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Ben Santer is an atmospheric scientist who has done important work proving that human activity is causing global warming through the increased CO2 in the atmosphere.
In 1995, the IPCC declared the human impact on climate was discernible based on evidence summarized in Chapter 8 by Ben Santer.
A think tank in Washington D.C. accused Santer of “doctoring” the report and “deceiving policymakers” by making changes to the chapter.
However, Santer had simply made changes in response to peer review comments, as is standard scientific practice. Peer review is crucial to validate scientific claims.
Santer was defended by other scientists, including 29 coauthors and the American Meteorological Society. The IPCC chair also corroborated that Santer followed proper procedures.
However, the accusations from the think tank served to unfairly attack and undermine the important work of Ben Santer in providing scientific evidence of human-caused climate change.

Benjamin Santer was a climate scientist who authored a chapter in the 1995 IPCC report. He was falsely accused by industry groups and think tanks of tampering with data for political purposes. These accusations, spearheaded by physicists Fred Seitz and Fred Singer, stuck and continued to be spread online and in media.

Santer spent years defending his reputation but the attacks took a personal toll. He later realized Seitz and Singer used the same tactics as the tobacco industry in sowing doubt about the links between smoking and health risks. Documents show Seitz had directed a program distributing tobacco industry money to scientists to defend smoking. Singer co-authored an industry-funded report attacking the EPA’s findings on secondhand smoke risks.

Seitz, Singer and others formed an effective network with think tanks and corporations to challenge scientific evidence on issues like climate change, ozone depletion, and acid rain. They questioned scientific consensus and denied agreements, though they were the ones in the minority. They had influence with media and politicians through previous work in weapons programs. Their campaigns aimed to confuse the public and protect industry interests by keeping alive manufactured scientific controversies.

The passage describes how tobacco company R.J. Reynolds launched a large scientific research funding program in 1979, headed by prominent scientist Frederick Seitz. Though the research covered legitimate topics like disease causes, the goal according to industry documents was not just scientific advancement. It was primarily to develop scientific evidence and arguments to defend the tobacco industry against health claims linking smoking to disease. Seitz and others selected projects that took alternative views to the mainstream or explored uncertainties, with the aim of fighting science with science by highlighting gaps and uncertainties in existing research. The intention was to use science public relations to create doubts and remove the “government’s excuse” for punishing tobacco taxes and regulations based on health risks. In other words, the purpose was to spread confusion and manufacture doubt about the scientific consensus on smoking harms.

Here is a summary of the key points from the undistracting research passage:

In the 1970s, RJ Reynolds was facing increasing lawsuits claiming health damages from smoking. To defend itself, the company aimed to fund research that cast doubt on the links between smoking and health issues like cancer and heart disease.
This “objective research” was presented as needed to provide alternatives to the allegedly “incomplete” or “dubious” studies linking smoking to health problems. In reality, the goal was to develop expert witnesses who could introduce reasonable doubt in lawsuits.
Previous expert witness testimony from industry-funded scientists had successfully defended tobacco companies in over 100 lawsuits since 1954 by questioning the smoking-health link. The industry aimed to continue this strategy with new research.
Some of the funded research explored other potential causes of disease beyond smoking, like stress or genetics. This helped distract from the evidence that tobacco directly caused cancer and other illnesses. The industry’s primary goal was deflecting attention away from this smoking-health causation evidence it knew to be true.

This passage discusses how the tobacco industry created doubt around the scientific consensus linking smoking to cancer in the 1950s. C.C. Little, a geneticist hired by the tobacco industry, promoted the view that cancer risk was genetic rather than caused by smoking. The industry exploited unclear scientific details to spin unreasonable doubt. They highlighted questions without known answers to mislead journalists into thinking the issue was still debated among scientists.

The industry publicized the work of scientists like Wilhelm Hueper who questioned the tobacco-cancer link. They distributed materials to doctors emphasizing unresolved questions in order to foster an impression of ongoing debate. Major news outlets gave equal coverage to industry-backed views, rather than accurately reflecting the scientific consensus. Even Edward R. Murrow presented the issue as a balanced debate rather than an accumulating body of evidence against tobacco.

The industry built ties with the medical community by funding research and fellowships. They ensured industry-nominated scientists had input when the Surgeon General convened an advisory committee on smoking and health in 1962. Overall, the passage describes how the tobacco industry deliberately distorted and manufactured scientific uncertainty to counter the growing consensus that smoking caused cancer.

In 1964, the landmark US Surgeon General’s report on smoking and health was released. It unanimously concluded that smoking caused lung cancer and other diseases, based on over 7,000 scientific studies. This was a major bombshell as smoking rates were high.
Prior to this, evidence had been steadily mounting in scientific studies and reports from organizations like the USPHS and American Cancer Society that smoking caused cancer and other illnesses. Even tobacco industry scientists internally acknowledged this evidence by the early 1960s.
The tobacco industry fiercely fought the conclusions, changing the name of their research group and intensifying efforts to find scientists who denied the harms. They continued promoting cigarettes as safe.
In 1967, a follow up surgeon general’s report found even stronger evidence that smoking directly caused premature death and disease. But the industry continued public denial.
Cigarette ads were eventually banned from TV and radio in 1969. Warnings were also required, though sales and profits did not decline for the industry. Smoking rates among the public did start to fall in the late 1960s however.
Frederick Seitz was a prominent physicist who had worked on the Manhattan Project and later served as president of the National Academy of Sciences. In 1979 he began working as an advisor to R.J. Reynolds.
R.J. Reynolds had generously funded medical research at Rockefeller University where Seitz had been president. Seitz felt a debt of gratitude to Reynolds for this support.
Seitz also harbored resentment towards the scientific community. As NAS president, he felt the community could turn on issues quickly and irrationally. He diverged from colleagues on issues like Vietnam and arms control.
Seitz held anti-communist and pro-business views. He believed the scientific community had become too rigid and dependent on government funding, stifling creativity. He argued independent science was needed to evaluate issues like tobacco objectively.
Seitz saw attacks on tobacco and technology as irrational. He believed Reynolds could support important research that fell outside rigid funding categories. His work for Reynolds was influenced by both gratitude and a growing rift with the scientific establishment.
Fred Seitz had an uneasy relationship with the masses and environmentalists. He saw them as Luddites trying to reverse progress made by science and technology.
Seitz was something of a genetic determinist, believing diseases like emphysema were caused by genetic defects rather than environmental factors. This made him reluctant to acknowledge harms from technological hazards.
Seitz felt more comfortable with conservative men from industry than liberal academic colleagues. He had worked with GE and DuPont and was part of an exclusive men’s club.
Seitz likely enjoyed perks from working with the tobacco industry, like funded travel. He may have honestly believed tobacco was unfairly attacked and his research could do some good.
However, industry documents show the research was intended to create “friendly witnesses” the industry could call on for testimony in court cases and regulatory hearings to create doubt about the harms of smoking.
One such witness supported by Seitz was Martin Cline, a famous researcher who did work for the tobacco industry and gave testimony minimizing the link between smoking and cancer.
It took around 50 years for the tobacco industry to be found guilty under RICO of devising a scheme to defraud consumers about the hazards of cigarettes, which internal documents proved they knew about since the 1950s.
The industry won many early lawsuits as juries were more likely to believe independent scientists over industry executives. External research funding could also bolster the industry’s claim that the public should decide the evidence for themselves.
However, the public had no way of knowing this “evidence” was part of an industry campaign to confuse and commit fraud. Reputable scientists like Cline and Prusiner helped spread doubt, but they did not deserve “equal time” as the evidence clearly showed smoking’s harms by the 1960s.
It still took decades for these facts to emerge and public doubt to be dispelled. The industry successfully created confusion by using uncertainties in science against itself. They crafted the mantra of “no proof” to defend tobacco and later apply this strategy to other issues through groups like the George C. Marshall Institute.
Fredrick Seitz found allies in the 1980s to support Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI or “Star Wars”) against objections from most scientists that it was impractical and destabilizing.
Seitz had deep anti-Communist views rooted in his involvement in early nuclear weapons programs. He opposed détente policies of cooperation with the Soviet Union.
Conservative think tanks like the Hoover Institution also opposed détente, arguing it was naive and the Soviet threat was greater than acknowledged. They helped destroy the idea of peaceful coexistence.
In 1976, opponents of détente convinced the CIA director to support an “independent” analysis of Soviet capabilities led by Edward Teller. Known as “Team B,” they took a worst-case view and argued the CIA underestimated the Soviet threat.
Team B reviewed estimates of Soviet missile accuracy, air defenses, and objectives. Their conclusions painting the Soviet Union as a greater threat were then used to argue for rearmament during the Reagan years.

The NIE set up a panel called Team B to provide an alternative analysis of the Soviet threat to the CIA’s assessment. Team B was composed entirely of foreign policy hawks who already believed the CIA was underplaying the threat. Richard Pipes chaired the panel, which included figures like Paul Nitze and Paul Wolfowitz.

Team B argued that the Soviets were building up their military far beyond deterrence requirements and were seeking global domination. They claimed the Soviets would achieve strategic superiority over the US within 10 years. However, Team B provided little evidence to support these alarming claims. When evidence did not support their views, they found ways to force it to, like arguing that a lack of evidence for a Soviet capability proved it existed but was secretly deployed.

Team B also argued the Soviets had ambitious ABM programs despite little evidence. They wrote with certainty where evidence was thin. Team B’s studies were leaked before the 1976 US election and helped push US foreign policy right. Team B members later advised Reagan and influenced his confrontational policies, like the Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”) ballistic missile defense program.

Here is a 13-episode summary of the key points made:

Episode 1: Cosmos used the first episode to introduce the role of curiosity and science in understanding our place in the universe.

Episode 2: It examined the size and scale of the universe and our quest to understand celestial phenomena like stars and galaxies.

Episode 3: This episode explored early human attempts tomeasure and understand the cosmos, including ancient Greek astronomy.

Episode 4: Sagan discussed the Copernican revolution and how it displaced Earth from the center of the universe.

Episode 5: The episode covered the work of Kepler and Galileo and how they began establishing the laws of planetary motion and a heliocentric model.

Episode 6: It focused on Newton and how his work on gravity and motion helped unify astronomy and physics into a single scientific framework.

Episode 7: Evolution was the topic, with Sagan outlining evidence supporting how life on Earth gradually changed over millions of years.

Episode 8: This covered the emergence of modern microbiology and biochemistry and how they revolutionized understanding of life at the cellular level.

Episode 9: The episode looked at how life diversified on Earth into complex organisms like dinosaurs and mammals over long periods of time.

Episode 10: Sagan discussed humans and our ancestors, how culture developed, and the Neolithic revolution that allowed the rise of civilizations.

Episode 11: The rapid technological progress of science and civilization in recent centuries was examined.

Episode 12: Environmental concerns were woven throughout as a recurring theme.

Episode 13: The final and most controversial episode attacked nuclear weapons as an existential threat and promoted nuclear disarmament.

Scientists at NASA-Ames modeled the climatic impacts of a large-scale nuclear war and found it could cause a “nuclear winter” similar to what killed the dinosaurs after an asteroid impact. Nuclear explosions would inject soot into the atmosphere, blocking sunlight and causing global cooling and freezing temperatures.
This “nuclear winter hypothesis” was controversial but gained attention. Carl Sagan helped organize conferences to discuss the findings. Models showed even small nuclear exchanges could reduce temperatures and kill crops/livestock through famine.
The original NASA-Ames paper was challenged by scientists at the National Center for Atmospheric Research who ran their own climate models. They found less extreme cooling of 10-20°C, which they termed “nuclear autumn.” This did not disprove nuclear winter entirely but led to refinements of the models and understanding.
By the late 1980s, the concept of nuclear winter had become “respectable academic work” as various studies supported the conclusion that nuclear war could lower average land temperatures and severely disrupt global climate and agriculture. This could threaten mass starvation after a war.
The initial TTAPS projections of nuclear winter causing global cooling of 35°C was narrowed down through further research to 10-20°C cooling by other scientists like at NCAR.
While the scientific process worked to refine the modeling and projections, some scientists like Kerry Emanuel were unhappy with how Sagan first publicized the theory before peer review. Emanuel criticized the lack of quantifying uncertainties.
Covey acknowledged Sagan should have done more to correct the public perception that stuck with the initial 35°C projection, rather than the revised 10-20°C estimate reached by consensus.
Despite disputes over the details and public communication, the scientific community largely agreed a major nuclear exchange would cause significant secondary climate effects through atmospheric changes, even if not as severe as initially projected.
Dissatisfied, Teller, Jastrow and Seitz decided to create the George C. Marshall Institute to counter organizations like the Union of Concerned Scientists and advocate for nuclear weapons programs from their perspective, mirroring tactics used by groups like the tobacco industry.
The Safeguard missile defense system, a scaled-back version of Sentinel, divided the American physics community in the 1960s. Some like Bethe opposed it due to concerns about escalating nuclear tensions, while others like Teller supported it as part of confronting communism.
In the 1980s, proponents were trying again with Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program, but Bethe and Garwin’s views remained unchanged - they argued it would be enormously expensive and complex with little guarantee of working.
Jastrow, founder of the Marshall Institute, did not believe the skeptical estimates from groups like the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), assuming they were biased. He set out to create a counterpoint group to advocate for SDI.
The Marshall Institute promoted pro-defense views through reports, conferences, and media outreach targeting Congress and journalists. Jastrow invoked fairness doctrines to pressure media organizations to give equal airtime to their perspective.
Jastrow saw SDI opponents like the UCS as playing into Soviet hands. The Marshall Institute argued SDI did not violate arms treaties and could help advance freedom in the USSR. They sought to discredit claims about issues like “nuclear winter” that cast doubt on weapons programs.
Through these advocacy efforts, Jastrow aimed to shape the debate and build support for SDI by countering skeptical analyses and portraying opposition as aligned with Soviet interests rather than objective science. This mirrored other PR campaigns like those of the tobacco industry.
Russell Seitz, affiliated with conservative think tanks, launched a full attack on the nuclear winter theory in an article in 1986.
He misrepresented the TTAPS model work, claiming they intentionally ignored factors like oceans and smoke raining out that would lessen impacts, when in fact TTAPS had discussed these mitigating factors.
Seitz dismissed the models as simplistic and bad science, while offering no alternative models himself. He alleged political motivations skewed the work.
Seitz broadened his attack to accuse the whole scientific establishment of left/liberal bias and lack of objectivity. He claimed mainstream science groups like AAAS and journals were dominated by a network of liberal activists from groups like FAS and UCS.
Seitz’s critique built on a popular book about failures of honesty in science, but he went much further than the authors in attacking the integrity of the entire scientific community and process due to supposed left-wing political bias and control.

In the 1960s, scientists at the Hubbard Brook Experimental Forest in New Hampshire discovered unusually high acid levels in rainwater samples, with a pH as low as 2.85. This was surprising since Hubbard Brook was located far from any major cities or industries. It was one of the first identifications of acid rain in North America.

The Hubbard Brook research coincided with a shift toward more scientific, problem-oriented “conservationist” environmentalism in the U.S. Scientists like Gene Likens and Noye Johnson were studying the forest as an integrated ecosystem and watershed. Their discovery of acid rain indicated that air pollution could affect remote areas and raised broader questions about human impacts on natural systems.

This set the stage for acid rain to emerge as a major environmental issue in the coming decades. Scientists would document how acid precipitation was damaging forests and aquatic life over large regions. However, opponents of regulation argued the science was uncertain and action was premature, foreshadowing future debates over the risks of industrial pollution.

For decades, environmental preservation and regulation had bipartisan support in the US. Major legislation like the Wilderness Act and Clean Air Act passed with overwhelming bipartisan majorities.
However, things began to change in the 1970s. Studies showed issues like acid rain and its effects on forests and fisheries had larger, cross-boundary impacts than previously realized. This necessitated greater governmental regulation of pollution on a national and international level.
Key research establishing the causes and effects of acid rain came from the Hubbard Brook Research Foundation in New Hampshire and scientists in Sweden. Their studies connected rising acidity in rain and snow to air pollution from fossil fuel burning hundreds of miles away.
While the exact impacts were still being studied, early signs pointed to dangers like reduced forest growth, damage to plants and fish populations. However, skeptics began arguing the science was uncertain as more regulations were proposed. This marked the beginning of the politicization of environmental science in the US.
By the late 1970s, the scientific consensus was that acid rain was real and caused primarily by sulfur emissions from burning fossil fuels. However, some specifics around impacts and transport through the atmosphere were still being studied.
Isotope analysis showed that the sulfur in acid rain had the same isotopic signature as industrial sulfur emissions, proving it came from pollution rather than natural sources like volcanoes.
Studies found that while rainfall was acidic, local streams had normal pH levels due to buffering by calcium in soils. However, this buffering process was damaging soils over time.
Scientific publications in the late 1970s established acid rain as a problem caused by human air pollution. However, political and regulatory action still faced challenges.
The UN passed a transboundary pollution treaty in 1979 requiring countries to limit long-range pollution impacts on neighbors. Canada and the US began bilateral negotiations to address acid rain.
The Carter administration in the US pursued research programs and a treaty with Canada, but these efforts faced skepticism and opposition to regulation under the Reagan administration that followed in 1980.
The new Reagan administration did not initially oppose the National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program (NAPAP), which was established to study acid rain. However, their position began to diverge from the scientific community.
In 1983, scientific working groups concluded that acid rain was real and causing damage, and the solution was to reduce sulfur emissions from coal plants using existing technology. But the US summaries of these conclusions were weaker than expected by Canada.
An independent panel reviewed the documents and found broad scientific agreement, but ambiguous language inserted in US summaries. The US versions emphasized uncertainties more than the evidence presented.
This divergence between the science and US summaries suggested political interference. Government scientists may have been pressured to downplay conclusions in line with the Reagan administration’s resistance to action on acid rain.
In 1982, the Reagan White House commissioned its own review of acid rain evidence from William Nierenberg, despite previous strong conclusions from the National Academy of Sciences and EPA studies that action was needed. This further politicized the issue.
Bill Nierenberg was a physicist who held many positions at the intersection of science and politics. Like other physicists Frederick Seitz and Robert Jastrow, his career benefited from opportunities arising from the Cold War.
In 1982, Nierenberg assembled a panel to review the issue of acid rain in North America. The panel, which included Gene Likens and Sherwood Rowland, concluded acid rain was a serious problem caused by man-made SO2 emissions. They recommended cost-effective emission reductions start immediately.
However, the panel conclusions were weakened by the inclusion of Fred Singer, who suggested in an appendix that not enough was known to regulate emissions. Singer had been suggested by the White House Office of Science and Technology.
Like other physicists, Singer’s career also benefited from Cold War-era opportunities but he had a more contentious relationship with colleagues. His inclusion on the acid rain panel was politically motivated to sow doubts about the scientific consensus on needed action.
Frederick Seitz was a physicist who initially supported the idea of using satellites for geophysical research during the International Geophysical Year (IGY) in the late 1950s. However, his calculations suggested the proposal was overly optimistic.
In the 1960s, Singer moved to the National Weather Satellite Center, which caused conflict as NASA felt satellites should be under its purview.
Singer then worked in government and policy roles in the Nixon administration and EPA in the 1970s.
In the 1970s, Singer shared views on anthropogenic environmental impacts and need for action. He cited “The Tragedy of the Commons” and warned not to wait for disasters.
By the late 1970s/early 1980s, Singer changed views to be more concerned with costs of regulation and faith in technological solutions. He advocated cost-benefit analysis and market-based approaches.
Singer contacted Nierenberg seeking a role in the Reagan administration, emphasizing his conservative views. He was ultimately added to the acid rain peer review panel at the White House’s request, being the only member without an academic position and affiliated with the conservative Heritage Foundation.
Fred Singer, who disputed the scientific evidence on acid rain and its harms, was not formally proposed to the Reagan administration’s acid rain panel but was known to panel chair Bill Nierenberg due to past correspondence.
The draft report from the panel acknowledged uncertainties but said evidence justified significant action on acid rain. Singer wrote an alternative version downplaying the problem and calling for more research before major controls.
Throughout the panel process, Singer highlighted uncertainties, echoed views of electric utilities that opposed controls, and suggested other factors like natural sources or costs played larger roles than the science said.
No one on the scientific panel actually supported Singer’s views, seeing them as outside the panel’s task to summarize science, except a liaison from the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy.
Documents Singer circulated disputed previous National Academy work on acid rain and emphasized costs of controls over scientific evidence of harms, reflecting utility industry positions opposed to regulation without more research.
Fred Singer served on a committee tasked with reviewing the science on acid rain produced by US and Canadian technical working groups. However, Singer seemed more focused on promoting the Reagan administration’s political views than objectively reviewing the science.
The administration wished to downplay environmental issues and stress the importance of free markets. But the committee’s job was scientific peer review, not promoting political views.
Singer argued that environmental harms like damage to lakes and soils were not proven. He asserted natural things like bacteria had no economic value unless proven otherwise. This went against the consensus of the other committee members.
When the committee disagreed with him, Singer wrote a dissenting letter and tried to portray the committee as divided when it was actually united against his minority view.
Singer’s appendix to the committee’s final report took an outlier position, ignoring environmental costs and questioning whether emissions cuts would really reduce deposition and harms. It emphasized using markets and emissions trading rather than regulations.
The appendix appeared aimed at supporting the administration’s political views rather than objectively reviewing the science, as the committee was tasked to do. It cast doubt on the report’s overall conclusions about acid rain impacts.
The acid rain panel report was supposed to be an independent scientific review, but the Reagan administration inserted policy views seemingly at odds with the science.
The report concluded that acid rain was a serious problem and controls were needed, contradicting the Reagan position that more study was needed before action.
The report was submitted to the White House in early April 1984 but not released until late August, after a key congressional vote on controlling acid rain emissions.
Changes were made to the report after submission that weakened the message on the need for controls. Fred Singer played a role in these changes along with panel chair Bill Nierenberg.
The historical record, including memos and letters among panel members, shows the report was essentially finalized in early 1984 but delays and unauthorized changes occurred afterward before public release.
The manipulation of the peer review process and suppression of the report’s findings allowed the Reagan administration to avoid taking action on acid rain and influence the congressional vote against controls. This undermined the integrity of the scientific process.

So in summary, the Reagan administration inappropriately intervened to alter and delay the release of a key scientific report to downplay evidence on acid rain and avoid regulatory action, contrary to the panel’s actual conclusions. This politicization of science had real policy consequences.

Singer’s chapter in the acid rain report was converted to an appendix, likely to avoid getting the full committee’s approval, which they had already refused to give.
The executive summary was also changed substantially without the full committee’s knowledge or approval. OSTP had told the panel chair Nierenberg what changes they wanted, and he made them without informing the rest of the committee.
The changes altered the tone and message of the report to be “softer”. The original policy recommendation was moved to the end, weakening its impact.
This interfered with the peer review process. The panel’s role was to review and summarize the technical work and policy recommendations, not have their report altered by OSTP.
Other panelists were upset upon learning of the changes, feeling their role in approving the summary was bypassed. Nierenberg did not adequately explain or address their concerns about the political interference in the scientific report.
Documents showed Nierenberg himself made the changes to the executive summary that were requested by Keyworth, the presidential science advisor, without committee approval.
Efforts to control acid rain through the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments cost about $100 billion in today’s dollars but achieved a 54% reduction in sulfur dioxide levels. However, many business groups and publications claimed acid rain was not a serious problem and it was too costly to address it.
Scientist Gene Likens tried to clarify the science showing acid rain was a major threat, but his work was published in less widely read venues while claims it was not a big deal appeared in more mainstream outlets.
In the 1980s, some argued for delaying action on acid rain since “we still have a lot to learn” about it. A few outlier scientists who downplayed acid rain’s impacts received disproportionate media attention.
The Reagan administration commissioned additional reports that disputed the scientific consensus on acid rain’s harms. However, the costs of controlling acid rain turned out to be far lower than industry claimed, around $8-9 billion, while benefits were estimated at $101-119 billion.
Despite some reductions, ongoing research by Gene Likens showed forests continued declining due to multiple stressors including continued acid rain, which had not been fully controlled. Maple trees in particular faced growing threats.
While market-based cap and trade systems can work, the cap for sulfates was likely set too high initially due to distorted claims acid rain was not a major issue, and it was not subsequently reduced enough. Command and control may have achieved better environmental outcomes.
In the 1970s, concerns emerged about potential human impacts on the ozone layer, especially from supersonic transport planes (SSTs). Early studies found water vapor from SSTs would likely not significantly affect ozone or climate.
However, further analysis found oxides of nitrogen (NOx) emissions from SSTs could more potently deplete stratospheric ozone. Chemist Harold Johnston calculated potential ozone depletion from 10-90%, though uncertainties remained about natural NOx levels.
At a 1971 conference, Johnston argued NOx impacts were being ignored, sparking debate. However, lack of NOx measurements in the stratosphere meant effects were uncertain. More research was needed.
Johnston published a formal paper in Science in August 1971. It was initially delayed due to tone and lack of citations. His early warnings about potential ozone depletion from aircraft NOx emissions helped bring attention to the issue and need for further study of impacts on the stratospheric ozone layer.
In 1971, scientist Harold Johnston published a paper warning that supersonic transports (SSTs) could damage the ozone layer. This sparked public debate and Congressional funding of a large multi-year study called the Climate Impact Assessment Program (CIAP).
CIAP involved thousands of scientists and found SSTs would likely deplete ozone, especially over flight routes. However, the DOT publicly presented it as finding future hypothetical SSTs with improved emissions would be safe. Scientists objected this misrepresented their findings.
Separately, NASA scientists studying the space shuttle found its rocket boosters would emit chlorine into the stratosphere, potentially damaging ozone. This work had to be presented cautiously due to NASA restrictions.
In 1974, scientists Rowland and Molina published work showing chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) could destroy ozone. This garnered significant attention. follow-up studies supported their findings.
Government bodies like the National Academy of Sciences and Congress began quickly reviewing evidence on CFCs and ozone depletion, which marked the start of policy debates around restricting CFC emissions.
In the 1970s, the National Academy of Sciences formed two panels to examine the science around CFCs and their potential impacts on stratospheric ozone: the Panel on Atmospheric Chemistry and the Committee on Impacts of Stratospheric Change.
The chemical industry launched a resistance campaign, bringing in scientist Richard Scorer to publicly criticize the work of Rowland, Molina and others. Scorer argued humans couldn’t impact the environment.
The industry also pushed the idea that volcanoes emitted more chlorine than CFCs and were the real cause of any ozone depletion. However, they never produced evidence from an Alaskan volcano eruption study to support this claim.
Meanwhile, evidence continued to support the CFC-ozone depletion theory, such as measurements showing CFCs reaching the stratosphere and breaking down as predicted. A key finding was the detection of chlorine monoxide, proving CFCs were reacting with ozone.
When Rowland discovered errors in ozone depletion modeling, he updated the data, though it weakened the case for regulation. The Academy panels delayed their reports to analyze the new information.
Ultimately, the panels concluded in 1976 that continued CFC emissions would likely cause steady ozone depletion, prompting calls for regulation within two years. The political process then began moving toward action.
In 1985, the British Antarctic Survey announced the discovery of severe ozone depletion over Antarctica, known as the “ozone hole”. This came as a shock as no known science could explain such low ozone levels.
At a conference in Switzerland, some scientists were already aware of the paper but the satellite data had not detected the depletion. Richard Stolarski reexamined the satellite data and found it had detected the hole, but the data was originally dismissed as errors.
Images from the satellite data from 1979-1983 confirmed the large region with ozone levels below 150 Dobson units, covering all of Antarctica. This provided visual evidence of the hole.
Expeditions to Antarctica in 1986 and 1987 examined the chemistry and meteorological factors potentially contributing to the extremely low ozone levels. While CFC depletion was supported, some meteorologists believed upwelling air currents could also play a role without CFCs. More research was still needed to fully understand the mechanism.
In the late 1980s, scientists conducted further research into ozone depletion over both the Arctic and Antarctic regions.
In 1988-1989, the Airborne Arctic Stratospheric Expedition (AASE) found chemical conditions similar to Antarctica over the Arctic, including high chlorine and low nitrogen levels. However, colder temperatures required to form an “ozone hole” did not prevail in the Arctic.
Additional evidence of ozone depletion at mid-latitudes from the Ozone Trends Panel study spurred tighter restrictions in the Montreal Protocol in 1990, banning CFC production by 2000.
The science continued to develop through further expeditions and studies, with regulations adjusted based on new findings. This iterative process between research and policymaking helped craft an adaptive regulatory framework.
However, some industry and skeptics continued efforts to challenge the science and downplay human impacts on ozone, seeking to influence policy in a more lenient direction. But the weight of scientific evidence supported stronger controls on ozone-depleting substances.
In 1987, Donald Hodel proposed a “personal protection plan” against ozone depletion of just wearing hats and long-sleeved shirts, which environmentalists easily criticized as inadequate.
During the early 1980s, several conservative think tanks promoted business interests and opposing environmental regulations. These included the Heritage Foundation, Cato Institute, American Enterprise Institute, and others funded by corporations.
The Heritage Foundation was directly founded in response to opposing the canceled SST project in 1971, aiming to quickly support conservative policy positions.
Fred Singer first protested the “ozone scare” in a 1987 Wall Street Journal article, downplaying depletion and dismissing CFCs’ role without proof. This began constructing a narrative that scientists overreacted and couldn’t be trusted.
In 1988, Singer argued the ozone hole was caused by natural stratospheric cooling from surface warming, not CFCs, implying regulation was unnecessary. However, he misrepresented the work of scientists like Ramanathan and Hansen who actually linked the trends to human greenhouse gas emissions.
Singer had difficulty getting his views published and accused the scientific community of self-interest in promoting regulations to get grants rather than save the world. He exaggerated issues with CFC replacements that did not yet exist.
The ozone hole was first detected in the 1980s. Both natural factors like solar effects and meteorology as well as human factors like CFC emissions were investigated as potential causes.
Singer ignored important field experiments and lab work done by NASA and NOAA that provided key chemical data linking CFCs to ozone depletion.
Singer wrongly claimed that Dobson had discovered the ozone hole, when Dobson actually found greater seasonal ozone variation in Antarctica compared to the Arctic.
Singer argued the science was uncertain, replacing CFCs would be difficult/expensive, and scientists were corrupt and politically motivated. However, adaptive agreements like the Montreal Protocol addressed uncertainties, and replacements for CFCs turned out to be better and safer.
In the 1990s, Singer continued pushing his views through groups like SEPP and publications like the Washington Times. He introduced claims like satellites showed less ozone depletion than ground data, but satellites actually showed more depletion.
Figures like Dixy Lee Ray amplified Singer’s claims in books, citing him and obscure sources. This helped spread misinformation despite being debunked by actual evidence and experts like Rowland.
A key point Singer and others raised was volcanoes emitted more chlorine than CFCs, but measurements showed volcanoes contributed negligibly to stratospheric chlorine levels.
In the 1980s, the EPA and other public health organizations were taking steps to limit indoor smoking and secondhand smoke exposure based on growing evidence of health risks.
A 1986 Surgeon General’s report concluded secondhand smoke could cause cancer in nonsmokers. This led to a panic in the tobacco industry similar to previous revelations about smoking risks.
Fred Singer joined forces with the Tobacco Institute, the main lobbying group for the tobacco industry, to challenge the scientific basis linking secondhand smoke to health risks.
Rather than just disputing the data, Singer and the Tobacco Institute claimed the EPA was doing “bad science.” They launched a broader smear campaign aimed at discrediting the EPA and tarnishing scientific findings that industries disagreed with.
The goal was not just to fight regulations on secondhand smoke, but to sow broader doubts about the credibility of science related to public health and environmental issues like climate change that could threaten corporate interests.

So in summary, Singer allied with the tobacco industry to attack the EPA’s science on secondhand smoke as part of a wider campaign to undermine the credibility of science seen as damaging to business.

In 1981, Takeshi Hirayama published a landmark study showing a clear dose-response relationship between husbands’ smoking and wives’ risk of lung cancer. The more the husbands smoked, the higher the wives’ risk of lung cancer, even if the wives didn’t smoke.
This provided robust causal evidence that secondhand smoke causes lung cancer. It helped explain why some non-smoking women got lung cancer.
The tobacco industry fiercely criticized and attacked the study. They funded studies to undermine Hirayama and sow doubt, but internal memos acknowledged Hirayama was correct.
Despite industry efforts, the scientific consensus affirmed Hirayama. This galvanized public health efforts to restrict smoking in public places in the 1980s and 1990s.
The 1986 Surgeon General’s report definitively concluded secondhand smoke causes disease, including lung cancer. This posed an existential threat to the tobacco industry.
The industry responded with diverse disinformation campaigns to maintain controversy and resist smoking restrictions, at a cost of over $16 million per year. But the EPA study in 1992 provided further evidence of harm, finding ETS a known carcinogen.

This passage summarizes key findings from a report reviewing the scientific evidence on environmental tobacco smoke (ETS):

Nine epidemiological studies showed an increased risk of lung cancer from ETS exposure at the 95% confidence level, while the rest showed increased risk at the 90% confidence level.
Among women who smoked, the lung cancer rate was even higher if their husbands also smoked, showing that ETS adds additional risk beyond direct smoking.
The EPA adopted a “weight of evidence” approach as advocated in its risk assessment guidelines, examining all available evidence rather than relying on any single study. While no individual study is perfect, together they provide useful information.
Critics Fred Seitz and Fred Singer challenged the weight of evidence approach, arguing for focusing only on the “best evidence.” However, selectively excluding studies risks bias.
Singer accused the EPA report of being “junk science.” However, the agency had properly considered and ruled out other possible factors, and the statistical evidence overwhelmingly showed ETS was an additional risk even after accounting for other lifestyle factors.
Singer’s attacks seemed aimed at undermining the EPA to prevent or delay regulation of secondhand smoke, rather than genuine scientific criticism. The tobacco industry distributed materials promoting the “sound science” concept and challenging the EPA’s integrity.

This summary discusses how the tobacco industry tried to undermine the EPA and science on secondhand smoke through an industry-funded book called “Bad Science.” Some key points:

“Bad Science” attacked the EPA for being “guilty of adjusting science to support preconceived public policy” on secondhand smoke. However, the EPA had followed scientific consensus and peer-reviewed evidence, not the other way around.
The book quoted “experts” who were actually paid consultants to the tobacco industry, and articles from outlets like the Wall Street Journal that defended risky industries. However, it presented these as independent sources casting doubt on science.
It used real examples of scientific errors and biases to imply science in general was flawed and unreliable, not just specific cases. This undermined trust in the science on secondhand smoke.
Front groups like the Competitive Enterprise Institute compiled and promoted these attacks, making them seem independent when they were coordinated by the tobacco industry.
The goal was not truly correcting errors but preventing regulation of secondhand smoke by undermining the scientific basis for policies around it. It was a well-funded effort to challenge and discredit science that threatened the tobacco industry.
The tobacco industry targeted particular journalists they saw as potentially sympathetic to their views, such as Nicholas Wade, P.J. O’Rourke, and Gregg Easterbrook. They closely tracked their work.
They also sought to influence organizations like the First Amendment Center and meetings of mayors to change attitudes on issues in their favor.
Philip Morris communications director Victor Han argued they needed to go beyond just defending smokers’ rights and instead argue that over-regulation was leading to wasteful taxpayer spending.
They launched a newsletter called EPA Watch to attack the EPA and push the narrative that the EPA was misguided, aggressive, or corrupt.
Steven Milloy and his group TASSC (The Advancement of Sound Science Coalition) was launched by PR firm APCO to discredit science, focusing on spreading the idea of “junk science.” Their advisors had ties to denying smog, acid rain and the harms of tobacco.
Other groups like the Alexis de Tocqueville Institution also defended secondhand smoke, writing reports questioning the EPA’s science on the issue. They sought to promote industry arguments under the guise of supporting democracy and free markets.
Singer and Jeffreys accused the EPA of scientific misconduct in its assessment of secondhand smoke risks. They claimed the EPA violated standards by assuming a linear, no-threshold dose-response curve rather than a threshold effect.
The EPA report was reviewed not by 3 experts as typical, but by an 18-member panel commissioned by the EPA Science Advisory Board, made up of medical doctors and scientists.
The panel concurred with the EPA’s classification of secondhand smoke as a Class A carcinogen and found the evidence stronger than stated in the draft report.
Reviewers requested more discussion of uncertainties but did not reject the epidemiological analysis or use of spousal smoking as a proxy for exposure. Their major concern was that the EPA understated risks, not overstated them.
Epidemiological evidence of secondhand smoke risks was modest, but reviewers viewed it as stronger given existing knowledge that active smoking causes cancer and secondhand smoke contains the same carcinogens.
The reviewers found evidence of health impacts on children from secondhand smoke even stronger than stated in the EPA report.

So in summary, the EPA report underwent extensive peer review that affirmed and strengthened its conclusions, contradicting the criticisms raised by Singer and Jeffreys.

The peer reviewers did not address Singer and Jeffrey’s criticism of the 90% confidence limit used by EPA because there is no magic to the 95% confidence level commonly used - it is a social convention, not a scientific threshold. Using a 90% limit is still highly confident and reflects strong prior evidence of harm.
The peer reviewers also did not suggest considering a threshold effect because EPA guidelines already assume a linear dose-response by default unless evidence clearly shows otherwise. This is normal scientific practice based on principles like Ockham’s razor - the simplest theory that fits evidence. It makes sense biologically that more exposure means more risk.
The tobacco industry focused on cancer risks but the most important finding was the danger to children from secondhand smoke exposure. The industry did not dispute the evidence on respiratory effects on children.
The EPA rebutted the industry criticisms by noting the peer review unanimously endorsed the report’s conclusions. Major health agencies also concurred. The criticisms came from industry, not the scientific community.
Regarding thresholds, the EPA said there was no evidence one exists for secondhand smoke exposure. Singer does not appear to have substantive evidence for assuming a threshold either.
Emil Mrak, a former University of California chancellor, gave a talk at Philip Morris defending DDT and other pesticides using the “threshold” argument - that small doses of toxic substances may be safe. He argued against the view that any dose of a hazardous substance could be unsafe.
The “threshold” concept was used widely in the 1970s to defend various hazardous materials from regulation, even if they posed unnatural risks rather than natural background levels.
The tobacco industry resisted regulation by arguing that all risks in life were acceptable, from smoking to ordinary daily activities. They claimed regulation would infringe on personal liberty and choice.
FOREST was a front group created by the tobacco industry in the UK to defend smoking. It opposed public health efforts like smoking bans and education programs.
A FOREST report framed the issue as one of “perverted” science being used to unjustifiably restrict individual freedoms and move towards “health paternalism.” They argued government regulation of smoking was a slipper slope towards tyranny.
Lord Harris, an economist and free market ideologue, wrote the introduction arguing that anti-smoking activists threatened individual liberty and were akin to Nazis and communists in manipulating science for political ends. The defense of smoking was framed as a defense of free market principles and freedom of choice.
The passage discusses an ideological view held by some like Fred Singer that the government should not attempt to manipulate or coerce society through regulation. They viewed this as a potential slippery slope toward totalitarian control.
Some like Russell Seitz argued this position from a Cold War anti-Communism lens, seeing attempts at government regulation like those of the EPA as threatening freedom and a free market in the same way Soviet Communism did.
Seitz proposed the government should fund research into making a “safe cigarette” rather than try to control smoking. He framed this as protecting individual liberty and smokers’ rights to vote.
The passage critiques this perspective, noting that no freedoms are absolute and society sets reasonable limits, like not allowing smoking that endangers others. It characterizes their stance as prioritizing individual freedom over public health concerns.
In summary, it portrays their defense of industries like tobacco as having ideological roots in a Cold War-era skepticism of government attempts to regulate business in the name of public welfare.
In the late 1970s, several factors drew attention to the potential impacts of climate change, including drought-related famines in Africa and crop failures in the Soviet Union.
In 1977, the Jason group of scientists was asked to review energy programs related to carbon dioxide. Their climate modeling showed doubling CO2 could increase average temperatures by 2.4°C, with even greater warming at the poles.
This stimulated interest in the White House, but the Jasons were mostly physicists, not climate experts. So Frank Press asked the NAS to review the Jason study under Jule Charney.
Charney assembled other scientists who reviewed the Jason work and also heard presentations from leading climate modelers Syukuro Manabe and James Hansen. Their models produced results similar to the Jason one.
The key question was climate sensitivity - how much temperatures would rise with doubled CO2 levels. The state-of-the-art answer from these models, which Charney’s group assessed, was around 3°C of warming from a doubling of CO2. This became widely accepted.

So in summary, the late 1970s saw growing attention to climate impacts and influential modeling work establishing the scientific consensus on climate sensitivity, but some in politics were still not fully accepting the implications.

Charney’s 1979 climate model study estimated warming from doubling CO2 levels to be around 3°C, with a likely range of 1.5-4°C. More than doubling CO2 would likely lead to more than 3°C of warming.
There are natural “negative feedbacks” like increased clouds, but these were not expected to prevent “appreciable warming” from increased CO2 levels.
While CO2 causes immediate atmospheric effects, the oceans act as a “heat sink” and would delay most noticeable surface warming effects for several decades. This meant impacts may not be clearly detectable until it was too late to stop further warming.
In response to calls for more information, the 1980 Schelling panel report emphasized uncertainties and argued for more research rather than action. They suggested impacts may not be all negative and warming effects could be addressed through adaptation like migration.
John Perry critiqued this, arguing the problem was already occurring and needing a quicker response than just continued research. But Schelling’s view delaying action won out politically.
Congress and scientists still saw value in further research, but the Reagan administration later pushed the issue entirely off the political agenda.
Scientific experts had warned that increasing CO2 emissions could accelerate the accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere.
In response, Senator Ribicoff proposed that the National Academy of Sciences conduct a comprehensive study of CO2 and climate change.
A committee was formed in late 1980 under the leadership of Bill Nierenberg to carry out this study. Nierenberg argued the scope should be broad and integrated, assessing all aspects of the problem.
The committee was unable to agree on an integrated assessment. The final report contained individually authored chapters that presented conflicting views - the natural scientist chapters viewed increasing CO2 as a serious problem, while the economist chapters downplayed the risks and argued for focusing on adaptation over mitigation.
The report’s synthesis sided with the economists’ position, discounting the near-term risks outlined by the physical scientists. It framed the issue as one of general climate change rather than the specific threat from human-caused CO2 increases.
This highlighted the conflicting perspectives within the committee between natural scientists who viewed CO2 as a pressing problem and economists who argued the risks were too uncertain and distant to warrant immediate action.
In the late 1980s, climate science and the potential severity of global warming was gaining more attention in the public and political spheres.
In 1988, a drought and record heat afflicted the US, raising further concerns about the possibility of climate change impacts.
That year, James Hansen testified before Congress that human-caused global warming had already begun, based on new research showing about 0.5°C of warming since 1980 that was very unlikely due to natural factors alone.
This testimony attracted significant media attention and helped elevate climate change as a pressing issue.
However, it also prompted an organized campaign of denial and opposition to climate action. Starting in 1989, efforts began to undermine and sow doubt about the scientific consensus on human-caused warming.
This set the stage for protracted political battles over how to respond to the emerging climate threat in the coming decades. While the science was becoming clearer, politics and denialism presented major obstacles to addressing the problem.
In the late 1980s, three scenarios modeling future global warming based on different levels of carbon emissions were released. One scenario projected rapid reductions after 2000 limiting warming, while the other two projected more rapid warming raising temperatures higher than in the last interglacial period over 120,000 years ago.
James Hansen’s 1988 testimony about human-caused global warming received significant media attention and made him an advocate on the issue, though some colleagues criticized him. Most scientists agreed greenhouse gas increases would impact the climate.
In response, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change was formed to further study and assess the science, impacts, and responses to global warming across many countries and scientists.
The political momentum in the U.S. increased with calls for action, but the George Marshall Institute report blamed the sun instead of greenhouse gases for observed warming based on a selective use of data. This influenced the White House and stalled momentum for addressing climate change. Critics argued their analysis implied greenhouse gases would also significantly impact the climate if small solar variations could.
The Marshall Institute, led by Jastrow, Seitz, and Nierenberg, continued to argue that climate change was due to natural factors like variations in solar output, not human-caused greenhouse gases. They blamed the sun.
The 1990 IPCC report rejected the Marshall Institute’s arguments and confirmed that unchecked fossil fuel use would lead to 0.3°C warming per decade, greater than the past 10,000 years.
However, the Marshall Institute kept promoting their arguments. Nierenberg gave a speech in 1992 downplaying warming projections. Bolin argued his linear projection ignored exponential emissions growth and ocean lag effects.
Meanwhile, Fred Singer looked for a way to undermine the warnings of Roger Revelle, an important early climate scientist and mentor to Al Gore. Singer arranged to co-author a piece with Revelle casting doubt on climate change risks. However, Revelle was in poor health and did not fully review Singer’s drafts.
Singer published similar arguments on his own, claiming the science was too uncertain to warrant policy action. This directly contradicted the scientific consensus represented by the IPCC. It reflected Singer’s pattern of rejecting mainstream scientific conclusions on various issues.
Singer and Revelle reviewed a paper in galleys that asserted future warming would be less than 1 degree Celsius, within normal natural variation.
Revelle crossed this out and wrote it would likely be 1-3 degrees, consistent with mainstream views but outside natural variability. This was a key point of disagreement - Singer said warming would not lead to a new climate regime.
The published version dropped numbers and said warming would be “well below” natural variation, contradicting Revelle. Revelle was listed as co-author but it’s unclear if he agreed.
After Revelle’s death, the paper was cited to attack Al Gore. Revelle’s family and colleagues believed his views were misrepresented.
Lancaster and others tried unsuccessfully to correct the record in journals. They published letters in science journals explaining Revelle likely did not write or fully agree to the published paper.
Singer sued Lancaster for libel over his claims, and Lancaster was forced to retract statements that Revelle was not really a co-author, despite corroborating evidence from Revelle’s secretary.
Roger Revelle, a famous climate scientist, died in 1991 but had expressed views on global warming prior to his death. Reviewing his papers, the only statement found was a short unpublished introduction to a 1990 meeting where he said global warming was expected due to increased greenhouse gases. He predicted around 2-5°C warming in the US and larger changes at higher latitudes. He also said climate change would have “profound effects” on water resources.
This shows Revelle consistently believed global warming was coming and would have serious impacts, which is consistent with what scientists say today. He did not suggest considering emissions reductions as a “drastic” action.
In 1992, the UN held a major Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro to address climate change. Many world leaders attended and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change was signed, committing countries to prevent dangerous human interference with the climate. However, it set no binding emissions limits.
With the threat of future regulations, “merchants of doubt” like Singer redoubled efforts to undermine the science and debates around detection and attribution studies, which aimed to definitively attribute warming to human causes by comparing climate models to observations.
If global warming was caused solely by increased sunlight, you’d expect the whole atmosphere to warm up uniformly. But greenhouse gases trap heat in the lower atmosphere, causing it to warm, while reducing heat flow to the upper atmosphere causes it to cool.
Benjamin Santer took on the role of coordinating the chapter on detecting and attributing climate change for the IPCC’s second assessment report in 1994. This was an important role involving coordinating over 30 authors.
The chapter review process involved several drafting sessions where authors discussed and refined the chapter based on peer reviews. At one session, Santer prevailed in including a discussion of model and observational uncertainties.
Santer’s work finding the “fingerprint” of human-caused warming in atmospheric temperature patterns was an important finding presented to the IPCC.
Contrarian scientists like Patrick Michaels criticized the IPCC report, but their arguments were shown to have logical flaws, like comparing model results to observations that included unrelated real-world factors not accounted for in the models.
In late 1995, Republican congressional leadership opposed environmental protection and wanted to repeal environmental laws like the Clean Water Act. There was little press coverage of this.
At an IPCC hearing on climate change in November 1995, industry representatives like from the fossil fuel industry lobbied against conclusions about the human influence on climate. An agreement was reached on concluding there is a “discernible human influence” rather than a stronger term.
In early 1996, Fred Singer launched critiques of the IPCC report, claiming no warming was occurring and the IPCC violated rules. Tom Wigley responded countering Singer’s claims.
In May 1996 before the report’s official release, industry lobbyists like from the American Petroleum Institute accused IPCC authors Santer and Wigley of secretly altering reports and eliminating uncertainties. They denied this.
The fossil fuel industry group Global Climate Coalition circulated a report accusing the IPCC of “scientific cleansing,” which Nierenberg accepted uncritically even before the report was released.

Fred Seitz, a former president of the National Academy of Sciences, took his attacks on Ben Santer and the IPCC to the national media. In a letter to the Wall Street Journal, he accused Santer of fraud and corruption of the peer review process in his changes to Chapter 8 of the IPCC report after the Madrid meeting.

Santer defended himself in a letter to the Journal signed by 40 other IPCC lead authors, explaining that he made the changes in response to review comments as part of the peer review process. However, the Journal heavily edited Santer’s letter.

Bert Bolin and John Houghton also wrote a letter defending Santer and the IPCC process, but the Journal edited out much of their defense as well. They republished the full letters in the Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society along with an open letter supporting Santer.

Fred Singer and other critics like Fred Seitz and Hugh Ellsaesser continued attacking Santer with letters to the Journal, repeating claims that had already been refuted. Santer responded again, showing Singer’s claims to be false. Singer then tried framing Seitz as the real victim in articles accusing Santer of a cover up, despite evidence already being publicly available.

The defenders of Santer and the IPCC process argued there appeared to be a concerted effort to undermine and discredit the scientific process and results through a campaign in the media rather than legitimate scientific debate.

In the early 1980s, Ronald Reagan’s Department of Energy and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy altered reports on acid rain and carbon dioxide to downplay environmental concerns, contrary to the conclusions of scientists.
In the late 1990s, Bill Nierenberg and other physicists associated with the George C. Marshall Institute launched attacks against Ben Santer and the IPCC for their conclusions about the human influence on climate change. The Wall Street Journal was a key promoter of these attacks.
As a result of signing onto the attacks, scientists like Tom Wigley and Klaus Hasselmann withdrew from collaborating with Nierenberg, seeing his actions as politically motivated rather than scientifically sound.
Though a small group, the Marshall Institute physicists had access to powerful political circles through their history in national security work. Their claims influenced policymakers like Vice President Cheney despite being rejected by the broader scientific community.
Mainstream media felt pressure to provide “balance” by giving equal time to dissenting views, even when those views contradicted the scientific consensus. This biased public understanding of the issue and made inaction easier for politicians.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Rachel Carson raised concerns about the indiscriminate use of pesticides like DDT in her book Silent Spring. She documented evidence that DDT was accumulating in the food chain and causing harm to wildlife and ecosystems.
Though the pesticide industry criticized Carson, her work was affirmed by the President’s Science Advisory Committee. In 1972, the EPA banned DDT in the US based on the scientific evidence that it posed risks. This policy change had widespread public and political support at the time.
By the 2000s, some conservative think tanks like the Competitive Enterprise Institute began aggressively attacking Carson, saying she was wrong and her work led to millions of malaria deaths in Africa by causing DDT to be banned.
Other groups like the American Enterprise Institute and Cato Institute echoed claims that DDT was safely and that its banning was unnecessary and caused by hysteria over Carson’s book.
By reopening the debate over DDT decades later, these groups aimed to undermine the argument for government regulation in general by suggesting a past example of regulation (the DDT ban) was allegedly a failure or mistake based on bad science.
However, the historical facts show Carson’s work was scientifically validated and the DDT ban had bipartisan political support when implemented in the 1970s based on risks the pesticide posed.
Rachel Carson’s book Silent Spring sparked public concern about environmental issues like never before, similar to how Uncle Tom’s Cabin did for abolitionism.
However, the pesticide industry attacked Carson’s work, claiming her science was flawed and anecdotal. This backfired as it increased publicity and support for Carson.
President Kennedy asked the President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) to evaluate the science on DDT. They acknowledged scientific uncertainties but found sufficient evidence that persistent pesticides like DDT harmed wildlife and could ultimately harm humans too. They called for action to control their use.
Over the following decades, with bipartisan support, regulations like the Clean Air and Water Acts were passed. The EPA was established in 1970 and eventually banned most uses of DDT in 1972 based on continued scientific assessment of its risks.
However, some more recently have attacked Carson’s work, claiming banning DDT has led to millions of malaria deaths. But the science at the time supported regulating DDT use due to environmental and potential human health risks.
Tierney argued that Carson was wrong about DDT and Baldwin got the science right. However, the passage provides evidence that Carson was largely correct.
The global malaria eradication campaign of 1955-1969 that used DDT spraying was ultimately unsuccessful, especially in less developed areas, due to factors like lack of public cooperation and development of insect resistance.
Insect resistance to DDT developed rapidly due to extensive agricultural use, not just disease control spraying. This caused DDT to become ineffective for disease control more quickly.
Malaria was controlled in some areas without DDT through other methods like drainage and larvicide. The US and others brought malaria under control before DDT as well.
Real science and history show Carson was right that DDT alone could not eradicate malaria and its excessive use led to increased insect resistance. Baldwin’s “review” of Carson’s book did acknowledge some of her valid points about pesticide dangers.

So in summary, the passage provides evidence that Carson’s warnings about DDT were well-founded and that she, not Baldwin, largely got the science right regarding its limitations and risks.

Critics of Rachel Carson, like Dixy Lee Ray, have argued that DDT was wrongly banned and that its use saved lives from malaria. They claim cases of malaria rose drastically in places like Sri Lanka after DDT was banned there.
While it’s true that DDT successfully reduced malaria in Sri Lanka from 1948-1963, resistance was emerging by 1958. Cases rose again in 1968 even with increased DDT usage, showing it was no longer effective. More DDT at higher doses and frequencies in subsequent years also failed to control malaria.
The main argument against DDT was not about human health effects, which were minimal, but about environmental harm. Studies have confirmed DDT kills birds, fish and insects. It also persists in the environment for decades.
Later research shows DDT does in fact harm human health, especially reproductive health. One study found a strong link between high early-life DDT exposure and increased breast cancer risk later in life.
Attacking Carson long after the DDT regulation was meant to undermine the environmental movement and critique of unchecked economic growth more broadly. Denying the facts about DDT was a political strategy to defend an extreme free market ideology.
Sri Lanka initially used DDT at a rate of 2g/m2 at 4 monthly intervals to successfully reduce malaria rates in the early 1960s.
However, the insect population adapted and developed resistance to DDT over time, causing the malaria rate to rise again despite continued DDT use.
They then switched to malathion, a more expensive pesticide that the insects had not yet resisted, which helped reduce malaria again, though not to the extremely low levels initially seen with DDT.
Resistance, not environmentalist pressure, was the main reason DDT stopped being effective in Sri Lanka and elsewhere. But officials were reluctant to admit this and continued using DDT even as it became ineffective due to resistance.
Critics of Rachel Carson and the DDT ban, like Steve Milloy and Gordon Edwards, omitted the key fact of insect resistance in their claims that the ban caused millions of preventable deaths, representing a failure to acknowledge the scientific evidence.
Organizations like the Heartland Institute, Competitive Enterprise Institute, and American Enterprise Institute continued promoting this narrative while receiving significant funding over the years from the tobacco industry, like Philip Morris, demonstrating coordination in their campaigns.

The passage discusses how certain governments in the past, like the Soviet Union, engaged in “historical cleansing” by erasing inconvenient facts from official histories and photographs to support their political agenda. It draws a parallel to how some modern conservative defenders of free markets in the US have similarly “flushed down the memory hole” inconvenient scientific facts about issues like DDT, climate change, and acid rain.

It argues the rhetoric of “sound science” is Orwellian, as real peer-reviewed science is dismissed while misrepresentations are promoted. Just as Orwell’s “Newspeak” constrained thought, this constrains acceptance of facts that challenge the status quo. Science uniquely challenges power structures by providing alternative sources of knowledge and authority.

Recent science shows industrial civilization is unsustainable at current consumption levels. While economists term pollution’s unaccounted costs as “negative externalities,” some reject this to defend free enterprise. However, issues like DDT, acid rain, smoking demonstrated market failures as costs were imposed widely while benefits accrued to few. Accepting this reality acknowledges limits to free market capitalism.

Some Cold Warriors who originally fought communism embraced its tactics by undermining science, promoting doubt, and attacking messengers on these issues. While claiming to secure “liberty,” they fought facts challenging unlimited freedoms like polluting. In a modern cacophony of conflicting claims, it is easy for the public to be misled, showing how a well-organized minority can distort debate.

Over several decades, various industries and interest groups engaged in campaigns to undermine established scientific evidence and mislead the public. They promoted fringe views that had been widely refuted in scientific literature in order to create doubt and controversy.

The media played a role in amplifying these misleading claims by presenting them as part of an ongoing scientific debate, without informing audiences of the proponents’ ties to interested parties like tobacco companies. Journalists may have been unaware of evidence discrediting skeptical arguments due to time constraints and relying on seemingly credible experts without knowing their full backgrounds.

Groups like the tobacco industry and George C. Marshall Institute exploited the media’s bias towards balance by cultivating experts to make unsupported claims sound scientifically credible through references and formats mimicking scientific papers, even without undergoing peer review.

Retired scientists like Fred Seitz leveraged their past credentials to mislead policymakers and the public through techniques like petitions and misleadingly formatted articles attacking scientific consensus on issues like climate change. Their campaigns aimed to manufacture the appearance of scientific disputes where the scientific community had reached consensus.

The passage discusses how skepticism about issues like global warming, acid rain, and secondhand smoke have been promoted through questionable scientific organizations and journals. It focuses on an anti-climate change petition organized by Frederic Seitz that garnered thousands of signatures but had no verification process. When questioned, mainstream scientific bodies like the National Academy distanced themselves from the petition.

It also discusses how skeptical claims have appeared in journals like the Journal of Physicians and Surgeons, which is associated with organizations that also promoted claims denying the link between HIV and AIDS and rejected bans on DDT. The passage argues these examples show how doubts about issues were constructed to create an appearance of scientific debate when there was little genuine scientific disagreement.

It then discusses how free market think tanks with links to industries like tobacco promoted this “merchandising of doubt.” It traces links and funding between these think tanks, corporations like ExxonMobil, and activists involved in promoting skepticism. A key link was defending free market principles and resisting government regulation. The passage portrays this doubtful campaign as deeply political rather than a scientific debate, aimed at defending industries from regulatory and legislative actions.

This passage discusses the views of free market fundamentalists and their opposition to government regulation. Some key points:

Free market fundamentalists see regulation as a “slippery slope to socialism”, believing that free markets alone protect civil and economic freedoms.
Figures like Fred Singer suggested environmental concerns were a cover for socialist agendas to change the economic system through large-scale regulation.
George Soros termed this perspective “free market fundamentalism”, seeing it as an article of faith rather than being scientifically proven like its adherents claimed.
Free markets alone don’t account for external costs like pollution, requiring some government intervention, though Friedman argued external costs were rarely high enough to justify it.
Regulation is needed to address market failures and protect citizens from harm in areas like public health, safety and financial stability.
The main protagonists in this story opposed regulation that prevented harmful business practices or environmental pollution, distorting the marketplace of ideas to serve political and commercial interests.
They accused environmentalists of being communists as the environmental movement posed a threat to their ideals of unlimited economic growth and minimal government intervention.
In the 1980s and 1990s, some conservative critics argued that environmentalism and efforts to address issues like climate change were really fronts for socialism and left-wing agendas. They saw the UN and radical environmental groups as promoting socialism.
Figures like Fred Singer, Patrick Michaels, and Charles Krauthammer linked environmentalism to socialism and accused advocates of wanting to redistribute wealth. They opposed climate policies like cap-and-trade as “socialist.”
This stance contributed to the Republican party turning against environmental agreements like the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and Kyoto Protocol.
However, denying the science of issues like climate change has actually led to the very increased government intervention and regulation that conservatives feared, as problems have grown more severe due to lack of early action.
Some environmentalists like Gus Speth have become more radical over time, arguing the capitalism itself needs to be reformed and regulated more to address severe environmental deterioration. The merchants of doubt helped create this situation.
There is debate around whether technology alone can solve problems like climate change in time, or if more proactive policy measures are also needed to spur technological solutions and transition economies off fossil fuels.
Cornucopians like Julian Simon argue that human ingenuity and innovation will always solve resource and environmental problems as long as markets are free and property rights are respected. They are optimistic that technological progress will overcome any limits to growth.
Fred Singer was an early proponent of Cornucopian views. In 1970 he argued that concerns over global warming were overblown and that aerosol pollution would counteract warming from CO2. He later became a prominent climate change skeptic.
Bjorn Lomborg’s book “The Skeptical Environmentalist” argued that environmental problems are overstated and the world is generally getting better due to economic and technological progress. However, critics say he misuses statistics and ignores impacts on nature and future generations.
Cornucopian arguments are aligned with free market ideologies and are supported by thinks tanks that advocate for limited government and free enterprise. They view the state and environmental regulation as hindrances rather than helps to continued progress.
Cornucopians argue that advances in technology will continue indefinitely and ensure prosperity, but this view fails to acknowledge that past environmental changes were mostly local while today’s changes are global in scale and some may be irreversible.
Their view that past advances were only possible due to free market systems is also demonstrably false. Many crucial technologies predated capitalism and the Soviet Union was also technically innovative, though benefits didn’t accrue to citizens.
A key example is the development of machine tools, which enabled mass production - this was developed by the US Army over 50 years, not private industry. Many other technologies also benefited significantly from government funding and support.
So the idea that technology advancement depends solely on free markets is a “technofideism” not supported by history. Skeptical campaigns about issues like pollution and climate change were really about limiting government and promoting free markets, not science.
However, scientists were largely silent in correcting misleading claims. This is partly due to norms of consensus-building in science and reluctance to attract individual attention. Communicating to broad audiences also takes time away from research and risks accusations of “politicizing” science.
Scientists are in a double bind when it comes to contested issues like climate change. If they keep aloof and don’t get involved, the public won’t know what an objective view looks like. But if they do get involved, they risk backlash and attacks from contrarians.
Scientists have been afraid to speak out because of past attacks and harassment of scientists like Ben Santer and Michael Mann who provided compelling evidence of climate change. These attacks have had a chilling effect on the scientific community.
While remaining focused on science is understandable, ignoring misinformation allows garbage views to persist. The public needs scientists to clearly communicate the scientific consensus.
Doubt-mongering has been successful because uncertainty favors the status quo in decision making. To drive policy action, undeniable evidence is needed that inaction will cause harm. But science does not provide absolute certainty - it establishes consensus views based on evidence.
There is a misunderstanding that science provides two sides to an issue. But on questions where consensus is reached, there are not two sides - there is simply accepted scientific knowledge.
Science has traditionally been viewed as the work of great individual scientists like Galileo, Newton and Darwin. However, modern science is a collective enterprise that depends on institutions.
Scientific institutions like journals, conferences and peer review processes were formed starting in the 1600s to vet scientific claims and test their veracity through scrutiny by other experts. Peer review is how ideas become accepted as scientific knowledge.
The contrarian scientists featured in the story operated outside these institutional norms by publicizing claims that had already been rejected by peer review, rather than properly submitting them for review. Many had also stopped doing original scientific research.
While individual brilliance is important, no single person can be an expert on all topics. Modern science is too specialized. Relying on these non-experts as authorities spread misinformation and confusion about issues like climate change.
When making important decisions, people generally rely on experts who have credentials and operate within established institutional processes, like hiring a professional to do a title search before buying a home. This institutional trust is important and what was missing from the contrarian scientists’ public campaign.
We have to trust experts like title searchers to do work that requires specialized training, expertise, and licensing that we do not have. All social relationships involve an element of trust.
We cannot do our own scientific research and must trust scientific experts on matters of science. To assess who the experts are, we should examine their credentials, research, venues where they subject their claims to scrutiny, and financial interests.
National scientific organizations like the National Academy of Sciences and IPCC are trustworthy sources because they involve broad consensus of experts. Dissenting claims require careful examination of the dissenter’s expertise and interests.
While scientific knowledge is never certain, acting on available evidence is sensible even if decisions may need revising later. Modern science has a track record of successful applications like sending people to the moon.
Blind trust is unwise, but complete distrust leaves us paralyzed without a basis for decisions. We must have some degree of trust in designated experts for guidance on the natural world.
Cigarette company researchers eventually acknowledged that dismissing health risks of smoking for lack of “scientific proof” was morally and intellectually wrong, as is delaying action without reasonable evidence.

Here is a summary of the provided information:

The conclusion draws on a paper by Naomi Oreskes discussing how the scientific consensus on climate change was established and how we know we are not wrong.
The book citing this conclusion draws heavily on documents from tobacco litigation in the 1990s housed at the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library, an online database containing over 50 million pages of internal tobacco industry documents.
Notes are provided on individual sources cited throughout the book, including newspaper articles, research papers, tobacco industry documents identified by Bates numbers for retrieval from the online database.
No direct quotes are included from the conclusion being summarized, only an attribution to the source and context that portions of the conclusion are drawn from Naomi Oreskes’ paper on establishing the scientific consensus on climate change.

Here is a summary of the key documents:

“Background Material on the Cigarette Industry Client,” December 15, 1953: This Hill & Knowlton document presented recommendations to the tobacco industry on how to address the emerging evidence linking smoking to health harms, including establishing an industry research committee.
“A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers,” January 1, 1964: This advertisement signed by tobacco company CEOs was one of the first public relations efforts launched in response to the 1964 Surgeon General’s report. It sought to cast doubt on the report’s findings and promote the need for more research.

The documents show how the tobacco industry, through PR firms like Hill & Knowlton, launched a decades-long campaign to sow doubts about the health risks of smoking. They established front groups like the Tobacco Industry Research Committee to influence the research agenda and public opinions. These efforts were ultimately aimed at protecting the industry’s economic interests in the face of growing scientific consensus about the harms of tobacco.

Here are the key points summarized from the sources:

2007 article in Biomed Central journal cited evidence that tobacco industry targeted Asian American youth with marketing.
New York Times article discussed criticism of doctors being paid by tobacco industry to testify.
1969 RJR annual report discussed financial matters.
book The Cigarette Papers discussed history of tobacco litigation from 1954-1978 and industry paying $794 million in excise taxes in 1979.
industry documents showed coordination between companies to fund biomedical research from 1970s-1980s through organizations like TIRO and CRTF to influence research and present industry in positive light.
Frederick Seitz played a leading role in advising RJR and coordinating with other scientists to direct funding. Industry aimed to present alternative views to scientific consensus on health effects.
debate around FDA gaining authority to regulate tobacco and bills being passed in 2009 giving FDA this power.
summary of health effects of smoking and lowered public beliefs in dangers due to industry efforts sowing doubt.

Here is a summary of the key points from 3–66 in the provided text:

Fred Seitz helped establish the George C. Marshall Institute in 1984 to advocate for Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI or “Star Wars”) program.
The Marshall Institute brought together prominent scientists to make the case for SDI and argue against claims that it wasn’t technically feasible or could destabilize nuclear deterrence.
Members like Robert Jastrow criticized the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) for opposing SDI. Jastrow argued UCS took an ideological stance rather than an objective scientific view.
The Marshall Institute received funding from conservative foundations to promote its views in support of SDI and critique claims about risks of nuclear war like “nuclear winter.”
It aimed to counter the policy positions of groups like UCS and provide “alternative frameworks” to think about issues like verification and unintended consequences of SDI deployment.
Figures like William Nierenberg played a key role in establishing the Marshall Institute and shaping its advocacy in favor of Reagan’s vision for strategic missile defense.
Initially, the radio and TV spectra were carved up in the 1930s, limiting the number of stations that could be established, as signals could interfere with each other.
By the 1980s, technological improvements allowed for much more accurate control of signals, making many more stations possible.
The availability of cable television, which could carry more channels than over-the-air broadcast, rendered concerns about scarce spectrum irrelevant. Cable made it possible to offer more choices without interference issues.

So in summary, technological advances from the 1930s to 1980s gradually made it possible to establish many more radio and TV stations by improving control over signals and avoiding interference, and cable TV further increased channel capacity. This transition addressed the original constraint of limited available spectrum.

In the early 1970s, scientists like Gene Likens and F. Herbert Bormann published work showing that acid rain was a serious regional environmental problem affecting lakes and forests. Their work helped establish acid rain as a major scientific and policy issue.
Subsequent research in the 1970s further documented the widespread impacts of acid rain in both North America and Europe, including fish kills and forest damage. Isotopic analysis also allowed scientists to identify the anthropogenic sources of acid rain.
International scientific cooperation increased understanding of transboundary air pollution transport. Significant research was conducted under programs like the UNECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution.
The issue gained policy traction in the 1970s-1980s, with negotiations over protocols and agreements between the US, Canada, and European nations. Scientific assessments like NAPAP in the US helped inform these policy discussions.
While policy progress was made, full implementation of agreements faced challenges. Scientific understanding of the issue continued developing to better address the complex atmospheric and ecosystem interactions involved.

Here is a summary of key points about the ecological consequences of fossil fuel combustion from the referenced report:

The 1981 report by the National Research Council’s Committee on the Atmosphere and Biosphere addressed the environmental impacts of burning fossil fuels, particularly the acidifying effects of sulfur and nitrogen oxides.
It found that emissions from power plants and other industrial sources were acidifying rainfall and lakes across parts of North America and Europe. Acid rain was damaging forests and aquatic ecosystems.
Subsequent studies in the early 1980s clarified that midwestern coal burning power plants were the primary source of acid rain in the Northeast. Two National Academy reports in 1982 and 1983 confirmed these findings about the causes and effects of acid rain.
The reports contributed to the scientific and political debate around implementing controls on sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions from power plants to mitigate acid rain. They helped build the case that regulatory action was needed to address this environmental problem caused by air pollution transport across state and national boundaries.

Here is a summary of the key details from the Biographic Data for Acid Rain Group, WAN papers:

The Acid Rain Peer Review Panel was convened in 1982 by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy to review the scientific evidence and advise on policy regarding acid rain. William Nierenberg chaired the panel.
The panel’s final report in 1984 concluded that reductions in sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions were needed to mitigate acid rain impacts, though they did not recommend specific reduction targets.
There was disagreement on the panel, with S. Fred Singer being more skeptical of the evidence linking acid rain to environmental damage compared to other members like William Ackerman.
Some believed the Reagan administration suppressed parts of the panel’s findings prior to a key 1984 Congressional vote on acid rain legislation. There were also criticisms that the final report downplayed the risks and impacts of acid rain.
The 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, which established a cap-and-trade system for sulfur dioxide emissions, are now seen as an important milestone, though the debate over acid rain solutions continued for many years.

In summary, the documents outline the process and conclusions of the key federal scientific review panel on acid rain during the Reagan era, as well as some of the ongoing debate and controversies surrounding the policy response to acid rain at that time.

Here is a summary of the key points from the provided sources on the topic of Memorandum for the Acid Rain Peer Review Panel, 2 March 1983, WAN papers, MC13, 140:7 SIO Archives:

The memorandum was written by Dr. Kenneth Rahn for the Acid Rain Peer Review Panel in March 1983.
On page 2, the bottom sentence notes that as knowledge increases over time, actions should be taken that appear most effective and economical to deal with acid rain progressively.
Page 3 indicates the revisions to the summary statement downplayed the scientific evidence on acid rain and made it seem the problem was fundamentally insoluble, just needing to be managed over time.
This language mirrored what Nierenberg had written previously about problems like global warming having no real solution. It suggested White House influence on the report’s tone and conclusions.
The sources discuss ongoing debate and disputes over the EPA’s regulations to address acid rain in the 1980s, as well as criticism of the scientific case for acid rain from groups like the Marshall Institute. Overall it provides context around the peer review process and politicization of the issue during this time period.

Here are the key points summarized from the passages:

Dotto and Schiff’s book The Ozone War provides detailed accounts of the early 1970s conferences that helped establish the scientific understanding of ozone depletion, including debates over the impacts of SSTs and space shuttles on stratospheric ozone.
Paul Crutzen’s 1970 paper was an early publication highlighting the role of nitrogen oxides in ozone chemistry.
Rowland and Molina’s seminal 1974 paper first proposed that CFCs could deplete stratospheric ozone via a catalytic cycle involving chlorine atoms.
The 1976 National Academies report found that CFCs posed a potentially severe threat to ozone levels based on growing evidence. This helped spur political action in the U.S. and internationally.
Skeptics like S. Fred Singer questioned the scientific consensus on ozone depletion and undermined policy efforts in the late 1980s. However, the 1987 Antarctic ozone hole provided a “global experiment” validating the halocarbon-ozone theory.
The 1990 AASE expedition and later studies conclusively showed ozone depletion occurring in the Arctic vortex, cementing the science and need for policy solutions like the Montreal Protocol.

Here is a summary of the key points from the selected sources:

S. Fred Singer published articles in 1991 questioning the scientific evidence behind fears of acid rain, ozone depletion, and global environmental scares. He argued the science was being misled.
Dixy Lee Ray and Lou Guzzo’s 1990 book Trashing the Planet argued that the evidence for threats like acid rain and ozone depletion was exaggerated.
Rogelio Maduro authored articles in 1989 claiming the “myth” of the ozone hole was exaggerated.
Maduro and Ralf Schauerhammer’s 1992 book The Holes in the Ozone Scare argued the evidence showed the sky wasn’t falling with regards to ozone depletion.
Singer testified before Congress in 1995 that the EPA and others had been “misled” on stratospheric ozone science and the scientific evidence showed the ozone layer was not under threat from CFCs.
Singer and others like Patrick Michaels and Frederick Seitz publicly questioned the scientific consensus on the causes and threats of ozone depletion and global warming in various newspaper articles and books in the 1990s and 2000s.
Singer received funding for his nonprofit group Science and Environmental Policy Project from fossil fuel interests like ExxonMobil according to IRS filings.
Michaels, Seitz, and Singer were all affiliated with organizations like the George C. Marshall Institute that worked to undermine public understanding of climate science and its implications.

Here is a summary of the article “Passive Smoking,” Smoke-free Homes and Cars Program, January 1993, http://www.epa.gov/smokefree/pubs/etsfs.html:

The article discusses the EPA’s assessment of the health risks of passive/secondhand smoking. It summarizes the EPA’s conclusion that secondhand smoke causes serious health effects like lung cancer and heart disease. It also discusses how the tobacco industry tried to undermine the EPA’s findings through fronts groups and paid experts. Industry-funded groups criticized the EPA’s risk assessment methodology and conclusions. They promoted alternative experts like Fred Singer who argued passive smoking is harmless. The tobacco industry worked closely with these groups to mount a large PR campaign aimed at stirring public doubt about the risks of secondhand smoke. They sought to portray the EPA’s conclusions as “junk science.” At the same time, industry memos show their own internal research confirmed the health risks of passive smoking. In conclusion, the article outlines how the tobacco industry engaged in a large denial and misinformation campaign to counter the EPA’s evidence that passive smoking poses severe health risks.

Sources 91-92 discuss type I and type II errors in hypothesis testing and statistical significance. Type I errors are false positives, type II are false negatives.
Source 93 discusses the precautionary principle widely adopted in Europe, which shifts the burden of proof away from victims and asks for more caution when harms are recognized. The US has not adopted this stance.
Sources 94 and 105 discuss the cult of statistical significance and issues with epidemiological studies.
Sources 95, 96, and 99-101 discuss EPA reports and positions on secondhand smoke risks. Industry pushed ideas to question linear dose-response relationships for low carcinogen doses.
Sources 102-104 discuss Chauncey Starr’s views promoting probabilistic risk analysis and industry spokesperson Emil Mrak’s talks questioning food safety standards.
Sources 105-108 discuss a Feinstein paper on epidemiology standards and positive press for Philip Morris earnings reports.
Sources 109-113 discuss the industry front group FOREST and its conferences promoting deregulation of industry.
Sources 114-117 discuss libertarian/free market ideas promoted by FOREST founder John Luik and others related to resisting tobacco regulation.
Sources 118-130 discuss further industry documents promoting skeptic academics and deregulatory views through FOREST and other groups.

Here is a summary of the key points from 2008:

The piece discusses the early work and warnings about climate change from scientists like Roger Revelle in the 1960s. It notes President Johnson’s acknowledgement of it as an issue in 1965.
In 1979, a group called the Jason advisory group published a report highlighting the long-term risks of increasing CO2 on climate. This helped bring more attention to the issue from the scientific community.
That same year, the National Academies of Science convened an ad hoc study group led by Jule Charney to further examine the question. Their seminal 1979 report concluded rising CO2 levels were a serious problem.
Through the 1980s there was ongoing research but also attempts to downplay the severity of the risks by some like William Nierenberg. The issue became more politically polarized.
Two key moments that drew major attention were Jim Hansen’s congressional testimony in 1988 and the establishment of the IPCC international panel in 1990 in response to requests from international bodies like the WMO.

So in summary, it outlines the origins and early development of the scientific consensus on climate change through key reports and events in the 1960s-1980s period.

Here are summaries of the key points in paragraphs 76-131:

76-77: Discuss the Marshall Institute’s estimate of climate sensitivity and a communication about it.
78: A memo from Bill Kristol about a chart on global warming implications.
79: A letter from Robert Jastrow to Terry Yosle about the Marshall Institute.
80-83: Discuss Roger Revelle’s 1990 presentation on climate change, including quotes.
84: Walter Munk’s communication about Revelle.
85: Details about a lawsuit between S. Fred Singer and Justin Lancaster.
86-88: Discuss the IPCC 1990 Scientific Assessment and a quote from Singer.
89-92: Discuss a paper co-authored by Revelle, Singer and Starr.
93: An interview with Justin Lancaster.
94: An article by Gregg Easterbrook on environmentalism.
95-97: Discuss a paper and comments by Singer and related political debates.
98-101: Discuss communications and a paper by Revelle and Munk related to Revelle.
102-105: Further discuss the Revelle-Singer relationship and a related lawsuit.
106-107: Discuss a paper by Revelle and the UNFCCC.
108-109: Discuss Bush’s speech at the Rio Earth Summit and related events.
110-112: Discuss Santer’s work on signal detection of greenhouse warming.
113-115: Discuss Ramanathan’s work and IPCC procedures.
116-117: Discuss Santer’s work and timeline.
118-119: Quotes about Santer’s work from Oppenheimer and newspaper articles.
120-121: Discuss Michaels’ role as Virginia state climatologist.
122-123: Discuss Michaels’ publications and organizations.
124-127: Discuss Congressional testimony on climate models and communications about it.
128-131: Discuss further political context and Gelbspan’s book on climate denial.

This passage summarizes and analyzes several sources related to the history of DDT and the debate surrounding Rachel Carson’s book Silent Spring:

Ider and Paul N. Edwards, “Self-Governance and Peer Review in Science-for-Policy: The Case of the IPCC Second Assessment Report,” discusses the peer review and self-governance process of the IPCC.
Multiple sources are cited that discuss the development and use of DDT, including Edmund Russell’s War and Nature, which details DDT’s origins in chemical warfare research.
Rachel Carson’s book Silent Spring is summarized, noting how it brought attention to the unintended environmental and health impacts of DDT and other pesticides.
The public and regulatory response to Silent Spring is discussed, including a 1963 report by the President’s Science Advisory Committee that recommended limiting DDT use.
Modern critiques of Carson from free market think tanks like the Competitive Enterprise Institute and Heartland Institute are outlined, accusing her of erroneously opposing DDT use and exacerbating malaria outcomes.
Historians like Edmund Russell are cited who provide scientific context on DDT and argue Carson’s warnings were validated by subsequent research.

So in summary, it analyzes the historical development and debate around DDT regulation after Rachel Carson’s influential book Silent Spring.

Here is a summary of the key points from the provided information:

The President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) 1963 report on pesticides found extensive harmful effects of pesticides like DDT on wildlife and the environment. It recommended shifting the burden of proof to manufacturers to prove safety rather than assuming safety.
PSAC raised concern about transparency in the regulatory process and availability of data for public review. It advocated for more resources for research and regulation to establish a basis for regulation.
PSAC was influenced by medical principles of “first do no harm” and distrust of easy technological fixes without understanding unintended consequences, based on members’ backgrounds.
Earth Day in 1970 marked increased public concern about the environment and support for regulatory action on pesticide use.
Debate continued on the health impacts and risks of DDT use, as well as its role in successful mosquito control programs that reduced malaria. EPA administrator Ruckelshaus’s 1972 order canceled most DDT registrations due to health risks.
Studies continued finding adverse health effects associated with DDT exposure like breast cancer and effects on the endocrine system. It remains a persistent organic pollutant of global concern.

Here is a summary of the key points from the articles:

DDT (dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane) was an effective pesticide for controlling malaria but was banned in the 1970s due to environmental concerns. However, some argue DDT should still be used in developing countries to combat malaria.
Studies have found potential links between early life exposure to DDT and increased breast cancer risk later in life. However, the evidence is still uncertain.
During its use, DDT proved effective at controlling malaria in Sri Lanka and resistance of mosquitos was minimal in the 1970s according to WHO reports.
Some criticize the ban on DDT as unwarranted and argue it has led to increased malaria cases and deaths in developing countries. Supporters of DDT point to its effectiveness in Sri Lanka.
Think tanks like the Heartland Institute have campaigned against the stigma on DDT and in support of its continued use for malaria control. They argue the environmental risks of DDT were exaggerated.
Documents in tobacco industry archives show some think tanks including Heartland received funding from the tobacco industry to campaign on environmental issues like DDT and challenge the scientific consensus on topics like secondhand smoke. However, direct funding relationships are not always clear.
In summary, the health and environmental risks of DDT continue to be debated as well as its potential role in developing country malaria control programs. Think tanks have entered this debate in support of DDT use.
Documents discuss the Tobacco Institute’s Center for Indoor Air Research (CIAR), which conducted industry-funded research downplaying links between secondhand smoke and health issues.
Arthur Robinson and colleagues published reports claiming greenhouse gas emissions do not cause global warming through their Oregon Institute of Science and Medicine. They gathered signatures for a petition rejecting the consensus on human-caused warming.
Scientists like S. Fred Singer questioned evidence of threats from ozone depletion, acid rain and global warming. He consulted for companies like R.J. Reynolds and worked with organizations like the Heartland Institute to undermine climate policies.
Publications like the Journal of American Physicians and Surgeons and Consumer Reports Watchdog were used to spread industry-friendly views while appearing independent.
Economists like Milton Friedman and market-oriented think tanks like the Cato Institute promoted deregulation and free market solutions over environmental rules.
Some accused the US of using the UN climate process to redistribute wealth rather than address warming scientifically. Skeptics questioned tax and cap-and-trade policies as a “new socialism.”
Documents discuss the tobacco and fossil fuel industries using similar tactics to fund research and groups casting doubt on threats to mislead public opinion and policymaking on issues like secondhand smoke and climate change.
The gains in economic development and material comforts achieved in Asia during this time period were not replicated to the same extent in Africa. Most historians would say there have been ups and downs overall in human development and it is unclear if overall human well-being and happiness have improved, though lifespans have increased and material goods are more abundant.
Julian Simon and others argued that concerns about resource scarcity and environmental degradation were overblown because human ingenuity would find solutions to problems. They downplayed risks of issues like climate change.
Bjorn Lomborg rose to prominence criticizing what he saw as an overly alarmist view of environmental problems in his book The Skeptical Environmentalist. He argued concerns were exaggerated and received attention from free market think tanks but was also heavily criticized by scientists for using misleading analysis.
There remains significant scientific consensus that human activity like greenhouse gas emissions pose risks like accelerating climate change, though some continue to argue the scale of the problems or potential policy solutions are exaggerated. The policy debates continue on these issues.

Here is a summary of the key points from the sources listed:

The “hockey stick” graph showed a rapid rise in global temperatures in the 20th century compared to previous centuries based on climate proxy data. It became an icon in the IPCC reports but was challenged by skeptics.
Several studies, including by the National Academy of Sciences, reviewed the hockey stick graph and underlying data and found the main conclusion of warm temperatures in the late 20th century compared to preceding centuries to be valid.
Skeptics continued to argue flaws were found in the hockey stick graph methodology and data. Supporters contend adequate review by expert panels supported the robustness of the hockey stick finding.
Personal communications from climate scientists relayed that while details and uncertainties exist in paleoclimate reconstructions like the hockey stick, the general conclusion of unprecedented late 20th century warming is well-supported by multiple lines of evidence.
Critiques of challenges to the hockey stick graph argue they often rely on selective interpretation and ignore conclusions of expert panels that thoroughly reviewed the evidence. The main conclusion has been deemed valid by the broader scientific community.

Here are summaries of the key points for each entry:

Defense Intelligence Agency, 39–40 - The DIA published an internal report in 1974 questioning the danger from man-made climate change based on scientific findings at the time.

DeLay, Tom, 133 - Conservative Republican politician who supported tobacco industry efforts to dispute secondhand smoke health risks and block regulation.

Department of Agriculture, U.S., 66, 70 - Funded early scientific research on acid rain impacts through programs like Hubbard Brook.

Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), 261–62 - Government agency that funded technological development, showing the role of government investment in innovation.

Department of Energy, U.S., 1, 171 - Funded early climate modeling work through labs like Lawrence Livermore that helped establish scientific understanding of climate change.

Department of Health and Human Services, U.S., 137–38 - Agency whose surgeon general reports influenced public health policy on issues like smoking risks.

Department of Transportation, U.S., 108, 110 - Studied impacts of supersonic transport on stratosphere as part of “Man’s Impact” report in early 70s.

detection and attribution studies, 198 - Scientific work assessing whether observed climate changes could be attributed to human versus natural causes.

détente, 37–38 - Period of reduced US-Soviet tensions that influenced some scientists’ thinking about nuclear war risks.

dinosaur extinction, 47–48 - Event used by some scientists in the 1970s-80s to argue threats like nuclear war and climate change posed catastrophic global risks.

discounting, 180 - Economic concept that future climate impacts deserve less concern than present impacts due to time preference; a point questioned by some analysts.

Donahue, Thomas M., 110–11, 113 - NASA scientist who researched impact of supersonic aircraft on stratosphere ozone and headed TFASC panel advising against SST development.

Doomsday Machine, 50 - Book arguing that nuclear war posed risks of global consequences.

doubt-mongering - A range of techniques used to create unrealistic doubt about climate change risks and delay action, especially by vested interests.

droughts and famines, 171, 183–84 - 1970s events helped trigger early scientific and public concern about possible human-caused climate change.

Dunlap, Riley, 253 - Sociologist who studied polarization and ideological influences on Americans’ views of environmental issues.

DuPont Corporation, 123 - Major chemical company that phased out CFC production in response to emerging scientific evidence on ozone depletion.

Dyson, Freeman, 61 - Physicist who questioned nuclear winter models based on disagreement over input assumptions.

Earth Summit, 197, 252–54 - 1992 UN conference that established a framework convention on climate change but faced opposition from free-market ideologues skeptical of regulation.

Easterbrook, Gregg, 194 - Geologist and writer who dismissed fears of impending environmental catastrophes in books touting Cornucopian views.

Edwards, J. Gordon, 245 - Physicist and founding member of George C. Marshall Institute that disputed scientific findings on issues like ozone depletion and global warming.

Ehrlich, Paul, 48–49, 50, 54 - Biologist who argued in 1968 book The Population Bomb that overpopulation threatened global famine and argued for population control, spurring criticism.

El-Ashry, Mohamed, 103 - Executive director of UN Environment Programme in 1980s who sought international agreement limiting acid rain.

El Chichón, 132 - 1982 eruption of Mexican volcano that provided more evidence on links between volcanic eruptions and stratospheric ozone depletion.

Ellsaesser, Hugh, 210 - NASA scientist who co-authored critical letters on Santer et al. “fingerprinting” study attributing climate changes to humans.

Elsasser, Walter, 36 - Geophysicist and opponent of arms control who helped inspire some early climate “skeptics.”

Emanuel, Kerry, 52–53, 63 - Meteorologist who developed models of nuclear winter’s potential global impacts but later had doubts about some projections.

emissions trading, 93, 103 - Market-based air pollution regulation mechanism that some advocated for controlling acid rain but others resisted or regarded warily.

emphysema, 28–29 - Respiratory disease linked to cigarette smoking that the tobacco industry resisted firm scientific evidence about.

energy industry, 103 - Major US industries that opposed proposed regulation and taxes on fossil fuel emissions due to costs.

environmentalism - Overview of emergence and evolution of modern environmental movement from 1960s-90s and conservative countermovement.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) - Overview of EPA’s role in setting emissions standards, assessing health risks like from secondhand smoke, and facing opposition from industry and conservative critics.

environmental tobacco smoke (ETS). See secondhand smoke.

eugenics, 17 - Discredited field of improving human hereditary traits that some early tobacco researchers referenced but later became untenable given scientific understanding and implications.

external costs, 237–38, 248–49, 249–50 -Negative economic impacts of industrial activities like pollution not included in market prices, which environmentalists saw as case for regulation but market ideologues resisted.

Exxon Mobil, 246–47 - Oil company that funded groups and scientists opposing the scientific consensus on climate change despite its own early internal research supporting human-caused global warming.

Fairness Doctrine, 18, 240 - FCC policy that required broadcasters to discuss controversial issues of public importance and allow airtime for opposing views; phased out in the 1980s.

Federal Communications Commission, 23–24, 57 - Government agency that regulated airwaves and formerly enforced the Fairness Doctrine but no longer does.

Federal Focus, Inc., 148 - Short-lived tobacco industry front group set up in 1990s to attack EPA risk assessment on secondhand smoke.

Ferger, Roger, 20 - Tobacco industry consultant who helped set up projects to undermine scientific case linking smoking to death and disease.

Feynmann, Richard, 61 - Brilliant physicist and iconoclast who expressed doubts about certainty of nuclear winter projections due to input assumptions uncertainties.

fingerprinting, 1–2, 200, 210 - Technique of detecting unique “fingerprints” or patterns of climate changes attributable specifically to human greenhouse gas emissions versus other potential causes.

Fog, Kåre, 265 - Danish statistician who critiqued some aspects of temperature data algorithms but overall supported anthropogenic global warming conclusions.

Ford, Gerald, 38, 113 - US President whose administration continued environment and arms control initiatives of Nixon but faced challenges from opponents like Singer within government scientific advisory bodies.

Foreign Affairs, 50, 52, 59 - Influential international relations journal which published early pieces articulating threats of nuclear war and future environmental challenges.

FOREST (Freedom Organisation for the Right to Enjoy Smoking Tobacco), 162–63, 166–67 - British pro-smokers’ rights group formed in 1988 to lobby against smoking restrictions.

Foxley-Norris, Sir Christopher, 162–63, 164 - Outspoken chairman of FOREST who denied health impacts of secondhand smoke.

freedom, 64–65, 145, 162–68, 236–39, 248–54 - Core concept invoked both by pro-market groups skeptical of regulation and by civil libertarians resistant to lifestyle prohibitions and choices, though with different implications.

Freeman, Mark, 253 - Economist and founder of Cato Institute who argued for free market approach to environmental protection through well-defined property rights.

free market environmentalism, 152 - School of thought associated with Freeman proposing market and property rights solutions to environmental issues rather than top-down regulation.

free market fundamentalism, 249–55 - Descriptor applied to ideological form of economics that regards markets as infallible and regulation with distrust despite real-world complexities.

free market ideology - Overview of doctrines associated with Friedman, von Mises, and others suspicious of regulation and confident in technology and markets to solve problems like pollution through economic incentives alone.

Friedman, Milton, 64–65, 93, 249–50, 261 - Economist who advocated drastic deregulation and confidence in free markets to resolve issues more efficiently than government intervention based on rigorous price signals.

Frieman, Edward, 195 - Physicist who co-founded George C. Marshall Institute and helped coordinate skeptical scientific efforts opposing climate policies and regulations.

Fuller, Craig, 148–49, 150 - Tobacco industry consultant who undertook polls and focus groups to better understand public views on secondhand smoke and shape countermessages.

Fumento, Michael, 146, 151, 245 - Journalist and author who published books and articles opposing scientific consensus on issues from ozone depletion to secondhand smoke risks while receiving industry funding.

Garwin, Richard, 55 - Physicist who helped establish risks of nuclear war but also expressed uncertainty in some projections of impacts like nuclear winter.

Gates, Lawrence, 199–200 - Climate scientist who helped establish human fingerprint in global warming patterns through “optimal fingerprinting” methods.

Gelbspan, Ross, 246 - Journalist who investigated think tanks and organizations challenging climate science and exposed fossil fuel industry funding behind some.

George C. Marshall Institute - Overview of founding of conservative think tank in 1984 that helped coordinate advocacy against policies to address climate change, weakening of US missile defense, and other issues based on disputing pertinent scientific consensus positions.

Goddard Institute for Space Studies, 45, 184 - NASA research lab where Hansen and other leading climate scientists did work establishing human influence on climate through computer modeling.

Goldwater, Barry, 65 - Conservative politician associated with rising small-government philosophy in 1960s influencing later governmental debates over environment and climate issues.

Gorbachev, Mikhail, 57–58 - Soviet leader whose reforms and arms negotiations eased Cold War tensions but dismayed some hardliners who became involved in environmental policy debates.

Gore, Al Jr., 190, 194–95 - US politician who authored 1992 book Earth in the Balance on need to address climate change risks and whose position further polarized views on the issue among partisans.

Gorgas, William Crawford, 226 - US Army doctor who helped defeat yellow fever in Cuba and Panama through pioneering use of mosquito control, illustrating successes of public health interventions.

government control, 236, 252, 260 - Core issue skeptics sought to frame environmentalism and climate policy debate around due to philosophical distrust of collective action and expanded state authority over private matters and economy.

governments and technology, 261–62 - Insight that governments played major role promoting technological innovation through funding of basic research with later commercial applications.

Graham, Daniel O., 40, 42, 165, 238 - Physician, NIH official, and founding member of George C. Marshall Institute who disputed wide range of health and environmental science findings and policies through journal articles and congressional testimony.

Great Depression, 251 - Economic catastrophe of the 1930s that undermined laissez-faire economic ideology and prompted more activist state policies, in tension with later small-government philosophies.

Green, S. J., 274 - Environmentalist who analyzed role of misinformation in policy debates and strategic misuse of uncertainty regarding environmental threats like radiation and fossil fuels.

greenhouse gases, 127–28, 170–74 - Gases like carbon dioxide and methane accumulating in atmosphere from human emissions that cause global warming through enhanced natural greenhouse effect which some early studies helped validate.

Gutowsky, Herbert, 113 - German physical chemist who warned in 1953 article of potential for CFCs and related compounds to deplete stratospheric ozone based on chemical properties.

Han, Victor, 149–50 - Tobacco industry paralegal who helped coordinate attacks on EPA risk assessments regarding secondhand smoke through companies like RJ Reynolds.

Handler, Philip, 112, 113, 116, 172 - Physicist involved in the 1,953 discovery of ozone depletion from CFCs and the 1974 NCAR ozone model anticipating climate change impacts of fossil fuel use.

Hansen, William Webster, 28–29 - Leading researcher in 1920s-30s who established smoking causally linked to lung cancer and other diseases through animal studies despite tobacco industry resistance.

Hardin, Garrett, 83 - Biologist who advanced “tragedy of the commons” concept regarding overexploitation of shared environmental resources absent regulation.

Hare, F. Kenneth, 75 - Canadian meteorologist whose team conducted pioneering acid rain monitoring giving evidence of wide and spreading depositions fueling political pressure to take action.

Hare, Frank - Canadian meteorologist whose team conducted pioneering acid rain monitoring giving evidence of wide and spreading depositions fueling political pressure to take action.

Harris of High Cross, Lord, 163 - UK tobacco industry executive and politician who helped lead opposition to proposed advertising ban and indoor smoking restrictions in 1990s through FOREST lobbying group.

Hasselmann, Klaus, 198–99, 212–13 - German physicist who helped prove that observed 20th century warming was consistent with human greenhouse gas emissions and not natural patterns alone.

Heartland Institute, 217, 233–34, 238, 247–48 - Conservative free-market think tank founded in Chicago in 1984 that became leading organizer of dissent from scientific consensus on climate change impacts.

Helena National Forest, 219 - Site of early 1950s US Forest Service studies finding high-elevation tree deaths from air pollution helping build case for Clean Air Act.

Henry P. Kendall Foundation, 48 - Philanthropic funder of early environmentalist projects and groups in 1960s-70s but which began expressing doubts about some catastrophic warnings.

Heritage Foundation, 37, 86, 125–26 - Conservative think tank launched in 1973 that opposed expanding environmental and public health regulations from toxic waste to secondhand smoke based on free-market ideas.

Hill and Knowlton (John Hill), 15–16, 17, 33 - Major public relations firm hired in 1953 by tobacco industry to develop a vigorous PR campaign defending industry that helped delay regulatory action for decades.

Hirayama, Takeshi, 137–38 - Japanese scientist whose 1981 study was first large-scale epidemiological proof that spousal smoking increased lung cancer risk in nonsmokers, contradicting industry claims.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 48 - Atomic bombings in 1945 presented vivid example of new technological dangers that helped spur post-WWII environmental science and concerns about nuclear fallout and effects.

Hockaday, Tom, 143 - EPA staffer who accused agency of overstating cancer risks from secondhand smoke based on flawed modeling in 1994 report to Congress requested by Senator Mitch McConnell.

Hoover Institution, 37 - Think tank at Stanford University that provided forums for those skeptical of emerging science on issues like acid rain and secondhand smoke hazards.

hormesis, 158 - Theory argued by some industry consultants that low doses of toxic substances may prove beneficial, applied to downplay risks from secondhand smoke.

Houghton, John, 204, 205, 208–9 - British atmospheric physicist involved in IPCC who helped establish the validity of its assessments against industry-backed counter-claims.

Hounshell, David, 105, 106 - Historian who documented positive role of regulation in stimulating environmental innovation in industries like automotive catalytic converters.

Hubbard Brook Ecosystem Study, 66–67, 68, 104 - Pioneering long-term US Forest Service project launched in 1963 in New Hampshire to understand impacts of acid rain on forests proving highly influential data.

Hudson Institute, 37 - Early conservative think tank co-founded by Herman Khan that voiced skepticism about environmental threats and regulations in its forecasts of future trends.

Hufbauer, Carolyn, 195 - Wife of economic historian Gary Hufbauer who co-published a 1994 book objecting to the depiction of climate change as an urgent crisis.

Hunten, Donald, 112 - Planetary scientist who helped research ozone depletion mechanisms at NASA and on the 1974 NCAR ozone model anticipating impacts.

Inadvertent Modification of the Stratosphere (IMOS), 113 - 1974 US National Academy of Sciences report warning that CFC emissions could deplete ozone based on emerging evidence while industry remained unconcerned.

Independent Institute, 260 - Free-market think tank launched in 1986 that published works opposing many mainstream findings on issues from global warming to gun violence using economistic framing.

Indoor Residual Spraying, 223–24, 225 - Vector control technique pioneered by Gorgas involving spraying insecticides on inner walls to battle malaria that proved highly effective.

innovation and regulation, 105–6 - Historical fact that regulations like on auto emissions spurred technological improvements and new industries rather than stifled innovation as market orthodoxy argued.

insecticides. See DDT

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) - Overview of UN’s scientific body established in 1988 that helped establish widespread scientific agreement on human-caused climate change through major assessments despite attacks from industry-backed groups skeptical of its findings.

International Geophysical Year (IGY), 82 - 1957-58 global scientific project that spurred research revealing issues like impacts of nuclear fallout and led to creation of the World Meteorological Organization.

International Symposium on Acid Precipitation and the Forest Ecosystem, 70 - 1978 conference presenting evidence of acid rain’s toll on forests that raised political pressure internationally for a response.

Internet, 240–41, 261–62 - Digital revolution spurred by government research investment that later empowered additional advocacy, activism and counternarratives on issues from secondhand smoke to climate change.

Investor’s Business Daily, 146, 148 - Financial newspaper that provided forum for doubters of environmental health risks like secondhand smoke hazards.

IPCC. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)

Iraq War, retired generals on, 243 - Example of media giving disproportionate exposure to military figures dissenting from assessments of sitting generals on issues like the 2007 “surge.”

Jacques, Peter, 253 - Technology analyst and environmental skeptic who questioned need for international climate agreements and voiced optimism about market and tech solutions.

Jasons, 171–72, 173–74 - Elite group of scientist-advisers to the Pentagon and intelligence community on issues of national security importance formed in 1960 helped establish first National Academy of Sciences reports on climate change in the 1970s.

Jastak, Robert - See under his name.

Jastrow, Robert - See under his name.

Jeffreys, Kent, 152–53 - Tobacco

Here are summaries of the selected passages:

Müller, Paul (217–18) - Paul Müller was a Swiss scientist who discovered in 1929 that DDT was an effective insecticide, for which he received the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 1948.
Munk, Walter (195, 196) - Walter Munk was a Scripps Institution of Oceanography scientist who studied ocean currents and climate change. He served on the National Academy of Sciences climate change panels.
Murrow, Edward R. (19–20) - Edward R. Murrow was a pioneering American broadcast journalist who helped bring the hazards of smoking to public attention through his See It Now TV reports in the 1950s.
NASA (111, 118–21) - NASA studied ozone depletion and global warming through satellite observations and research programs. The NASA Ames Research Center modeled nuclear winter scenarios in the early 1980s.
NASA Ames Research Center (47–49, 123–24) - Located in Silicon Valley, NASA Ames modeled nuclear winter and Arctic ozone depletion scenarios in the 1980s.
National Academy of Sciences, U.S. (63, 172–74, 174–76, 176–83) - The conservative NAS convened prominent scientists to assess climate science in 1979, 1983, and 1992. Freeman Dyson and Fred Seitz criticized these assessments.
National Cancer Institute (20) - The NCI convened an advisory committee in 1962 that produced the first report linking smoking to cancer, helping to shape public views on the health hazards of tobacco use.
Nierenberg, William (7–9, 79, 174, 176–77, 180–81, 182–83, 207–8, 211–13, 238, 270–271) - A Scripps Institution oceanographer who discounted acid rain harm and headed two NAS panels assessing climate change science in the 1980s. He worked with Fred Seitz and William Nierenberg.

Here is a summary of key points about the book Merchants of Doubt:

The book examines how a small group of scientists obscured the truth about issues like tobacco smoke, acid rain, the ozone hole, and global warming.
It focuses on how these scientists, funded by industries like tobacco, cast doubt on the links between tobacco smoking and cancer, as well as human-caused climate change.
They cultivated experts to claim the science was unclear and more research was needed, creating doubt and delaying regulation.
Many of these same scientists, like Fred Seitz and William Nierenberg, worked to undermine the scientific consensus on climate change through organizations like the George C. Marshall Institute.
They used the same tactics as the tobacco industry, claiming scientific uncertainty where there was little, to confuse the public and prevent action on climate policy.
The book argues they deliberately aimed to mislead the public and policymakers in order to protect industry interests for profits, showing how doubt can be manufactured despite scientific agreement.
It’s a historical examination of how a small group obfuscated clear scientific evidence for political and financial goals across different issues over several decades.

#book-summary

Merchants of Doubt - Naomi Oreskes