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Here is a summary of the key points from the introduction and chapter 1 of “The Digital Silk Road”:

The book examines China’s quest to build dominance in digital infrastructure and control the future of global communications networks through its Digital Silk Road initiative.
In the past, companies like AT&T played a major role in developing US communications capabilities and supporting national security goals. Now China is emerging as a new information power seeking to export its vision globally.
During the Cold War, the West viewed communications technology as an inevitable force for increasing freedom and open societies. But China is proving communications can be used for both liberation and repression.
Just 30 years ago, China was completely dependent on foreign companies for all its communications capabilities. But it has since emerged as a major innovator and supplier through state support of companies like Huawei.
Chinese leader Xi Jinping has ambitious goals for China to dominate advanced tech manufacturing, standards-setting, and become a global superpower by 2050. The Digital Silk Road is a key part of realizing these objectives.
The stakes go beyond sales and include which nation most controls the physical infrastructure and flow of digital information impacting security, economics and societies worldwide.
In 1989, the CCP violently suppressed protests in Tiananmen Square, leading observers like Nicholas Kristof to predict the party’s imminent demise. However, the CCP endured.
In the 1990s and 2000s, new technologies like satellites and the internet raised hopes that connectivity would undermine CCP rule. Bloggers were seen as potential agents of change. However, the CCP has since harnessed these technologies for digital authoritarianism and surveillance.
China has built up major companies in telecom equipment, surveillance cameras, undersea cables, and satellite navigation that have global reach. This is part of China’s digital Silk Road program to expand its influence abroad through infrastructure projects and technology exports.
The US has grown alarmed at Chinese tech in its networks and taken steps to restrict companies like Huawei and China Telecom. It is lobbying allies to avoid Chinese suppliers as well.
The COVID pandemic accelerated digitalization and China’s push into developing markets with affordable connectivity projects. The US and China are now in intense competition over control of emerging technologies and global networks, marking the beginning of “Network Wars.”
There was a widely and persistently held belief that new communications technologies like fax machines, the internet, and cell phones would naturally promote liberalization and shift power from governments to individuals by allowing free speech, organization, and accountability. This idea aligned commercial tech company interests with political philosophies.
However, this view overlooked how these tools could be used differently by governments. While the West saw freedom’s inevitable march, China saw a struggle for power over information flows.
Chinese officials actively sought to build networks that served their goals of controlling information, issuing restrictions on online activities from 1994 onward. Foreign tech companies prioritized access to China’s market over values like free expression.
Contrary to optimism that connectivity would weaken authoritarian rule, China modified foreign technology for surveillance and now leads globally through innovation by firms like Huawei. While the West talked of values, China invested more holistically in infrastructure, widening digital divides China could exploit. The battlefield has expanded beyond national security to economic and technological competition worldwide.
China has been bundling digital infrastructure like telecommunications networks and underwater cables with traditional infrastructure projects as part of its Digital Silk Road initiative. This strategy has attracted many countries, even in rural areas that desperately need connectivity.
Leaders in developing countries are often intrigued by Chinese surveillance technology’s potential to reduce crime and spur growth, despite concerns about China’s repressive use of it domestically. Chinese surveillance tech is used in over 80 countries.
China aims to control more of the world’s data flows and storage through its state-owned telecom firms expanding globally. It wants foreign data passing through its networks while insulating its own. This asymmetric strategy could give it intelligence and economic advantages.
China offers satellite technology to developing countries and positions itself as the central node connecting some nations, expanding its network effects. It hopes to set future global communications standards.
If China became the chief network operator, it could reshape data/communications flows, gain insights into competitors through widespread access and use of user data, and exercise power through access/sanctions - achieving a new kind of global influence without military force. however, there are also cybersecurity and data privacy risks.
The anniversary celebration of Northern Telecom marked its rebranding as Nortel, reflecting its ambition as a global telecommunications supplier.
Nortel executives saw themselves ushering in a new “information society” driven by globalization and digitalization, presenting tremendous growth opportunities.
Nortel aimed to become the dominant player in building out global information and communications networks during this transition period. Its future looked very promising at the time.
However, history did not unfold as favorably for Nortel. While the speed of technological and economic change was accelerating, Nortel struggled to adapt and eventually declared bankruptcy, becoming a cautionary tale of a company failing to navigate disruption.
Nortel was once Canada’s leading telecom equipment supplier, growing rapidly in the 1990s. It saw opportunities to expand globally, with a particular focus on China’s growing market.
Nortel made strategic mistakes by forming joint ventures in China that helped Chinese firms become competitors. It willingly transferred technology to partners, believing this would gain them market access.
Chinese firms benefited from copying Western technology, breaking agreements, gaining control of patents, and hiring away talent. They were aided by government subsidies.
Nortel competed aggressively with other Western firms for Chinese deals. It made major concessions like allowing a Chinese appointment to its joint venture’s CFO. Executives acknowledged pursuing technology transfer to China.
Restrictions on exporting telecom technology to countries like China had been lifted in the 1990s after the Cold War. This opened the door for partnerships like one between a US firm and Chinese military that the US later viewed as concerning.
By trying to gain access to China’s market, Nortel and others contributed to “the single greatest transfer of wealth in history” as Chinese firms leveraged Western partnerships to build their own capabilities.

Here are the key points:

In the 1990s, Western countries believed China posed manageable commercial risks and viewed strong exports as essential for technological leadership. Export controls were seen as outdated remnants of the Cold War that needed reform.
The Clinton administration aimed to expand open markets and democracy through its “Engagement and Enlargement” strategy. Allowing telecom equipment exports fit this strategy by creating opportunities, jobs, and helping promote democracy.
Export controls were relaxed significantly in the mid-1990s, with licensing requirements dropped for many telecom and high-tech goods. This made commercial sense but also reduced visibility into exports and end users.
Companies like Nortel embraced an optimistic vision where open markets and communication technologies would help spread democracy globally. However, some like John Polanyi sounded notes of caution about technologies potentially enabling authoritarian control as well.
In contrast, Chinese company Huawei was struggling domestically but received implicit state support as it transformed from a reseller to technology developer, laying the foundations for its future success.

Here is a summary of the provided text:

By 1994, Ren Zhengfei of Huawei had become well-connected enough to meet with Chinese president Jiang Zemin. During the meeting, Ren planted the idea that China should develop its own telephone switching equipment for reasons of national security.
Ren realized Chinese authorities were wary of foreign dependence as well as the domestic risks of new communications technologies enabling unrest. He advocated for China to develop its own switches.
Ren may have previously worked for a military research institute developing telecom technology. He tapped these connections to help Huawei win early contracts with the military.
Supported by the state, Huawei launched its first domestically developed switch in 1993 and a higher-capacity version in 1994. This set the company up for more government contracts.
In 1995, the Chinese government implemented policies to assist domestic switch producers like Huawei, including restricting foreign investment and placing tariffs on imports. Huawei was becoming a national champion.
Huawei gained increased state support over the following years through bank loans, matching contracts with state organizations, and high-level visits promoting the company. It closely aligned its mission with serving the interests of China.
Huawei was struggling in the early 1990s, unable to accurately predict demand for its products. Parts were either understocked or overstocked, and the company was only delivering half of orders on time, far below industry standards. Huawei also had issues accurately calculating profits and losses each year.
In the late 1990s, Ren brought in IBM to completely transform Huawei’s operations and management practices. Ren poured resources into the effort and demanded strict adherence to IBM’s instructions. The transformation took 17 years and cost over $1.6 billion, but helped Huawei professionalize its operations and allowed it to win contracts in new markets like the UK.
Western management consulting practices, not just technology acquisition, were transformative for Huawei. IBM provided hands-on training across Huawei’s business operations and helped overhaul areas like product development and financial services. This internal transformation opened doors for Huawei abroad.
Meanwhile, Chinese leader Jiang Zemin viewed information networks as a new “ideological and political battleground.” Though promoting China’s entry into international organizations like the WTO, Jiang intended to keep China’s networks firmly under Communist Party control and saw technology development as serving the military first and foremost.
During the 1990s, Jiang Zemin observed the Gulf War and NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia, which cemented his views on the importance of new technology for military power. He began focusing on information and communications technology as part of modern warfare.
In 2000, Jiang talked about the inevitability of free information flows globally. However, he also advocated for an international treaty to strengthen supervision of information security, indicating China’s interest in controlling information flows.
While the West focused on commercial aspects, China was fixated on technology’s military and national security implications. China’s “Golden Shield” project aimed to build a centralized surveillance system connecting law enforcement agencies.
Western tech companies like Cisco, Motorola and Nortel attended China’s “Security China 2000” expo to sell their products to China’s security services. Nortel in particular provided networking equipment like JungleMUX that had dual use for both commercial and surveillance applications.
The “Golden Shield” highlighted the disconnect between the West exporting values and China importing tools to maintain Communist Party control. Western companies prioritized profits over concerns about enabling mass surveillance in China.
Around 2000, a mysterious Huawei employee visited Nortel’s Texas headquarters and returned a fiber card from one of Nortel’s switches, asking for a refund. Former Nortel employees believe this was part of a covert reverse engineering effort by Huawei.
Around the same time, Huawei was allegedly collecting intelligence on Cisco’s router technology through similar means, according to later court documents and investigations. Huawei copied Cisco’s source code and router designs closely.
Huawei opened its North American headquarters in Plano, Texas in 2001, just 10 minutes from Nortel. Texas officials provided grants and subsidies to encourage Huawei’s expansion.
In 2001, Huawei is alleged to have recruited a senior Motorola engineer, Shaowei Pan, to develop products for Huawei using Motorola’s proprietary technology. Pan had direct access to Huawei’s CEO Ren and transmitted Motorola specifications to him in 2003.
By 2004, Nortel acknowledged facing growing competition from Chinese rivals like Huawei in its annual report, but did not disclose that it had suffered a major network breach from Chinese hackers since at least 2000.

The hackers initially breached Nortel’s internal network in 2004 and gained access to the email accounts of several senior executives over a period of 6 months. They extracted over 1,400 documents containing technical, product, and pricing information. Nortel failed to meaningfully strengthen its cyber defenses after the initial breach was discovered.

The hacker trail led to Shanghai, home of a major Chinese military cyber unit. Notably, Nortel had previously built Shanghai’s first fiber optic network using its own products, so its secrets were literally flowing through a network it built in the city where the hacking originated from.

By the late 2000s, Huawei was becoming a major competitor to Nortel. They formed a joint venture in 2006 but it fell apart quickly. Huawei then surpassed Nortel’s revenue in 2007 as Nortel declined rapidly. When Nortel filed for bankruptcy in 2009, Huawei was interested in acquiring its assets but eventually dropped out due to concerns from the US government about national security implications.

After Nortel’s collapse, Huawei aggressively recruited its employees, including hiring away the former CTO to lead R&D. This helped Huawei gain access to knowledge from Nortel. Overall, the summary outlines how lax security and cooperation with Huawei ultimately contributed to Nortel’s demise and Huawei’s rise in its place.

The chapter introduces Nemont Telephone Cooperative in Glasgow, Montana, which relied heavily on equipment from Nortel until it went bankrupt. Nemont then turned to Huawei for more affordable equipment.
Glasgow is located very remotely in the northern Great Plains. It was established in 1887 as a stop along railroad tycoon James Hill’s railroad expansion project. The town grew but has since declined as the nearby air force base and other towns closed down.
Gregg Hunter, a lifelong Glasgow resident, talks about the challenges of rural decline. He now works for Nemont helping to expand broadband access, which is important for rural communities.
The chapter argues that Huawei and other Chinese firms have thrived by expanding into rural and developing areas neglected by Western companies. They have brought connectivity to places like Glasgow and established a major global presence as a result.
Glasgow’s experience highlights the “digital divide” between urban and rural America and how lack of infrastructure has exacerbated rural population loss and economic challenges. Nemont and Huawei helped bridge this divide in Glasgow.
The city of Glasgow, Montana’s economic plan in 2013 included goals of strengthening the economy, diversifying beyond agriculture, and keeping young people in the area after they receive their education.
Glasgow faces challenges of ensuring access to high-speed internet (digital connectivity) as networks advance, to avoid being left behind economically.
There is a digital divide between urban and rural America in access to broadband internet. Measuring and defining this divide, as well as determining minimum speed standards, have been points of disagreement.
Expanding broadband access to rural Americans was a priority for both Tom Wheeler, FCC chair from 2013-2017, and Ajit Pai, who became chair in 2017. However, they differed in their views on the role of government versus private industry in addressing the issue.
In Glasgow, residents did not seem alarmed about using Chinese telecom equipment, as they valued affordable and reliable internet access over security concerns without affordable alternatives. Nemont, the local internet provider, has close relationships with customers as a community cooperative.
Nemont, a small rural telecom company in Montana, needed to upgrade its wireless networks to 3G but didn’t have the resources of larger national carriers. Huawei gave them a much cheaper quote, undercutting competitors by 20-30%.
Nemont’s CEO Kilgore informed US officials about using Huawei equipment but no one objected. They installed the equipment in 2011 with help from Chinese technicians who worked long hours.
Huawei had been connecting remote areas internationally for over a decade, targeting markets where competition was less after crises. They focused on regional anchors to expand.
In the 1990s Huawei realized it needed to internationalize for survival as China’s market shrank. They targeted riskier markets where competition was less due to crises.
Huawei worked to establish itself through low costs, fast delivery, attention to customers. Their first major overseas market was Russia in the late 90s, where they persisted through an economic crisis.
Early on the Chinese government helped open doors for Huawei abroad, like in Russia. By 2003 Russia was a top market for them. They struggled at first to establish their brand internationally.
Huawei employees endured very difficult working conditions when entering new markets, such as living in poor housing with no amenities. However, the CEO Ren felt this built character and a strong work ethic.
Huawei was able to thrive in vastly different environments around the world due to its flexibility. It succeeded in both open and closed/state-run telecom markets by offering low prices, quick delivery, and courting officials.
Ren expected and encouraged employees to make sacrifices and endure hardships like malaria when working abroad. Safety was not the top concern, rather continuing operations and making profits.
Employees reported living in primitive and unsafe conditions in countries like Sudan and Afghanistan, where some were even held hostage. There were also reported deaths that the company did not acknowledge.
The U.S. invasion of Iraq created opportunities for Huawei to rebuild destroyed infrastructure. It also found work in Afghanistan through contracts aided by U.S. and other foreign funding into the country.
Huawei expanding role in unstable countries like Iraq and Afghanistan raised questions about the U.S. strategy in focusing on security but not commercial partnerships in rebuilding efforts. Huawei equipment was even used by U.S. forces until views changed on it as a national security threat.
Ren viewed rural and developing markets as critical to success, and promised to connect people anywhere through its networks. This approach helped it win the contract with Nemont in remote areas.
The passage describes the Fort Peck Dam in Montana, which was built in the 1930s during the Great Depression as a massive public works project by the US government. It became the largest earth-filled dam in the world at the time.
Construction involved around 40,000-50,000 workers and took place continuously over 7 years, with 60 workers killed. Temporary towns sprung up to house the workers. Conditions were harsh.
The scale and speed of the project is hard to imagine today, given regulatory hurdles and lack of government vision/leadership for large infrastructure. It cost around $100 million (equivalent to $2 billion today).
The dam played a role in rural electrification through the New Deal. It helped power the Rural Electrification Administration’s goals of bringing electricity to farms across the country via cooperative utilities, transforming rural life and the economy.
While not perfect due to environmental/social impacts, the project was seen as critical infrastructure that required a massive coordinated public effort across many years, like Roosevelt described. Private companies had not electrified rural areas.
The passage argues broadband should be viewed as similarly critical today as electricity was in the past, but US broadband policy and investment has lacked the scale and vision of projects like the Fort Peck Dam. The digital divide persists in rural areas.
A full digital infrastructure package is estimated to cost between $130-150 billion over 5-7 years. It could include establishing a national infrastructure bank, reviving Build America Bonds, and training workers in digital skills like cybersecurity and data science.
The $2 trillion American Jobs Plan proposed by Biden aims to provide $100 billion for broadband access, which supporters see as crucial infrastructure like electricity was in the past. Congress is also investing $250 billion in emerging tech R&D over 5 years.
Open RAN networking could make the US more competitive against Huawei by separating hardware and software, allowing operators more choice. US companies lead in specialized software and semiconductors for Open RAN. Some examples from companies like Parallel Wireless are mentioned.
However, Open RAN is still maturing and faces challenges around compatibility. Wider adoption may take several years to a decade. Government support and incentives could help speed this up.
Most Americans support using public funds to expand internet access. But replacing Huawei equipment is also facing challenges around costs and timelines.
5G risks widening the rural-urban divide as faster versions may not reach rural areas due to high costs and technical limitations, potentially exacerbating “connected” vs “superconnected” divides.
China has built one of the most extensive surveillance systems in the world using cameras, facial recognition technology, and artificial intelligence. It aims to install cameras to achieve “total surveillance” of public spaces and track individuals.
The cities of Hangzhou and nearby are home to China’s largest surveillance camera manufacturers like Dahua and Hikvision. These companies have grown rapidly with government support and now supply over 40% of the world’s surveillance cameras.
There are concerns that China is “exporting authoritarianism” by selling these surveillance systems to over 80 countries globally. However, some argue this oversimplifies the reasons why other countries import the technologies and how they may be used.
While Chinese companies dominate the industry and do not question the government’s usage, the challenges are more complicated than a simple narrative of exporting authoritarianism. More needs to be understood about each country’s motivations and ability to limit technology usage.

The passage discusses China’s extensive domestic surveillance system known as “Sharp Eyes,” which uses high-definition cameras, facial recognition, and other technologies on an unprecedented scale to monitor public spaces. It has been implemented not just in major cities but even in rural villages. While the government claims it fights crime and helps public safety, there are also concerns that it infringes on privacy and is used to suppress dissent. The story profiles one Chinese man, Guo, who sued a safari park for collecting visitors’ facial recognition data without consent, raising broader questions about limits on businesses collecting biometric data. Despite some proposed new regulations, the government remains reluctant to relinquish surveillance powers. In Xinjiang, leaked documents show how an “Orwellian” system of mass detention camps targeting Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities relies heavily on surveillance to control over a million people.

Camps in Xinjiang strictly control prisoners through propaganda, Mandarin lessons, and harsh punishments for minor infractions. Prisoners earn and lose points, with fewer points meaning more time in the camps.
Surveillance and control extend beyond the camps. Uyghurs must install monitoring apps, submit to biometric data collection, and face restrictions on religious and cultural practices. The government conducts security exercises and rewrites history to control identity.
Chinese technology companies like Hikvision supply much of the surveillance infrastructure. They work closely with the government and benefit from state support. Hikvision has become a global leader through aggressive overseas expansion aided by US investment and partnerships.
Hikvision cameras are now ubiquitous worldwide. Their low prices led to installations in sensitive US government sites despite national security concerns. Tracking internet-connected devices shows Hikvision cameras in most US cities and towns, revealing the company’s vast international surveillance network.
EZVIZ is the US subsidiary of Chinese company Hikvision, one of the largest surveillance camera manufacturers in the world. EZVIZ downplays its Chinese origins and portrays itself as an American startup.
Surveillance cameras and other internet-connected devices are becoming more common in smart homes. There are concerns about privacy and security as these devices collect massive amounts of personal data.
Fitness trackers like Xiaomi’s collect detailed health and activity data but often lack proper privacy protections. Xiaomi has sold millions of trackers despite being briefly blacklisted by the US government over alleged military ties.
Common devices like refrigerators, TVs, and speakers contain microphones and can reveal private information if hacked or misused. Security is often an afterthought for companies focused on being first to market.
Hikvision trains sales reps to tout its success worldwide without acknowledging growing human rights concerns over its cameras in China. Its technical courses explain surveillance capabilities but not their potential misuse in authoritarian states.
Hikvision cameras are used in both Minnesota public schools and Xinjiang internment camps in China. Their dual use shows how surveillance technologies can both protect people and restrict freedom.
Hikvision surveillance courses teach technical capabilities like facial recognition but ignore ethical issues and privacy concerns. There is no discussion of responsible use or obtaining consent.
Surveillance systems still make errors but companies understate limitations. Hikvision claims high accuracy rates for facial recognition but it has biases against women and minorities.
Military language is used to describe surveillance functions, like “patrolling” and “intrusion detection,” heightening concerns about misuse. The goal is always to expand monitoring powers without constraint.
Technology companies argue they just sell tools, not how they are used, but in reality they provide training and capabilities without safeguards. Greater responsibility is needed to prevent harm from AI surveillance.

So in summary, the passages discuss the dual-use nature of surveillance technologies and the need for companies like Hikvision to take more active responsibility in addressing ethical concerns rather than just maximizing monitoring capabilities.

Chinese surveillance company Hikvision appointed a chief compliance officer to address issues around human rights, data security, and social responsibility, but the job description lacked detail.
Hikvision and other Chinese surveillance companies aggressively market “safe city” surveillance solutions to cities around the world. They promise these systems will improve security, public health, traffic, and economic growth.
The allure of these smart city promises is understandable for mayors facing crises, but there are concerns the technology could bolster authoritarian regimes and allow mass data collection by China.
Chinese companies have fewer regulations around who they sell to compared to some Western companies. They have exported surveillance gear to over 100 countries.
However, the effectiveness and capabilities of Chinese safe city systems are questionable. Companies like Hikvision, ZTE, and Dahua have exaggerated claims and made suspicious promises about efficiency gains and crime reductions their systems deliver. They have also falsified test results required for some exports.
While advocates say the systems improve efficiency and safety, critics warn they enable mass government surveillance. Both sides assume the technology works as promised, but a closer look finds the track record is more mixed.
Governments are often persuaded to purchase smart city technologies like surveillance cameras due to prestige and a desire to appear technologically advanced, rather than whether the projects will actually be effective.
Pakistan spent $100 million on a Huawei smart city system for Islamabad, but crime rates rose and half the cameras did not work properly. Lahore later discovered its Huawei cameras had extra WiFi cards of unknown purpose.
Kenya also spent money on a Huawei smart city system but crime rates did not decrease as promised and later increased above pre-installation levels in some areas.
China may have strategic interests in Pakistan’s smart city projects given its investment in infrastructure through the Belt and Road Initiative, but transmitting bulk surveillance footage would likely need to occur through fiber cables rather than wireless access.
Kenya is working with China to build a new “digital city” called Konza from scratch, but the project is behind schedule and struggling to attract companies due to challenges in creating a tech hub in an undeveloped area.
China is pushing hard to develop “smart cities” using AI, big data, and extensive surveillance systems. A key example is Hangzhou’s “City Brain” system run by Alibaba to manage traffic.
However, these systems have limitations. Data is fragmented across different government systems, and basic infrastructure is still lacking in poorer areas. Authorities have not achieved full centralized monitoring.
The emphasis is on maximum control rather than efficiency. China relies on mass surveillance and enlists citizens to police each other. This prevents truly centralized oversight but fuels continued industry and jobs growth.
The approach taken in Xinjiang reveals the limits - targeting an entire ethnic group rather than just identifying threats. The goals are political control rather than precision security. Basic methods like knocking on doors still supplement the technology.
In summary, while China promotes its high-tech surveillance as advanced, the systems have challenges integrating data and oversight remains uneven. The focus remains political control through broad monitoring rather than precision or efficiency. Basic methods still play a key supplemental role.
Doug Madory works for a startup that monitors internet data traffic routes using traceroutes and other measurements.
In December 2015, he noticed data traveling from LA to DC was routing through China unexpectedly.
He traced the issue to a brief but impactful announcement by South Korean company SK Broadband, which incorrectly told the internet it was Verizon for over a minute.
This announcement was transmitted through a Chinese company, China Telecom, who SK Broadband peered with. It caused global networks to route Verizon traffic through China for a period.
U.S. officials warn China intentionally redirects data flows through similar “route injections” in order to surveil or control traffic. China shaping routing conditions raises national security concerns.
The incident highlighted vulnerabilities in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) system which determines global internet routes in a decentralized, rumor-based way between autonomous systems (ASes).

So in summary, Madory discovered unexpected routing through China caused by a technical BGP error, raising broader worries about Chinese influence over global internet infrastructure and traffic routes.

China uses its three state-owned telecom companies (China Telecom, China Unicom, China Mobile, known as the “Big Three”) as gatekeepers for international internet traffic entering and exiting China. This gives the government extensive control and monitoring capabilities.
Traffic entering China experiences significant slowdowns and instability due to bottlenecks imposed by the Big Three, while outgoing traffic is relatively fast. This strategic “Great Bottleneck” encourages foreign companies to locate servers in China and protects domestic companies from foreign competition.
While some argue China’s policies are accidents or mistakes, others see evidence of malicious intent based on internal documents stressing the information control benefits. Incidents have redirected a meaningful portion of US traffic, though impact is limited by encryption.
China aims to have even greater control over global data flows to strengthen its global influence, but more open connectivity would reduce domestic control, creating tensions in its approach.
Internet shutdowns in China demonstrate the state’s power over information flows, but they can also backfire by restricting access for all and stoking resentment. However, China is developing more sophisticated censorship methods.
China employs over 2 million internet censors, roughly the size of its active military forces, as well as over 20 million volunteer censors. These censors work to block, delete, and shape online content and discussions.
In early 2020, Chinese censors worked frantically to suppress information about the emerging COVID-19 virus and promote the CCP’s narratives, prioritizing social control over public safety. However, this deception may reduce trust in future crises.
China’s tightly controlled internet infrastructure, with few access points to the global internet, facilitates domestic surveillance and offensive cyber operations but comes at huge economic costs by constraining innovation and China’s global influence in internet networks.
Enforcing censorship rules also creates bureaucratic challenges for companies navigating between legal/commercial interests. Restricting information access harms technological development.
China’s pursuit of “digital sovereignty” through a tightly controlled internet fortress is fundamentally incompatible with an open, neutral internet exchange point system, as seen through the struggles of ChinaCache’s attempted carrier-neutral exchange.
The global telecom networks are still dominated by American and Western European companies, despite China’s large internet population and popular websites. The Chinese companies depend heavily on foreign networks to carry their international traffic.
To reduce this reliance, China is investing heavily in new submarine cable networks to directly connect continents. They are following a similar strategy to 19th century British companies, which built commercial cable networks as well as strategic “All-Red Routes” within the British Empire.
Huawei Marine was created in 2009 through a joint venture with a British company. It has followed a strategy of starting with smaller cable projects to gain experience, learning from partners, and taking on more complex builds over time.
One of its early projects was the transatlantic Hibernia Express cable, which would have given it a major foothold. However, U.S. security concerns led the American partner to drop Huawei. Since then it has focused on building cables in other regions without directly connecting to the U.S.
Its projects aim both to build commercially viable networks as well as strategic connections, following China’s goals to establish alternative routes and reduce reliance on foreign infrastructure providers.
Huawei Marine’s SAIL cable project between Brazil and Cameroon represented China’s approach of government-to-government dealmaking, Chinese state financing, and a preference for speed over safeguards.
The project faced competition from a Japanese cable and needed to move quickly. However, two years after completion there was little evidence the cable was handling significant traffic.
China provided $85M in loans and China Unicom provided $34M for the $136M project. Cameroon backed it to modernize its economy but demand did not materialize.
China could potentially seize more control of the project by acquiring Cameroon’s ownership stake, although this could fuel criticism of “debt-trap diplomacy.”
Huawei Marine’s other major projects were the PEACE cable between Pakistan and Africa, and expanding its presence in strategic locations like Djibouti near China’s first overseas military base. These continued China’s strategy of building its own cable systems for strategic and security reasons.
China is seeking to build out a new global submarine cable network centered around itself, connecting Asia, Africa, Europe, and South America. This would give it more control over global digital infrastructure and routes.
Companies like Hengtong Group are state-backed champions building out this network. Hengtong controls the 4th largest market share globally but still relies on foreign firms for some installation/repair work. Its goal is full independence.
China’s existing global connections rely heavily on infrastructure in countries where relations are fraying. It wants to expand into new markets in Asia, Africa and Latin America where it has more political influence.
Chinese cloud providers like Alibaba and Tencent are aggressively expanding globally to compete with Amazon, Microsoft and Google who currently dominate the market. They see opportunities in connecting Chinese firms operating abroad and emerging markets under China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Building global cloud infrastructure is part of China’s digital strategy to exert more soft power internationally and less reliance on foreign infrastructure controls its critical data and systems. Multiple Chinese tech champions are investing heavily to scale their cloud businesses.
Huawei’s global cloud revenue grew 168% in 2020 due to the pandemic accelerating cloud adoption by 1-3 years. Its government cloud services have seen success in developing markets where it provides sensitive government functions.
The global data center boom is just beginning, with projections of 10,000-100,000 data centers needed worldwide to meet demand. Currently there are about 540 hyperscale data centers globally, with the US hosting 38% and China hosting 9%.
Chinese cloud providers face fierce competition and security concerns in advanced markets. They struggle to compete against US giants and it is hard for foreign customers to choose a less capable foreign provider that puts their data at risk due to China’s cyber laws.
Chinese providers are targeting emerging markets in Asia, Africa, and Latin America where they have barely made a dent so far. Huawei is seeing over 100% growth in Latin America and Africa-Middle East.
Positioning for Southeast Asia’s growing internet economy, Alibaba committed $1 billion to develop the region’s tech talent and startups. Singapore is an incumbent hub but space there is limited, pushing growth to alternatives like Jakarta.
India was a promising market but has restricted over 100 Chinese apps following border clashes, though it remains dependent on Chinese hardware. Africa represents a major opportunity but also uncertainty for Chinese providers.
The US currently dominates Latin America but Chinese companies are positioning as alternatives, with Alibaba opening data centers in Brazil and elsewhere in the region.
Officials in some Latin American countries like Chile have tried to diversify their internet connections and submarine cable links, beyond reliance on the U.S. This has attracted interest from Huawei and Alibaba.
Huawei is aggressively building out data centers in countries like Mexico, Chile, and Brazil to form a Latin American connectivity triangle. Their strategy is aimed at capitalizing on regional dissatisfaction with U.S. dominance.
Alibaba has taken a more cautious approach, forming local partnerships instead of owning infrastructure directly. As of mid-2021 it had no data centers in Latin America.
Chile in particular has become a hub for major cloud providers like Google and Huawei due to its coastline, climate, cables, and incentives. This makes it a strategically important location as China looks to expand its network periphery.
The U.S. is taking a more defensive stance against China by denying licenses to Chinese carriers, reviewing submarine cables, and reassessing internet exchange points due to security and influence concerns. But blocking connections too widely could push traffic and infrastructure to other regions counter to U.S. interests.
China successfully launched the final satellite needed to complete its Beidou global navigation satellite system, providing an alternative to the US GPS system. Developed with both scientific and military goals in mind, global navigation systems are important for both military operations and widespread commercial/civilian uses.
The launch using a Long March 3B rocket broadcast live, a rare move by China to publicly showcase its space capabilities. Completing Beidou allowed China to join a small group including the US, EU, and Russia with truly global navigation networks.
However, China still has work to do to catch up with more advanced US space technologies. While China invested in Beidou over decades, US companies have been pioneering innovative new technologies. Chinese officials view Beidou as evolving rather than complete, planning upgrades through 2035 to continually improve the system. The successful launch shows China’s growing capabilities but it still lags behind US leadership in some areas of space technology.
SpaceX launched a third-generation GPS satellite for the US Air Force from Cape Canaveral, Florida. SpaceX now handles about two-thirds of NASA launches, having dramatically cut costs by reusing rocket components.
SpaceX is also working on a satellite constellation that could provide global broadband internet access. This would connect remote areas and competing companies are also working on similar constellations.
China has built its own satellite navigation system called Beidou to reduce its reliance on GPS. Beidou started in 1994 and is now global after motivating events like US missile strikes in the Gulf War highlighted China’s vulnerability without its own system.
China completed Beidou’s first phase in 2007, delivering the minimum 4 satellites for a basic system. It then rapidly expanded coverage and achieved global coverage by 2018, demonstrating China’s growing capabilities in space.

China developed its Beidou satellite navigation system to rival GPS and advance its military capabilities. It established the Strategic Support Force in 2015 to integrate space, cyber, and electronic warfare using systems like Beidou. China aims to complete its stable space infrastructure by 2021.

Beidou outperforms GPS in accuracy for the Asia-Pacific region and has advantages in messaging capabilities and coverage. The PLA incorporates precise Beidou location services into exercises near Taiwan.

China promotes Beidou usage globally to foster commercial, political, and strategic dependence on Beijing. Partners gain access to advanced navigation, and Beijing could offer military Beidou access when selling arms. Hundreds of millions use Beidou via phones, vehicles, and other devices exported by Chinese companies. Foreign firms also add Beidou support to remain competitive in global markets dependent on Asia-Pacific coverage.

While concern exists over potential device tracking, most receivers only get signals. China more easily obtains location data through commercial means and apps revealing military bases. It uses Beidou to boost scientific cooperation and showcase products through regional centers and forums.

China has been expanding its Beidou satellite navigation system’s ground infrastructure to every continent and the Arctic. This includes 30 global reference stations to improve precision. There are concerns this infrastructure could potentially be used for activities like jamming enemy signals.
Beidou’s ground infrastructure overlaps significantly with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Several Belt and Road countries host Beidou reference stations. China aims to build more smaller ground stations abroad and integrate satellite capabilities along the Belt and Road over the next decade.
Reliance on systems like Beidou could give China leverage, as disrupting access could impact critical infrastructure. It also stands to gain commercially from other countries’ dependence, as the US has from GPS use worldwide.
China is also a major provider of communications satellites to developing countries for about $250 million, usually financing 85% of costs. This appeals to countries’ space ambitions but risks have been ignored. Satellites from China have had mixed success commercially for recipient countries.
Nigeria was China’s first foreign satellite customer in 2004. Ambitious goals for its impact faced tensions and challenges emerged before launch. China Great Wall was the only bidder, eager to demonstrate its untested DFH-4 satellite model. Problems with commercial viability and capacity building followed.
Nigeria signed a $311 million deal with China in 2004 to obtain its first communication satellite. China covered about two-thirds of the cost and provided $200 million in financing.
The first Nigerian satellite had issues - it lasted only 1.5 years instead of the designed 15 years due to solar array malfunctions. Nigeria then signed a new deal with China Great Wall for a replacement satellite launched in 2011.
The replacement satellite was successful but the Nigerian company managing it, NIGCOMSAT, remains unprofitable with unnecessary staff. China Great Wall has tried to help NIGCOMSAT sell satellite capacity.
There are ongoing investigations into procurement irregularities and corruption related to Nigeria’s satellite deals with China.
China has also struck satellite deals with other developing countries like Laos and helped Belarus and Nigeria work together on satellite services. These deals provide strategic benefits to China like additional satellite orbital slots.
Some of China’s partner countries’ first satellites, like Venezuela’s and Indonesia’s, failed prematurely. But China faces little public criticism due to economic dependence. Questions remain about true ownership and direction of projects in countries like Sri Lanka.
Despite issues, many countries are planning additional satellites with China due to their willingness to provide financing and the political appeal of space projects. Advanced new satellites could find more buyers.
SpaceX launched its first Starlink satellites in 2019 and plans to have over 12,000 operating by mid-2027, with another 30,000 approved afterward. Musk says this will help “rebuild the internet in space.”
Low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite constellations like Starlink could expand broadband access globally. They have faster speeds than geostationary satellites due to shorter distances and fewer network “hops.”
Connectivity from LEO constellations may initially benefit rural areas in developed nations, but could eventually help close the digital divide globally by reaching remote areas.
While these constellations face technical and commercial challenges, succeeding nations that control them may enjoy strategic advantages in navigation, communications, and early warning systems.
For consumers, LEO constellations promise high-speed connectivity anywhere, but costs remain challenging, especially serving the billions not yet online globally.
Musk’s primary goal is to fund SpaceX’s mission to colonize Mars, and Starlink aims to generate billions in annual revenues to support this objective.
In the 1990s, several companies tried to launch large LEO satellite constellations for broadband internet but all went bankrupt, including Iridium, Orbcomm, and Globalstar. SpaceX founder Elon Musk noted this trend in 2020.
Recently, other LEO satellite companies have also failed or faced bankruptcy, such as LeoSat in 2019 and OneWeb and Intelsat in 2020. OneWeb was acquired by the UK government and an Indian company after filing for bankruptcy.
To succeed, LEO satellite companies need to dramatically cut costs. SpaceX is helping to reduce launch costs through reusable rockets. But operating ground stations and providing affordable user terminals is also critical and expensive.
China is taking a different, state-backed approach to LEO constellations through companies CASIC and CASC. They have significant government support but are lagging commercial competitors.
CASIC and CASC are competing on similar LEO projects like Hongyan and Hongyun while also cooperating on launches. This dual competition-cooperation model has helped China develop other industries.
Integrating these Chinese efforts will be challenging but the government aims to consolidate them through the new China Satellite Network Group company. However, China risks missing the “LEO moment” if it doesn’t act fast enough as companies claim useful spectrum.
Companies developing low Earth orbit (LEO) broadband satellite constellations are competing for limited spectrum bands that are essential for providing internet access. The Ku, Ka, and V bands are most sought after.
Getting priority status from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) process confers advantages like not having to make as many adjustments to resolve frequency conflicts. However, it does not guarantee financial success or market access.
Securing national approvals and dealing with incumbent users and competitors makes the process longer and more complex than anticipated. Companies must also meet milestones to retain their spectrum rights.
While early movers have advantages, later entrants like Amazon and Facebook have huge financial resources and could acquire other companies. China’s state-backed approach also gives it long-term staying power.
LEO constellations have potential to serve rural markets overlooked by previous satellite internet providers. However, affordability will be a major challenge for connecting lower-income areas and emerging markets where customers can only pay $2-3 per month.
Subsidies may be needed to make services truly affordable in low-income regions. Partnerships with development banks or philanthropic funding could help but face various economic, political and sustainability hurdles. The path to global coverage remains long and complex.
Jeff Bezos announced in early 2021 that he would step down as Amazon CEO to focus on his passions, including his space company Blue Origin which aims to make space travel more accessible.
Western satellite companies currently lead in technology development and secured markets, but China is catching up. If China closes the technology gap, its existing commercial and political ties backed by state financing could give it an edge in developing markets.
Chinese constellations will likely carry China’s vision of “cyber sovereignty” into orbit, requiring data to route through Chinese gateways. This puts companies using direct inter-satellite links at a disadvantage.
To gain access to markets like Russia and China, Western companies have had to drop direct links and agree to route all data through in-country gateways, losing control and incurring costs. However, not making these changes risks being locked out of markets.
Competing globally against China’s subsidized offerings will require democracies banding together and providing better connectivity alternatives to overlooked developing markets. A coalition approach is needed to avoid companies undercutting each other as occurred in the 1990s telecom industry.
A coalition dubbed the “Coalition of Open and Resilient Economies” (CORE) is proposed to address technology and economic challenges posed by China in the 21st century.
CORE should include a core group of wealthy democracies like the US, allies in Europe and Asia, as well as emerging economies in the developing world. Flexibility is important as different groups may agree on some issues but not others.
Two key bridges need to be built - across the Atlantic between the US and Europe, and between the core and peripheral countries like India. This will require incentives to shift companies’ risk-reward calculations.
Inspired by FDR’s call for an “arsenal of democracy” in WWII, CORE could coordinate investments, R&D, global standards, supply chains and export controls to counter China’s influence. But building democratic cooperation will be challenging.
Critics argue focusing only on democracies limits important partnerships, but democracies do share interests in open networks. Threats from China may have greater potential to catalyze democratic coalition-building than past issues.
The International Parliamentarians Alliance on China (IPAC) was formed to encourage cooperation among democratic legislatures on issues related to China. It currently includes legislators from 18 countries and the EU.
IPAC aims to represent both the political left and right by having co-chairs from rival political parties in each country. It has issued statements on various issues regarding China’s human rights record and territorial disputes.
While IPAC shows desire for democratic cooperation, it risks becoming unwieldy like previous efforts. Coordination challenges increase as membership grows.
Proposals for new groupings of “techno-democracies” vary in scope. Some are too ambitious in initially proposing a T-12 group, while others focusing just on the Five Eyes intelligence alliance are too narrow for technology and commercial cooperation issues.
The optimal size for an initial coalition is between the T-12 and Five Eyes proposals. Several proposals involve a D-10 format including major European countries plus others like S. Korea and India.
While the US and Europe agree on challenges from China, fundamental differences in threat perceptions remain. Europe is more ambiguous about taking strong stands that could impact economic ties with China.
Perceptions of the US declined in Europe during Trump’s presidency, while views of China have also hardened over issues like human rights and COVID response. This makes fully aligning US and European approaches towards China more challenging.
Initially, Germany had planned to allow some Huawei equipment in non-core parts of its 5G network, but announced a ban in July 2020 over security concerns due to US sanctions. France also announced phasing out Huawei by 2028.
As of mid-2021, 24 of the EU’s 27 members had adopted measures restricting Huawei. Austria, Malta, and Hungary have not due to existing dependence on Chinese vendors for 4G networks.
Reliance on a single vendor like Huawei creates infrastructure lock-in issues. Open RAN standards promoting multi-vendor networks could help address this.
Greater transatlantic cooperation is needed in international standards bodies to shape 5G and emerging tech standards in a socially responsible way and counter Chinese influence.
While the US pushed to restrict Huawei, the EU is reluctant to choose between US and Chinese visions and wants autonomy. Digital sovereignty and championing European tech firms are priorities over defending current US dominance of big tech.

So in summary, the EU seeks a “third way” between US and China on digital issues rather than siding fully with either, due to concerns over dependence on non-European companies.

GAIA-X is an initiative launched by Germany and France to promote cloud computing independence and sovereignty in Europe. It aims to create a European platform and set principles for data storage and processing.
The goals are to reduce dependence on large US and Chinese cloud providers, give European providers more visibility, and allow for easier movement of data between providers. However, it is unclear what specific technical solutions or products GAIA-X will offer.
Skeptics argue the rhetoric and goals are not backed by serious funding compared to large cloud players. It may increase barriers for US providers but welcome Chinese players.
The initiative reflects European concerns about digital sovereignty in the face of dominant US and Chinese tech giants. However, it faces challenges in truly competing at a global scale.
Cooperation between Europe and US on digital issues will remain important but also friction-filled, as they have different visions. Managing differences honestly and finding new avenues for cooperation, like the EU-US Trade and Technology Council, will be important.
Looking ahead, the West needs to engage more with the developing world, where economic and technological influence will increasingly shift. India and the rising global middle class will be particularly important targets for expansion.
India is seen as a key strategic partner for the US-led CORE coalition, as it would add significant economic and demographic weight. With India’s participation, the CORE would represent 8 of the top 10 global economies by 2030.
However, if India tilts toward China instead, it would be a major loss for the CORE. The US and India have been growing closer in recent years due to common concerns about China, but full alignment is not guaranteed.
India relies heavily on imports of technology from China, including telecom equipment and smartphones. Affordability is a major factor, though India is starting to take a tougher stance on Chinese 5G suppliers.
India wants to develop its own tech champions but faces challenges in manufacturing capabilities and reliance on Chinese tech. It also wants more control over its data but has not actively participated in relevant international discussions.
India’s democratic credentials have also faced some issues, such as frequent internet shutdowns. To fully participate in the CORE, it needs to take demonstrable actions to strengthen protections for civil liberties and reduce barriers to cooperation.
The summit could focus on data flows, building on efforts started in Japan in 2019.
India’s reforms could be incentivized by policies that help manufacturing, like tax incentives for companies moving production from China to India. This could help diversify supply chains away from China and decrease India’s reliance on it.
A more open India could act as an ambassador between wealthier CORE countries and developing markets, using its experience to help connect more of the developing world. Its growing manufacturing sector could offer solutions designed for lower-income markets.
Upgrading American statecraft requires shifts in strategy, budgets, operations, and messaging to compete with China’s digital ambitions. Resources must be better aligned to digital/cybersecurity issues, with a more entrepreneurial and risk-tolerant approach to emerging technologies and foreign markets. Partnerships can help share risks and rewards. Messaging needs to go beyond only highlighting dangers of Chinese equipment to presenting a positive vision.
If China continues its unchecked expansion into global digital infrastructure, it could gain immense intelligence, economic and military advantages over time.
Through controlling global networks, China would have insight into other countries’ energy usage, trade flows, research, politics and more. This would help it economically and detect threats.
On “the worst possible day”, China could leverage its digital control to launch devastating cyber attacks or information warfare against adversaries.
Developing countries are increasingly dependent on Chinese technology, opening them up to espionage risks now and coercive influence in the future if dependence grows.
With a dominant position at the center of global networks, China’s state-controlled system may gain superior information to market-based economies like the US.
Armed with so much advantage, Chinese leaders may be tempted to intervene more in other countries’ affairs, believing risks are low. This could increase tensions and likelihood of conflict.
If left unchecked, China’s growing digital control poses serious national security, economic and geopolitical risks for the US and its allies over the long run.
Nations are increasingly targeting each other’s computer networks, critical infrastructure, communications systems, financial systems and space assets through cyber and information operations as part of conflicts.
In a conflict, China could potentially severely disrupt other countries’ critical systems like military, financial, telecom, power and computer networks, without even firing a shot. However, China is still far from having that level of capability and understanding other networks globally.
While China aims to dominate physical infrastructure connecting data worldwide, network power has limits. Disrupting other countries’ infrastructure risks retaliation and loss of allies. It’s not too late for countries to reduce dependence on Chinese systems.
Concerns about China’s technological ambitions are valid given its rapid growth, but there is a risk of paranoia weakening the response. Maintaining focus on addressing real threats and exploiting China’s weaknesses, while avoiding protectionism and promoting competitiveness at home, will be key.
Winning the “Network Wars” will require resilient systems and preventing disasters over the long run, not a single decisive victory. Democracies strengths like transparency and adaptation provide advantages if awareness of challenges drives progress.
Freely connecting the world does not guarantee positive outcomes. Responsibility now falls on governments, companies and citizens to actively work to advance human freedom and democratic values through technology.

Here is a summary of the acknowledgements and thanks section:

The author thanks the team behind the Reconnecting Asia Project for their work, including Andrew Huang, Emily Cipriani, Laura Rivas, Joseph Yinusa, and Maesea McCalpin.
The author is also grateful to colleagues who advised on the project, including Bushra Bataineh, Michael Bennon, Jude Blanchette, Victor Cha, and others.
The author benefited from the guidance of more experienced advisors in navigating new areas, including Blaine Curcio, Steven Feldstein, Allie Funk, and others.
The author thanks Andrew Hill at the Financial Times for overseeing the Bracken Bower Prize opportunity. Thanks also to Allan Song and the Smith Richardson Foundation for funding support.
The publishing team including Hollis Heimbouch, Wendy Wong, and Plaegian Alexander helped make the book possible.
The author thanks friends and family for their support during the writing process, including providing a change of scenery to work. Special thanks to his partner Liz for her endless energy and support.

Here is a summary of the article:

The article discusses how Huawei’s deep roots in Africa have put the continent beyond the reach of the US crackdown on the company. It describes how Huawei has had a presence in Africa for over 20 years and has become the leading ICT company on the continent. It has gained strategic partnerships with many countries and suppliers, establishing itself as crucial to Africa’s mobile networks and future tech development plans. As a result, African countries have been reluctant to exclude Huawei from their markets in response to US calls to do so due to national security concerns. Many African leaders view the US actions as threatening their sovereignty and ability to choose suppliers independently. So while the US campaign against Huawei has impacted some of its other global markets, Africa has largely remained beyond the reach of these efforts due to Huawei’s entrenched role and strategic importance for many African economies.

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The Digital Silk Road - Jonathan E. Hillman