providentially lead to better solutions. With good planning and management, most difficulties can be avoided in the first place.

• In summary, data analysis shows that difficulties in complex projects typically reduce benefits and increase costs. Creativity usually mitigates rather than enhances outcomes. Success stories may inspire but do not prove that ignorance and adversity should be embraced or that extensive planning should be avoided. For the best outcomes, difficulties are best avoided through good planning and management.

The key conclusions are:

1. Data show that unforeseen difficulties in projects usually worsen outcomes rather than leading to benefits, contrary to Hirschman’s theory.

2. Success stories reflect survivorship bias and do not prove Hirschman’s view. They appeal emotionally but do not reflect the typical outcome.

3. Extensive planning and management are better ways to achieve good outcomes than relying on improvisation and creativity to overcome difficulties.

4. Difficulties should be avoided rather than embraced. They typically increase costs and reduce benefits.

5. Outcomes are usually overestimated and costs underestimated due to optimism and overconfidence in ambitious projects. Realistic planning is needed.

Please let me know if you would like me to clarify or expand on any part of this summary. I’m happy to discuss this topic and argument further.

• After the Sydney Opera House, Utzon’s career stalled. The opera house’s success was unusual; most mega-projects end up over budget and timeline.

• Evidence shows unrealistic optimism and improvisation often lead to poor outcomes, unlike the myths around the opera house. Careful planning and heeding experts works better.

• To succeed, assemble an experienced team and give them appropriate roles. The Hoover Dam and Sydney Opera House depended on experienced teams. But executives often rely on optimism, assuming “how hard can it be.” This fails.

• Building a cohesive team is challenging but critical. They need a shared purpose, trust, open communication, and willingness to understand others. With this, diverse groups can achieve great outcomes, as with the Chrysler Building.

• For Terminal 5, BAA used incentives, resolving disputes, and team building to align contractors. Many knew each other, helping cooperation. BAA promoted an “all in it together” spirit, leading to success. The lessons are: incentives, interventions, relationships, and shared purpose.

• BAA chose experienced contractors and subcontractors it trusted. It promoted a shared “your team is T5” identity with events, messages, and uniforms. Workers bought in, leading to cooperation, high morale, and tackling problems. T5 opened on time; Wembley Stadium, which lacked this, failed. Team dynamics and identity drive success.

• Bespoke “one huge thing” projects often fail due to lack of experimentation, experience, unexpected obstacles, cost, and unpredictability. An alternative is “modularity”: aggregating identical small things. It enables experimenting, learning, and improving. Examples are nuclear plants, skyscrapers, schools in Nepal, and Heathrow T5. Assembly is efficient, unlike traditional building. Server farms show scale-free scalability through modularity.

In summary, the key lessons are: rely on data, not stories alone; build an experienced team with a shared purpose; use incentives and interventions to foster cooperation; develop team dynamics and identity; and where possible, use modularity and assembly for efficient, scalable outcomes. Hard work and relationships, not just vision, achieve great successes like the opera house. The norm is overpromising and failure without these lessons.

• Modularity refers to designing systems by assembling standardized components (modules) in a scaled and repeated manner. This fractal-like approach allows for efficient scaling and rapid construction. Examples include prefab medical facilities in Wuhan, Sears homes, Apple Park, Tesla Gigafactory, and SpaceX rockets.

• The author argues that modular and incremental project management leads to better outcomes than the traditional “one huge thing” approach. Modular projects are faster, cheaper, lower-risk, and more adaptable. Examples include shipping containers, road projects in India, and wind/solar energy. Improving infrastructure projects by 5-30% through modularity could save $300B-$3.5T per year globally.

• Denmark successfully scaled up wind power using a modular model, increasing from 18% to 56% of electricity in 10 years and becoming an industry leader. Government support and a modular approach were key. Modularity enabled fast learning and growth.

• The author proposes 11 heuristics for project leadership, including hiring experienced leaders, getting the right team, asking “why?”, building with “Legos”, thinking slow/acting fast, taking an outside view, envisioning the end result, detailed planning, modularity, communication, and visiting the work. Heuristics should be adapted based on experience.

• Treat projects as part of a reference class, not unique. Use data on similar past projects to forecast risks and learn. Focus on downside risks and mitigation. Say no and maintain focus. Incorporate climate change. Your biggest risk is psychological biases. Cost overruns vary by project type; use data to assess your risks.

• Bent Flyvbjerg has published extensively on megaproject management, cost overruns, benefit-cost analysis, and phronetic social science. Key works include “Megaprojects and Risk” (2003) on optimism bias and governance failures and “Survival of the Unfittest” (2009) on poor planning leading to expensive infrastructure.

• In summary, the material advocates modular and phronetic project management to address systematic challenges around megaprojects. Reference classes, risk mitigation, and disciplined heuristics can help leaders avoid costly failures and deliver sustainable outcomes. But governance, oversight, and incentives must also be addressed to curb political opportunism and strategic misrepresentation.

• The study examines “productive social comparison,” which refers to comparing oneself to someone who is slightly better in a domain. This kind of comparison motivates people and improves performance.

• Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld used the term “unknown unknowns” to refer to risks that are unpredictable or unforeseeable. These types of risks are challenging to manage in complex megaprojects.

• Reference class forecasting (RCF) is a method to reduce optimism bias in forecasting by basing estimates on actual performance of a reference class of comparable projects. It was developed to improve cost and benefit estimates for transportation infrastructure projects.

• The UK and Danish governments have mandated the use of RCF for large projects. RCF has also spread to other countries and other policy areas, with evidence that it improves accuracy.

• Daniel Kahneman’s research on cognitive biases, heuristics, and prospect theory has significantly influenced the study of decision making under uncertainty. His work provides insights relevant to improving megaproject management and governance.

The key points are:

1. Productive social comparison can motivate and improve performance. Leaders should create opportunities for teams to compare themselves to high-performing peers.

2. Unforeseeable risks or “unknown unknowns” pose major challenges in megaprojects. Risk management practices need to account for unpredictability.

3. Reference class forecasting is an evidence-based method to reduce optimism bias and improve accuracy in cost and schedule estimates for megaprojects. Governments and organizations would benefit from mandating its use.

4. Daniel Kahneman’s research provides a theoretical basis for understanding decision making errors and for developing strategies to improve judgment and choice, especially under uncertainty.

5. There are opportunities to apply insights from psychology and behavioral economics to megaproject management in order to curb biases, improve governance, and increase productivity.

Does this summary accurately reflect the key points and main takeaways from the provided material? Please let me know if you would like me to clarify or expand on any part of this summary.

Here is a summary of the summaries:

• The book “Worldly Philosopher” examines the life and work of economist Albert O. Hirschman. It focuses on key concepts Hirschman developed, including “the hiding hand principle”—the idea that humans tend to underestimate the difficulties of projects, which spurs action, and “exit, voice, and loyalty”—options people have in responding to decline in organizations or communities. Hirschman helped shape development economics and policies at institutions like the World Bank.

• The article “Time-and-Motion Regained” argues that the time-and-motion studies of industrial efficiency from the early 20th century are relevant for modern organizations. These studies emphasized close observation of workflows to minimize wasted time and motion. The article suggests methods for applying similar observations and logic to optimize knowledge work and administration in contemporary offices. Eliminating inefficiencies and interruptions can yield substantial time savings and productivity gains.

• Additional notes discuss project management techniques like reference class forecasting, taking an outside view, and recognizing regression to the tail. Reference class forecasting uses data from similar past projects to generate more realistic estimates. An outside view examines the experiences of a broad reference class, rather than an inside view of a specific project. Regression to the tail means that uncertain variables often have power law distributions with extreme values that dominate outcomes.

• There are also notes on megaprojects, which are prone to significant cost overruns, schedule delays, and benefit shortfalls due to high complexity and uncertainty. Modularity and platforms—standardized and reusable components and designs—can help address these challenges and may reduce costs by 30-80% for some types of megaprojects. Examples of modularity and platforms include prefabricated buildings, shipping containers, and the Madrid Metro system.

• Finally, there is a summary of an article on China’s rapid expansion of wind, solar and nuclear power over the past decade. Wind and solar grew much faster than nuclear, with costs declining dramatically. New nuclear technologies face hurdles to match the scale and cost effectiveness of mature renewables like wind and solar. The growth of renewables in China shows their potential to drive faster progress against climate change than nuclear power alone. Policy and infrastructure support remains important for their continued expansion.

Does this cover the key highlights from the notes and summaries? Let me know if you would like me to clarify or expand my summary in any way.

Here is a summary of the references:

• The article “Albert O. Hirschman and the Power of Failure” discusses Albert Hirschman’s theory that unexpected problems encountered in complex projects can drive creativity and new solutions.

• The report “California Water 2020: A Sustainable Vision” provides recommendations for improving water management in California through 2020, including ensuring adequate supply.

• The book Underground Infrastructures discusses planning and engineering considerations for underground construction projects such as tunnels, metro systems, and pipelines.

• The journal article “The Uniqueness Bias” examines the tendency for people to see their own experiences and situations as more unique than those of others.

• The book Building Art is a biography of architect Frank Gehry.

• The book The Games examines megaprojects related to hosting the Olympic Games and other major sports events.

• The report “Investigation into the Construction of Sports Stadia Volume 1” discusses issues encountered in the development of Wembley Stadium in the UK.

• The presentation “Forecasting and Managing Cost Overruns and Schedule Delays for Infrastructure Projects” provides recommendations for addressing cost overruns and delays based on studies of projects worldwide.

• The article “The Cost Performance of Projects: Is there Evidence of Path Dependence?” examines data on cost overruns for various project types and sectors. It finds the level of cost overruns depends on project characteristics and may show path dependence over time.

• The paper “An Appraisal of Underground Rail Mass Transit in Saudi Arabia” discusses options for developing metro systems in Saudi cities and challenges that would need to be addressed.

• The document “The Truth about Railway Cost Escalation” argues that cost overruns for rail projects can often be explained by inaccurate scoping and estimation early in development rather than issues encountered during implementation.

• The presentation “Megaprojects – Concepts, Strategies, Practices” provides an overview of megaproject management, including common problems like cost overruns as well as strategies and tools to improve performance.

In summary, the sources cover transportation megaprojects, water infrastructure, stadium and Olympic development, and underlying issues like cost overruns, creativity, decision making, and judgmental biases. The references span theories, case studies, guidelines, and recommendations for policy and practice.

The references provide a broad overview of challenges in managing complex megaprojects. Psychological biases and heuristics, such as optimism bias, anchoring bias, and escalation of commitment, systematically lead to poor judgment and decision making in megaproject planning. This results in strategic misrepresentation of costs and schedules, cost overruns, delays, and failures. Megaprojects also face major technical, financial, and managerial difficulties in implementation due to their large scale, complexity, and tight coupling. They frequently encounter social and political opposition as well due to unequal distribution of costs and benefits.

Several analyses of historical data show that ridership and cost forecasts for rail and infrastructure projects are often overly optimistic. Case studies of projects like Walt Disney Concert Hall, Wembley Stadium, and the Panama Canal expansion highlight how managerial and social factors can interact to produce delays and budget overruns.

Some authors argue that complexity and tight coupling make “normal accidents” inevitable in megaprojects. Others argue that more flexible and adaptive management practices could improve megaproject performance. Additional tools proposed include analysis of extreme events, self-organized criticality, and behavioral project management approaches informed by behavioral economics.

In summary, the literature highlights the particularly challenging nature of megaproject management due to psychological, social, and technical factors. A major theme is that traditional rational policy and management models are insufficient, and a more realistic, flexible, and behaviorally-informed approach is needed to address the complex realities of megaproject implementation.

I apologize, but I do not actually have a team, project, or distribution I can refer to. I am Claude, an AI assistant created by Anthropic to be helpful, harmless, and honest.

I am an AI assistant created by Anthropic to be helpful, harmless, and honest.