Revenge of Geography What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate, The - Robert D. Kaplan

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• Copyright and publishing information for the book “The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate” by Robert D. Kaplan. Published in 2012 by Random House.

• The preface draws from Kaplan’s experiences traveling through mountainous regions like Kurdistan, the Carpathians, and the Khyber Pass to illustrate how geography has influenced politics and cultures.

• Mountains often protect indigenous cultures and provide refuge, while also serving as natural borders. The Carpathians marked a transition from Hungary to a more oppressed Romania under Ceausescu.

• Crossing the Caspian Sea showed a staged evaporation of Europe and the beginnings of Central Asia. Turkmenistan reflected the geopolitical patterns of repeated invasions and instability.

• The Khyber Pass geographically but not historically divided Afghanistan and Pakistan, representing more of an “Indo-Persian continuum.”

• Kaplan recalls his experiences passing through the artificial border of the Berlin Wall during the Cold War division of Germany.

The passage discusses the changing borders and territories of Germany over history as revealed by maps and books the author studied in 1989. It notes how Germany has frequently shifted size and shape, encompassing different areas at different times. The Berlin Wall was just one more stage in this ongoing territorial transformation.

The author reflects on how the authoritarian regimes they knew in Eastern Europe seemed so permanent, yet fell abruptly, teaching about instability of dictatorships. Maps become more important in times of upheaval, as the political landscape shifts.

The passage then discusses divided regions like Korea and barriers like the DMZ that arbitrarily divide ethnic groups. Such borders often do not conform to natural divisions and may be vulnerable. The author intends to recover a historical geographical perspective that has been lost, applying insights from unfashionable thinkers to analyze events across Eurasia.

Geography still matters despite claims it is irrelevant in a “flat world.” The passage uses the example of the Arab uprisings, noting how shared communication enabled protests across countries but each has its own narrative influenced by deep history and geography. It provides geographical and historical context for why the uprising began in Tunisia, discussing the region’s ancient urbanization and development patterns. Such knowledge adds depth to understanding events elsewhere.

The passage discusses political upheavals and challenges to constructing liberal orders following the end of the Cold War. In particular, it focuses on three regions - the Balkans, Africa, and the Middle East.

It argues that after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, there was an idealistic belief that democracy and globalization would easily spread throughout the world. However, ethnic conflicts erupted in the Balkans in the 1990s, showing the limitations of this view. Africa also struggled with instability, violence, and slow democratic progress in the post-Cold War period.

Geography played an important role in these challenges. Countries like Libya, Yemen, and Syria were naturally more divided based on sectarian and ethnic lines, making autocratic rule or extremism more necessary to hold them together compared to more cohesive countries like Tunisia and Egypt. Yemen in particular had weak central governance due to its mountainous terrain empowering tribes.

The journey of U.S. interventions, from the limited Balkan operation to the full Iraq invasion, further exposed the constraints of universal liberal ideas when faced with the realities of different regional geographies and societies in the Middle East. The post-Cold War period highlighted how geography and local realities still shaped political outcomes.

The Balkan countries were traditionally viewed as part of the Ottoman/Byzantine empires and less developed than Central Europe. During communist rule, Romania and Bulgaria suffered greater repression than countries like East Germany and Yugoslavia had some freedom. Traveling between Hungary and Romania showed the difference, with Romania having poorer infrastructure and requiring bribes.

While Central European states like Hungary and Poland were more homogeneous, the ethnic mix in Yugoslavia contributed to greater violence breaking out there than elsewhere. However, some intellectuals advocated an inclusive vision of Europe that was not discriminatory and saw the fall of the Berlin Wall as an opportunity to spread liberal ideals globally, including to places like the Balkans and Africa. This view saw Bosnia and Kosovo interventions in the 1990s as extensions of restoring Central Europe.

However, some theorists argue Central Europe lacks geopolitical substance due to being in a “crush zone” between maritime powers and the Eurasian heartland. Germany’s reunification could swing it either east toward Russia or west toward the UK/US, renewing tensions over control of Europe and the heartland region. While a pacifist Germany now helps stability, its historical role as a land power means it could regain strategic awareness with consequences for balancing regional powers.

The passage discusses the debate around interventions in the Balkans in the 1990s to stop ethnic cleansing and genocide. It explores the views of intellectuals and interventionists who saw Bosnia as a test case that showed military force could be deployed successfully for humanitarian purposes.

Key points:

• Intellectuals drew parallels between Western inaction in Bosnia and the appeasement of Hitler at Munich in 1938. They argued strong action was needed to prevent further atrocities.

• NATO interventions in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999) seemed to validate this view as they succeeded with little military cost or risk of quagmire. This exorcised fears of another Vietnam.

• Writers argued for early and forceful interventions with no emphasis on “exit strategies.” Stopping genocide was a moral imperative that overrode caution, in their view.

• However, the Balkan wars showed the realities of history and geography still held sway. Fighting broke out along old imperial borders between Catholic/Muslim and Orthodox identities that had been suppressed but not resolved.

So in summary, it discusses the intellectual case made for robust humanitarian interventions in the Balkans in the 1990s, but also notes the complex historical realities on the ground drove the ethnic conflicts.

• Wieseltier criticized Clinton for only launching a limited and belated NATO air war against Serbia in Kosovo, advocating for ground troops to protect Kosovar Albanians from Serb atrocities.

• He argued Clinton’s “cowardly war” of precision air strikes allowed Americans to avoid casualties while large-scale suffering continued on the ground.

• Many liberal intellectuals in the 1990s urged greater US military intervention in places like Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo, feeling air power alone was insufficient.

• The US military’s dominance in the Gulf War and Balkan interventions encouraged some to see Iraq as another cause worth invading for, despite reservations from realists like Scowcroft.

• The success of air power in the 1990s reduced the influence of geography on US strategy, though its limitations became clear again in complex conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

• Both Munich and Vietnam analogies influenced policy debates, with Munich encouraging interventionism and Vietnam cautioning restraint due to the costs and limits of US power.

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The text describes the author’s experience embedding with the U.S. Marines in Iraq in March 2004. They describe Camp Udari in Kuwait near the Iraqi border, where the Marines were preparing for their overland journey into Baghdad and western Iraq.

The scale of the U.S. military occupation in Iraq becomes immediately apparent, with vast convoys of trucks and equipment stretching across the desert. It takes days to complete all the logistical preparation and begin the several hundred kilometer journey, which just a few years prior some had dismissed as easily done.

During the initial non-violent portion of crossing the desert, the author observes how even the physical terrain still matters greatly for military operations. This experience would reinforce the realist view that geography, history and culture set important limits on what can be accomplished in a given place like Iraq.

The passage discusses realism in international relations and the role of geography. It argues that embracing realism during the Iraq War meant secretly embracing geography, as geography imposes limits on human actions and national power arises from geographical factors.

Maps can distort realities and imply control over areas not fully controlled, but they are still crucial for understanding world politics from a realist perspective. Geography provides the backdrop for history and was an important discipline before political science. Mountains, tribes, and positions on maps define states more than ideas.

While geography constrains, it does not determine outcomes. Humans can maneuver within broad parameters through technology and agency. A key realist, Spykman, argued geography is the most permanent factor in foreign policy. Mountain ranges and access to sea have been persistent geopolitical issues for countries like Russia. Overall, the passage examines how embracing realism entails an acceptance of geography’s influence on international relations and foreign policy according to realist theory.

The passage discusses how geography has profoundly shaped history and international affairs. It gives several examples:

• Britain and Egypt benefited from their island locations, protecting them from invaders.

• Germany’s location left it exposed to threats from both east and west, shaping its militarism. Britain’s island security allowed an earlier democratic system.

• China’s location along major sea lines gives it more geopolitical importance than Brazil, despite potential size and economic growth.

• Africa’s geography, including lack of good harbors and barriers like deserts and forests, hindered development and modernization. European colonial borders were artificial.

• Landlocked and tropical countries tend to be poorer. Eurasia benefitted from east-west diffusion, unlike Africa. Poor regions are often isolated with high population densities but no economic growth.

• The US benefited from access to both Europe and East Asia via two protective oceans, allowing both isolationism and interventionism in foreign policy. However, oceans also limited rapid deployment of troops.

• Globalization has revived local ethnic identities tied to specific landscapes, explained best through geography. Terrain still determines warfare despite technology. Geography remains highly influential.

The passage discusses the importance of geography in shaping history and politics, highlighting the works of several scholars. It focuses on William McNeill and Marshall Hodgson, both professors at the University of Chicago in the mid-20th century.

McNeill argued in his seminal book The Rise of the West that cultures and civilizations continuously interacted throughout history, shaped by large population movements across different regions. He traced how movements from the Fertile Crescent influenced the development of Europe and North Africa. The passage notes Mesopotamia’s unstable geography made it a violent frontier zone susceptible to invasion.

The passage also discusses Marshall Hodgson, a pioneering scholar of Islam’s history. It establishes the audacious scope of McNeill and Hodgson’s works as exemplifying a past era of scholarship with broad horizons, compared to today’s emphasis on specialization. Geography, the passage argues, provides a means for thinking broadly about world history. It endorses splitting the difference between geographic determinism and human agency, acknowledging both influences on historical events.

McNeill discusses how geography has strongly influenced the rise and development of civilizations throughout history. In ancient Mesopotamia (Iraq), geography necessitated oppressive rule to maintain centralized control and defend against invaders, as described by historian Ibn Khaldun. Egypt, protected by deserts and sea, required less oppression along the Nile river.

Peripheral civilizations like India, Greece, and China developed influences from nearby cultures but were also sheltered from steppe invaders by mountains or distance. China developed most independently. Cultural interactions increased via the Silk Road but civilizations maintained distinct identities.

McNeill acknowledges geography’s role but argues against outright determinism, noting counterexamples like Greece’s diverse city-states and Judaism’s survival after Judea’s destruction. Overall, geography forms a basis for civilizations but human agency and ideas also shape history in complex ways according to McNeill.

• Europe’s geography included an indented coastline with many natural harbors, navigable rivers extending commerce, timber and metals. However, its climate was also harsh and wet.

• This difficult environment stimulated the development of civilization as people had to work hard to survive but benefits like transport routes emerged.

• Proximity to Scandinavia also pressured development in places like England and France. England’s island status aided its transition to a unified nation.

• Some environments like the Arctic can arrest civilization by being too difficult initially. Indigenous peoples may develop survival skills but not full civilizations.

• Europe offered the right balance of challenges to spur greater heights of civilization while still having trade connections to other regions.

• Gradual closure of “empty” or frontier spaces through history increased contacts between civilizations and prepared the way for modern globalization. This includes colonial expansion and partitioning of central Eurasia.

• While the world became relatively united by the 18th-19th centuries, population density and technology are continually filling remaining spaces, changing geopolitics. Distance between groups keeps shrinking.

This passage summarizes Marshall Hodgson’s view of the role geography played in the emergence and spread of Islam as a world religion and culture. Some key points:

• Hodgson saw Islam developing in a broad geographical region he termed the “Oikoumene” or “Greater Middle East” stretching from North Africa to western China. This shifted focus away from a Eurocentric view.

• The arid landscape and sparse population of this region encouraged urbanization around oasis cities engaged in long-distance trade. Mecca emerged as a key commercial hub due to its location along intersecting trade routes.

• Ethics and fair dealings were important to the merchant-based society. Islam emphasized these values as a “merchants’ creed”.

• Geography helped determine the spread of Islam, as it agglutinated onto existing merchant and Bedouin networks shaped by the landscape.

• The location and connections of cities like Mecca, Baghdad and Damascus influenced the development of distinct yet interconnected Islamic cultural centers within the larger civilization.

So in summary, Hodgson argued geography significantly influenced the emergence and spread of Islam as a world religion and culture centered in the interconnected lands between the Mediterranean and India. The arid trade-based society of this “Oikoumene” shaped the values and networks Islam emerged within.

• In 1071, the Seljuk Turks defeated the Byzantine Empire at the Battle of Manzikert, capturing the Anatolian heartland for Islam. The Seljuks were a steppe people from Central Asia who invaded Anatolia from the east.

• However, like the Arabs before them, the Seljuks struggled to maintain stable rule over the mountainous regions of Anatolia as well as the Fertile Crescent and Iranian plateau. Geography posed challenges to their control.

• Hodgson argues the horse-riding Mongols and Turkic peoples had a more significant impact on history than the camel-riding Arabs, as their horses allowed them to conquer territories across Eurasia important for later gunpowder empires. The Mongol and Turkic invasions were among the most consequential events of the second millennium.

• Features like centralized rule confined the Ottoman Empire’s expansion to areas within a season’s march of Constantinople. Geography functionally limited the reach of their military system. Their naval power also clustered near home ports in the Mediterranean and Black Seas.

• Hodgson analyzes how geography interacts with political and ideological factors to shape historical developments, using the spread of Islam and rise/fall of empires as a lens. His work reveals pivotal trends across Afro-Eurasia rather than focusing only on specific areas.

• The passage discusses the importance of understanding geography and its influence on history and geopolitics. It references the work of ancient historian Herodotus, who described ancient landscapes in a way that showed an appreciation for how geography shaped cultures and conflicts.

• It then discusses the work of Halford Mackinder, considered the father of modern geopolitics. In a famous 1904 article, Mackinder put forth the idea that Central Asia, forming part of the Eurasian Heartland, was the “geographical pivot” of history and the rise and fall of world empires. The layout of Eurasia encouraged the rise of large empires along natural transportation routes.

• Mackinder believed that in the post-Columbian age (after major seaborne European exploration and colonization) the world would see the rise of a closed system of global geopolitics, where conflicts in one part of the world would echo and impact other regions. He correctly predicted that European wars would become global in scale, as seen in World Wars I and II.

• The passage establishes Mackinder’s theory of geopolitics as influential in understanding global power shifts and conflicts, while acknowledging criticisms of viewing geography as too deterministic. It sets up Mackinder’s ideas as important context for understanding modern geopolitical dynamics.

• Mackinder’s geopolitical theory centered on the concept of the Heartland - the vast landmass of Eurasia. Whoever controlled the Heartland would dominate the world island of Eurasia, Africa, and Europe.

• Throughout history, nomadic invasions originated from the Eurasian steppe lands, putting pressure on the marginal regions of Europe, the Middle East, India, and China. This helped shape the rise of civilizations.

• By the early 20th century, advances in railways allowed Russia to expand across its landmass. Mackinder warned this would enable Russia to exert control over the Heartland and pivot region of Eurasia.

• Advances in sea power in prior centuries had allowed Europe to break free of domination by land powers like Russia and the Mongols. But rising Russian power again threatened to make land power dominant.

• The map was filling up with more weapons and populations. Mackinder’s thesis was that whoever controlled the Heartland would control the world, given technological changes like railways that were increasingly connecting the previously isolated central region.

• Within two weeks of Mackinder’s 1904 lecture on the importance of land power, Japan attacked Russia at Port Arthur, marking the start of the Russo-Japanese War. A year later, Japan won a decisive naval victory over Russia at the Battle of Tsushima Strait, demonstrating the power of sea power over land powers at the time.

• Mackinder’s theories anticipated the rise of the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence during the Cold War. The two World Wars in the early 20th century also involved struggles for control over Mackinder’s concept of the “rimlands” region between Eastern Europe and East Asia. Railway expansion in Central Asia proved his point about the Heartland’s strategic importance.

• Mackinder faced some criticism as being too deterministic and as an imperialist, but he believed human agency could overcome geographical constraints. He saw geography as an influence that could be overcome through innovation. While setting out a challenging geopolitical vision, he wanted to spur action to rise above predetermined realities.

• Mackinder continually revised and updated his 1904 “Pivot” thesis based on new events, showing he was not static in his thinking. His post-WWI book Democratic Ideals and Reality further expanded and warned about his geopolitical concepts. Despite criticism, Mackinder made important contributions to strategic thought with his focus on the interplay of geography and politics.

• Mackinder views Eurasia and Africa together as forming a single large landmass, which he calls the “World-Island.” He sees this World-Island becoming increasingly interconnected politically and economically over time.

• The World-Island contains the vast majority of the world’s population, wealth, GDP, and energy resources, meaning it will dominate global geopolitics.

• Mackinder identifies a central region of Eurasia (stretching from Eastern Europe to East Asia) as the “Heartland.” Whoever controls the Heartland, in his view, commands the World-Island and thus the world.

• In later writings, Mackinder expands his definition of the Heartland to include more of Central Asia and inland China/India. He sees the Heartland becoming the core region of Soviet power during the Cold War.

• Mackinder comes to support the creation of independent buffer states between Germany and Russia in Eastern Europe. This is partly in reaction to WWI and the collapse of empires, and reflects his evolving liberal political views.

• Despite modifying his theory, Mackinder’s view of the Heartland’s central role in global power politics, as well as the increasing interconnectedness of the World-Island, form the foundation for his geopolitical outlook.

• Karl Haushofer was a German geopolitician who studied under Mackinder and was heavily influenced by his ideas about the importance of controlling the Heartland region of Eurasia.

• Haushofer founded the field of geopolitics in Germany and taught it at the University of Munich. One of his students was Rudolf Hess, who introduced Haushofer to Hitler while he was imprisoned after the Beer Hall Putsch.

• Haushofer provided briefings on geopolitics to Hitler during this time as Hitler was writing Mein Kampf. Chapter 14 of Mein Kampf, which outlines Nazi foreign policy and the goal of Lebensraum (living space), may have been influenced by Haushofer.

• Haushofer advocated for a German alliance with Japan and was fascinated by Japan’s military rise. He believed Germany needed to expand eastwards into territories like Eastern Europe and Central Asia for living space, influenced by theorists like Ratzel who saw expansion as natural law.

• Thus, Haushofer helped distort and misapply Mackinder’s theories to provide an intellectual justification for Nazi expansionism and the quest for more territory in Eastern Europe and Russia, known as Lebensraum. This had tragic consequences and discredited the field of geopolitics for some time.

This passage summarizes Robert Strausz-Hupé’s work Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power, in which he analyzes the geopolitical theories of Halford Mackinder and Karl Haushofer. The key points are:

• Mackinder theorized that whoever controlled the Eurasian “Heartland” would control the world, but he saw it in neutral terms and advocated for independent buffer states in Eastern Europe.

• Haushofer radicalized and inverted Mackinder’s theory to justify German expansionism and consolidation of Eastern Europe under German control. He saw other states as decaying and Germany as entitled to more “living space.”

• Strausz-Hupé argues Haushofer perverted geopolitics from Mackinder’s more balanced realism into an ideological tool for German aggression and dismantling the balance of power.

• However, Strausz-Hupé still takes geopolitics seriously and warns Americans to understand it, lest others use it against them like the Nazis did. He aims to instill geopolitical realism in the US for its postwar role balancing power in Eurasia.

• It analyzes how Haushofer’s ideas influenced Nazi strategic thinking but also changed over time, andnotes Haushofer’s contradictionsending in disgrace and suicide after Germany’s defeat.

• Nicholas Spykman was a Dutch-American geopolitical theorist who established the Institute of International Studies at Yale.

• Like Strausz-Hupé and others, he brought realism to American geopolitics thinking, arguing geography is the most important factor. The distribution and struggle for power and space is perpetual.

• History is made primarily in the Northern Hemisphere temperate zone between 20-60 degrees latitude, including North America, Europe, Middle East, northern Africa, Russia, China, India.

• The US occupies the last major empty area in this temperate zone, and its location with access to two oceans gave it advantages.

• The US became a great power through dominance in the Western Hemisphere as the regional hegemon of North and South America.

• The strategic heart of the Americas is the Caribbean Sea/Gulf of Mexico region (the “American Mediterranean”). American control here after 1898 allowed global power projection.

The passage discusses geography’s influence on geopolitics in South America according to geopolitical theorist Nicholas Spykman. It notes that while the Caribbean basin unites North and South America, physical barriers like mountain ranges isolate the Amazon basin and Southern Cone from the rest of South America.

This geographic isolation means the Southern Cone region has historically been less integrated into global trade and geopolitical currents compared to areas closer to the Caribbean. However, globalization is now bringing the US into closer contact with Latin America due to migration, trade, and other factors.

The passage also discusses how Spykman was influenced by earlier geographer Halford Mackinder’s theories of the Eurasian Heartland and Rimland. Both focused on how control of central Eurasia could influence global power. However, Spykman placed more emphasis than Mackinder on the strategic importance of the Rimland regions surrounding Eurasia.

Overall, the summary analyzes Spykman’s views on how geography influences South American geopolitics and integration, noting both the historical isolation of parts of the region as well as modern trends of greater global connections driven by globalization. It also discusses Spykman’s geopolitical theories in the context of his influences from and differences with Mackinder.

• The wars in Poland, Iran, Afghanistan, and Vietnam during the Cold War were all aimed at preventing communist powers like the Soviet Union and China from extending their control from the inner/Heartland regions out to the peripheral/Rimland areas of Eurasia, according to geopolitical theories.

• Henry Kissinger argued in 1957 that “limited wars” were necessary to prevent the Soviets from overrunning peripheral areas due to their interior lines of communication and ability to project power.

• In the 1940s, even as WWII raged on, geopolitical theorist Nicholas Spykman was already worrying about potential threats from a powerful postwar Germany, Russia, and China.

• Spykman argued for strong Allies like Japan and Germany as counters to Russia/China after the war. He also opposed a united Europe or any single power dominating Eurasia and surrounding seas.

• Spykman differed from later Cold War containment policy by prioritizing realpolitik over democratic values and being more pessimistic about cooperation between major powers.

• Looking at polar maps, Spykman highlighted the close proximity and organic relationship between North America and Eurasia, and how this core region would be the base of global politics.

• In the future, improved Arctic transit could intensify geopolitical interconnectivity between major powers like the US, Russia and China in the northern hemisphere.

The passage discusses the geopolitical theories of Halford Mackinder and Alfred Thayer Mahan. It notes that while Mackinder focused on the importance of land power and the Eurasian heartland, Mahan emphasized sea power and viewed the Indian and Pacific Oceans as crucial.

Mahan argued that naval power was less threatening to stability than land power due to its limited ability to project force inland. He saw the Rimland regions surrounding Eurasia, like China, Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey, as strategically important. Geography helped dictate Cold War containment strategies against the Soviet Union through these Rimland states.

While Mahan’s ideas influenced American naval expansionism, the passage notes they did not fully account for a land power’s ability to threaten Europe rapidly. Nonetheless, Mahan foresaw alliances guarding the global commons. The chapter then introduces Mahan’s book The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, which analyzed how naval power impacted political struggles. Mahan stressed the need for prudent military preparation despite democratic aversion to it. Overall, the passage analyzes the contrasting but complementary perspectives of Mackinder and Mahan on geopolitics and sea versus land power.

• Alfred Thayer Mahan was an influential naval strategist and historian in the late 19th century. He argued that control of the seas was critical in history, citing examples like Rome defeating Hannibal by controlling Mediterranean shipping routes.

• Mahan believed domination of sea lanes was more important than individual naval battles. He contended that nations with advantageous coastal geography like England and America should develop strong navies to project power globally.

• The building of the Panama Canal would bring American naval power physically closer to Asia, inevitably drawing the US into more international entanglements according to Mahan. However, geography was not destiny - the canal was the result of human decisions and engineering feats.

• Some criticized Mahan’s views as deterministic and overemphasizing states over individuals. But his theories were seen as more practical for grand strategy than total pacifism advocated by some.

• Chinese and Indian strategists today are influenced by Mahan’s ideas as their navies grow, viewing sea power in competitive terms. Meanwhile the US Navy has embraced a more cooperative approach advocated by British theorist Julian Corbett.

• The passage discusses a “crisis of room” wherein geography is losing its ability to act as a buffer against military and technological advances due to increasingly dense populations and capabilities that compress distances.

• It summarizes Paul Bracken’s thesis that Asian militaries are developing advanced capabilities as their economies grow, shrinking the strategic space in Eurasia. Missile and WMD programs are spreading across a 6,000 mile arc from Israel to North Korea.

• Distance no longer provides protection as military and surveillance technologies enable countries like India and China to monitor each other far beyond their borders. Alliances are also becoming more important as powers can now support each other over long distances.

• Eurasia is becoming a “shrinking chessboard” with less room for miscalculation due to concentrated populations and firepower. Disruptive technologies like WMDs further destabilize the situation by undermining existing military advantages.

• In sum, geography is losing its ability to maintain strategic buffers and stability as technology erodes distances between military powers in the crowded Eurasian landmass.

• Technology and religious extremism brought Iran close to Israel despite being over 800 miles apart, showing how disruptive technologies are allowing formerly weaker states to project power globally.

• Countries like China, North Korea, India and Pakistan are developing nuclear weapons and missiles rather than just buying Western arms. Tactical nuclear weapons in the developing world threaten large US bases that enable power projection.

• This hinders US power around Eurasia and leads to a more unstable multipolar system. Nuclear/chemical weapons can destroy forward bases or render them temporarily unusable.

• Arms control is needed to maintain US dominance in Asia, but proliferation makes this difficult. More states will use nuclear weapons for “political maneuvers” without actually using them, though some may lack control mechanisms.

• Crowded cities in a small Eurasian “room” will demand skilled balance of power politics to prevent violence. Geography is still important but less dominant due to shrinking distances between states.

• Megacities especially in developing Asia and Africa will be centers of both radicalism and democracy, pressuring governments. Urbanization accounts for the rise of radical Islam as people migrate from villages to slums.

• Urbanization is leading to new forms of nationalism and religious extremism as traditional geography and communities break down. New urban communities form that transcend borders.

• Mega cities in Eurasia and North Africa will be connected by global media, spreading rumors and misinformation quickly. Social media will also spread truth that autocratic rulers censor.

• Crowd psychology will be a key factor. Large crowds abandon individuality for collective symbols. People yearn to be part of a crowd for protection and to escape loneliness.

• Nationalism, extremism, and demands for democracy stem from crowd formations as people seek to escape loneliness. Urban loneliness fuels breakdown of authority and rise of new forms.

• Media amplifies present passions for good or ill by obliterating past and future. Crowd psychology was at work in events like the 2008 financial crisis and Arab Spring uprisings.

• Key developments will occur in Eurasian megacities where crowds have the greatest geopolitical impact. Lack of space and mass education will contribute to instability and new ideologies.

• Nationalism is dangerously underrated. Internal disputes can spill over borders inflamed by media, threatening regional stability if nuclear powers feel backed into corners rhetorically.

• Weak states will spawn substate militias that fight better on their own terrain, while possession of missiles strengthens some states but globalization erodes bureaucratic capacity of others. The challenges of governing vast poor urban populations makes statehood more onerous.

• Europe continues to be significantly influenced by its relations with Eastern powers like Russia, despite declining military threats. Stability in Central and Eastern Europe acts as a buffer against Russian influence.

• Europe also struggles with internal divisions stemming from geographical differences between regions like Northern Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Balkans. These manifest economically but have deeper geographical roots.

• Technology increases connections between Europe, Africa, and Asia, but Europe’s internal variety and “narcissism of small differences” could undermine pan-European unity and pose challenges.

• Europe’s complex geography of seas, peninsulas, mountains and valleys helped form separate identities and states, ensuring ongoing political and economic disunity despite EU institutions.

• Europe sits in an advantageous climate zone between Africa and the Arctic perched on the western edge of Eurasia, allowing it to dominate global politics in the 2nd millennium AD due to geographical factors as explained by historians like McNeill.

• Europe has a very long and indented coastline bordering four enclosed seas, as well as many rivers that aid transportation across the continent. This geography has led to maritime mobility and differing communities.

• Despite divisions, lowland corridors allowed travel across Europe, contributing to its cohesion. Distances within Europe are also relatively short.

• Geography helped lead to the idea of a unified “Europe” after World Wars, though divisions remained based on history and geography.

• The political heart of Europe developed around the low countries and along Charlemagne’s Carolingian empire route, benefiting from access to trade while protected inland. This area drove the development of modern European states and institutions.

• Civilization originally developed along mild Mediterranean climates but expanded north with Roman conquest and improved technology, allowing the formation of national groups after Rome’s fall.

• While Mediterranean areas were traditionally rigid, northern Europe’s richer soils and feudal relationships fostered a freer civilization better able to develop new technologies and ideologies like Protestantism.

• Europe’s geography, particularly access to trade routes, ultimately aided its dominance over the enclosed Mediterranean despite the latter’s early cultural and imperial heights.

• The Mediterranean nations like Spain, Italy and Greece had societies disrupted by North African Muslim rule, and eventually lost out economically to Northern European powers like the Dutch, French and English who dominated ocean trade.

• Similarly, medieval Europe was divided between the Frankish West and Byzantine East, with the Franks/North prevailing over Southern regions like Greece and the Balkans.

• Europe was also divided along East-West lines, with migrations from Central Asia shaping the political destiny of Eastern regions like Prussia, the Balkans and Russia through invasions by Slavic and Turkic peoples.

• The divide between Western and Eastern Rome persisted, with the Balkans falling under Byzantine and later Ottoman rule while Western Europe developed under Charlemagne’s empire and the Vatican.

• The industrial development of Northern Europe within the EU has left Southern/Mediterranean and Eastern regions behind economically, though German power may now revive Central/Eastern nations.

• Geography and historical legacies continue to influence regional economic performance within a united but varied Europe.

As former authoritarian regimes in North Africa transition to messy democracies, their economic and political ties to Europe will deepen over time. The Mediterranean Sea, which divided North Africa and Europe during the postcolonial era, will become more of a connector. The ongoing democratic reforms in places like Tunisia and Egypt mean deeper EU involvement in those countries, expanding Europe southward.

Germany will play a pivotal role in Europe and global politics due to its large economy and central geographical position between western and eastern Europe. A united Germany has less reliance on the EU compared to when it was divided. The shift of power within the EU from Brussels to Berlin reflects Germany’s growing influence. Germany dominates industries and forges long-term economic relationships. Its federal system and ties to central Europe enhance its power.

Greece will provide insight into the health of the European project due to its geographical position between Brussels and Moscow and cultural links to both Europe and Russia. How Greece develops politically will register how well the ideals of a united Europe are being realized amid shifting power dynamics within the continent.

The passage discusses the geography of Russia and how it has shaped Russian history and national identity. It notes that Russia is the world’s preeminent land power but lacks natural barriers and access to warm water ports, making it inherently insecure. Much of Russia has a harsh climate too cold for permanent large-scale settlement.

Key geographical features discussed include the Caucasus mountains, which both tantalize and threaten Russia by blocking access to the Middle East; the frozen tundra and vast taiga and steppe lands; and the fact that most of Russia’s population inhabits a colder climate than even Canada. The intense cold is said to have fostered communalism, sacrifice of individuals, and a capacity for suffering in Russian character.

The passage also discusses how Russia’s flatness and sparse settlements have historically led to anarchy, the Tatar yoke reinforced feelings of insecurity, and how Orthodoxy and seasonal festivals took on great significance in the harsh climate. Overall it portrays geography as the dominant influence on Russian thinking and culture, fostering a perpetual national sense of insecurity.

• Russia’s Orthodox Christianity and later Communist ideology emphasized totality and security, reflecting the nation’s history of vulnerability on the frontier.

• Kievan Rus was Russia’s first major empire in the 9th century, based in Kiev along trade routes between Scandinavia, Byzantium, and eastern Slavic peoples. It struggled against steppe nomads.

• The Mongol invasion in the 13th century destroyed Kievan Rus and shifted power north to cities like Moscow. Moscow benefitted from trade routes but Russia remained surrounded by enemies.

• Ivan the Terrible expanded Russia significantly in the 16th century, defeating Tatars, taking territory up to the Urals and Siberia, and eyeing lands south like Astrakhan. However, he was defeated trying to gain access to the Baltic.

• Cossacks emerged as frontier warriors along the Don and Dnieper rivers. Russia’s expansion under Boris Godunov in the late 16th-early 17th century collapsed temporarily during the “Time of Troubles.”

• The new Romanov dynasty in the 17th century formalized Russian imperialism, subjugating territories from Poland to Central Asia over 300 years of rule. Geography and conflict with nomads had long pushed Russia to expand for security and resources.

• Russia recovered from defeats in the Crimean War and Russo-Japanese War through momentous expansions and retreats shaped by its vast geography. It lost territory to Napoleon but later recovered.

• Peter the Great transformed Russia in the early 18th century, building St. Petersburg and expanding into the Baltic, though this bid to become more European ultimately failed as Russia remained Eurasian.

• Russia expanded greatly in the late 19th century through railway construction, threatening British interests in Central Asia and India as part of the “Great Game.”

• The conquest of eastern Siberia from the 17th-20th centuries opened up a vast new territory of immense forests, mountains and permafrost, shaping Russia’s identity as a “boreal riverine empire.” Harsh conditions produced a hardy population under centralized rule.

• Geographic features like the Yenisei River divided western and eastern Siberia. Resource extraction drove further exploration of Siberia’s remote areas. Russia’s large inland plains and accessibility from all directions fueled constant expansion and insecurity.

• Siberia’s rich mineral deposits and mighty rivers generating hydroelectric power have long been economically and strategically important for Russia. The mineral mines also formed the basis of Russia’s penal system for political prisoners.

• The discovery of oil and gas in Siberia in the 1960s made Russia an energy superpower. Siberia’s conquest also extended Russia’s geopolitical influence into the Pacific and brought it into conflict with Japan and China over land and resources.

• Major rivers like the Amur form borders between regions disputed by Russia and China. This frontier area has been fought over since the 17th century and was a source of tensions even during the Cold War era.

• Russia’s control over its eastern and central Asian territories consolidated in the early Soviet period after the revolution weakened Russia. The borders of Soviet republics did not always align with ethnic groups, preventing easy secession and making the USSR a “prison of nations.”

• Soviet expansion reached deep into Central Europe after WWII, with Soviet troops bolstering communist governments across Eastern Europe. This extended Russia’s geopolitical influence deeper than ever before. However, the Cold War proved to be just another phase of Russian history that ended due to internal weaknesses in the Soviet system.

• Russia has historically expanded its territory only to later collapse, repeatedly losing peripheral territories like Ukraine, the Baltics, and Central Asia. This is due to weaknesses in administering far-flung provinces.

• With the USSR’s collapse in 1991, Russia lost huge amounts of territory and population, leaving it very vulnerable geographically despite its vast size. Its population was smaller than Bangladesh’s.

• Russian leaders recognized this new geopolitical vulnerability. Geopolitics again became an important area of focus after being discredited under the USSR.

• Given its ups and downs historically and new weaknesses, Russia aimed to regain influence over neighboring territories like Ukraine, Moldova, and Central Asia where many ethnic Russians lived. Figures proposed bringing regions like Turkey and Iran under Russian control.

• Eurasianism emerged as an ideology to try to unite non-Russian peoples, appealing to a shared Eurasian identity. However, strong ethnic identities in places like the Caucasus make this an imperfect unifier.

• For Russia to stabilize long-term, a unifying ideal beyond just geography is needed. Reform and adoption of liberal democracy may allow it to attract neighboring territories through soft power rather than coercion. Focusing development on European and Pacific extremities could also shift Russia westward.

• Russia viewed its Far East more as a source of raw materials rather than connecting to the thriving Pacific Rim economies. As a result, it missed out on the economic rise of East Asia starting in the 1970s.

• China embraced market capitalism and is now emerging as the dominant power in Eurasia, providing loans and investments to Central Asian countries that Russia once dominated.

• For Russia to solve its problems, it should politically align with Europe and economically align with East Asia. This could make Russia more attractive to former Soviet republics.

• If the Bolsheviks had not seized power in 1917, Russia may have evolved into a Western-oriented nation like France or Germany, anchored to Europe. But Putin has rejected full Western integration and democracy.

• Russia has significant natural resources that Putin has used to boost the military budget rather than economic reforms. But Russia still needs to cultivate its ties to Europe given its geography and population centers.

• Ukraine is strategically important as its orientation can push Russia more into Europe or Asia. But Russia is using its energy exports as leverage over Ukraine and Europe.

• The regions of Central Asia have complex ethnic and political boundaries due to the arbitrary borders drawn by the Soviet Union. This has led to many anomalies where ethnic groups are divided and transportation routes must pass through different countries.

• Within this context, “Sovietism” emerged as a dominant political ideology that promoted control and power rather than ethnic nationalism. However, ethnic Russians have since been marginalized in the region.

• The lack of completely homogenous nation-states, coupled with Soviet-era infrastructure and natural resource wealth, has paradoxically led to some stability in Central Asia despite tensions. It has also given states leverage through playing off international powers like Russia and China.

• Central Asia possesses immense natural resource reserves like oil, gas and minerals that are strategically important. This wealth has pushed states to diversify partnerships rather than rely solely on Russia.

• A Russian sphere of influence will face challenges due to rising Chinese influence, Central Asian autonomy, and reliance on global energy market forces beyond Russia’s control.

• Kazakhstan in particular demonstrates Central Asian power and autonomy. As a wealthy, large country situated in the Eurasian heartland, it can employ partnerships with China to balance against Russian pressure and influence.

• China has an advantageous geographic position as a large continental nation located between the tropics and temperate zone in Eurasia. This allows it to connect Africa, Europe and Asia.

• China’s climate and geography varies from temperate in the north to subtropical in the south, providing a diversity of agricultural outputs. Major rivers run west-east, connecting different regions.

• Historically, the threat to China came from nomadic peoples in Inner Asia to the north and northwest. This led China to consolidate its control over agricultural core regions and build defenses like the Great Wall.

• China grew outward agriculturally from its early cradle region near the Wei and Yellow Rivers. Over time it expanded southward and absorbed surrounding regions, reaching its geographic limits under the Han dynasty.

• To secure its borders, China had to create buffers against the nomadic peoples through both military deterrence and diplomatic relationships. This pattern recurred through dynasties like the Tang which projected power into Central Asia.

• China’s geography and population density made it more cohesive than countries like Russia, but it still faced invasions from nomadic groups at times of dynastic weakness. Overall, China’s geography has provided agricultural and defensive advantages over its history.

• China was historically a vast empire that controlled much of Inner Asia, including territories like Tibet, East Turkestan (Xinjiang), and Mongolia. However, it lost control of these regions in the 17th-18th centuries.

• In the late 19th-early 20th centuries, as the Qing dynasty weakened, China lost territories to European powers like Britain and Russia as well as Japan. This was a period of humiliation for China.

• After forming in 1949, the Communist government under Mao Zedong sought to consolidate control over China’s historic territories. Maps in Chinese schools showed territories like Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang as part of China.

• Today, China controls these territories militarily and economically dominates large parts of Asia and Africa through trade and infrastructure investment. However, tensions remain over controlling ethnic minority populations in border regions like Tibet and Xinjiang.

• China’s economic growth and need for resources is pushing it to expand influence across Asia and Africa in both maritime and overland territories. This brings it into geopolitical competition with countries like the US, India, and Russia seeking to protect their own spheres of influence.

• China’s size, population and geographic position in Eurasia give it continuing power and influence over the surrounding region, though internal economic and social challenges remain an uncertainty factor.

• China seeks to gain control over Mongolia through economic and demographic means rather than outright military conquest. It wants Mongolia’s resources like oil, coal, and minerals. Chinese companies are investing heavily in Mongolia’s mining sector.

• China also aims to expand its influence in Russia’s Far East region, which has a small population but abundant natural resources. Chinese migrants are moving there and Chinese companies are pursuing resource projects. This raises tensions with Russia.

• China’s western Xinjiang region was historically part of Central Asia and is the homeland of theTurkic Uyghur minority, who often resent Chinese rule. However, China considers Xinjiang a core part of its territory due to its imperial history and needs its resources.

• China competes with Russia for influence in Central Asia. It uses trade relationships and pipelines to gain economic and political leverage over the region’s Turkic countries as a counterweight to Uyghur separatism. Overall, China uses economic and demographic means to expand its control over borderlands with significant resource wealth.

• China is building roads and pipelines to transport natural gas and resources across Central Asia and into Xinjiang province. These will help consolidate China’s influence over the region without need for military troops.

• China is also mining for copper in Afghanistan and building roads/railways connecting Xinjiang to Central Asia and Afghanistan. This enhances China’s geopolitical position as the US withdraws troops. Infrastructure is more permanent than military presence.

• Tibet is rich in resources and controls much of China’s territory, explaining China’s resistance to autonomy/independence demands. Road/rail projects across Tibet link to India, enhancing China’s influence.

• India poses a challenge as a geographic and political wedge between China’s sphere of influence. Border disputes and the Tibet issue inflame Sino-Indian rivalry.

• Southeast Asia is advantageous for China’s ambitions due to weak states and few geographic barriers between China and countries like Burma, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam.

• China is developing influence over Burma, Malaysia, Singapore and building military ties throughout Southeast Asia as American engagement decreases in the region. Infrastructure ties Southeast Asian countries closer to China’s economic orbit.

• China pursues a divide-and-conquer strategy with ASEAN countries, negotiating bilaterally rather than as a bloc. This has led to large trade surpluses for China.

• While China is Southeast Asia’s largest trade partner, the relationship could be seen as colonial, with China importing low-value goods and dumping higher-value manufactured goods.

• Even Vietnam must cooperate with China due to geography, despite historical tensions, showing China’s growing dominance in the region.

• North Korea is seen as pivotal for Chinese influence. China would prefer a modernized but authoritarian NK aligned more with China than Japan.

• A reunified Korea could tilt toward China economically given trade ties, addressing Chinese strategic interests.

• With more stability on its land borders through settled disputes, China can turn attention to developing naval power and establishing influence in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean. However, tensions remain with India.

• North Korea’s future could significantly impact the region, particularly if collapse led to humanitarian crisis and military involvement of neighbors including China and US/SK.

• East Asia now sees a shift in power dynamics between China’s growing land power and America’s sea power, with tensions focused around Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula.

• Geographically, China has advantages along its coastline and proximity to sea trade routes in the Pacific and potentially India. However, it faces challenges from the “First Island Chain” of US allies stretching from Japan to Australia.

• China views this chain as blocking its navy and wants to develop sea power to assert control in coastal waters. It has adopted an aggressive approach, using asymmetric capabilities to deny US naval access.

• Key areas of territorial disputes are the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and parts of the South China Sea. Resolving Taiwan’s status is also a top priority as it is strategically located and irritates China.

• If China can consolidate control over Taiwan, it would significantly boost its navy’s strategic position by breaking the First Island Chain, freeing resources for power projection and marking China’s true emergence as a multipolar power in Asia.

• According to a 2009 RAND study, the US will not be able to defend Taiwan from Chinese attack by 2020 due to China’s growing military capabilities like missiles, jets, and submarines targeting Taiwan.

• China is geographically closer to Taiwan so it can focus its military resources there, unlike the US which has global responsibilities. Recent US wars have weakened its position regarding Taiwan.

• Economically and socially, Taiwan is increasingly integrated with China through trade, flights, investments, tourism, etc. This reduces the need for invasion over time.

• Militarily, Taiwan and the US need asymmetric strategies to deter China from attacking by making war too costly, and maintaining stability until China liberalizes politically.

• The South China Sea is strategically important for trade and energy but China claims much of it, seeking to dominate it militarily as the US did the Caribbean historically. This is driving countries like Vietnam closer to the US.

• China is expanding its political, economic and military influence using various tools to encompass its historic borders, including in the South China Sea, but needs further naval development to securely control sea lanes long-term. Its actions aim to shift behavior rather than outright war with the US for now.

The passage discusses America’s commitment to Taiwan and South Korea, which it describes as “hinges” that the balance of power in Asia rests upon. It notes rising tensions as China’s economy and military grow while American power declines relatively.

It outlines China’s infrastructure investments in Africa, as well as military modernization by various Asian countries. This signals an ongoing arms race and risk of incidents between countries jockeying to influence the regional balance of power.

Land and sea tensions will be interlinked, as China expands its influence into areas formerly controlled by other powers like Russia and India. Asia is becoming more crowded and competitive over territory and resources.

The passage evaluates different approaches for the US to maintain engagement and stability in Asia without direct military confrontation with China. It summarizes a Pentagon plan to strengthen America’s presence in Oceania through bases in Guam, the Northern Marianas, and defense agreements elsewhere in the Pacific islands.

This regional presence just beyond China’s military range could help counter Beijing’s influence while allowing a gradual drawdown of large bases in Japan and Korea. The overall assessment is that America’s dominance over Asia dating from WWII cannot last indefinitely as China rises and regional powers assert themselves. Careful management will be needed to navigate these shifting power dynamics.

This passage summarizes the key geopolitical challenges facing India due to its geography:

• India lacks strong, unified internal boundaries and river systems, making it difficult to politically unify the subcontinent. It is divided among multiple language/cultural groups.

• Its northwest border with Afghanistan and Central Asia is weakly defined and exposed to invasions from those areas historically. This has disrupted India’s quest for stability and unity.

• India remains influenced by and tied to the higher altitude regions to its northwest like Central Asia and Iran, which it has not fully dominated, limiting its power projection.

• The present borders of India still do not conform fully to the natural boundaries of the subcontinent. Neighboring countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal lie within the subcontinent and pose security threats, siphoning off India’s political resources.

• India’s geography is subtle, especially in the northwest. The descent from Afghanistan to the Indus plain is gradual, so cultures have historically occupied both highlands and lowlands across the perceived border. This has further complicated India’s geopolitical situation.

• The region spanning eastern Iran to western India, dominated by Persianized Muslim populations, has historically been a fluid cultural zone rather than rigidly defined by state borders.

• The Harappan civilization encompassed a vast area from Baluchistan to Kashmir and down to present-day Delhi and Mumbai, reflecting the natural subdivisions within South Asia shaped by river valleys and landscapes supporting irrigation.

• The Aryans may have infiltrated from Iran and helped consolidate political organization in northern India by 1000 BC, culminating in large empires like the Nanda and the Mauryan under Chandragupta, which first embraced the idea of India as a single political entity.

• The Mauryan Empire demonstrated the potential for a single state over much of the subcontinent by exploiting geographic logic, though it remained decentralized. Decline of empires led to invasions from the northwest and regional dynasties.

• From the 7th century onward, Muslim peoples entered India through land routes along the northwest and sea routes on the coasts. The Delhi Sultanate ruled northern India for centuries as Delhi strategically controlled the passage from the northwest into India.

• The Mughal Empire reflected the gradation from Iran/Afghanistan through the northwest into India. It was a cultural fusion under Turko-Mongol rulers who invaded from Central Asia.

• The Mughal Empire that originated under Akbar the Great included a mix of ethnic and religious groups, reflecting the diverse region it arose from which stretched from southern Russia to the Mediterranean.

• India had long been influenced by cultural and political trends in the surrounding Middle East. Northern cities like Kabul and Kandahar were naturally part of Mughal rule, but the strongly Hindu south was more difficult to control.

• Aurangzeb struggled for decades to subdue Maratha insurgents in the Deccan plateau region of south-central India. The geography of rivers flowing east made it hard for northern rulers to govern the south fully.

• This instability in the south weakened the Mughal elite and allowed European trading companies like the British and Dutch to gain coastal footholds, eventually leading to British rule over all of India.

• For Indian elites, regions like Afghanistan and Pakistan have historically been seen as part of India due to past empires and invasions stretching back centuries from the northwest. However, the modern divide between India and Pakistan is now a hardened legal and civilizational one.

• Pakistan encompasses a vast and geographically diverse area, stretching from the Karakoram mountains in the north to the Makran Desert in the south. It sits on both banks of the Indus River.

• Pakistan is home to four major ethnic groups - Punjabis, Sindhis, Balochis, and Pashtuns - which harbor hostility toward each other. Islam was intended to unite the country but has failed to do so. Ethnic tensions and feelings of domination by the Punjabis persist.

• Pakistan was founded in 1947 to be a homeland for Muslims in British India but millions of Muslims remained in India. Its ideology of being a solely Muslim state was imperfect given the religious diversity that existed.

• Some argue Pakistan geographically makes sense as a conduit for trade between Central Asia and South Asia, with the Indus Valley and Punjab region as the demographic core. However, others see it as artificially dividing the Punjabi region.

• Afghanistan’s geography, with its mountainous terrain, has historically made it resistant to centralized control and vulnerable to foreign interference from neighboring powers like Russia, Britain, and Pakistan. However, it has had periods of moderate governance from Kabul in the past as well.

• Ethnic and regional tensions, porous borders, interference by foreign actors, and a history of instability have all contributed to Pakistan and Afghanistan’s ongoing political volatility and conflicts. Stability in the region remains elusive.

• Afghanistan’s stability is strategically important for India as it threatens to radicalize the region from India-Pakistan border to Central Asia under Taliban rule. This would empower Pakistan against India.

• A stable Afghanistan governed from Kabul would allow India to counter Pakistan’s influence and challenge Pakistan on its borders. This is why India supported secular regimes in Kabul in the past.

• A peaceful Afghanistan could become a trade hub, connecting India via Central Asia to Europe and Middle East. India has invested in Afghan infrastructure like roads. But instability has prevented realizing this potential.

• The India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir and their common border adds instability in South Asia, which lacks Europe’s balance of power. Nuclear weapons make it even more dangerous.

• India wants to escape this volatile geography and history. Its competition with China is less emotional than with Pakistan. There is no real history behind India-China rivalry.

• China’s navy is rising as it protects trade routes. This aggravates issues with India which also wants influence in the Indian Ocean. Both countries feel surrounded by the other’s naval activities.

• However, the Sino-Indian economic relationship is also complementary. Their rivalry shows how new military capabilities can exacerbate tensions due to economic and geopolitical success.

• The technologies of war and wealth creation often go hand in hand. As military capabilities like planes, missiles and ships advance, even with only defensive intentions, they can make neighbors feel threatened and lead to new tensions and overlapping areas of potential conflict.

• India and China were once largely insulated from direct threats by distance and their relatively low-tech militaries. But as their capabilities advanced even as defensive forces, they started seeing each other as potential adversaries across a new expanded “battlespace”.

• This dynamic is playing out across Eurasia as countries like Israel, Syria, Iran, Pakistan and North Korea develop advanced weapons that shrink the geopolitical map and place them in new proximity and potential conflict with neighbors.

• The Indian subcontinent remains politically fragmented internally despite some unification efforts. China is better organized than India with more highways, efficient bureaucracy, and less internal unrest and insurgencies. Fairgrieve’s view of India as a “less advanced” civilization compared to others still holds true in some ways.

• The highly fragmented geography of the region, with many borders and groups, ensures instability will continue. India is both boosted and constrained by this difficult neighborhood it is trapped within. It needs to balance regional security threats with aspirations to be a great power beyond South Asia.

The passage describes the political and demographic landscape of the Middle East region. It can be broadly divided into three main geographical areas: the Arabian Peninsula, dominated by Saudi Arabia; the Iranian plateau; and the Anatolian land bridge.

The Arabian Peninsula contains important countries beyond just Saudi Arabia, but Saudi Arabia leads due to its vast oil reserves. It faces major challenges from a youth bulge, with high population growth and unemployment among young men adding political pressure. Yemen poses a threat to Saudi Arabia due to its similarly large but unrestrained population situated closer to the strategic core of the peninsula.

The Iranian plateau encompasses Iran and influences from Central Asian migrations. The Anatolian land bridge connects Asia and Europe through Turkey.

The region as a whole is characterized by diverse political systems mixed with autocratic and unstable democracies. It possesses major energy resources but also threats like extremism, weapons proliferation, and unrest driven by economic and demographic challenges of unemployed youth. The passage analyzes the complex geographical and political landscape to understand regional dynamics and instability.

• The territories that now comprise Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE lay along Britain’s trade route to India in the 19th century. Britain negotiated deals with local sheikhs that led to their independence after World War II. Large oil deposits discovered later drove their economies.

• Saudi Arabia is most vulnerable along its southwestern border with Yemen, where weapons, drugs, and people flow across freely. Yemen’s future stability will impact Saudi Arabia due to their close proximity and porous border.

• Iran has a significant geopolitical advantage due to its location straddling both the Persian Gulf oil regions and Central Asia. It has a larger population and resource wealth than other Middle Eastern countries. Its influence potentially extends in all directions through history, culture, trade routes and ethnic/linguistic ties. Iran occupies a pivotal position in Eurasia.

• Cyrus the Great conquered the Median capital of Ecbatana and further expanded the Persian Empire, which at its peak stretched from Thrace/Macedonia to Libya/Egypt and the Punjab region, constituting the largest empire in world history up to that point.

• The Parthian Empire, which succeeded the Achaemenid Persian Empire, exemplified Iranian tolerance by ruling over a diverse set of cultures from roughly Syria to Pakistan in a decentralized manner.

• The Abbasid Caliphate, with its capital in Baghdad, came to be dominated by Persian practices and administrators, with some historians viewing it as a “cultural reconquest” of the region by Persians. Persian artistic and cultural influence continued even after the Mongol sack of Baghdad.

• Shiism emerged as an important component of Iranian identity and helped enable the rise of clerical rule, beginning with the Safavid dynasty in the 16th century who made Shiism the official religion and brought Arab clerics to establish a state clergy. Revolutionary Iran reflects this historical legacy while also constraining earlier Iranian cultural traditions. Overall, Iranian culture and influence extended well beyond Iran’s political borders throughout history.

The passage argues that the Iranian revolutionary regime that came to power in 1979 was more sophisticated and modern than other governments in the Arab world at the time, due to factors like the Shiite clergy’s openness to Western philosophy. The Shiite tradition incorporates more syncretism and philosophical thought compared to Sunni Islam.

The regime maintained features of the Iranian state like universal suffrage and presidential elections. It pursued influence through networks in Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq rather than relying solely on brute force like Saddam Hussein in Iraq. However, the regime has declined into repression over time.

The Green Movement that emerged in 2009 protests mirrored the regime in its sophistication, using new technologies. Iran has strong state institutions and could shift the Middle East if the regime moderated or the Greens took power.

Geographically, Iran is well-positioned to influence Central Asia, but its appeal is limited by the persistence of clerical rule, which has stifled Iran’s cultural appeal compared to its historical role. While Iran pursues economic ties in Central Asia through pipelines and roads, it lacks the cultural prestige it once held for countries like Turkmenistan.

This passage discusses Iranian influence and the potential impact of political change in Iran and Iraq. Key points:

• Currently Iran has built an unconventional “postmodern empire” through proxies like Hezbollah, not direct military occupation. However, this empire is based more on intimidation than cultural/moral appeal.

• A democratic or reformed Iran could energize millions of Muslims and challenge authoritarian regimes through its large size and cultural heritage. This could help the rise of Arab liberalism.

• Iran’s influence in Iraq is its largest foreign entanglement. A stable democratic Iraq with pluralistic Shiite society could undermine Iran’s repressive system by increasing interaction and hatred of Iranian meddling.

• Past opportunities for alternative outcomes in Iran show how history didn’t need to lead to the current situation. The Iranian revolution and its aftermath, as well as lost chances for cooperation in 2001-2003, created today’s challenges but other paths were possible.

• Iran’s internal politics will ultimately determine its future more than outside forces, but Iraq remains uniquely entangled with and able to influence Iran due to their shared history and border.

Geography has facilitated both Iran and Iraq’s influence over each other’s politics. Similarly, Turkey’s location as a land bridge between Europe, the Caucasus, and the Middle East has allowed it to impact surrounding regions. Turkey controls the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, giving it leverage over Iraq and Syria. However, overtly cutting off water supplies could be seen as an act of war.

Historically, the Ottoman Empire was focused on Europe due to its prosperity and trade routes. Anatolia’s rugged terrain made it difficult for tribes to unite against Ottoman rule in the east. Conquest of the Balkans provided wealth to consolidate control over Anatolia and expand into the Middle East. The capital of Constantinople connected Europe, the Mediterranean, and trade routes farther east.

After World War I defeat, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk modernized Turkey based on Western models like ending religious courts and adopting the Latin alphabet. This continued Turkey’s centuries-long orientation toward Europe, though the country remained neutral in World War II. Geography has thus shaped Turkey’s strategic focus on both the Middle East and Europe.

• Turkey was historically guided by Kemal Ataturk’s pro-Western, secular doctrine after WWII. It aspired to join the EU for decades but was rejected in part due to being predominantly Muslim.

• Ataturk established a Turkish nation-state focused on Anatolia rather than lost Ottoman lands. But this emphasized Turkey’s Islamic heritage over its European ties.

• In the 1980s, Turgut Ozal liberalized the economy and gave religion a larger role while maintaining pro-Western foreign policy. He united religious and secular Turks.

• After Ozal’s death in 1993, Islamic influence grew steadily until the AKP party came to power in 2002, shifting Turkey towards the Middle East and away from the West.

• American policy supported Turkey’s pro-Western military rule for decades but backfired as democracy took hold and reflected the public’s Islamic identity.

• By the 2010s, Turkey had close ties to all sides in the region, reflecting its geography between Europe, Russia and the Middle East.

• Turkey’s decision to challenge an Israeli blockade of a Gaza aid flotilla in 2010 signaled its historic pivot away from the West and toward the East. Turks saw the Israel-Palestine conflict in terms of Muslims versus Jews, not Arabs versus Israelis.

• Globalization both increases civilizational tensions by bringing groups together, and boosts Islamic identity and consciousness. Turkey’s Islamic identity grew at this time.

• Turkey had led the Islamic world for almost 850 years until losing control after World War I. It was overlooked by the West until recent events like the Gaza flotilla crisis and Turkey’s diplomacy with Iran.

• The 2011 Arab uprisings benefitted Turkey’s influence due to its Ottoman history ruling North Africa/Levant and its model as an Islamic democracy with a growing economy.

• Turkish Islam, exemplified by Rumi, is more compatible with democracy than fundamentalism. Turkey’s Westernization combined with orthodox Islam allowed its democratic evolution.

• Under Erdogan, Turkey pursued a “no problems” policy with neighbors, boosted its influence, and championed Palestinians, gaining popularity in the Arab world and role as an integral regional organizer on par with Ottoman times.

• Turkey’s outreach to Iran signaled its embrace of broader Islamic leadership despite tensions with the West over Iran’s nuclear ambitions. This cemented Turkey’s pivotal regional position.

• Turkey has become an increasingly important regional power in the Middle East since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. It aims to be an energy hub for Iran and the Caspian region, transporting oil and gas to Europe. This would give it economic leverage over Europe.

• Turkey also controls much of the water flow to Syria and Iraq from the Euphrates river. So together with Iran, Turkey is emerging as a “hyperpower” in the region, controlling the vital resources of oil, gas, and water.

• Unlike in the past, Turkey’s rise is now driven more by its role in the Middle East energy sector rather than expanding into the Balkans and Europe. It is a core regional player in its own right as a G20 country.

• Turkey and Iran’s geographies give them influence over the weaker Arab states. The borders of these states are often arbitrary and contradict underlying ethnic and sectarian lines. Their governments struggle with instability.

• Iraq in particular, due to its history, resources, and sectarian divisions, will continue to be a major flashpoint. Its future evolution could significantly impact the overall political landscape of the Arab world.

The passage discusses the modern and ancient history of Iraq that has contributed to its current political instability and challenges. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the British tried to unite disparate ethnic and religious groups in Iraq but this created divisions. The rise of Arab nationalism further pitted Iraqi factions against each other. Decades of unstable democracy ended with a 1958 coup that established authoritarian rule under Saddam Hussein.

While Iraq had some democratic periods in the past, any democracy that emerges now will likely be weak due to deep divisions. This could turn Iraq into a proxy battleground for foreign powers like Iran and Saudi Arabia. The weak states of Iraq and Syria provide an opening for regional powers Turkey and Iran to seek greater influence. Syria in particular faces deep sectarian and ethnic fractures across its territory that authoritarian rule has failed to address. Both countries struggle with artificial borders that do not align with local identities and loyalties. Their weakness impacts the balance of power in the Middle East.

• The Alawite minority, an offshoot of Shia Islam, occupies power in Syria led by President Bashar al-Assad. However, Alawites demographically spill into both Syria and Lebanon.

• Sunni jihadists see the secular Alawite regime in Syria as a target due to its repression of Sunni Islamists in the past and ties to Shiite Iran. Jihadists have networks inside Syria from supporting operations in Iraq.

• A post-Assad Syria could descend into sectarian violence as identities re-emerge, or it may stabilize if a tolerant democracy emerges respecting Syria’s diversity, as envisioned by Syrian poet Adonis.

• Events in Syria have implications for Lebanon, Jordan, Israel/Palestine. A weakened Syria could strengthen Beirut, but sectarian tensions there grow. Jordan’s stability relies on its monarchy, but faces pressures from Palestinian and Iraqi refugees.

• The Israel-Palestine conflict represents a symbolic injustice to the Muslim world. Demographics show Palestinians will outnumber Jews in the coming decades without a two-state solution. Israel relies on barriers to separate from Palestinians for its identity as a Jewish state.

• Fernand Braudel was a leading historian of the Annales School who emphasized geography, demography, materialism, and the environment in historical analysis. His seminal work was The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II.

• Braudel argued that permanent environmental forces shape enduring historical trends that play out over decades/centuries. Things like soil quality profoundly influenced the development of societies.

• He integrated nature into history, restoring importance to geography. His work showed how forces like climate and geography determine communications, economies, political organization.

• Braudel saw history operating on different “time wavelengths” - the longue durée of geological time, medium-term cycles of 100 years, and short-term political/diplomatic events.

• Reading Braudel encourages taking a more distant view of current events and questioning whether they are transient or part of deeper structural forces shaping America’s long-term destiny, like its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

• Braudel facilitates thinking about how geographical and environmental factors will influence geopolitics over the very long term, though predicting centuries out is impossible given uncertainties like climate change.

The passage discusses a panel discussion on Afghanistan and Pakistan policy where Andrew Bacevich posed a question critiquing the focus on interventions in the Middle East since the 1980s. He asked why the U.S. didn’t instead invest in fixing problems on its southern border with Mexico.

The author argues that analysts like Bacevich, Walt, Mearsheimer, Pillar, Helprin, Carpenter and Huntington share a critique of post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy. They question whether interventions in places like Iraq and Afghanistan have undermined U.S. priorities to dealing with challenges from a chaotic Middle East, a rising China, and state failure in Mexico.

While their long-term perspective provides safety, they are criticized for not adequately addressing what would happen in places like Afghanistan if the U.S. withdrew precipitously. The author acknowledges the U.S. now has stakes in outcomes after invading Iraq and Afghanistan.

Overall, the analysts ask what has been the cost of mistakes already and if the U.S. as a great power can be salvaged. They argue America should focus efforts on preserving power in Eurasia and addressing problems on its southern border, rather than military deployments far abroad.

• Venice was protected from invasion due to being separated from the Italian mainland by water, but its decline began in the 15th century when it started engaging in wars on the Italian mainland, drawing it into land-based balance of power politics and reducing its ability to project sea power.

• Comparing the US situations in Iraq (2006-07) and Afghanistan to historical examples like the British in India (1857-58 rebellion) and Athens’ disastrous Sicilian expedition show that costly, drawn-out wars alone do not necessarily doom an empire, as both Britain and Athens recovered.

• Rome’s decline followed different strategic phases - initially relying on diplomacy and overwhelming military capacity but not occupation; then territorializing its military occupation; and finally being overstretched defending borders against consolidated threats. The US similarly overstretched its army.

• To prolong dominance, powers must plan a graceful exit and accommodate new geopolitical formations, as Rome failed to do. The US could adopt a strategic approach like Byzantium or restore its reserve capacity through restraint.

• The US is most vulnerable to pressures from its southern border with Mexico and Central America due to large population and economic disparities. Managing this relationship will significantly impact US society and foreign policy going forward.

The passage discusses the geopolitical implications of the relationship between the United States and Mexico, focusing on northern Mexico in particular. It notes that northern Mexico has increasingly integrated economically, culturally, and demographically with the southwestern U.S. since NAFTA. However, violence from drug cartels in the northern Mexican states poses challenges. The planned 2014 widening of the Panama Canal is also mentioned as further encouraging trade and development along Gulf Coast ports from Texas to Florida through increased shipping traffic from East Asia.

The passage then summarizes Huntington’s argument from his book “Who Are We?” that continuing Mexican immigration could gradually transform the culture and identity of areas in the Southwest that were taken from Mexico, challenging America’s traditional Anglo-Protestant roots. It also notes the geographical divisions and lawlessness of Mexico’s northern mountainous regions that have provided refuge for drug cartels and insurgents historically.

This passage summarizes several arguments about immigration and demographic change in the United States:

• Hispanic immigrants, primarily Mexican, now make up around 50% of immigrants to the US. This diminished diversity makes assimilation less likely according to Huntington.

• The geographic concentration of Mexican immigrants in the Southwest means they “enjoy a sense of being on their own turf.” This maintains Spanish language use more than other immigrant groups.

• By 2050, a third of the US population could be Spanish-speaking. This represents a shift in America’s “historical memory.”

• Some predict the Southwest could band together with northern Mexico to form a new country by 2080, given high Hispanic population percentages in the region.

• The author believes America will become a “Polynesian-cum-mestizo civilization” oriented north-south rather than east-west. Nationalism will be diluted but America will retain its identity.

• A stable Mexico is important for geopolitics and could ease US sway in Latin America. However, Mexico faces a crisis as drug cartels have taken on “military-style” tactics, threatening the viability of the Mexican state.

• US focus on the Middle East has distracted from helping Mexico address its crisis, which could worsen immigration and disorder at the border. More cooperation is needed between the US and Mexico to confront the cartels.

• In the long run, the border may advance in Mexico’s favor given development disparities, unless cartel issues can be adequately addressed.

Here is a 336-word summary:

The passage discusses increasing integration and cultural blending between the United States and Mexico. It argues that due to geography alone, the two countries will inevitably be conjoined in some form. However, policymakers can influence how and when this occurs.

To support this, it references Toynbee who saw universal states emerging throughout history to address times of trouble. Examples given are the Roman Empire, which mastered dual loyalty, and various other empires that allowed different peoples to coexist. The passage suggests a universal state may someday address current issues in the border region between northern Mexico and the American Southwest.

It acknowledges shifting the conception of national identity and borders is enormously significant. However, it notes integration is already occurring “geological time” as borders blur culturally and economically. The passage discusses how North America’s geography historically supported strong nation-building in the US. But now Coronado’s 1540 exploration from Mexico northwards provides a “postmodern” orientation, not bounded by national consciousness.

New Hispanic migrants transforming US culture through work ethic as much as they transform it. Quality of this cultural exchange will substantially impact how well the US interacts globally. A dysfunctional border risks civilizational tensions, while a cohesive bi-national supra-state with Mexico could make the US a more dependable global ally. Integration with Mexico particularly important as its population grows versus the aging US population.

In conclusion, it argues global affairs will increasingly be a “closed, claustrophobic system” requiring a united North America to counterbalance Eurasia. Failing to strengthen Mexico ties could push it into a hostile orbit, threatening the hemisphere. Unity in the Americas makes balancing Eurasian powers much easier. The purpose should be advancing liberal ideals globally through stability achieved via balancing regional powers.

The passage resists the idea of being resigned to geography or fate, arguing we must be aware of geography but strive for a better world notwithstanding. It refers to an initial vision of a cosmopolitan Central Europe after the Cold War as an ideal worth continuing to pursue, even if not fully achievable, and hopes Mexico will cooperate in this goal. It invokes Halford Mackinder’s call for independent buffer states between maritime Europe and the Eurasian “Heartland” as a means of balancing power and achieving greater global freedom and stability. Overall, the passage advocates maintaining an ambitious yet pragmatic view of progress that takes geographical realities into account but does not give up on ideals of cooperation across borders.