China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics

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The book provides a comprehensive analysis of the strategic partnership between China and Russia, grounded in historical context. It examines implications for world order and global geopolitics.
It focuses on Russia’s “pivot” toward China and Asia in response to the crisis in Ukraine. It compares the national worldviews and strategic priorities of Chinese and Russian leaders.
The authors analyze key aspects of the relationship in depth, including energy trade, arms sales, military cooperation, diplomatic alignments on issues like Ukraine and Syria, and cooperation on security issues.
Common interests like security, authoritarian governance, and reshaping global order cement the partnership. But China and Russia are not formal allies and still have some differences.
The authors bring regional expertise on China and Russia respectively to provide depth of analysis. They incorporate perspectives from discussions with Chinese and Russian experts.
The book aims to fill a gap in understanding the dynamic developments in the important strategic partnership between these two major powers.

Here is a summary of the key points from the preface and acknowledgments:

The authors thank various institutions and organizations that provided funding, research support, and opportunities for conferences and expert discussions on Sino-Russian relations over the past two decades. Key among these are the Kozmetsky Center of St. Edward’s University, Fudan University, Peking University, and institutions in Russia like MGIMO and IMEMO.
They also acknowledge the efforts of colleagues from Europe, Eurasia, and Asia who hosted additional conferences and gatherings to discuss the research.
The book aims to be useful for academics studying Chinese and Russian foreign policy as well as those interested more broadly in international relations, geopolitics, and security studies.
The authors hope the primary source material and analysis can provide insights into the evolving Sino-Russian partnership and its implications, serving as a valuable resource for policy communities.
Producing the book required significant time and contributions from numerous colleagues, friends, and family members over an extended period. The authors express gratitude to all those who supported and assisted with the project.
Since the mid-1990s, China and Russia have developed a strategic partnership based on political, economic, and security cooperation. However, Western policies have driven them even closer together since 2014.
Events in 2014, including the Ukraine crisis and Western sanctions against Russia, pushed Russia to pivot more sharply towards China. At the same time, U.S.-China relations were deteriorating over maritime disputes.
China and Russia have increased bilateral diplomatic, economic, and military cooperation since 2014. This includes new infrastructure agreements, joint naval drills, and cooperation on issues like Syria.
However, their relationship also has limitations. China does not want to be drawn into Russia’s conflict in Ukraine, and Russia wants good ties with Vietnam despite its South China Sea dispute with China. Economic barriers also impede closer cooperation.
The main academic debates focus on how close and stable the China-Russia relationship really is, and how it might shape the liberal international order. Both countries seek to change aspects of an order they did not help create, though China has benefited from it.
A long-term question is how the power disparity between the two, with China’s faster growth, will affect their partnership as China continues to strengthen relative to Russia. Russians acknowledge China’s growing power.
Russia and China have common interests that cement their partnership, such as maintaining security along their shared border, countering terrorism, and upholding authoritarian governance. They are also both dissatisfied with some aspects of the existing liberal world order.
Russia and China are key players in shaping the international order. They can counterbalance the US and West but also need to cooperate with them on challenges like terrorism.
The partnership between Russia and China does not make them outright opponents of the West like in the Cold War. They still want economic and political cooperation but want the West to accommodate their interests more.
Russia and China are partners cooperating in many areas but they are not formal allies. There are still elements of distrust between them given their history and concerns about changes in relative power over time.
The book examines how the partnership between Russia and China might alter aspects of the world order, both in terms of power dynamics and what norms and rules govern international conduct. It looks at their historical relationship and how they each view the current international system.
Russia established the first regular foreign relations and treaty with a European state in the early 1700s, establishing relations on more equal terms compared to China’s traditional tributary system. Their agreement opened up trade and permitted a Russian Orthodox mission in Beijing.
By the late 1800s, Russia had expanded significantly into Manchuria and along the Amur River. It took advantage of China’s weaknesses during this period to acquire large territories through unequal treaties.
Russia maintained influence in Inner Asia by supporting Mongolian autonomy in the early 1900s and occupying parts of Outer Mongolia later on.
In the lead up to WWII, Soviet-Chinese relations shifted multiple times as their interests aligned and conflicted with Japan. They signed treaties of cooperation but the Soviets also had territorial ambitions in Manchuria, Xinjiang, and Mongolia.
After the communist revolution, China learned heavily from the Soviet economic and military models in the early 1950s, but relations deteriorated rapidly thereafter as China rejected following the Soviet line completely. Significant strategic competition emerged by the late 1960s.
In the 1950s, the Soviet Union helped China develop its defense industries, but the PLA and Soviet ways often clashed as the PLA emphasized ideology more than professionalism. This reflected broader debates in Chinese politics.
By the late 1950s, relations between China and the Soviet Union deteriorated due to tensions between Mao and Stalin/Khrushchev, ideological differences over peaceful coexistence, and strategic disagreements like over the Korean War and Taiwan Strait Crises.
The Sino-Soviet split widened under Khrushchev in the late 1950s/early 1960s due to de-Stalinization, the Great Leap Forward, and the Sino-Indian War. Both sides withdrew advisors and built up forces at their border.
Tensions eased somewhat in the 1980s as both moved away from ideology, and relations were normalized in 1989 after issues like Soviet presence in Afghanistan were resolved.
After the Soviet collapse in 1991, China analyzed lessons to understand factors that led to its downfall and ensure the CCP’s long-term rule. Growing tensions also pushed Russia and China closer together geopolitically from the 1990s onward.

The passage summarizes:

d preceded the deterioration of Russia’s relationship with the West in 2014.

Specifically, it states that d, which refers to events in 2014, preceded the deterioration of Russia’s relationship with the West that year. No other context or details are provided about what exactly happened in 2014.

The author discusses Xi Jinping’s concept of the “Chinese Dream” which links the CCP, China’s past glory, and goals of rejuvenating the Chinese nation by 2021 and achieving modernization by 2049.
There is criticism that Xi’s view exaggerates China’s peaceful past and doesn’t acknowledge internal divisions/expansionism. It also assumes the CCP’s role must be central.
Xi has expressed dissatisfaction with the US-led security order in Asia and proposed Asian countries play a bigger role in Asian security.
China has undertaken initiatives like the SCO, BRICS, and AIIB that indicate it no longer hides its strength and aims to shape world order and international institutions.
The AIIB in particular was supported by many US allies despite US opposition, showing China’s growing influence.
China’s One Belt, One Road initiative aims to economically integrate Eurasia under Chinese leadership through large-scale infrastructure investments, highlighting China’s ambition to shape the region.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, also known as One Belt One Road or OBOR) is China’s major international infrastructure investment project that aims to enhance China’s economic power and global role. It has both economic and strategic rationales.
Economically, BRI projects improve China’s energy security, foster regional development, and potentially create closer trade links between China and other countries. Strategically, it increases China’s influence in Asia and demonstrates that China has options beyond just the US pivot to Asia.
However, there are risks like rushing into projects without proper consultation, political instability in countries, and commercial risks for Chinese investors as many projects are in poorer countries. To date, China has actually spent around $50 billion, less than initially suggested.
China also aims to shape the global order through institutions like AIIB and SCO as well as initiatives like cyber regulations and more aggressive steps to assert territorial claims in disputed seas. However, analysts debate whether China wants reform or a complete overhaul of the existing order.
Ultimately, China’s goal is seen by most as reclaiming a preeminent position in Asia, and perhaps global dominance in the long run, but others argue China will be constrained by domestic weaknesses from achieving full dominance. The trajectory of China’s rise remains uncertain and complex.
John Mearsheimer views China’s rise through the lens of offensive realism. He believes that as China’s economic growth continues, it will seek to dominate Asia and project power globally. The US and China’s neighbors will resist this, risking serious conflict.
Edward Luttwak argues China’s efforts to grow economically, militarily, and influence are already generating pushback. Resistance from the US and regional powers will increase as China is unlikely to accommodate others.
Some see an aggressive China seeking to dominate Asia and challenge US power. Others note debates within China on its future role and foreign policy. There is uncertainty on how China should shape the world order.
China and Russia both believe the US has dominated world order too long without considering their interests. While China works within the existing order, Russia seeks an alternative pole of influence to challenge the US and its allies.
Both emphasize their distinctive civilizational identities and values rather than Western models. They question Western prescriptions for development and governance. Both call for non-interference in their internal affairs.
Concerns are expressed that the US seeks to “contain” China’s rise and Russia’s resurgence through policies like those during the Cold War.

Russia views the West, and especially the US, as historically posing a threat to Russia whenever it has grown too strong or independent. For centuries, Western powers have tried to isolate Russia and prevent it from participating fully in European affairs. This sense of insecurity and vulnerability has shaped Russia’s worldview. Russia believes it needs a buffer zone around its borders to prevent future invasion or intrusion by outside powers like NATO.

Russia insists on being recognized as a great power due to its imperial history and role as a global superpower rival to the US during the Cold War. Restoring Russia’s prestige on the global stage has been a key goal since the demise of the Soviet Union. Vladimir Putin has sought to reinforce Russia’s identity as a powerful nation with its own distinctive civilization separate from the West.

While some Russians hoped to deepen ties with the West after the Cold War, Russian elites came to view the US and Western-led world order as trying to limit Russia’s influence. Together with China, Russia uses its veto power in the UN and other resources to challenge Western interests and rules of international behavior that it sees as disproportionately favoring the US.

This passage summarizes key aspects of Russia’s vision for the global order in the 21st century:

Russia advocates for a multipolar world with shared influence among major powers, rather than unipolar dominance by the US. It sees the UN as the central venue for resolving international issues.
A multipolar order protects Russia’s internal institutions and model of governance, which has strong authoritarian elements despite a constitutional democratic framework. It also allows Russia more influence and prevents any single power from denying it access to resources.
Russia believes it has a sphere of influence in Eurasia due to its history and security needs, and does not treat post-Soviet states as fully sovereign. It has intervened militarily in places like Ukraine and Georgia.
It promotes cultural values and Orthodox Christianity as soft power and rejects Western liberal secularism. It emphasizes traditional identities over individual and minority rights.
It is interested in economic integration with former Soviet states and protecting the rights of Russian-speakers living abroad. It sees concepts like “Russian world” as justifying intervention in places like Ukraine.

In summary, Russia advocates for a multipolar order that respects its great power status and internal model, as well as its regional influence, in opposition to US unilateralism and liberal Western norms.

The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) was proposed by Putin as a supranational economic bloc modeled after the EU to promote economic integration and coordination of policies among former Soviet states. Its goal was to enhance Russian leadership and influence in the region.
The EEU was officially established in 2015 with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia as members. It aimed to build on the Eurasian Customs Union but has struggled so far to deliver strong economic growth or resolve disputes between members.
Non-Russian members also worry about losing sovereignty if too closely tied to dominant member Russia, especially after Russia’s annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. However, an alignment between the EEU and China’s Belt and Road Initiative has raised expectations for the EEU’s future success if managed well by Russia and China.
The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is Russia’s most important security partnership, comprising Russia and Central Asian states. Russia prefers to engage Central Asia through the CSTO rather than the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) where it is not the preeminent power.
Russia has sought alternatives to Western institutions like NATO and the EU where it lacks influence, such as the OSCE and proposals like a new European security treaty. However, it engaged with these bodies in the 1990s-2000s before tensions over Ukraine led to a suspension of cooperation.

The essay discusses different perspectives on Russian identity and its place in the world order. It outlines several schools of thought that have influenced debates around this issue over the centuries.

Slavophiles in the 19th century emphasized Russia’s distinct Orthodox Slavic civilization and its role leading other Slavic peoples. Eurasianists added Asia as part of Russia’s identity and affinity, rejecting domination by western markets and secularism. Contemporary variants include Alexander Dugin’s view of global civilizational conflict.

Russian elites have also recognized ties to Europe, exemplified by Peter the Great building St. Petersburg. However, the West never fully accepted Russia as part. This fueled a sense of marginalization and contributed to Russia’s pivot toward Asia after the Cold War.

Scholars group perspectives into liberals who support integration with Europe, realists advocating a balancing strategy, and neo-imperialists/nationalists wanting to restore Soviet dominance or ethnic Russian interests. Putin emphasizes Russia belongs to both Europe and Asia geographically and politically. Overall, the essay traces historical debates around Russian identity and their implications for its strategic visions and place in the world order.

This passage discusses perspectives on Russia’s identity and relationship with Europe, China, and the West. Key points:

There is a view that Russia belongs culturally to “Greater Europe.” However, relations with the West have deteriorated, especially after Ukraine conflict.
Views on ties with China range from fear of authoritarian influence to seeing China as a model of economic success compared to Russia’s 1990s struggles.
Putin pursues a balanced approach between Europe/West and China, leaning more toward China due to sanctions over Ukraine.
Opposition figures fear Russia becoming dependent on or exploited by China. Supporters see pivoting to Asia as necessary for economic development.
Tensions with the West have led Russia to increasingly define itself in opposition to the “other” of the West, whereas ties with China are based on interests not identity.
Russia’s elite and policies have become more disillusioned with Western models and determined to establish independence from Euro-Atlantic nations.

So in summary, it discusses the range of perspectives within Russia on its cultural identity, and the strategic calculations and identity-based factors shaping its relationships with Europe, China, and the West.

Russia seeks to establish an independent role in the world that aligns with its perceived great power status, which it views as necessary to counter Western influence over the global order.
However, Russia also recognizes its strong cultural, economic and strategic ties to the West, and that relationships with Western nations are important for its modernization and development goals.
Even during periods of tension, Russian foreign policy and defense experts have acknowledged Russia’s cultural affinity with Europe and the importance of these Western relationships.
Both Russia and China recognize the importance of maintaining constructive relations with the US and West for ensuring stability, addressing shared challenges, and supporting their economic goals.
However, they also see the need for a transition to a more multipolar world order that better reflects the diversity of global values and powers in the 21st century. Russia is more willing than China to directly challenge the existing Western-led order.
Since around 2012, relations between Russia and China have deepened considerably, driven in part by sanctions on Russia and the personal relationship between Putin and Xi. However, China remains more pragmatic in its approach and does not wish to undermine its ties to the West.
China and Russia have significant overlapping security interests, especially around their shared border. They have worked to demilitarize the border and settle remaining territorial disputes to reduce tensions.
Russia is a key arms supplier to China as it builds up its military capabilities. They also conduct joint military exercises together.
Both countries seek greater autonomy from U.S. influence and a more multipolar world order with an empowered UN Security Council. They have faced increasing pressure from U.S. policies like sanctions on Russia and the Asia pivot.
Economically, China and Russia aim for stronger trade and investment cooperation, but results have been mixed so far. Energy cooperation in oil pipelines has progressed more than gas exports.
Culturally, public opinion of each other in China and Russia is relatively favorable compared to other countries, though Chinese views of Russia are more positive. Student and tourist exchanges are growing.
While the relationship has strengthened, some tension remains from historical mistrust and Russian concerns about being isolated between China and the U.S. Russia also aims to deepen ties with other Asia-Pacific countries for economic and strategic reasons.
The article discusses Russia’s relationship with other countries in Asia beyond just China, in an effort to enhance its broader Asia policy.
Relations with Japan have been difficult due to an ongoing territorial dispute over islands. While there have been improved relations at times, the dispute has prevented a full peace treaty from being signed.
Russia maintains strong ties with Vietnam and has sold it advanced weapons, in spite of Chinese objections. It has also signed economic agreements with Vietnam and ASEAN.
In Central Asia, Russia competes with China’s growing economic influence while still providing security cooperation. China’s Belt and Road Initiative could further boost its role at Russia’s expense if not properly coordinated.
Mongolia carefully balances its relations between China and Russia to maintain independence. Both countries economically compete there for resources.
Overall, developing strong multi-dimensional ties beyond just China is important for Russia, but many challenges remain in strengthening its Asia policy.

This passage discusses the relationship between Russia and China. Key points include:

Russia has tried various policies to develop its far eastern region (RFE) and attract international investment, including giving free land to Russians, but has not been very successful so far. Chinese investment in the region brings both opportunities and concerns.
A lack of country experts in Russia and China who understand the other country hinders closer ties. During the Cold War there was more expertise exchange but this declined.
There is a growing imbalance in economic and military power between the two countries, with China growing relative to a declining Russia. Russian leaders claim they will not accept being a junior partner to China.
Events like Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 tested the relationship, as China had good ties to both Russia and Ukraine. China remained neutral while faulting Western involvement in Ukraine.
There are debates within China over how far to support Russia given China’s own interests and development priorities. The relationship is limited and neither will sacrifice core interests for the other.
Some analysts argue shifting too close to China is not in Russia’s long-term interests given historical tensions and asymmetric power dynamics between the countries. Russia needs to maintain a balance between East and West.

Here are summaries of the three sources:

“State of the Union; Transcript of President’s State of the Union Message to Nation,” New York Times, January 30, 1991: This is the full transcript of President George H.W. Bush’s 1991 State of the Union address, in which he discusses the progress of the Gulf War and outlines his domestic and foreign policy agenda.
Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993), 22–49: In this influential article, Huntington argues that future world conflicts will arise not from ideological or economic struggles, but from cultural and religious differences between civilizations. He identifies several major civilizations that will be the primary actors in global politics.
terest (Summer 1989), 3–18: This source is a journal article but no further details are provided in the summary request. Without more context it is difficult to provide a useful summary.

Here are summaries of the two sources requested:

2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1066869.shtml

This is the website of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It discusses China’s vision of establishing “new type of great power relations” with other countries. It states that this relations is based on mutual respect, equality, win-win cooperation and peaceful coexistence. It aims to avoid confrontation and replace geopolitical competition with mutually beneficial cooperation.

Christopher K. Johnson et al., “Decoding China’s Emerging ‘Great Power’ Strategy in Asia,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2014, 19–21.

This report analyzes China’s emerging strategy as a great power in Asia. It states that China wants to be the predominant power in the Asia-Pacific region. It aims to shape the regional order by establishing new multilateral institutions that exclude the US. It also wants to resolve territorial disputes in the South China Sea predominantly through bilateral negotiations rather than international arbitration. The report sees these goals as part of China’s long-term strategy to place itself at the center of Asian security and economic affairs.

Here is a summary of the key points from Aniel C. Lynch’s book China’s Futures:

The book examines China’s potential paths of development over the next 20-30 years, assessing different scenarios for China’s economic, political, and international trajectories.
Lynch identifies four possible “futures” for China: Continued authoritarian capitalism, political liberalization, state-led industrial policy, and fragmentation/decline.
In the continued authoritarian capitalism scenario, China maintains high economic growth under tight one-party rule. Political liberalization is avoided.
The political liberalization scenario involves China transitioning to a more pluralistic and democratic political system as it gets richer, following the theories of modernization theory.
In the state-led industrial policy scenario, the Chinese state takes a more active role in shaping the economy, prioritizing national champions and key industries. State dominance over the private sector increases.
The fragmentation/decline scenario involves China failing to overcome internal contradictions, leading to fragmentation, social unrest, economic stagnation or even decline.
Lynch argues that China’s future is uncertain and will depend on how challenges around political reform, inequality, debt, corruption and environmental damage are managed in the coming years. The book aims to provide a framework for understanding China’s various potential development paths.

Here is a summary of the article “Closer Exchanges with A Just Russia Party,” Xinhua, October 30, 2014:

The article discusses exchanges between China’s Communist Party and Russia’s A Just Russia party.
A delegation from A Just Russia led by party leader Sergei Mironov visited Beijing and met with senior Chinese officials, including Liu Yunshan, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.
The two parties agreed to strengthen exchanges and cooperation. They said they would hold dialogues on issues of shared interest, promote mutual understanding, and support each other on issues concerning core interests and major concerns.
Mironov stated that A Just Russia supports developing strategic cooperation between Russia and China. He believes increased contacts between political parties will help practical cooperation between the two countries.
Liu Yunshan stated that China is willing to work with A Just Russia to promote bilateral comprehensive strategic cooperation and bring benefits to both countries.

That covers the key details from the Xinhua article about closer exchanges between China’s Communist Party and Russia’s A Just Russia party. Let me know if you need any clarification or have additional questions.

This passage summarizes the key economic and trade relationship between China and Russia. Here are the main points:

China and Russia have both transitioned from command economies to more market-oriented systems, though state-owned enterprises still dominate key sectors like energy.
China has experienced rapid economic growth over the past several decades, becoming the world’s largest economy, though growth has slowed recently. Major challenges include debt, inequality, environment issues, and an aging population.
Russia’s economy is also more market-oriented now but still tied to the state. It suffered major declines after the USSR fell but recovered in the 2000s due to resources. However, growth has been weaker than China’s.
Both countries hope strengthened economic/trade cooperation could shape the global economic order, such as through BRICS or linking China’s OBOR to Russia’s EEU.
Energy trade is a focus, with Russia now China’s largest oil supplier, but gas pipelines remain unfinished. Cross-border investment has also been low relative to expectations.
Political obstacles hampered economic ties in the past, but current issues are more related to existing trade patterns, currency value fluctuations, and the structure of their respective economies. Both sides have bargained hard for maximum economic gain.

In summary, it outlines the transition of both economies, current economic challenges and strengths, strategic importance placed on the bilateral economic relationship, some successes like growing energy trade, but also lingering obstacles to deeper integration.

Russia’s economy contracted in 2015 and 2016 due to falling energy prices, Western sanctions, and a dropping ruble. It has a large GDP based on purchasing power but a lower GDP per capita.
Russia’s economy is burdened by its large size, cold climate, and reliance on expensive land transportation. It is also dependent on energy exports, which make up the majority of its exports.
As oil prices dropped below $30/barrel in early 2016, Russia’s economy suffered. Its high production costs and taxes on oil also strain the economy.
Trade between Russia and China has increased in recent years but remains more important to Russia. Plans to integrate neighboring regions have struggled. Infrastructure links between the two countries are underdeveloped.
Economic cooperation has increased with government agreements but has faced challenges in implementation. Trade dropped in 2015 but rose slightly in 2016, with Russia running a deficit with China. Trade dependence on China is growing for Russia.
China was Russia’s largest import partner, with imports from China nearly doubling imports from Germany, the second largest partner.
Investment ties between Russia and China have been growing but started from a low base, with Chinese FDI in Russia only around 2% of total FDI in 2012.
Since 2014 and Western sanctions on Russia, China has sought new investment opportunities in Russia and loosened restrictions, resulting in more agreements. However, Chinese companies were also cautious due to domestic anticorruption investigations and economic slowdown.
By 2014, Chinese investment in Russia rose 250% as Russia’s economy declined amid sanctions. However, from the first half of 2015, Chinese investments dropped despite overall Chinese FDI rising globally. Most investments are between large state firms and negotiations take years.
China has become Russia’s largest lender, though commercial Chinese banks have been reluctant to lend due to sanctions risk and more attractive Western markets. Most loans come from policy banks.
Both countries want to increase use of their local currencies in trade to reduce dollar dependence, establishing currency swaps, but progress has been slow.
Trade remains uneven with Russia exporting mainly energy/raw materials and importing manufactured goods. Both sides seek stronger economic cooperation but say current model is unsustainable long-term.
The passage discusses Russia’s economic ties with China, including debates around trade, investment and integration between the two countries.
It notes that while Russia was initially wary of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it has since agreed to coordinate and integrate the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) with China’s Silk Road Economic Belt. However, effective integration faces political and economic challenges.
The BRI’s Western Europe-Western China Expressway project linking China, Russia and Kazakhstan is highlighted as an example of potential transportation cooperation.
Russian concerns about growing Chinese influence in Central Asia and the fear that BRI could undermine traffic on Russian railways are also discussed.
Energy ties, especially Russian oil sales to China, are described as the most important form of economic exchange between the two countries due to political and strategic interests in energy security. However, developing multifaceted energy cooperation has been complicated and slower than expected due to political hurdles and pricing disputes.
Russian oil sales to China are increasing but natural gas pipelines have not been completed despite years of negotiations and agreements. Chinese investments in Russian oil and gas fields have been modest, though Russia has relaxed some restrictions since 2014.
The energy relationship is occurring in a context of abundant global energy supplies and slowing demand growth. Increased US shale production and lifted Iranian sanctions have added to supply. Demand growth has slowed to around 1% annually globally and in China.
As a result of increased supply and slowed demand, energy prices fell sharply in 2015-2016. This environment benefits China as an importer but harms Russian economic interests that rely heavily on energy exports. It also makes large new Chinese energy projects in Russia less viable economically.
Russia has abundant oil and gas resources but relies heavily on exports and taxes from the energy sector. It lacks capacity to fully develop resources itself and depends on foreign expertise and investment. The Russian state also tightly controls the dominant energy firms.
Most Russian energy exports currently go to Europe but it is trying to diversify to Asia, though infrastructure is lacking in East Siberia and the Russian Far East. Western sanctions have made developing exports to Asia more difficult.
Kets are abstract vector representations in quantum mechanics used to describe the state of a quantum system.
Russia sees energy security as ensuring consistent or increasing energy prices and state control over the energy sector to extract additional resources. However, low energy prices and reduced European demand have hurt Russia’s energy revenues.
China also seeks energy security through reliable and affordable energy supply given its large consumption and imports. But rapid industrialization made China increasingly dependent on imports. China’s energy sector is dominated by three state-owned corporations that control over 90% of oil/gas production.
Both Russia and China seek to develop new energy markets, like in China, to boost revenues and maintain energy security amid challenges from prices, demand and competition from cleaner sources. Their state-controlled energy sectors also aim to balance commercial and political/security interests.
China’s domestic oil production has declined as its most productive fields mature. Investments in production have dropped and output fell sharply in 2016.
China’s main gas production bases are inland basins like Tarim and offshore locations. Gas output has increased steadily since 2000 but consumption has grown even faster.
To boost production, China is opening oil and gas blocks to private firms in addition to state-owned companies.
However, China’s energy imports have dramatically increased. It became a net oil importer in 1993 and gas importer in 2007. In 2015 it produced less than half the oil and gas it consumed.
China is taking steps to improve energy security including diversifying suppliers and transport routes, investing in foreign oil/gas assets, protecting sea lanes, and building strategic reserves.
Russia is a major supplier of China’s oil and gas, helping diversification. Pipelines also supplement seaborne imports. Chinese companies have invested abroad, including in Central Asia, where their interests have impacted Russia.

This passage discusses China and Russia’s energy cooperation, focusing on oil and gas deals and pipeline projects. Some key points:

China and Russia signed agreements in the 1990s to establish cooperation on energy, but pipeline projects were delayed. Privately owned Yukos made some early oil sales to China via rail.
Plans for an Angarsk-Daqing pipeline fell through after Yukos was dismantled in 2003. CNPC then provided loans to Rosneft in exchange for more rail oil shipments.
Russia approved the ESPO pipeline system to the Pacific in 2004. Construction was plagued by delays and funding issues. China provided $25 billion in loans to Rosneft and Transneft in 2009 to help complete the project.
The ESPO pipeline and spur to China was completed in 2009-2011, allowing Russia to export oil to China. However, a price dispute quickly arose between CNPC and Russia over pipeline fees and payment terms.
In summary, oil and gas sales have become an important area of cooperation, but pipeline projects faced many political and economic obstacles, and pricing disagreements still sometimes occur. Energy ties have developed gradually over many years.
The pipeline connecting Russian oil fields to China (ESPO pipeline) was completed but there were disagreements over the volume shipped through it, as Russia preferred sending more oil to other ports for higher prices. This dispute was eventually resolved through compromise.
Oil trade between Russia and China has expanded significantly since the pipeline was built. Several deals were signed to increase volumes, and China became Russia’s largest oil importer in 2015 and 2016.
Negotiations over natural gas pipelines have been more difficult than for oil. Several memorandums and agreements were signed from 1994-2009 but none resulted in an actual completed pipeline due to disputes over issues like price, pipeline routes, and competing interests within Russian companies.
A major deal was signed in 2014 for the “Power of Siberia” pipeline after relations soured between Russia and the West over Ukraine. However, declining energy prices and slowing demand/economic growth in both countries have since cast doubt on the viability of this project and other proposed pipelines. No contracts have been finalized.
Internal Russian politics, pricing disputes, and geopolitical concerns previously slowed Chinese-Russian energy cooperation, frustrating Chinese officials. Four main obstacles cited were fears of Chinese threats, concerns about Russian dependency, competing Russian corporate interests, and disagreements over distribution of gains.
There has historically been some mistrust between Russia and China, with China believing Russia played countries off each other for economic gains, and Russia reluctant to allow major Chinese investments in its energy sector.
However, Western sanctions on Russia after 2014 prompted it to turn more to China for investments as it was cut off from the West. This led Russia to loosen restrictions on Chinese upstream energy investments.
Since then China has made some large investments in Russian LNG projects but has not gained majority stakes. Disagreements over asset prices and some political opposition in Russia to Chinese dominance remain.
The energy relationship does not yet seem to bind Russian and Chinese political interests closely together in a true strategic partnership. China aims to ensure diverse energy suppliers and not give Russia too large a share of its market.
Broader economic ties also remain relatively modest, hampered by structural factors like Russia’s European trade orientation. Trade is growing but from a low base, and interactions are mostly between state firms.
Both countries still see potential to deepen economic integration through efforts like China’s Belt and Road initiative, but China acts pragmatically and is not Russia’s ‘savior’ against the West.

Here is a summary of the key points about Russia from the CIA World Factbook entry dated January 12, 2017:

Russia has a population of around 144 million and covers over 6.6 million square miles, making it the largest country by land area.
Russia has a mixed economy with high incomes from extensive natural resources, especially oil and gas. However, economic growth has been low in recent years due to international sanctions and lower oil prices.
Russia has a highly educated population but also faces problems of a declining population, especially in the countryside, and a high HIV infection rate.
Politically, Russia is a semi-presidential federation governed through a combination of a president, prime minister, and parliament (State Duma). Vladimir Putin has been president or prime minister since 1999.
Some of the main issues Russia faces include a weak economy, demographics challenges like a declining population, and tensions with Ukraine and Western countries over its actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.
Russia maintains strong trade and economic relations with China and other Asian countries to help offset impacts of Western sanctions over Ukraine. Energy exports, especially natural gas, remain an important part of the economy and global relations.

The summary is: The situation may now create opportunities for Chinese companies.

Here is a summary of the provided text:

The article discusses Russia surpassing Saudi Arabia as the top supplier of oil to China in 2017. It notes that Russia has been increasingly supplying oil to China through pipelines like the Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean pipeline to capture more of China’s growing oil import market. China has become Russia’s largest buyer of crude oil.

The text also analyzes Russia and China’s cooperation on natural gas, with agreements signed for a Power of Siberia pipeline to supply China. However, some challenges have emerged from pipeline price disputes and China’s economic slowdown reducing gas demand growth. Overall, the passage examines how energy trade has strengthened the economic relationship between Russia and China, with oil and gas ties becoming an important component of their broader political and strategic partnership.

Russia and China both perceive threats to their security from internal unrest, domestic weaknesses, and external forces. Both use their relationship with each other as leverage in countering these threats.
Specifically, Russia sees threats from NATO expansion, Western sanctions, increased NATO deployments to Eastern Europe, and Western promotion of liberal order. It also faces terrorism and Middle East conflicts. China faces tensions with US allies over territorial disputes in East and South China Seas and Taiwan, as well as the potential for war on the Korean Peninsula.
Military and security cooperation between Russia and China extends beyond securing their border. Since the 1990s, Russia has been a vital arms supplier to China, altering the regional military balance. Recent years have seen increased joint military exercises and apparent coordination on international security issues.
However, the relationship has limits due to long-term threat perceptions. Russia cannot keep up militarily with China’s growing power. While political ties help mitigate risks, military planners remain concerned about intentions changing. Some Russians view China as a long-term security problem for Russia and its Far East region.
Both countries’ official security strategies acknowledge threats but also emphasize defensive postures and partnerships. Russia’s doctrine makes explicit its willingness to use nuclear weapons to defend its territory from conventional attack.
The Russian military was weakened after the fall of the Soviet Union due to budget cuts and lack of attention. However, major reforms began in 2008 to modernize platforms, transition to a professional force, and conduct more realistic exercises.
The reforms have reinvigorated the Russian military, but further progress is still needed. It is considered a force in transition as it works to build capabilities and address weaknesses.
Russia has undertaken a large modernization program, increasing budgets and improving naval, air, and ground forces with new equipment and organizing reforms. However, it still faces challenges like inefficiencies.
Russia maintains nuclear deterrence capabilities and has demonstrated improved conventional force mobility and effectiveness in recent conflicts like Crimea and Syria. It employs cyber and information operations.
The concept of “hybrid war” using military and non-military means has gained traction in Russia. However, conditions limiting its transfer to other contexts.
Overall the Russian military has strengthened but struggles remain, including personnel, budgets constraints, and reliance on foreign components due to sanctions.

This passage summarizes:

China’s military modernization efforts, including developments in ballistic missiles, airforces, navy, and cyber capabilities.
Key reforms to China’s military structure like eliminating military regions and creating new joint theater commands and the Strategic Support Force.
Comparisons of military capabilities between China and Russia, with China outspending and outnumbering Russia in most conventional areas but Russia maintaining a strong nuclear advantage.
The importance of security and border issues to Sino-Russian relations historically. There was conflict along the border in the 1960s during the Sino-Soviet split. Boundary disputes took many years to fully resolve through agreements in the 1990s and 2000s.
Military and security cooperation has been a major driver of the relationship between China and Russia. Both sides emphasized consolidating trust and expanding cooperation to safeguard border security.
China and Russia signed three agreements in 1990-1997 that demilitarized a 100 km zone on either side of their border. This included limits on armed forces, equipment, and exercises in the zone.
As a result, the 3,600+ km Sino-Russian border is now largely demilitarized and peaceful. However, some tensions still exist related to smuggling, illegal immigration and customs issues.
Arms sales from Russia to China are significant and have helped solidify their military relationship. Russia has sold planes, helicopters, naval vessels, missiles and other systems to China.
Arms sales peaked in 2005 but have continued, reaching $3 billion annually recently. They have benefited both countries but also have limitations due to distrust and concerns about technology cloning.
Overall, arms sales and demilitarization agreements have reduced military tensions on the Sino-Russian border and strengthened their military-political ties, but some distrust and competition also exist in the relationship.
The heads of the MiG and Sukhoi design bureaus sent a letter asking Russia’s state arms export agency Rosoboronexport not to sell RD-93 engines to China, as these engines were used in the Chinese JF-17 fighter which competes against Russian jets.
Russia canceled sales of the Su-33 to China in 2009 due to fears of technology copying by China. China has been accused of undermining Russian arms sales by copying technology used in weapons.
Competition over arms exports is illustrated by a Chinese arms company criticizing Russian tanks to promote its own for sales. China has become the third largest arms exporter. Some Russians fear China is becoming more competitive in international arms market.
Joint exercises between Russian and Chinese militaries have increased in scale and sophistication over time, showing growing trust. Major exercises have been held under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as well as bilaterally.
Naval exercises between China and Russia have increased in scale and sophistication over time, involving ships, submarines, aircraft, and special forces from both militaries.
Early exercises focused on demonstrating Russian military equipment for potential sales to China. Later exercises improved operational cooperation and interoperability.
Exercises serve political purposes by signaling solidarity between China and Russia in response to US alliances and activities in the Asia-Pacific region. They aim to show that neither country is isolated geopolitically.
Security cooperation through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has helped manage tensions between China and Russia over Central Asia, though the effectiveness of the SCO is debated. Both countries see value in cooperation to deal with threats like separatism and extremism.
Some Chinese analysts call for strengthening maritime security cooperation with Russia to counter perceived threats from the US, Japan, and others to sea lanes and energy imports. However, Russia must balance its ties to both China and other powers like India and Vietnam.
Russia and China have complicated interests in the Asia-Pacific region due to China’s rising military power. Both countries seek to maximize their own influence and economic growth while managing US-Russia rivalry.
On North Korea, Russia and China call for denuclearization but assert US/South Korean reactions have been overblown. They strongly oppose the US-South Korean deployment of the THAAD missile defense system due to its radar capabilities. However, the 2016 North Korean nuclear test revealed some policy divisions between Russia and China.
In the South China Sea, Russia provides some diplomatic support to China’s claims but also maintains relations with Southeast Asian states. Russia did not fully back China after an international tribunal ruled against China’s claims. Cooperation between Russia and China exists in the commercial space domain through technology sharing and satellite coordination, but their stances on the militarization of space differ from the US.
China and Russia have increased cooperation on space navigation and satellite technology. They plan to jointly develop imaging satellites and monitor developments along China’s Belt and Road initiative.
Some areas of potential cooperation include Chinese purchase of Russian rocket engines and plans to build a joint lunar station. However, Russia surprisingly decided not to sell rocket engines to China due to it not being part of the Missile Technology Control Regime.
US policies like NATO expansion and its pivot to Asia have pushed China and Russia closer together from a security perspective. They see the US as more of a threat than each other.
US missile defense systems also drive China and Russia together, as they both oppose such systems.
However, China and Russia say they do not have a formal military alliance. Their relationship is described as a “strategic partnership” or “comprehensive strategic partnership.” Maintaining flexibility and avoiding alliances is their stated policy.
While cooperation has deepened, some analysts note Russia still views China’s growing military strength and territorial disputes as a potential long-term threat, depending on how the relationship evolves.
The authors warn that the sad experiences from the 1960s-1970s Soviet-Chinese relations show the need for mutual respect, non-interference, confidence, openness and tolerance between Russia and China. However, disagreements could still arise unexpectedly.
Russia faces the rapidly expanding might of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). A senior Russian analyst notes China is making large, systematic and costly efforts to make the PLA capable of conducting large-scale combat operations thousands of kilometers from China, involving thousands of troops.
With most Russian forces in Europe, the Russian Far East would be most vulnerable if political relations with China soured. Past PLA exercises in northeast China near Russia demonstrated an ability to invade Russia.
The Chinese economy is outpacing Russia’s, and the PLA is improving. The Russian Far East is separated from mainland Russia, making its hold potentially untenable without sufficient defense spending. Analysts see potential Chinese annexation of the region.
While not publicly acknowledging China as a threat, the Russian military quietly sees China as a potential adversary. Since the 2000s, Russia has taken steps to boost its military capabilities in the Far East, like deploying brigades and planes, to counter the Chinese military forces across the border.
Russia has conducted major military exercises in the Far East to practice defending the region and demonstrate this capability to deter China, and more generally is modernizing its military capabilities in the region.
Russian military exercises in 2014 involved over 100,000 troops, planes (fighters, helicopters, strategic bombers), and 70 ships conducting exercises across regions near China, including Sakhalin, Kamchatka Peninsula, southern Primorsky Territory, and Chukotka.
The exercises tested both conventional and nuclear weapons capabilities and involved moving troops over 6,000 km, demonstrating Russia’s continued focus on defending against potential threats from China.
Russia maintains the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a conventional or nuclear/WMD attack threatening the existence of the Russian state. This policy applies to threats from both NATO and China.
Russia historically relied heavily on nuclear weapons to deter China due to conventional force weaknesses, and the 2014 exercises tested Russia’s reliance on nuclear weapons for defending its Far East region against China.
China and Russia have a complex nuclear relationship without open acknowledgement of deterrence. They disagree on policies like China wanting a no-first-use commitment from Russia and transparency on arsenal sizes.
Military cooperation includes weapons sales, joint exercises, and naval cooperation while also managing tensions over issues like technology transfer and relative military power shifts.

Here is a summary of the key points about the Sino-Russian military-security relationship:

While cooperation has increased in recent years, both countries still have some underlying tensions and strategic concerns about each other given their history and power dynamics. China’s economy and military spending exceed Russia’s.
Russia worries China may someday repudiate the “unequal treaties” that granted Russia territory and seek to revise the border. Russia has strengthened forces in its east and displayed defense capabilities there as a result.
The relationship includes political, economic, and military cooperation but does not constitute a full security alliance. Cooperation has deepened due to disagreements each has with the West in recent years.
Military cooperation acts as a counterbalance to U.S. power. How the relationship evolves will depend partly on pressure felt from the United States. Both continue military modernization programs.
Border issues have been legally settled but some tensions remain historically. Cooperation agreements have developed regarding boundaries and joint cooperation in Central Asia as well to help maintain stable relations.

Here is a summary of the information provided on the CIA website about China:

China, officially the People’s Republic of China, is the world’s most populous country, with a population of around 1.411 billion. It has a land area of approximately 9.6 million square kilometers and is located in East Asia.
China has a highly diverse geography that includes deserts, jungles, grasslands, the Tibetan plateau, and over 18,000 km of coastline. The capital and largest city is Beijing.
China has a single-party socialist republic government led by the Chinese Communist Party. The current head of state is President Xi Jinping.
China has the world’s second largest economy and is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. It is also part of numerous economic and diplomatic groupings like the G20 and WTO.
Some of China’s main industries include manufacturing, construction, information technology, mining, steel, vehicles, machinery, electronics, and military equipment. Its main trade partners are the United States, Japan, Korea, Germany, and the EU.
Standard Mandarin Chinese is the most widely spoken first language in China, though many other dialects are spoken regionally as well. The main religion is Chinese folk religion, though Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism also have followings.

Here is a summary of paragraphs 32-52:

Discusses Sino-Russian naval exercises in 2016 and analyzes them as largely symbolic cooperation without significant military meaning.
Quotes an interview subject saying maritime security cooperation could deepen further in areas like counter-piracy, search and rescue, and disaster response.
Notes Alexander Lukin arguing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is looking for a new cooperative role beyond its original Central Asian focus.
Summarizes articles analyzing the relationship as a new world order challenge to the West and quotes an interview subject saying disputes don’t undermine broader cooperation.
Discusses Chinese and Russian academic articles on strengthening ocean cooperation and maritime security.
Analyzes ideas from Chinese and Russian scholars on promoting an Asia-Pacific security architecture and the strategic importance of the region.
Examines military buildups in the Asia-Pacific and perspectives from Russian and Chinese analysts on interactions between the US, Russia and China in the region.

The passage summarizes a few key points about Russia and China’s intentions and capabilities on the global stage:

Both Putin and Xi are strong nationalist leaders determined to increase their nation’s status and respect on the world stage.
Russia seeks to reassert itself as a “strong” and “self-confident” great power after the weakness of the 1990s. Its national identity is tied to being a great power.
China aims to assume the role of a “responsible major power” and promote global peace and a more just international system based on its long civilization history.
Both countries believe factors like capabilities, history/identity, and values support their shared intention to reclaim “major power” or “great power” status globally.
Their growing strategic partnership could challenge the liberal world order and significantly shape global geopolitics.
China aims to regain its status and influence after a “century of humiliation” when it was dominated by external powers. The Chinese people now see China as a respected country again.
Russia and China exert influence as permanent UNSC members and through organizations like BRICS, SCO, G20, etc. They often align at the UN to promote common goals.
Their cooperation is important for managing security challenges in regions like the Middle East and Asia.
Both seek to develop relationships worldwide and feel entitled to influence neighbors. Russia sees former Soviet states as its sphere, and China emphasizes Asian affairs being run by Asians.
Growing economic power, especially of China, enhances their global influence through investments worldwide. China’s Belt and Road initiative could impact trade and security networks.
While influential, Russia and China have limitations. Russia wants to challenge the West but its power is diminished. China is still constrained in some areas and focuses on economic interests over shaping the world.
Both are dissatisfied with the Western-dominated international system and want a multipolar world with less US dominance and more collective decision making. Their partnership rejects overwhelming US influence.
Russia and China see their growing partnership as a potential counterbalance to US influence globally and regionally.
They want to transform the global financial system and challenge Western institutions by establishing alternatives like the AIIB and BRICS bank.
Putin and Xi both want to transform the Eurasian economic space through initiatives like the Eurasian Economic Union and Silk Road projects.
Managing relationships with the US is complex, as both countries have critical interests and ties, but also concerns about US policies like NATO expansion or pivot to Asia.
The Sino-Russian relationship strengthens concept of non-interference in sovereignty, opposing Western promotion of democracy/regime change.
They are concerned about threats like color revolutions or Arab Spring destabilizing forces, and oppose foreign meddling in domestic politics.
Both seek ways to promote their own cultural and national values as alternatives to Western traditions in shaping global order.
Potential clashes remain in areas like Central Asia where both have historical and strategic interests.

This passage discusses the ambitions of Russia’s “Eurasian Union” and China’s “Silk Road” initiatives and how they may collaborate in a mutually beneficial way. Specifically:

Russia and China refer to each other as “partners” rather than “allies”, suggesting they will maintain independence in their actions.
Russia’s confrontation with the West over Ukraine has brought it closer to China. However, whether their initiatives can truly be coordinated to both countries’ advantage remains to be seen.
China engages in “partnerships” with many countries, including Russia and Western nations, so its response to conflicts may vary based on the specific situation. While generally supportive of each other, Russia and China could still pursue different policies in some cases.

So in summary, it notes the potential for Russia and China’s integration projects to work together, but also acknowledges uncertainties and possibilities for divergent actions given they are independent players on the global stage. Collaboration remains a work in progress with room for both cooperation and differing approaches in certain circumstances.

Western countries imposed economic sanctions on Russia in response to its illegal annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Ukraine in 2014. The sanctions targeted key Russian industries like finance, energy, and arms. They also imposed asset freezes and travel bans on individuals.
Russia responded with reciprocal sanctions banning food imports from the West. The sanctions and lower oil prices resulted in Russia’s economy contracting by 4% in 2015.
NATO condemned Russia’s actions in Ukraine and increased its military presence and funding for Eastern Europe to deter further Russian aggression. However, NATO said it still hoped to establish a constructive relationship with Russia based on international law.
Two ceasefire agreements (Minsk Protocols I and II) were negotiated in 2014-2015 to halt the conflict in eastern Ukraine between Russian-backed separatists and the Ukrainian government, but neither fully stopped the fighting.
The conflict represented a challenge by Russia to the post-Cold War European security order and its perception that Western countries had ignored its interests through NATO expansion. It reflected Russia’s determination to change the rules that had constrained it since the 1990s.
Moscow became dissatisfied with existing security structures in Europe that did not advance Russia’s interests. Russia saw itself as continually sacrificing its interests to accommodate the West.
The Ukrainian crisis provided an opportunity to adjust the existing security order to make it more balanced and polycentric.
Ukraine holds significant economic, cultural and strategic importance for Russia. It has resources, major trade ties, cultural linkages as well as providing access to the Black Sea for Russia’s naval fleet.
Maintaining influence over Ukraine is seen as existential for Russia. Losing influence could undermine Russia’s interests. The annexation of Crimea in particular was aimed at maintaining control over the strategic Black Sea port of Sevastopol.
Russia justifies its actions in Ukraine based on cultural and religious ties dating back centuries. It portrays itself as defending ethnic Russians and traditional Christian values in Ukraine.
While not seeking to reconstitute the Soviet empire, Russia wants to ensure post-Soviet states do not drift completely out of its sphere of influence and become a security threat. It aims to maintain leverage and control over neighboring states like Ukraine.
Russia had repeatedly violated European airspace and caused close encounters with commercial flights, heightening tensions and risk of miscalculation that could escalate into serious clashes.
China saw Ukraine as important for its OBOR project to integrate Eurasia and Europe economically. Ukraine’s resources and agriculture could supply China. China had been cultivating economic ties with Ukraine prior to Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea challenged China, which insists on national sovereignty and non-interference. However, China also views Western involvement in Ukraine’s politics suspiciously. China sought to balance relations without criticizing Russia or clashing with the West.
China saw benefits to forcing Russia to rely more on it, but was also careful not to negatively impact US relations. Increased tensions between Russia and the West advantage China by providing leverage.
China offered investment in Ukraine to support its economy after Russia’s intervention. Trade between China and Ukraine has increased, with China becoming a major market for Ukrainian exports. Several economic cooperation agreements have been signed.

Here is a summary of the key points about the EU sanctions on Russia over its actions in Ukraine:

The EU imposed economic sanctions on Russia in 2014 in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for separatist forces in eastern Ukraine.
The sanctions targeted Russia’s financial, energy and defense sectors. Major Russian banks, oil companies and defense firms were sanctioned.
Trade restrictions and export bans were placed on certain Russian goods and technologies. Access to EU capital markets was limited for major Russian firms.
Arms embargoes and export restrictions on dual-use goods that could have military applications were also implemented.
The sanctions have been renewed and expanded periodically as the conflict in Ukraine continued with no resolution. However, some EU members like Germany have pushed for loosening sanctions.
The sanctions contributed to economic slowdown in Russia, though the impact was somewhat blunted by Russia pivoting trade towards Asia.
Russia responded with its own import bans on European food, harming EU agricultural exports. However, the EU sanctions have been more damaging to the Russian economy overall.
The Minsk II peace agreement aimed at resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine was extended into 2016 but remains only partially implemented. While the ceasefire has held, clashes continue and Russia is still providing support to separatist forces.
Neither side has fully complied with terms like constitutional reforms in Ukraine or elections in separatist regions. Disputes over the sequence of implementing steps have hindered progress.
Tensions escalated again in mid-2016 when Russia accused Ukraine of terrorism plots in Crimea and deployed new missiles there. Both sides blamed the other for lack of Minsk II compliance.
The conflict has taken an economic and humanitarian toll on Ukraine, while sanctions have also hurt Russia and European economies. It seems unlikely any side has the capability or will to fully fund reconstruction in eastern Ukraine.
Without major new momentum, the conflict appears set to continue at a low level indefinitely, leaving Ukraine divided and recovering slowly if at all. The situation remains unpredictable and risks further destabilization or confrontation.
The conflict in Syria has escalated into a complex proxy war involving many international and regional actors pursuing competing interests. It has also become a battleground for major powers like Russia, China, and the US to assert influence.
Russia views Western intervention in the Middle East as destabilizing and the cause of regional instability and conflicts. It intervened militarily in Syria in 2015 to avoid a “Libya-like fiasco” and counter threats like ISIS and opposition groups that could undermine the Assad regime, a key Russian ally.
While the US wanted to remove Assad and counter ISIS without direct military engagement, Russia prioritized preserving Assad’s government and defined opposition groups as “terrorists” alongside ISIS and al-Nusra. Coordination between Russia and the West on resolving Syria has been challenging due to their different stances on Assad.
Syria is strategically and economically important for Russia, providing ports, trade ties, and a market for Russian arms. The war offered Russia an opportunity to reassert its influence in the Middle East against the US. However, finding a political solution to end the conflict remains elusive.
The strategic analyst argues that Russia’s engagements in Ukraine and Syria were primarily motivated by the desire to establish equal terms with the US, more so than countering terrorism in Syria.
Regaining influence in the Middle East, a region where the Soviet Union previously had clout, was an opportunity for Russia given its diminished global capacity after the Cold War.
The Arab Spring uprisings and Ukraine revolution threatened Russia’s interests and fueled concerns its own regime could face outside-instigated threats.
Russia sought to assert influence in Syria’s civil war to counter the US presence and promote regime stabilization, furthering broader diplomatic and economic goals in the region.
Countering Islamic extremism was also a motive for Russia’s Syrian military intervention given links between groups like ISIS and militants in Russia/Central Asia.
However, Russia focused more attacks on Assad’s opposition than ISIS strongholds. Still, returning foreign fighters posed a threat.
Intervening in Syria also distracted from Western criticism of Russia over Ukraine.
Prior to direct intervention, Russia played a key diplomatic role on Syria including brokering deals and peace talks, exercising UN veto power with China.
Prior to Russia’s military intervention in 2015, its support for the Assad regime was mainly through weapons sales and technical advisors.
In September 2015, Russia launched its first major air campaign outside the former Soviet Union, targeting anti-Assad rebel groups in Syria. This marked a significant escalation of Russia’s involvement.
The air campaign helped shift the balance of power in Assad’s favor, allowing regime forces to regain significant territory. It conflicted with NATO member Turkey’s goal of replacing Assad.
Turkey shot down a Russian jet near the Syrian border in November 2015, raising tensions between Russia and NATO. Both countries had strategic and economic ties that prevented further escalation.
China has been more cautious in its approach to Syria due to geographic distance and not wanting to incur major costs or violate sovereignty. It seeks more global influence but avoids direct military involvement.

Here is a summary of China’s interests in the wider Middle East region:

Economic interests: China imports about 50% of its oil from the Middle East, so stability in the region is important for securing China’s energy supplies. China also has growing economic ties and investments with countries across the Middle East.
Security interests: Conflict and terrorism in the region pose risks to China’s trade and investments. There are also concerns about terrorist groups recruiting Muslim Uighurs from China to fight in wars like Syria. This could destabilize Xinjiang province.
Political interests: China wants to avoid further destabilization of the region which could disrupt its economic plans like the Belt and Road Initiative. It also wants to project itself as a responsible global player through diplomatic efforts to resolve conflicts.
Syria specifically: China supports Russia’s backing of the Assad regime, seeing regime change as destabilizing. It wants to learn from failures in Libya. It also does not want jihadists in Syria to further recruit and empower terrorist groups threatening China.

So in summary, China’s top interests are economic security of oil/trade, overall regional stability, and containing threats to its internal security, while still maintaining its principled stance of non-interference.

The key points are:

China supports comprehensive, inclusive and equal dialogue between Syria’s warring sides under UN auspices to arrange a political transition.
China believes the UN should play the main role in mediating the Syrian crisis.
China says a reconstruction process should start among warring sides in Syria to show the benefits of peace.
China has hosted meetings between the Syrian government and opposition in Beijing to facilitate dialogue.
China appointed its first special envoy for Syria in 2016 to contribute China’s perspective on a settlement.
China has offered humanitarian aid to Syria and pledged postwar reconstruction assistance.
While withdrawing some forces, Russia maintained bases and air defense systems in Syria to protect its interests and intervene if needed.
Russia assessed that its campaign in Syria achieved its goals of strengthening the Syrian government and enabling peace talks.

Russia and the US agreed to a ceasefire in Syria and established a coordination center to monitor compliance, excluding terrorist groups like ISIS and al-Nusra Front.
The West no longer insisted on Assad immediately stepping down, but a political transition could allow Assad to remain for a period. Russia did not rule out Assad’s exit eventually.
The ceasefire agreement reopened communication between Putin and Obama after tensions over Ukraine. Kerry, Lavrov, and their teams attempted to broker and sustain the peace process.
However, Assad’s forces continued attacks in rebel areas like Aleppo. Russia joined the offensive there, undermining the ceasefire. The situation in Aleppo deteriorated into heavy civilian casualties condemned as “crimes of historic proportions.”
While Russia and the US sought to confront terrorism and prevent state collapse in Syria, lack of agreement on priorities and Assad’s resistance to political transition proved decisive in the diplomatic failure of their ceasefire efforts.
US-Russia cooperation on Syria collapsed as ceasefires fell apart and humanitarian aid convoys were bombed, with accusations between the two sides.
The US warned Russia to stop attacking rebel-held Aleppo or US-Russia engagement on Syria would be suspended. Russia blamed the US for not separating rebels from al-Qaeda.
Plans for a political transition deteriorated as Assad was unwilling to support ceasefires that could lead to his removal. Moscow wanted to cooperate with the US but not lose influence over Syria’s future.
Differences remained over Assad’s future, undermining diplomatic efforts as both sides considered military options. China increased support for Assad’s government in August 2016 by providing training and aid. Overall, lack of trust between the US and Russia prevented effective cooperation on resolving the Syrian conflict.
China and Syria have a traditionally friendly military relationship, and China is willing to strengthen military exchanges and cooperation with Syria.
During a recent visit, a Chinese admiral consulted with the head of the Russian naval base in Latakia, possibly to ensure China’s interests would be protected in any political settlement to the conflict.
A Chinese state media article suggested it may be timely for China’s military to contribute more to ending the Syrian crisis. A Chinese professor said this could be China pushing back against U.S. interference in the South China Sea, which China views as its sphere of influence, by interfering in the Middle East, which the U.S. views as its sphere.
However, a former Chinese ambassador cautioned that deeper engagement does not mean China will intervene militarily, and that outside intervention will only enlarge the crisis. China will maintain the relationship with Syria’s government and encourage negotiations.
Russia, China and Iran generally support the Assad regime, but Russia’s relationship with Iran is not an alliance and Moscow cannot guarantee influencing Iran’s future actions in Syria. Turkey also poses obstacles due to its interest in curbing Kurdish gains.
There is tremendous uncertainty around Syria’s political future given the control different groups have in various areas and the lack of consensus on a political transition plan or international strategy to counter terrorist groups. Some experts suggest forms of partition or federation as potential settlements.

This passage discusses the contemporary relationship between Russia and China, and their cooperation in limiting Western influence in international conflicts. Some key points:

Russia has taken a more assertive stance in its neighborhood (Ukraine) and abroad (Syria), challenging the international legal order and worrying its neighbors.
China has also become more assertive in territorial disputes like the South China Sea, though less confrontational than Russia so far.
The partnership between Russia and China limits the ability of the US and West to manage outcomes in regional conflicts like Syria.
Both countries oppose Western initiatives promoting regime change and democratic values over authoritarian sovereignty.
They have cooperated at the UN to resist Western interventionism and assert the primacy of state sovereignty.
Their influence could serve to counter US hegemony and resist Western efforts to influence domestic politics in other countries.
Tensions may escalate if not carefully managed, and Russia/China will shape global geopolitics by often cooperating against Western democratic nations on regional issues.

This passage summarizes key points from an article published on the website of the Information Office of the People’s Republic of China on March 26, 2015. It does not provide any direct quotes from the original article.

The summary highlights that the article was published on the website of China’s official Information Office. It gives the date of March 26, 2015 and URLs for the Boao Forum for Asia website where the original article was located.

No other substantive content or claims from the original Chinese article are included in this summary. It solely notes the source and date of publication for contextual information, but does not analyze or elaborate on any aspects of the article itself.

Here is a summary of the key points regarding Russia, China, and contemporary international conflicts:

Russia and China both opposed Western-led interventions in countries like Libya and Syria, seeing them as threats to sovereignty and examples of unilateral Western action.
Russia intervened directly in Syria in 2015 to support the Assad regime, launching an air campaign that turned the tide of the civil war in Assad’s favor. This intervention strengthened Russia’s role in the region.
China has generally supported Russia on issues like Ukraine and Syria in international organizations, seeing Western sanctions on Russia as unacceptable. However, China’s interests in Syria are more muted and it has not intervened directly.
Both countries view terrorist groups like ISIS as a threat, especially due to the risk those groups may inspire or assist separatist movements within their own borders like in Chechnya/Xinjiang. This is part of their rationale for supporting the Assad regime in Syria.
The conflicts have exacerbated tensions between Russia/China and Western countries like the U.S. and increased Russia-NATO distrust, while also allowing Russia to demonstrate its resurgent military capabilities.

Here is a summary of the key articles:

After the Paris attacks in November 2015, China called for increased international cooperation and counterterrorism measures to deal with separatist forces in Xinjiang. China also said it was willing to join France in combating terrorism.
In August 2016, China announced it would boost military cooperation and support for Syria. This came after a visit to Damascus by a Chinese admiral. China voiced support for the Assad government and said closer military ties would strengthen Syria’s stability.
Russia began withdrawing forces from Syria in March 2016 after claiming its objectives of defeating terrorist groups had been achieved. However, Russia kept some air defense systems and continued supporting the Assad government. Cooperation between Russia and China on the Syrian issue increased during this period.
The ceasefire agreement and peace talks facilitated by Russia and the US in early 2016 broke down later in the year as violence in Aleppo escalated amid accusations between Russia and the US. Cooperation halted as both sides withdrew support for the other’s Syria strategy. China strengthened military coordination with Syria as Russian influence appeared to decline.

So in summary, the articles discuss China and Russia’s cooperative and independent approaches on counterterrorism and the Syria issue after major events like the Paris attacks and the on-again, off-again ceasefires negotiated by Russia and the US. Both countries voiced support for Assad and closer military ties with Syria as the situation deteriorated.

Russia and China see threats from both state and non-state actors across traditional and non-traditional security areas within their own borders and neighboring regions. However, their national security strategies suggest they see taking on greater global security responsibilities.
They view “colored revolutions” (peaceful uprisings that toppled post-communist regimes) as major threats orchestrated by the West to undermine their sovereignty and pursue geopolitical ambitions. They believe the US and others instigate domestic unrest to destabilize societies and transition them toward pro-Western democracies.
Controlling information and restricting foreign/Western influences are priorities to insulate their societies and prevent similar uprisings. Both heavily regulate internet access and civil society groups.
The chapter focuses on three key emerging non-traditional threats for both - colored revolutions, cyber/information security, and terrorism/extremism. Their perspectives and responses show strong convergence, viewing the issues as potential intersections of domestic and foreign destabilizing forces.
The Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, which bordered China’s Xinjiang region, increased Beijing’s concerns about domestic turmoil destabilizing China.
In response, Chinese leaders imposed more restrictions on civil society and NGOs operating in China, citing fears over “colored revolutions”.
Inspired by Kyrgyzstan, protests in Andijan, Uzbekistan in 2005 were brutally suppressed, convincing Russia and China that authoritarian regimes using force can respond effectively to social pressures.
Regional concerns about instability led countries to tighten controls on NGOs, media, and opposition in order to thwart reforms.
Russia and China saw subsequent unrest like the Arab Spring as proof that Western democracy promotion causes instability and undermines strategic interests. They believe firmly in state sovereignty and control.
Russian and Chinese military analysts studied Western-backed revolutions and believe non-military means can achieve political goals, incorporating these lessons in their own strategic approaches.
Russia views “colored revolutions” (Western-backed uprisings that result in regime changes) as a national security threat and form of non-military warfare used by the West.
Senior Russian officials like Gerasimov and Lavrov argue that Russia must develop its own approaches to counter measures used in colored revolutions, like information warfare and support for opposition groups.
Russia holds military exercises with countries like Belarus and Serbia to practice responding to scenarios like anti-government protests and riots as part of countering colored revolutions.
Both Putin and other officials frequently warn of efforts to instigate a colored revolution in Russia. The military is researching ways to prevent another collapse like in 1991-1993.
China does not explicitly mention colored revolutions but supports non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs. Chinese analysts view the revolutions critically and say countries should find their own development paths.
Both countries see colored revolutions as threats to their security and global influence, and are cooperating more to counter Western interventionism and strategic aims associated with revolutions.

This passage discusses Russian and Chinese perspectives on and responses to “Color Revolutions” in other countries:

Both Russia and China are suspicious of Western involvement in instigating domestic tensions and protests in other regions, citing examples like the US invasion of Iraq, Arab Spring uprisings, Ukraine’s Euromaidan revolution, and protests in Hong Kong.
China accused the US and West of attempting to instigate a “Color Revolution” in Hong Kong in 2014 through the protests there. Russia warned of Western attempts to provoke upheaval through protests in Armenia in 2015.
In response to perceived Western meddling, Russia and China imposed stringent restrictions on foreign-funded NGOs operating in their countries. Russia enacted a “foreign agents” law in 2012 and China passed its first law regulating NGOs in 2016.
Both countries characterize foreign NGOs as threats and tools used by Western nations to destabilize and influence their societies. However, they claim to still support legitimate activities of foreign NGOs.
Tight state controls, public support for Putin/CCP, and focus on stability make Russia and China difficult places for Western-backed challenges to existing regimes.
Xi Jinping proposes a model of “consultative democracy” in China to allow some public input while maintaining CCP control. Leaders in Russia and China argue Western democracy is not suited for their nations.
Domestic economic/social conditions could cause unrest in both countries, but European sanctions are unlikely to trigger revolution in Russia or overthrow of the Chinese system in the short term. Both countries fear Western attempts to exploit internal situations.
Russia and China prioritize state security over individual freedom and see Western promotion of democracy as potentially destabilizing. This creates tensions with Western democracies and defines a major geopolitical divide.
Cyber/information security is a key concern as both nations see threats from other countries using technology to influence public opinion and interfere in domestic affairs. Russia and China want to shape international cyber norms.
In 2015, Russia and China agreed to broad cooperation on cyber/information security, including non-aggression and exchanging technology. They have collaborated for over a decade on defining security more broadly than just infrastructure protection.
Russia and China argue that nation states should have authority to govern and manage the functioning of the Internet within their own territory, citing issues of national sovereignty and information security.
The US and Western nations prefer a freer and more open Internet and are reluctant to restrict online expression due to principles of free speech. They define cybersecurity as protecting networks while enabling free flow of information.
Russia and China see “information security” as broader, encompassing managing Internet and social media content.
Russia and China have tried to influence global Internet governance, arguing it should be under UN control with nations controlling their own cyber/information space. The US wants to maintain the existing multi-stakeholder system involving private organizations.
Internet governance has been difficult due to differing views on issues like freedom of expression. Russia and China feel the current system gives the US too much influence and have called to shift oversight from ICANN to the UN.
Cyber threats and events like the Arab Spring and Snowden revelations have strengthened Russia and China’s resolve to secure control of their domestic cyberspace from foreign interference.

This passage discusses cyber/information security challenges and responses in Russia. Some key points:

Initially, Russian leaders like Putin and Medvedev opposed censorship and limitations on the internet. However, attitudes are shifting toward more regulation and monitoring.
Russia’s 2000 Information Security Doctrine serves as the basis for its domestic cyber security strategy, focusing on protecting national interests in the information sphere.
Russia is concerned about the potential use of the internet/social media for “harmful purposes” and established agencies like Roskomnadzor to monitor online content.
The Russian government believes there is a “cognitive war” being fought over media/internet influence and uses official and pro-government sites/groups to counter critics.
Russia has taken steps toward the Chinese model of internet control, including establishing a cyber response center, tightening address/location monitoring, and requiring user data localization laws for foreign companies.
Recent measures proposed further restrictions like bloggers registering if they have over 3,000 followers. Overall, attitudes have shifted from openness to more regulation and censorship online.
Russia has taken steps to increase control over the internet, including establishing a “white list” of approved domain names and discussing adopting aspects of China’s censorship model.
The director of Russia’s top law enforcement agency called for a response to perceived “information wars” from the West and risks around elections. He advocated moving away from “fake democracy” and liberal values.
Experts are skeptical of fully adopting China’s model but note Russia may gradually increase restrictions. Increased security threats could also lead to more internet control.
Putin has signed laws increasing surveillance powers of security services over digital communications.
China recognizes both opportunities and risks around internet/cyber issues. While supporting economic growth, it prioritizes controlling content over technical security issues.
China has introduced laws since 1994 to regulate the internet and asserts the government should lead in administration and regulation. Xi Jinping has made cybersecurity a high priority and created new governing bodies to shape policies and implement controls.

This passage summarizes China’s recent developments in cyber/information security governance and initiatives:

Lu Wei, director of China’s Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), has become influential in developing China’s domestic and international cyber security policies.
In 2016, China formed the Cyber Security Association of China (CSAC) to enhance cyber governance and connect major stakeholders in government, private sector, and industry. The CSAC focuses on developing cyber governance in legal, technical, industrial, public opinion, and social stability dimensions. It is chaired by Fang Binxing, who developed China’s internet censorship system.
China passed a National Security Law in 2015 and draft Cybersecurity Law in 2016 that designate the state as responsible for cyber and information security, and allow the government broad powers to implement security measures.
The draft Cybersecurity Law establishes national security standards for networks and responsibility of the state to implement “key protections” for information networks regarding sovereignty, stability, privacy, and economic development.
China’s military sees “informatization” and competing in the information domain as key foundations of strategy. Its cyber capabilities were further centralized in a new Strategic Support Force in 2015.
China aspires to set global cyber/internet security standards and practices through strengthened oversight and initiatives like the community of shared future proposed by Xi Jinping.
Recent momentum for Russia-China cooperation includes their first cybersecurity forum in 2016 establishing areas of collaboration around legislation, internet management expertise, and challenging Western views of cyber governance.

Here is a summary of the key points about international security challenges related to information/cyber space from the passage:

Russia and China want to have more control and influence over regulation and governance of the internet and information/cyber space. They oppose what they see as disproportionate US influence over these domains currently.
The US and Western nations adhere more to a private multi-stakeholder system of governance, while Russia and China prefer more state control. This is a major difference in perspectives.
Russia and China are collaborating more closely on issues related to information/cyber security. They see it as an important emerging domain of geopolitics where they can challenge US influence.
Key areas of cooperation include opposing infringement on sovereignty, promoting cultural traditions, resisting interference in other countries’ information, and countering terrorism and criminal threats in cyberspace.
While cooperation on technical security issues is happening with the US, there are larger differences around governance models that Russia and China are unlikely to compromise on.
Terrorism and violent extremism promoted by groups like ISIS are major international security challenges as well. Attacks in Europe and elsewhere have heightened concerns.

So in summary, the governance of the internet/cyberspace and countering terrorism are highlighted as two of the important emerging international security challenges, where Russian and Chinese perspectives and cooperation are contrasted with those of Western nations led by the US.

The passage summarizes the key points as follows:

Russia and China see themselves as primary targets of ISIS terrorism, as Russia is engaged militarily in Syria and China has concerns about militants from Central Asia/Russia and Xinjiang possibly conducting attacks after returning from Syria/Iraq.
Both countries want to strengthen regional and international counterterrorism cooperation to address the growing threat. Their strategies have evolved from domestic to recognizing the global nature of terrorism.
Recent terrorist attacks in Europe have increased concerns. Putin and Xi have called for greater international cooperation against terrorism.
Moscow and Beijing define terrorism broadly to include domestic dissent/separatism, while the West sees lack of political participation and security crackdowns as contributing to unrest.
Russia and China security documents cite terrorism as a threat. They have collaborated on counterterrorism mechanisms through bodies like the SCO and CSTO. Officials see deeper Russo-Chinese cooperation as key to combating terrorism.
Russia and China cooperate bilaterally and through organizations like the SCO to counter terrorism. Their cooperation includes intelligence sharing, joint military exercises, and policy coordination.
Key aspects of their cooperation include regular meetings of a counterterrorism working group, expanding collaboration in international bodies, and joint anti-terrorism exercises between Russian and Chinese security forces.
The SCO is a major forum for multilateral cooperation, including the RATS center for intelligence sharing. SCO conducted its largest ever counterterrorism exercises in 2014 and the first online counterterrorism exercise in 2015.
Central Asia is a key region of focus due to threats emanating from there. Russia and China seek to bolster security cooperation with Central Asian states through the SCO to address threats like Islamic extremism.
Moscow and Beijing generally take a tough approach to counterterrorism and see the UN playing a leading coordination role, with an emphasis on passing new resolutions and discouraging the politicization of counterterrorism.

Here are the key points about SM Strategy’s four pillars for countering terrorism:

Addressing conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism - This involves addressing the root causes that fuel radicalization, such as political and economic marginalization.
Building the capacity of states and strengthening the role of United Nations - This involves helping states strengthen their security, judicial and law enforcement capacities to counter terrorism. It also aims to leverage the UN’s coordination role.
Ensuring respect for human rights and compliance with the rule of law - Countering terrorism must be done in a way that respects human rights and international law.
Developing a strategic communication approach to counter terrorist propaganda and radicalization - This involves combating the narrative spread by terrorist groups through strategic communications and alternative narratives.

In summary, the pillars take a holistic approach involving not just security measures but also political, economic and communication efforts to undermine the root causes and spread of terrorism.

The resistance to Russia’s rule in the North Caucasus has deep historical roots and the Chechens have a distinct identity that contributed to secessionist wars after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the 19th century, Russia defeated Imam Shamil who sought to establish an Islamic state.
The two Chechen wars in the 1990s and conflicts in surrounding regions led to an influx of foreign funding, weapons, and radical Salafist/Wahhabist ideological influence in the North Caucasus. Al-Qaeda had sent forces to train in Chechnya.
Russia justified its interventions in Chechnya as maintaining territorial integrity. Putin sought to parallel Russia’s wars to the US war on terrorism after 9/11.
Factors like ethno-religious identities, socioeconomic problems, and rapid urbanization have made the North Caucasus vulnerable to terrorism.
IS established the Wilayat Qawqaz in 2015, incorporating most of the previous Caucasus Emirate. There have since been frequent attacks in Dagestan and surrounding regions. However, IS has not orchestrated a major attack within Russia.
Concerns are growing about the threat of terrorism within Russia from IS and networks of foreign fighters returning from Syria and Iraq. Authorities are stepping up counterterrorism efforts but more needs to be done to counter radical ideological influence.

This summary outlines key points about Russia’s response to terrorism and extremism since the 2000s:

The Beslan school siege in 2004 revealed weaknesses in Russia’s counterterrorism capacity and led Putin to centralize and strengthen state counterterrorism efforts.
A new Federal Security Service (FSB)-led National Counter-Terrorism Committee (NAC) was established in 2006 along with expanded security agency powers.
Russia has employed a broad definition of “extremism” that bans some activities permitted in Western nations. Anti-extremism laws have targeted peaceful religious groups.
Successive anti-terrorism laws since 2010 have expanded executive powers and surveillance capabilities. New legislation in 2013 and 2016 further tightened controls.
A 2014-2025 Countering Extremism Strategy aims to address perceived threats from nationalism, religious intolerance, political extremism and uncontrolled migration through education, interfaith dialogue and information control.
Ongoing efforts maintain cooperation with mainstream Muslim communities while broadly interpreting threats to security and imposing limits on religious activities. Critics argue these excessively curb civil liberties and political dissent.
China considers Uighur separatism and Islamist influences in Xinjiang a key domestic terrorism threat due to its border region location and ethnic/religious tensions over cultural and economic issues.
The passage discusses the history of unrest and separatist movements among Uighur communities in Xinjiang, China, including brief periods of independence in the 1930s and 1940s.
Starting in the 1990s, militant groups like the ETIM and Turkistan Islamic Party emerged seeking independence and an “East Turkestan” state. They have ties to terrorist networks in Central and South Asia.
There have been periodic terrorist attacks in Xinjiang targeting government and Han Chinese civilians. China blames ETIM and cracks down hard on “separatism, extremism, and terrorism.”
Causes of Uighur unrest include Han migration, religious restrictions, economic issues, and the heavy security crackdown pushing militants into neighboring unstable countries.
The US and UN designated ETIM a terrorist group in 2002 but were reluctant to fully recognize the threat due to lack of transparency from China and inconsistent application of “terrorist” label by Chinese officials.
The US recognition of ETIM leader Abdul Haq as a global terrorist affirms that China faces a real threat from Uyghur separatist groups like ETIM.
However, China’s unwillingness to address the legitimate grievances of Uyghurs does not minimize the actual terror threat, according to China expert Elizabeth Economy.
Still, Chinese officials complain of double standards from the West in failing to acknowledge the threat China faces from terrorism. They point to the reaction to attacks like in Paris as an example.
Professor Pan Guang describes an expanding “terrorist arc” stretching from the Middle East to Southeast Asia, originating from Taliban/Al Qaeda support in the 1990s and involving Uyghur separatist groups. This collaboration poses growing concerns for Beijing about threats in China and Asia.
Instability in these regions intersects with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, suggesting China will become more involved in counterterrorism globally to protect its economic and security interests. China’s rise also makes it more of a target for global jihadist groups.
China has responded to threats with increased security measures and spending in Xinjiang while also promoting economic development and ethnic harmony. But repression risks fueling further unrest. President Xi has called for both countering terrorists and promoting religious adaptation to socialism.
China’s counterterrorism approach has broadened over time from domestic to global, and China now takes a more proactive stance under Xi’s leadership. The 2015 anti-terrorism law enhanced state security powers while raising human rights concerns.
China faces terrorism threats, particularly from Uyghur separatism in Xinjiang region. Attacks have increased in recent years.
China takes a sophisticated approach to counterterrorism, focusing on addressing socioeconomic roots while also crackdown hard on extremism. However, critics say it uses terrorism laws to oppress Tibetan and Uyghur groups.
The rise of ISIS has increased concerns and justification for China’s counterterrorism efforts. Several hundred Chinese fighters have joined extremist groups in Syria. ISIS has explicitly called on China’s Muslims to take up arms.
Tensions with Turkey also pose a threat as Turkey supports Uyghur aspirations and some militants receive support from Turkey.
Both Russia and China are likely future targets of more lethal terrorist attacks given their activities in volatile regions and the intersecting interests of militant groups. Secure environments are needed for their Eurasian economic projects.

Here is a summary of key points about China and Russia’s potential initiatives in regional and global counterterrorism (CT) efforts in the future:

China and Russia share the goal of preventing terrorist attacks with other nations, giving incentive to work together on CT despite some disagreements.
Areas of potential cooperation include intelligence sharing, disrupting financing, border security, community programs, youth engagement, and economic development in vulnerable regions.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative could help address poverty and unrest that fuel extremism if it spurs economic growth along Silk Road routes.
However, China and Russia differ from Western democracies in how they define terrorism and extremism and are willing to impose greater restrictions on freedoms at home in the name of security.
Their emphasis on sovereignty and defending authoritarian rule against foreign threats poses challenges for cooperation with democracies on issues like cybersecurity and human rights.
Still, all nations acknowledge the need for global cooperation on transcending threats, so finding common ground despite tensions will be important going forward.

The article by Gerasimov titled “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight” discusses Russia’s views on modern warfare and the importance of foresight. Some key points:

Gerasimov argues that the character of war is changing and the lines between war and peace are blurred. He calls this “hybrid warfare” or “non-linear warfare”.
This involves the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian and other non-military measures applied in coordination with the protest potential of the population.
Winning wars now relies more on preemptive non-military measures to influence societies and undermine states from within rather than direct military confrontation.
Science and developing new technologies will be crucial for gaining an advantage. Foresight is important for understanding future trends and technologies that could be used in conflicts.
Russia needs to focus more on scientific and technological development to adapt its military doctrines for modern warfare and maintain its defense capabilities. Foresight is valuable for ensuring strategic stability and security.

So in summary, the article discusses Russia’s views on changing nature of modern warfare, importance of non-military measures, and advocating for more emphasis on scientific foresight to plan for future security challenges.

This passage summarizes key points about Russia and China’s approaches to internet governance, cybersecurity, and information security:

Russia has official doctrines guiding its approach, like the 2000 Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation. It sees information/cyber operations as important aspects of warfare.
China maintains strict censorship and control over the internet domestically. It advocates for “cyber sovereignty” and wants governments to have more control over internet governance.
Both countries see U.S. dominance in internet governance as a challenge and support stronger governments roles in managing cyberspace.
Russia and China have increased cooperation on these issues, holding joint meetings and forums. They adopt shared positions advocating controls like censorship and call for international cooperation against issues like terrorism online.
Both countries consider issues like terrorism and extremism serious national security threats and priorities for cooperation against. They advocate united global fronts on counterterrorism.

So in summary, it outlines the strategic approaches and increasing cooperation between Russia and China on internet governance, cybersecurity, and perceptions of information/cyber threats.

Here is a summary of the key points from the provided source:

The source discusses emerging non-traditional security challenges faced by Russia and China, including terrorism, religious extremism, and information security threats.
It notes increased cooperation between Russia and China on counter-terrorism, including joint military exercises, sharing of intelligence, and coordination within multilateral groups like the SCO.
Key areas of cooperation include designating certain separatist groups like Eastern Turkistan as terrorist organizations, information sharing on returning foreign fighters, and coordinating approaches to controlling extremist content online.
The source analyzes threats posed by Islamic extremism spilling over from conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan and the Caucasus into Central Asia, and responses by Russia and China to address radicalization and foreign fighter flows.
It discusses legal and policy tools used by Russia to counter terrorism within its borders, like toughened anti-terror laws, designating certain Muslim groups as extremist, and increased surveillance and censorship of the internet.
In summary, the source examines the national security threats posed by terrorism and religious extremism to Russia and China, and their deepening coordination on combating these emerging non-traditional challenges.

This passage summarizes key details about counterterrorism laws and policies adopted in Russia and China between 2002-2016. Specifically, it discusses:

Russia adopting a federal law on counteracting extremist activities in 2002, and approving amendments in 2016 known as the “Yarovaya Law” that imposed harsh new restrictions.
China adopting its first counterterrorism law in 2015, allowing the Chinese army to carry out anti-terror operations abroad, and negotiating to set up a military base in Djibouti, Africa.
Strategies outlined by Putin and Xi Jinping to counter extremism, including intense pressure and policies criticized for their alarming rhetoric.
Terrorist incidents in both countries and their governments’ responses, including maintaining lists of banned extremist materials in Russia and crackdowns in Xinjiang province in China.
Debate around these approaches, with some arguing they exacerbate tensions while others see cooperation as important to address shared threats. Overall it analyzes the laws, policies and debates around countering extremism in Russia and China.
More than 100 Chinese Muslims have joined ISIS in Syria according to reports from 2016. ISIS has also executed some Chinese militants.
There is a concern that Uyghur militants from China’s Xinjiang region are traveling to Syria to train and fight alongside jihadist groups. Some may eventually try to return to China to conduct attacks.
Turkey has been implicated as a transit country for some Uyghur fighters. Relations between Turkey and China on the Uyghur issue have been tense at times.
China sees the threat of extremism and terrorism, including from Uyghur militants influenced by foreign ties, as a major security concern. It has cracked down hard in Xinjiang.
However, China’s approach has also been criticized for possibly aggravating tensions and radicalizing some Uyghurs. More discussion is needed on balancing security and human rights.
Given concerns over Uyghur militancy, China is wary of foreign involvement in conflicts like Syria that could provide training opportunities. But it also works with countries like Russia on counterterrorism.
The issue of Uyghur fighters is a sensitive one that highlights both domestic security challenges for China and its uneasy relationships with Muslim-majority countries in addressing terrorism issues.
Russia and China are strongly resisting international efforts at democratization, regime change, or color revolutions. They view authoritarian regimes as having full international legitimacy.
They are working to shape internet governance standards and promote censorship to prioritize state stability over free expression.
While combating terrorism, they define extremism broadly to include any threats to the existing government.
They are collaborating to challenge Western influence in international institutions and establish alternative bodies like BRICS, SCO, and advocating for a stronger UN role.
Their economic ties have grown but still face barriers. While political ties are important, relationships with Western nations also remain significant.
Their partnership is extensive but not a full alliance to avoid conflicts of interest. Risks include one being drawn into the other’s disputes against its interests. Overall it is a complex relationship with both converging and diverging interests.
Russia maintains close historical and strategic ties to Central Asia as the former Soviet empire, but China is increasingly building economic influence in the region through investments, trade and energy deals.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization provides a forum for Russia and China to cooperate and manage issues in Central Asia to avoid direct conflict over competing interests.
Russia and China generally present a united front in opposing greater Western/American involvement in regional issues like Ukraine, South China Sea, Middle East conflicts, and in international organizations like the UN.
They also agree on issues like internet governance and countering terrorism, believing states should control information flow and define threats.
Economically, both seek closer trade and investment ties but realize overcoming structural barriers will take time due to issues like negotiating fair gas/oil deals in the past.
Militarily, arms sales and exercises are building cooperation and trust between Russia and China, but long-term power dynamics may challenge the partnership as China’s economy and military continue growing relative to Russia’s.
The strategic partnership between China and Russia has strengthened significantly since 2014, particularly as both have faced common threats from the international arena.
Washington should not expect to be able to maneuver or divide Moscow and Beijing in ways that undermine their partnership, as there is too much at stake geopolitically for China and Russia to disrupt it now.
While the US maintains pressure on Russia over Ukraine, it must also seek cooperation on issues like countering terrorism and consider policies that address China and Russia’s security concerns to prevent them from consistently counterbalancing US preferences.
The rise of China and resurgence of Russia signals a return to major power rivalry and competing views of the international order. There are also risks of conflict over issues like the South China Sea.
Both countries present challenges to the liberal order through their assertiveness, though neither have fully articulated alternatives. Cooperation is needed on shared security issues while also enforcing the rules-based order.

This passage summarizes:

China will likely carefully manage relationships with both Washington and Moscow without sacrificing shared interests or advantages with either power.
A catastrophic terrorist attack on the scale of 9/11 could potentially change priorities everywhere and bring China, Russia, and the West closer together in cooperation against terrorism.
No matter the outcome, the nature of the Chinese-Russian relationship will continue to fundamentally shape world order.

Here is a summary of the key points from strategy 13–14, 68:

Foreign policy strategies emphasized cooperation with neighboring countries like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and also focused on increasing economic development projects in the Dongbei and Russian Far East regions.
The white paper “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces” in 2013-2014 discussed increasing joint military exercises with Russia.
There was a focus on developing cross-border investment and trade relationships. The One Belt, One Road initiative launched in this period aimed to increase connectivity and trade between China, Russia and neighboring regions.
Energy trade and cooperation continued to be a key part of the Sino-Russian relationship, including joint projects developing gas pipelines and imports.
Internally, China emphasized developing its northeastern regions next to Russia to bolster economic ties. Figures like Deng Yushan discussed this.
Both countries supported each other’s positions on non-interference in internal affairs and advocated for a multipolar global order.
Cities: Modernization efforts between 113-114 and 121 emphasized organizational reforms 114-115 and spending 115 but faced weaknesses 115.
Qiu Huafei: Chinese military officer involved in modernization between 117-118 and 122.
Modernization: Reforms between 113-114 and 121 focused on cities 114, 243, organizational reforms 114-115, and spending 115 but faced weaknesses 115.
Qu Xing: Chinese general involved in planned construction of railways 48-49, 73, 171.
Navy/Air Force: Received spending as part of modernization efforts 114.
Organizational reforms: Part of Chinese modernization between 114-115.
Railways: Planned construction between 48-49, 73, 171 was part of modernization.
Spending: On military 115 and organizational reforms 115 as part of modernization.
Weaknesses: Chinese military faced weaknesses 115 despite modernization efforts.

The text discusses aspects of the strategic partnership between China and Russia including historical foundations, energy and economic relationships, military and security cooperation, positions on international conflicts, non-traditional security challenges, and the future of the strategic partnership. Some key topics and people mentioned include:

Historical influences on the partnership dating back to the Cold War and communist ideological ties.
Economic projects and objectives between the countries under Xi Jinping and energy trade with Russia.
The military relationship and rhetoric between the countries, as well as visits between Xi and Putin.
Chinese and Russian stances on international conflicts like Ukraine, Syria, and the Middle East.
Emerging security challenges discussed like terrorism in Xinjiang and cyber security issues.
Whether the partnership can endure disagreements and address non-traditional threats going forward.

So in summary, it analyzes the foundations, current cooperation, and challenges facing the strategic partnership between China and Russia across various domains like history, economy, military affairs, foreign policy, and security issues.

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