Literary Insights

BOOK LINK:

Here is a summary of the key points about the book “The Entrepreneurial State” by Mariana Mazzucato:

The book argues against conventional economic wisdom that the private sector is primarily responsible for innovation and the state should just fix market failures.
It provides evidence that governments have played a central role in funding high-risk research that enabled revolutionary innovations like the Internet, touchscreen displays, GPS, and Siri.
Specific examples examined include how government funding through agencies like DARPA and NIH drove innovations later commercialized by Apple in products like the iPhone.
The book also looks at how governments pushed green technologies like wind and solar power through consistent funding and policies, driving down costs over time.
Mazzucato advocates for an expanded role of the state in directly investing in and driving innovations, not just addressing market failures. She cites examples where government displayed an “entrepreneurial” role.
She argues this type of proactive public investment is needed to address socio-economic challenges and achieve broader goals of promoting inclusive and sustainable growth.
The book provides a critique of conventional narratives that focus solely on the private sector role in innovation and minimizes the state’s contributions.

So in summary, it presents evidence for an expanded vision of the state as an “entrepreneurial” driver of innovation, not just a fixer of market failures.

Here is a summary of the Acknowledgements section:

The author thanks several intellectual collaborators who stimulated and challenged their thinking, including Carlota Perez on the role of the state in technological revolutions, and Bill Lazonick on distinguishing business from markets and the relationship between finance, production, and labor. Bill’s students Oner Tulum and Matt Hopkins provided invaluable research assistance.
The author also thanks Caetano Penna, Caroline Barrow, and Gemma Smith for editorial assistance. Caetano’s background in heterodox economics and innovation studies made him a useful sounding board. Caroline helped with editing and formatting despite challenges. Gemma helped steer the introduction for the revised edition.
Funding from the Ford Foundation and Institute for New Economic Thinking allowed time for writing. Discussions with Leonardo Burlamaqui and upcoming project with Randy Wray were also influences.
Other colleagues who provided inspiration through interaction and feedback include Fred Block, Michael Jacobs, Paul Nightingale, Andy Stirling, and the Science Policy Research Unit where the author is now based.

So in summary, the author expresses gratitude to intellectual collaborators, research assistants, editors, funders, and colleagues who challenged their thinking and supported the writing process.

The passage discusses the concept of an “entrepreneurial state” - where the government understands innovation to be key to capitalist competition. Rather than just mythologizing innovation, the state studies it critically in terms of both its rate and direction.

The author has worked with policymakers around the world who want to consider different voices in economics. They find inspiration in how certain UK and European policymakers have thought about public sector innovation.

However, the individuals mentioned bear no responsibility for any errors in the book.

The foreword discusses how the arguments in the book from 2013 are even more relevant now. There is an ongoing debate about whether austerity helps or hurts growth. The passage argues austerity can be self-defeating, based on Keynes’ views.

Additionally, there has been more political attacks on not just public spending but the organizational structures that support innovation. This challenges the progressive agenda to not just increase spending but safeguard innovative public organizations.

The passage discusses how Keynes and Polanyi viewed the role of the state in wealth creation and shaping long term prospects, not just fixing market failures. But modern views see the public sector more as impediments rather than creators. This has undermined confidence in public institutions.

Here is a summary of the key points from the provided text:

The argument in Mazzucato’s book The Entrepreneurial State is even more relevant now, as countries pursue new industrial strategies and invest heavily in economic recovery from COVID-19 and climate change.
However, these industrial strategies often fall short of embracing the state’s role in directing growth, innovation, and crowding in inclusive and sustainable investments. They tend to focus on promoting individual sectors rather than setting a clear direction.
For industrial strategies to foster resilient economies, the state needs to set bold goals like the UN Sustainable Development Goals to shape markets. It also needs to bring ambition to how it designs partnerships between government, business, and labor.
The state must ensure public funds and collaborations with private sectors maximize public value through conditions on access to funds and sharing of intellectual property and profits.
Effective citizen engagement is also vital to ensure solutions reflect peoples’ needs and have public support.
This requires the state to invest in its own capabilities and institutions rather than relying too heavily on consultants, in order to direct and shape markets towards public purposes.

In summary, the text argues the state needs to take a more proactive and ambitious role in directing industrial strategies and growth towards sustainability, inclusion and resilience.

Mazzucato advocates for a more active role of the state in driving innovation and economic growth, as opposed to the dominant narrative that the private sector is the true driver of innovation.
She argues that countries looking to emulate the US model should focus more on the US government’s historical role in funding high-risk research and development, rather than the rhetoric about small government and free markets. Major technological innovations like the internet, biotech, and shale gas relied heavily on initial public funding.
With declining public funding for basic research in the US, there is a need to change the policy debate away from deficit levels towards strategic investments in R&D, education, and other areas that can boost future economic growth.
The narrative that private businesses are inherently more innovative while governments are bureaucratic hinders the potential for public sector to properly shape and direct markets towards important societal goals like addressing climate change.
Mazzucato challenges the common conception that governments should only focus on fixing market failures and leveling the playing field, rather than directly shaping and creating new industries. She argues for a more ambitious and visionary role of the state in driving innovation and economic transformations.
The book aims to dismantle the “fabricated image” of a dynamic private sector versus a lazy public sector, which has allowed some private actors to portray themselves as true wealth creators and extract more value from the economy through lobbying and policy influence.
The conventional view of a passive state vs dynamic private sector is wrong and oversimplified. In reality, governments have historically played an active role in innovation by funding basic research, applied research, and early-stage companies.
Government investments have been transformational in creating entire new markets like the internet, biotech, nanotech, and clean energy. Technologies in the iPhone like GPS and SIRI originated from government research programs.
The state’s role goes beyond just fixing market failures. It can actively shape and create new markets by providing a vision and direction for technological change through public-private partnerships.
Narrowly evaluating public spending based only on existing markets ignores the state’s ability to push markets into new areas. Successful innovations often stem from governments willing to take risks businesses won’t.
Countries that owe their growth to innovation had mission-oriented public policies aimed at “thinking big” to advance technologies. Reviving this approach is key to spurring more innovation.
While markets are important, they are not sufficient and may stick to suboptimal, carbon-intensive paths. The state must lead the economy towards new “techno-economic paradigms” to address societal challenges like climate change.
The state plays a massive role in innovation, both on the supply side by funding fundamental research and developing key technologies, and on the demand side by creating market conditions that enable new technologies to diffuse. From the Internet to clean technologies, most major innovations benefited greatly from public funding and support.
However, the impact of public spending is often underestimated because its evaluation focuses too narrowly on short-term costs and benefits rather than dynamic long-term impacts. Public funding takes big risks and creates new opportunities, industries, and markets that wouldn’t otherwise exist.
For innovation to thrive, governments need to strategically pick broad directions of investment while allowing flexibility. They also need to attract expertise to envision bold policies and new economic landscapes.
Public and private sectors should have a more symbiotic relationship where governments share both the risks and rewards of early-stage innovation. This recognizes that the public sector often funds the highest-risk phases.
Overall, the state’s role in innovation is much greater than typically acknowledged. A better understanding and evaluation of this role is needed to maximize its impact.
Some economists argue we are facing “secular stagnation,” meaning long-term low growth is inevitable. However, the author argues this is not inevitable and is caused by policy choices.
Government spending cuts like austerity policies are squeezing education, R&D, and innovation budgets. This is reducing the public sector’s role in supporting technological progress.
Businesses are increasingly focused on short-term financial returns like stock buybacks rather than R&D and human capital investment.
To reverse stagnation, policies are needed that support both innovation-led and inclusive growth. But governments have become more timid in thinking big due to rhetoric portraying the private sector as the sole driver of wealth.
A new language is needed to portray the state’s potential role in shaping markets and driving entrepreneurship, not just fixing market failures. Terms like “crowding in” private investment are too defensive.
The book aims to change the discourse around the state’s role and capabilities. It presents the state not just as a regulator but also a risk-taking catalyst for business investment and market creation.
The chapters explore reimaging the state and developing policies that support an entrepreneurial state driving long-term growth and innovation.

This summary captures the key ideas from the passage:

The passage introduces the concept of the “entrepreneurial state” which actively takes risks and shapes new markets, rather than just fixing market failures.
Chapters 2-4 provide background and evidence of the US state taking proactive roles in developing technologies like DARPA, nanotech, and enabling companies like Apple.
Chapters 5-7 focus on specific examples like Apple and clean energy technologies to illustrate how the state played a lead role in risk-taking and establishing new industries.
Chapters 8-9 argue that the state’s risk-taking often benefits private actors more than taxpayers, and discuss ensuring the state earns returns from successful risks.
Chapter 10 concludes by reflecting on fully realizing the entrepreneurial state role and overturning limiting assumptions about the state’s innovation system relationships and ability to direct rather than just incentivize.
Overall, the book aims to provide a fuller understanding of the state’s central role in risk-taking, technological change and promoting long-term growth.
There is an ideology promoted in the media and by politicians that the private sector is dynamic and innovative while the public sector is bureaucratic and inhibits growth. This view downplays the important role of the public sector.
Governments across the globe have been pushed to cut back the state and free up the private sector in order to foster economic recovery from the financial crisis. However, the crisis was actually caused by excessive private debt.
The reality is that both the private and public sectors play important roles in innovation. The state funds basic research and takes on greater risks, while private firms commercialize innovations.
Countries like Italy have suffered from low growth not because of high spending, but because spending has not been strategic in areas like education, R&D, infrastructure that enable growth.
There is a need to balance the understanding of how economies work and re-evaluate conventional views that overstate the role of markets and understate the public sector’s role in innovation and long-term investment. Strategic public investment is important for growth.
Constant criticism of the state’s ability to “pick winners” ignores how much more difficult it is for the state to invest in new, emerging technologies compared to private businesses investing in mature industries.
This creates an unfair standard that ignores the higher risks and longer timelines associated with public investments in high-risk areas. Metrics are needed to properly evaluate public vs private investments.
Ironically, the state has not effectively communicated its role in successes like the Internet and companies like Apple, making it easier to criticize failures and be captured by private lobbies.
A stronger defense is needed against arguments that reduce support for critical state investments in innovation. Successful companies have relied heavily on prior state funding of R&D.
The emphasis should be on the entrepreneurial role of the state in making risky, long-term investments to launch new sectors and technologies, not just addressing market failures after the fact. Many innovations emerged from proactive state vision and support, not just private sector activity.
Arguing for an entrepreneurial state acknowledges its hidden but pivotal role throughout history in industries like IT, biotech, nanotech, and green tech through strategic investments in early R&D and network building.
Innovation requires “systems” where new knowledge and technologies can diffuse between different actors like firms, universities, research institutions, and the public sector. However, the role of each actor depends on where they fall in the “bumpy risk landscape” of innovation.
Historically, high-risk areas that require large capital investments, like biotech and nanotech, were largely avoided by private sector and required significant public sector funding and leadership to get off the ground. The state has often been behind major technological revolutions.
Understanding each actor’s proper role is important to avoid policy capture. While venture capital promotes its role, it typically enters industries long after initial public sector investments have reduced risk.
Innovation systems can be either “symbiotic” with mutual benefits between public and private sectors, or “parastic” where the private sector leeches benefits without contributing. Ensuring private sector investment increases in response to public funding is important.
In some industries like pharma, increased public funding for drug development coincides with decreased private R&D spending and closing of research labs. Financialization of industries also correlates with reduced research spending.
The role of government in innovation and technology is debated. Some argue the government should focus on creating the right market conditions but avoid “picking winners.” Others argue the government must play a more active role.
Adam Smith believed capitalist markets would self-regulate with the government providing basic infrastructure. But historian Karl Polanyi showed free markets are a myth - they require active ongoing intervention by the state to establish and maintain.
Polanyi argued contrary to expectations, innovation did not diminish the need for state control and intervention but greatly increased it. Administrators had to constantly oversee the system to ensure the free market functioned properly.
So while some argue the state’s role is limited to addressing market failures, the historical evidence shows establishing functioning markets required extensive ongoing state involvement and organization, not just correcting failures. The government’s role in innovation may need to be more active than simply setting broad conditions.

In summary, it debates the appropriate role of government in innovation and cites views ranging from limiting the state to market conditions to arguments that the state must play a more active role based on historical evidence of extensive state intervention required to establish markets.

Polanyi showed that national markets were created through state intervention and force, not naturally through free markets alone. Local and international markets predate capitalism and were less shaped by states.
Keynes believed capitalist markets need constant regulation due to inherent instability. He argued aggregate demand needs to be balanced through business investment, government spending, consumption, and net exports to avoid crashes. Private investment is especially volatile.
Keynesians argue for using government spending to boost demand and stabilize the economy. Some went further and advocated targeted government spending to increase innovation capacity through R&D, infrastructure, skills, and specific technologies.
While welfare programs are important, they cannot be sustained without economic growth. Growth requires productive investments, not just equality or redistribution. Bringing Keynes and Schumpeter together can help create and redistribute wealth through a growth agenda focused on innovation.
There has been a lack of connection between Keynesian spending and Schumpeterian innovation investments. Understanding different perspectives on economic growth theory is important to establish the role of technology and innovation in driving growth.
Nelson and Winter proposed an “evolutionary theory” of production and technological change, focusing on innovation dynamics within firms rather than assuming representative agents or exogenous tech change.
This perspective views competition as the co-evolution and selection of different firm routines/abilities to innovate. It recognizes dynamic increasing returns and path dependencies.
Innovation is uncertain and firm-specific. The focus is on a “systems of innovation” view examining how firms are embedded in sectoral, regional, and national networks.
Schumpeterians criticize endogenous growth theory for assuming R&D can be modeled probabilistically, when in fact innovation involves true uncertainty.
Systems of innovation emphasize linkages among actors, circulation of knowledge, and how institutions influence the distribution of R&D.
Examples are given of Japan’s developmental state model coordinating sectoral links and public-private ties, versus the more rigid Soviet model with separation of R&D and production.
Regional systems focus on cultural, geographic and institutional proximity facilitating innovation dynamics.

In summary, it presents an evolutionary, systems-based perspective on technological change and competition between firms, emphasizing uncertainty, increasing returns, institutional influences, and national/regional innovation networks.

Studies of industrial districts and local innovation systems have shown that socio-institutional factors in regions, like interactions between local administrations, unions, and family-owned companies, affect technological change at a national level.
Specific examples mentioned are the relationships between these actors in Italian industrial districts.
Beyond just addressing “market failures”, the state’s role includes fixing “system failures” - issues that prevent an innovation system from effectively performing functions like knowledge diffusion, entrepreneurship, resource mobilization, etc.
Successful innovation systems are characterized by networks that mobilize resources and foster entrepreneurship across sectors. However, a functional system alone is not sufficient - the state must also lead industrial development strategies.
Examples of developmental state-led industrialization in countries like Japan, South Korea, and China show how these states targeted certain sectors for investment and helped companies penetrate domestic and export markets. This type of strategic direction goes beyond just addressing failures.
The key point is that the state can effectively lead technological development and new industries, not just fund basic science and infrastructure to support private sector activities.
R&D spending is often used as a simple target for innovation policy, but it overlooks differences across industries and firms in terms of the levels and types of R&D required to generate economic returns.
Complementary assets at the firm level, like infrastructure, marketing capabilities, etc. are also needed to translate technological innovations into market successes, but are ignored in many innovation policies focused only on R&D.
Small firms are commonly assumed to be drivers of innovation, jobs and growth. However, evidence shows high-growth firms, regardless of size, are more important. Most small firms do not experience fast growth.
Targeting assistance just to SMEs due to their size involves significant waste, as most will fail or not grow substantially. It’s better to target growing, ambitious companies.
Venture capital is often hyped as risk-loving and innovative, but risk capital is actually scarce for early-stage seed funding due to high failure rates of new companies. Venture capital mainly provides later-stage growth funding after initial viability is proven.

In summary, the passage critiques some common “myths” around innovation policy by arguing factors like high-growth potential, proven viability, and complementary assets are more important than simple measures like R&D spending, firm size, or even availability of venture capital alone. A nuanced, evidence-based approach is needed.

In the early seed stage of an innovation, the risk of loss is highest at around 66%. The risk falls significantly as the innovation progresses through later stages like start-up, second stage, etc. as shown in Table 2.
Venture capital is typically thought to enter at the invention and innovation stages, but in reality the transition from invention to commercial application is highly uncertain and nonlinear, with many firms failing.
Government research programs in the US have historically provided significant funding for early-stage technology firms, more so than private venture capital or angel investors.
Venture capital tends to focus on areas that are lower risk, have high growth potential, low technical complexity, and low capital needs. They also prefer exits within 3-5 years despite innovations often requiring longer timelines.
Relying too heavily on the venture capital model, with its focus on short-term returns, can be problematic for risky, long-term research areas like biotech and green tech that require more patient capital.
The number of patents does not necessarily reflect innovation, as patent laws have expanded to include upstream research and discoveries. Many patents have little value. Thus policies focusing too much on patent numbers may misallocate resources.
In 2013, the UK government introduced a ‘patent box’ policy that reduces the corporation tax rate on income derived from patents to 10%. This fits with the government’s view that tax policy can encourage investment and innovation.
The Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) argues against this policy. They claim it will significantly reduce tax revenue without actually increasing innovation. R&D tax credits are enough to address market failures related to R&D spending.
The patent box policy targets income from patented technologies, not the underlying research/innovation itself. It adds complexity and opportunities for abuse to the tax system.
There are doubts about whether it will actually incentivize more research within the implementing country given international collaborations.
Similar policies have been introduced in other European countries, but they offer dubious benefits and lead to a redistribution of income to large companies without meaningfully fostering innovation. Ultimately, the IFS argues the policy will stifle rather than foster innovation.
In summary, the IFS contends the patent box policy will be costly to implement and monitor but provide little actual benefit in terms of increased innovation within the country.
Paul Berg, a Nobel Prize-winning Stanford professor, criticized risk-taking venture capitalists for not funding basic scientific research in the 1950s and 1960s, which laid the groundwork for many pharmaceutical discoveries and innovations.
Public funding of research is generally justified by the idea of “market failure” - that the private sector underinvests in research due to long time horizons, riskiness, and benefits accruing to the public good. However, public funding often does more than just fix market failures - it envisions and creates new markets by taking on risk and supporting early-stage technology development.
Entrepreneurship involves taking risks to implement new ideas and inventions. Technological innovation and R&D involve significant uncertainty since outcomes are unpredictable and many investments fail. This makes private companies less likely to invest in basic research.
While the private sector accounts for most overall R&D spending, the public sector accounts for over half of basic research funding in the US due to market failures in private basic research investment.
Examples are given showing that the public sector has often led the way in radical, path-breaking innovations like the Internet and nanotechnology, actively creating new markets rather than just fixing them. This shows the limitations of the market failure framework.
Governments have played a leading role in developing many major new technologies through long-term investments, including technologies like aviation, space, IT, the Internet, and nuclear power.
Specific government institutions were important for envisioning new opportunities, engaging in risky early-stage research, and overseeing commercialization.
The US government in particular has funded key developments like railroads, agriculture research, aerospace, IT, and digital networks like ARPANET which led to the Internet. Silicon Valley’s growth was also shaped by defense funding and relationships with universities.
At the micro level, around 88% of the most important innovations between 1971-2006 were dependent on federal research support, especially in early phases.
In pharmaceuticals and biotech, publicly-funded research like the NIH played a leading role in developing new molecular entities and monoclonal antibodies. However, private firms focused more on “me too” drugs and development/marketing.
75% of new molecular entities in drugs traced back to public NIH research, not private companies who spent heavily on variations of existing drugs and stock buybacks rather than radical new innovations.
The biotech industry growth was guided more by government investment and involvement than by venture capital as often claimed. Government led the development of the underlying knowledge base driving industry success.
The US government has played an active and entrepreneurial role in spurring innovation, despite the perception of the US having a private sector-led economy.
Four key examples of government initiatives that supported innovation are given: DARPA, SBIR, the Orphan Drug Act, and the National Nanotechnology Initiative.
These initiatives show how the government proactively shaped markets to drive innovation by providing early-stage financing where venture capital was absent and commissioning private sector activity that wouldn’t have otherwise occurred.
While a national innovation system is important, more impressive results can be achieved when the state is a major player within that system. The government can disseminate new ideas rapidly and shape markets through procurement, commissioning, and regulation to spur innovation at the frontiers of knowledge beyond just subsidizing companies.
In summary, the chapter argues that the US government has played an entrepreneurial role in innovation through strategic initiatives, not just a hands-off approach, contradicting the perception of a purely private sector-led economy. The state can drive higher levels of innovation by engaging proactively within the national innovation system.
DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) plays an important role in driving technological innovation for both military and economic purposes in the US.
It was created in 1958 in response to the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik to support “blue-sky” research beyond the military’s horizons.
DARPA funds cutting-edge research at universities and startups, helping new technologies transition from labs to commercial markets. It played a key role in developing computer science, semiconductors, the Internet, and other technologies.
DARPA operates flexibly with a small staff and short-term program manager contracts, bridging academia and the military. This structure lets it take risks and fund novel ideas.
It brokered interactions between researchers, entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and companies, expanding innovation networks and the pool of researchers in critical fields.
DARPA’s model and successes demonstrated how government can play an important role in catalyzing technological advance and driving economic growth through strategic targeting of resources and fostering public-private collaboration.
DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) played a key role in the growth of personal computing through decentralized industrial policy, but this is often omitted from accounts that view Silicon Valley as a product of free market capitalism alone.
In the 1970s, DARPA’s success with computing illustrated the potential for decentralized policy to accelerate biotechnology as well.
The key aspects of the DARPA model included small autonomous offices funding universities, startups, companies across basic and applied research to address technological challenges.
In the 1980s, the Reagan administration further built on this model through programs like the SBIR (Small Business Innovation Research) which required government agencies to dedicate funding to small businesses.
The 1983 Orphan Drug Act provided incentives like tax credits and clinical subsidies for drugs treating rare diseases, enabling small biotech firms to develop niche markets. Over 2,300 drugs have been designated as orphan drugs.
Major pharmaceutical companies now generate significant revenues from orphan drug sales, underlining the importance of this policy in accelerating biotechnology growth.
Lazonick and Tulum (2011) found that orphan drugs (drugs developed for rare diseases) were more numerous, saw earlier revenue growth, and many had higher 2007 sales than leading non-orphan drugs. This shows the important role orphan drugs have played in developing the biotech industry.
Big Pharma and biotech companies significantly depend on each other in the area of orphan drugs. Government support was crucial to the development and success of both industries during the 2000s. The US government continues investing in knowledge creation, subsidizing drug development, and protecting and purchasing drugs from biopharma companies.
Government has taken an active role in driving private sector innovation through initiatives like DARPA, SBIR programs, and creating a market for orphan drugs. This “nimble government” funds early-stage research and networks between government agencies and companies.
The National Nanotechnology Initiative is another example where government envisioned and invested in developing nanotech as a strategic priority over opposition from the private sector focused on short-term returns. Government agencies like NSF defined nanotech and distributed funding across agencies to successfully develop the field.
In summary, the chapter argues that contrary to common assumptions, government has played a leading role in innovating new technologies and industries like biotech and nanotech, often ahead of the private sector focused on short-term profits. Government investments were crucial for their development and success.
Steve Jobs’ 2005 Stanford commencement speech about staying “foolish” and emphasizing creativity/design over technology expertise is cited as epitomizing the knowledge economy. However, the story it creates overstates the role of individual genius at Apple.
The technologies that underpinned revolutionary Apple products like the iPhone/iPad, such as the Internet, GPS, touch screens, were developed through massive public/state investments, not just Apple’s innovation.
Without these publicly funded technologies, there would have been no “wave for Apple to surf” and transform into a highly profitable company. So state/public funding played a key role in Apple’s commercial success.
While Apple excels at design/integration, its actual R&D spending as a percentage of sales is relatively low compared to competitors. It focuses on integrating technologies often invented elsewhere with public funding, not developing new technologies itself.
The chapter questions whether the public sufficiently benefited from the profits and tax revenues generated by Apple, given the role of public investments in enabling Apple’s innovations. It challenges prevailing narratives that overlook the state’s contributions.
Apple received significant government support from its early days, including direct equity investment and access to technologies developed through government/military research programs.
Key technologies in Apple products like the iPod, iPhone, and iPad were enabled by public investments in computer and semiconductor research dating back to the 1960s-70s. This included research at DARPA, Bell Labs, Xerox PARC, and Silicon Valley labs.
Technologies like microprocessors, memory, displays, batteries, and data storage that Apple integrated in its products originated from government-funded research. The internet, web protocols, and cellular networks were also crucial enablers.
Groundbreaking inventions like giant magnetoresistance (GMR), which allowed smaller hard drives and made the iPod possible, received major support from government agencies like DARPA and the Department of Energy.
Government played an important role not just in basic research but also translating ideas into viable commercial technologies through programs like DARPA’s TRP initiative in the 1980s-90s. This reinforced the US innovation ecosystem that companies like Apple could then build upon.

In summary, the passage highlights Apple’s strong reliance on technologies developed through US government and military research funding from its early days through the development of iconic products like the iPod.

Following the Cold War, DARPA focused on developing “dual-use” technologies that could benefit both the military and commercial sectors through programs like SPINTRONICS. This increased scientific research and publication in areas like spin electronics.
Semiconductors and integrated circuits, first developed in the 1950s, became crucial to electronics and devices like computers, phones, and the internet. Government agencies like the Air Force and NASA drove early adoption and costs down through procurement.
In the 1980s, Japan was advancing semiconductor manufacturing capabilities faster than the US. This worried the Department of Defense about reliance on foreign suppliers for critical technologies. It launched programs like SCI and formed SEMATECH to collaborate with industry and universities on domestic semiconductor R&D.
Government investment and supervision helped reduce costs and improve the performance of microprocessors and memory chips over many years, enabling technologies like personal computers and mobile devices. Early touchscreen and scrolling technologies also benefited from decades of research at places like Oak Ridge National Lab and CERN.
Steve Jobs envisioned portable “post-PC” devices integrated through Apple products. The iPod click wheel exploited capacitive sensing technology to allow finger scrolling of music. This paved the way for multi-touch interfaces on later iOS devices like the iPhone and iPad.
The iPod was Apple’s most important product until the iPhone was introduced in 2007, generating over $22 billion in revenues. Great design, engineering, user experience, and marketing helped Apple dominate various consumer electronics markets.
Subsequent products like the iPhone, iPad were built on hybridizing existing technologies developed with decades of government support. As the smartphone pioneer, Apple integrated cellular, computing and digital entertainment into a single device.
The iPhone dramatically changed expectations of phones, and the iPad transformed the laptop-dominated portable computer industry. Apple virtually created and captured the tablet niche.
Within a decade, Apple singlehandedly came to dominate consumer electronics through innovative device design and marketing, as well as managing complex system integration.
Key enabling technologies included multi-touch displays, the Internet, GPS, and digital assistants like SIRI - all of which had origins in public research funding and development programs. Support from agencies like DARPA, NSF and SRI helped advance the underlying technologies that powered Apple’s popular consumer devices.
SRI recognized the potential for CALO (its intelligent assistant technology) to be used as a smartphone application when the original iPhone was released in 2007. It commercialized the technology by founding Siri as a startup.
In 2010, Apple acquired Siri, though the terms were undisclosed. Steve Jobs acknowledged the potential of artificial intelligence and was excited about Siri’s acquisition.
Many core iPhone technologies like LCD displays, batteries, and cellular networks originated from US government-funded research. The government played a key role in developing these technologies and fostering their commercialization.
For LCDs specifically, the military funded early transistor research. Later, industry consortiums like ADMARC received government support to develop manufacturing capabilities in the US.
Lithium-ion batteries were also invented with government funding but commercialized first by Japanese companies. The US government later helped foster domestic battery manufacturing.
The government protected Apple’s intellectual property rights and ensured it could access global markets, while also funding basic research that fed into iPhone technologies over multiple administrations.
The chapter discusses the push for a “green industrial revolution” to transform massive existing energy infrastructure to be more sustainable.
Both demand-side and supply-side policies are needed, as demand-side policies like emissions targets influence what technologies are needed, while supply-side policies directly support development of clean technologies.
Examples of demand-side policies include renewable portfolio standards and carbon taxes. Supply-side policies include subsidies, tax credits, grants, and R&D funding to support clean technology companies.
Most countries use both demand- and supply-side policies, but supply-side policies more directly promote green industry development by providing public funding.
Clean technologies still need support until their costs reach parity with incumbent fossil fuel technologies, which have a century of sunk costs. Understanding how companies lower costs through innovation is missing from many energy policy discussions.
The chapter will focus more on effective supply-side support mechanisms that use public financing to aggressively promote green industry development and a transition to more sustainable energy infrastructure.

This passage discusses the need for a “green industrial revolution” to transition the global industrial system away from fossil fuels and towards sustainable clean energy technologies in order to mitigate climate change. It argues that government support and funding is critical to make this transition successful given the high costs and uncertainty of developing new clean technologies.

Specifically, it defines a green industrial revolution as radically transforming the economy to be environmentally sustainable through an energy transition to renewable sources like solar and wind power. Climate change from greenhouse gas emissions also drives the need for innovation in the energy sector.

While clean energy technologies like wind and solar have existed for over 100 years, sustained government commitment is still lacking to replace fossil fuel infrastructure at a large scale. National approaches to funding cleantech vary, with some like Germany and China taking a coherent, coordinated approach while others like the US have an ambivalent strategy lacking long-term incentives.

For a green revolution to succeed, governments must continue investing heavily in cleantech research, incentivizing markets, and subsidizing manufacturing as was done in other industries, since businesses alone will not undertake the high risks required given uncertainty. Overall the passage argues for the critical role of active government support to make a transition to sustainable clean energy technologies and tackle climate change.

China is aggressively pursuing green economic development through ambitious targets and investments in its 5-year plans. It aims to invest $1.5 trillion over 2011-2015 across clean tech, renewable energy, and energy efficiency.
Some key targets include developing 20 GW of solar power by 2015, 100 GW of wind power by 2015 and 1,000 GW by 2050. These targets have been revised upwards, showing China’s strong long-term commitment.
Regional feed-in tariffs and subsidies ensure returns on renewable investments within 7 years. This provides certainty for developers and encourages continued tech improvements by manufacturers.
China recognizes competitive advantage depends on sustainable resource management, pollution reduction and waste control. Its 12th 5-year plan formally incorporated climate change mitigation into its core economic strategy for the first time.
In contrast, some other countries like the UK are lagging behind with lower investments in clean energy R&D and lack of a clear long-term vision or commitment to key technologies. This will hamper their ability to develop clean tech industries.

The passage compares and contrasts the approaches to green technology investment taken by China, the UK, and the US.

China takes a strategic, long-term view, prioritizing clean technologies as part of its economic growth plans. It provides significant public funding and its policies aim to make environmental protection and profits complementary. As a result, China dominates in areas like solar hot water and wind power.

In contrast, the UK has taken a start-stop approach, cutting funding for green programs and failing to provide long-term policy certainty. This has discouraged private investment in sectors like wind. The UK risks falling behind as a producer and becoming an importer of green technologies.

The US has innovation capacity and supportive government initiatives but has not sustained support for green technologies. It relies heavily on venture capital funding, which is impatient and focused more on short-term returns than long-term development. As a result, the US has not fully realized its potential in this sector despite early leadership. Public funding is needed to support higher-risk, capital-intensive areas of innovation.

In summary, China’s strategic, long-term approach centered on public funding seems most likely to achieve leadership in developing and deploying green technologies at scale.

Venture capital (VC) has supported the development of clean technologies, but primarily invests in later stages once technologies are established and de-risked. More fundamental R&D requires longer timelines and larger investments than what VC is structured to provide.
Government support has been critical for enabling the development and commercialization of advanced clean technologies through funding R&D, building early markets, and reducing risks. Examples given are support for First Solar and US solar market development.
However, impatient capital from VC investors exiting companies too early can undermine promising technologies that received government support, as seen with Solyndra. When costs shifted, VC backed out rather than staying the course.
While a few Department of Energy loan guarantee projects defaulted, the overall program is expected to earn taxpayers billions in returns over decades by supporting a portfolio of innovations, counteracting risks of backing individual “winners.”
Long-term government programs through agencies like the DOE and ARPA-E are needed to push development of radical technologies beyond what short-term VC is able to support on its own. More funding and policy support is argued to be needed.
The US Department of Energy (DoE) provided over $1.2 billion in funding for solar and wind energy R&D between 1992 and 2012. It collaborates frequently with industry through grants, contracts, loans, and funding university research.
Under the Obama administration, the DoE’s support for clean energy expanded significantly. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act provided over $13 billion for clean energy technologies and infrastructure modernization.
The DoE established the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) in 2007 to fund high-risk, transformational energy technologies that the private sector will not support due to risk. ARPA-E takes inspiration from DARPA and expects/tolerates failure like DARPA.
ARPA-E invites research proposals from academia and industry and funds projects through collaboration rather than picking technologies. It aims to bridge the gap between research and commercialization. While its funding is less than DARPA’s billions, it is pursuing potentially disruptive energy technologies.
Government investment and direction setting is needed to encourage innovation, as energy markets are dominated by risk-averse incumbents. Both basic and applied research funding from agencies like DoE and NIH have significantly advanced technologies.

Here are the key points about the role of public finance and state development banks in fostering clean technology innovation according to the passage:

Venture capital and private investment are not well-suited to providing the “patient capital” needed for high-risk, long-term technologies like renewable energy. They are aimed at short-term returns and reluctant to invest when commercialization takes a long time.
State development banks can take on greater risk than private banks and invest with a long-term outlook focused on public/social goals like renewable energy, rather than short-term profits.
They provide flexible, long-term financing for tech development, new companies, and large capital projects that private investors consider too risky. This includes projects that commercial banks won’t finance.
By investing strategically in domestic cleantech industries and supply chains, they help build economic value and manufacturing capacity in their home country.
Examples of effective development banks mentioned are in Germany, China, and Brazil. The US lacks such institutions and its renewable industries have suffered more uncertainty as a result.
Public finance institutions like development banks are better able than private capital to provide the “patience” and long-term commitment needed to support new technologies from development through commercialization.
Wind and solar power have seen rapid global deployment and market growth in recent decades, driven significantly by government policies and investments.
Behind many leading wind and solar companies are major public investments that helped catalyze the historical development of these technologies around the world.
In the 1970s-80s, several countries invested heavily in wind R&D following energy crises, with Denmark emerging as a leading manufacturer (Vestas), while the US failed to produce a viable commercial design despite outspending others.
Germany has become a leader in solar PV despite inferior resources, while China emerged as a top manufacturer despite historically lacking a domestic market, reflecting differences in government policies/support over decades.
Historically, no clean tech firm has emerged purely from market forces; public sector involvement has been key through R&D funding, regulatory shifts, financial support and more to develop and deploy these technologies at scale.

So in summary, the passage discusses how wind and solar power have grown into sizable global industries due to significant government efforts over decades, with examples of how countries’ policy approaches impacted commercialization outcomes and industry leadership in these sectors. Public sector involvement has played a critical role in development and deployment.

Denmark’s wind industry succeeded due to state-sponsored R&D collaboration between large manufacturers like Vestas and smaller pioneers. This allowed knowledge sharing and the development of robust, reliable designs that scaled up over time.
The US and Germany initially focused on less reliable designs from aerospace rather than robust farm equipment-inspired designs. However, neither country gave up on public R&D support.
Denmark’s program was less expensive but more successful due to veterans of the farm machinery industry like Vestas prioritizing durable designs.
US government support indirectly led to the success of foreign companies like Vestas in the US market. When support ended, Vestas nearly collapsed but survived by focusing solely on wind turbines.
Domestic companies like Kenetech also benefited from public R&D but failed due to warranty issues. Its technologies were acquired by other companies, including GE which became a leader with government and industry backing.
Long-term public R&D reduced costs and improved efficiency and reliability of wind power technologies in both Europe and the US. Government incentives were also crucial for developing wind power markets before they could stand on their own.
Germany began leading the global wind power market in the 1990s and continues today through its Energiewende plan to transition to renewable energy. Long-term government support and incentives have enabled leading manufacturers and stable annual growth.
China was a latecomer to wind power but established major manufacturer Goldwind in 1998. Domestic content rules in 2003 effectively shut out foreign competitors while strengthening Chinese suppliers. Generous fixed contracts, financing, and R&D grants fueled China’s rise to surpass the US as the top market in 2010.
Many solar companies originated from government initiatives. First Solar emerged from DOE-funded research to commercialize thin-film CDTE panels. Solyndra and SunPower built on national lab research with state/federal support. Evergreen Solar grew with Massachusetts subsidies before moving operations to China.
Suntech of China benefited from imported manufacturing equipment, public bank financing, and export markets in Europe driven by supportive government policies. Its technology derives from relationships and research at the University of New South Wales in Australia.

So in summary, long-term government support through funding, incentives, domestic content rules, and off-take contracts were critical in enabling the growth of leading wind and solar manufacturers in Germany, China, and the US. Many technologies also traced back to foundational public research.

China provided significant public financing and support to its solar photovoltaic (PV) manufacturers, including a 15% tax rate, millions in grants, and a $7 billion line of credit. This allowed Chinese solar companies to grow and commit to building a domestic solar market.
Suntech Power, once China’s leading solar company, declared bankruptcy in 2013 after defaulting on bond payments. It was taken over by a state-owned company. This stands in contrast to US-based Solyndra, which underwent private restructuring efforts before bankruptcy.
The article argues Solyndra faced market challenges as a privately funded company, while Suntech survived initially due to state support from China. Both companies scaled up production too rapidly before markets were ready.
The outcomes highlight differences in how the US and China view state support for innovative companies - the US prioritizes private financial interests, while China considers broader economic impacts and jobs when deciding company fates in bankruptcy.
Germany’s policies like feed-in tariffs helped make its solar PV market the largest, enabling the growth of domestic manufacturers like Q-Cells. However, this also benefitted non-German companies expanding to Germany.

So in summary, it contrasts the state support and responses to bankruptcy between leading solar companies Suntech and Solyndra, drawing lessons about different approaches to innovative companies in the US and China. It also discusses Germany’s role in growing the global solar market.

Germany led the way in solar PV development by strongly supporting the industry through feed-in tariffs and other policies. This created opportunities for foreign firms but also excess capacity when policies changed.
China has now become a major producer of solar panels, leading to trade tensions as US and European firms struggle to compete. Calls to end clean energy support ignore that more support may be needed.
The solar PV industry is facing a crisis as falling prices hurt profits despite being good for deployment. Countries like the US lack long-term policies and “patient capital” to foster firm growth and transition to clean energy.
China has shown commitment to renewable energy growth in the short and long run through strong industrial policies, while other countries lack vision and consistency. Excess capacity is partly due to changes in policies like in Spain.
Both R&D and industrial policy/manufacturing support over the long run are needed to develop clean technologies, not just R&D. Small startups also need long-term nurturing through challenges.

So in summary, it discusses the development of solar PV internationally, challenges currently facing the industry, and myths around the roles of R&D, government support, and small vs large companies in clean energy innovation.

GE is a major wind turbine manufacturer that has also invested in solar PV technology, with plans for a $600M investment in thin-film solar in Colorado.
GE has significantly more resources than small startups, including billions in R&D budgets, profits, global networks, and reputation/credibility with investors. Its entry into renewable markets could help ensure a more substantial and enduring US industry presence.
Large companies like GE can more easily supply large energy infrastructure projects and gain confidence from utilities and investors due to their scale, finances, experience, and networks. GE’s entry into wind power was followed by a surge in wind projects.
However, we should not overlook the role of small firms or assume only large companies have the needed resources. Startups can disrupt markets in ways large firms may not.
While venture capital invests billions in cleantech, VCs primarily seek high financial returns and are unwilling to sustain long-term technology development risks. They favor technologies near market penetration.
Government support has been critical to developing companies like First Solar over decades, taking on more risk than VCs. Subsidies helped create markets and make failures less likely.
Building symbiotic public-private partnerships, with both sectors continuing to invest, is important for a sustainable green innovation ecosystem. The state should seek appropriate returns on its risky innovation investments.
The passage discusses the role of government funding and support for innovation and how the profits from that innovation are distributed.
Many US taxpayers are unaware of how their tax dollars fund innovation through government agencies that take on significant risks in developing new technologies. However, private companies then commercialize these technologies and capture much of the profits without fully “paying back” the government.
The passage uses Apple as a case study to illustrate this point. While Apple is seen as epitomizing private sector innovation, the government in fact funded much of the early R&D into the technologies that enabled Apple’s successful products like the iPhone.
However, Apple and its shareholders have captured most of the rewards from commercializing these technologies, without adequately recognizing or compensating the government investors that took on the initial risks.
The passage argues we need a better framework for understanding the distribution of risks and rewards in innovation to make innovation-driven growth more inclusive and equitable. The government should be able to capture some of the profits from technologies it initially funded in order to reinvest in more innovation.
Apple claims to have created over 300,000 jobs in the US, but many of these jobs are in retail stores, distribution centers, call centers, etc. and not manufacturing. The exact number of manufacturing jobs is unclear.
Apple pays its retail employees modest wages with little opportunity for career growth or stock options. Executive pay is much higher, with the top 9 execs earning as much as 95,000-89,000 Foxconn workers in China in 2011-2012.
Most Apple products are manufactured overseas by companies like Foxconn in China, where average wages are much lower than in the US.
When Apple announced it had over $98 billion in cash reserves, there were calls for the company to return some of this to shareholders through dividends and stock buybacks.
Journalists revealed Apple uses tax loopholes to minimize its tax liabilities. It routes some US profits through a subsidiary in Nevada to avoid state taxes in California, where its headquarters are located.
Apple employs similar tax schemes globally to reduce its overall tax burden across different jurisdictions. This allows it to capture more value and profits from products, but contributes less in taxes to the countries and economies where its value is created.
Corporate tax havens like Ireland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and the British Virgin Islands allow companies like Apple to reduce their tax liabilities significantly through profit shifting and royalty payments to subsidiaries in these low-tax jurisdictions.
Estimates suggest Apple could have paid $2.4-$4.8 billion more in US taxes in 2011 if more of its reported profits were in the US rather than shifted overseas.
Other tech giants like Google, Oracle, and Amazon utilize similar tax strategies to benefit from low tax rates in certain countries.
Companies lobby for “repatriation tax holidays” that would allow them to bring overseas profits back to the US at a reduced tax rate, but there is no guarantee this money would be reinvested rather than going to shareholders.
While innovation tax credits can encourage R&D, large companies have benefitted tremendously from public investments yet deny the public their reward through aggressive tax avoidance schemes. Policy changes may be needed to better balance public and private interests.
Regional economic issues like declining manufacturing and job growth paradoxically occur even as some companies in those regions like Apple and Google see huge financial success, revealing deeper structural problems with the “new economy business model.”

The passage criticizes how today’s large companies utilize the massive amounts of cash generated from government-supported innovation in ways that predominantly benefit executives, shareholders, and investors rather than also supporting employees and society more broadly.

It argues that companies like Bell Labs used to conduct long-term research for the public good through large R&D centers. However, today’s “Big Business” focuses only on short-term needs through corporate R&D. Large publicly-funded university and government labs often generate early innovations, but companies lack the resources and willingness to fully commercialize them at scale.

As an example, it discusses how NIH spent billions developing a rare disease drug, but Genzyme set the price at $350k/year, taking the profits while risks were socialized. More broadly, it says finance and industries like pharma socialize risks through public funding but privatize rewards, enriching elites.

The system dysfunctionally rewards ups and downs for some actors like banks and executives through bailouts and high pay, even when companies fail. It argues for a more balanced risk-reward system through reformed policies that distribute benefits more broadly in line with innovation’s collective nature.

The relationship between innovation and inequality is complex and has traditionally been studied separately. Recent studies link it to “deskilling” where innovation benefits high-skilled workers more than low-skilled ones. But this cannot fully explain rising inequality.
A new “risk-reward nexus” framework looks at who contributes resources (labor, capital) to the uncertain innovation process versus who appropriates rewards if innovation succeeds. When risks and rewards are distributed proportionally, innovation reduces inequality.
But some actors can position themselves close to markets and appropriate disproportionate rewards. They justify this through neoclassical economic ideology focusing on shareholders as sole risk-takers.
In reality, workers, taxpayers and governments also contribute resources without guaranteed returns. When a few actors reap most rewards, it increases inequality and harms long-term investment in innovation, slowing economic growth.
Institutions are needed to link risks and rewards more equitably to support stable, inclusive growth from collective, cumulative innovation processes involving diverse stakeholders over the long run.

The passage argues that because innovation is a collective and cumulative process often driven by high-risk public investments, the current imbalance between risk and rewards undermines both equity and innovation. To better align risks and returns:

Governments should be able to claim a direct return on risky public investments through royalties, which could fund a national innovation fund for future R&D. This would make public funding more sustainable.
Patents from publicly funded research could give governments a “golden share” to ensure fair licensing and broader dissemination of the technology.
Loans and grants to businesses should have income-contingent or equity conditions so governments can recoup some returns from successful innovations they helped enable.
State investment banks could directly reap profits from public investments to funnel back into future projects, helping countercyclical lending as well.

In summary, the passage argues for policy reforms that allow governments to directly gain financial returns from the innovations they help create and fund, in order to better align risks with rewards and sustain the public funding of innovation over the long run.

State development banks like BNDES in Brazil and CDB in China have actively invested in innovation in clean tech and biotech, achieving high returns on equity that are then reinvested in technology funds and social/cultural projects.
CDB provided $3 billion in financing for the largest wind project in Argentina using Chinese wind turbines, enabling Argentine developers and Chinese manufacturers to benefit where commercial finance was unavailable.
Promoting innovation-led growth requires understanding the roles of both public and private sectors and their interactions in the innovation ecosystem. The public sector brings unique benefits by taking risks the private sector avoids.
The state plays a fundamental role in shouldering risks in modern capitalism. Various actors like firms, finance sources, and state policies interact in complex innovation systems.
Public policy should focus on the specific role the public sector plays in enabling things that otherwise would not occur, not just incentivizing private sector innovation. This role goes beyond countercyclical spending to shaping markets.
The state’s tools and ability to create markets distinguish it from business. It can pursue goals like inclusive, sustainable growth on a larger scale than private actors by leveraging taxation and addressing risks businesses avoid due to the “public good” problem.
The state plays an essential role in making high-risk investments in technology and new sectors that the private sector is generally unwilling to take on. These “foolish” investments by the state often end up laying the groundwork for major new industries and technologies.
Clean technology in particular requires sustained long-term support from the state until new technologies can mature and compete on cost and performance with incumbent fossil fuel technologies. Private investment tends to wait for early high-risk investments to be made by the state.
For the state to truly play an “entrepreneurial” role, it needs to build institutions and organizations within government that can develop long-term growth strategies and tolerate failure. It also needs to attract top talent.
When the state’s high-risk investments succeed, it should be able to capture some of the returns to help cover losses from failed investments and fund future work. There is currently an asymmetry where private actors reap the gains but risks are socialized.
Different actors play different roles in the innovation ecosystem over time. Policy should recognize this rather than overhyping some actors like SMEs and venture capital.
Governments are currently being cut back due to misguided ideas about the state’s role. Vision and specific policy tools are needed to ensure growth is both “smart” and “inclusive.”

The appendix then lists some potential UK policy changes focused on redirecting support to promote actual innovation spending rather than just transfers to businesses.

Enterprise zones that give tax/regulatory advantages to firms in certain areas are not effective at causing innovation and the money could be better spent elsewhere, resulting in potential cost savings.
When public funding supports successful investments, a portion of returns should be returned to government, again resulting in potential cost savings.
Free up resources from the above measures to massively expand the Technology Strategy Board aligned with the US DARPA model to directly fund innovation in research, development and commercialization through a bottom-up network, increasing expenditures.
More proactively fund green technology innovation drawing on UK strengths, increasing expenditures.
Raise the minimum holding period for private equity investments in the UK before capital gains tax exemption from 2 to 5 years, to prevent short-termism especially in green tech and help more companies become productized, resulting in potential cost savings.
Due to lack of private investment, the UK government should increase its green budget beyond just the Green Investment Bank, again increasing expenditures.

Here is a summary of the sources provided:

Several sources discuss renewable energy and clean technology investment, including a decline in venture capital funding for clean energy startups, China’s renewable energy market and targets, and solar company bankruptcies.
Sources outline government and public policy on innovation and climate change, including the UK’s innovation challenge to build a low-carbon economy, China’s five-year plan, and US DOE funding for energy research centers.
Articles analyze the taxation practices of tech companies like Apple and Google and estimated tax revenue lost through loopholes.
Studies investigate the relationship between R&D investment and firm growth/performance in high-tech sectors.
Sources provide historical context on the development of technologies like GPS, touchscreens, MP3 compression and their links to public research institutions and funding.
Reports analyze industrial policies in countries like Korea, continental Europe’s science-industry relationships, and inherited family firms in the UK.
Books and articles discuss broader topics like principles of innovation systems, open science, systems integration, technology management, and the role of institutions in economic change.

Here is a summary of the selected sources:

Several sources discuss Apple’s tax strategy of aiming for low-tax states and nations to reduce its tax burden. This includes a 2012 New York Times article and a 2012 Business Insider article about Apple laying off retail employees.
Sources also discuss government policies related to climate change and clean energy, including the European Commission’s Europe 2020 strategy, the EU Climate and Energy Package, and the UK’s revised energy policy statements.
Reports from the Global Wind Energy Council, European Photovoltaic Industry Association, and Ernst & Young provide data and analysis on trends in the renewable energy industry.
Articles from the Economist discuss issues like the world economy, state size, the US economy, and the third industrial revolution driven by new energy technologies.
Sources evaluate government programs supporting innovation like the US EPA, FDA, DARPA, and “mission-oriented” public R&D in Europe. intellectual property policies are also covered.
Studies look at the impact of innovation on economic growth and performance, the role of firms of different sizes, and sectors like biotech, semiconductors, wind power, and clean technology venture capital.

In summary, the selected sources provide information on taxation, government policies, industry reports, economic conditions, and analysis of innovation systems related to topics like energy, environment, technology, and intellectual property.

Here is a summary of the reference:

Hirsch, Jerry. 2015. ‘Elon Musk’s Growing Empire Is Fueled by $4.9 Billion in Government Subsidies’. LA Times. 20 May. Available online at http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-hy-musk-subsidies-20150531-story.html (accessed 29 June 2015).

This article from the LA Times discusses how Elon Musk’s growing companies like Tesla, SolarCity and SpaceX have received over $4.9 billion in government subsidies. It outlines various local, state and federal tax breaks and incentives that have supported the development and production of Tesla electric vehicles, SolarCity solar panels, and SpaceX rocket technologies. The article is citing publically available data to shed light on the significant role of taxpayer money in fueling Musk’s business empire.

Here is a summary of some of the key points from the article “Promoting U.S. Competitiveness in World Markets” in Public Economics: The Government’s Role in American Economics:

The article discusses how government policy can promote competitiveness of U.S. firms in global markets. It argues that strategic public investments and policies are needed to support innovation and the commercialization of new technologies.
It points to examples of mission-oriented public investments through agencies like DARPA that have supported emerging technologies and industries crucial to national competitiveness, like IT and biotech.
Maintaining leadership in sectors like renewable energy, advanced manufacturing, and life sciences will be important for economic and national security in the future global economy.
The article advocates for public-private partnerships and consortia to boost private sector R&D spending. It also supports targeted tax incentives and availability of risk capital for cutting-edge industries.

-Workforce development programs are needed to ensure American workers can gain skills needed in strategic industries. Collaboration between government, academia and private firms on research and skills training should also be enhanced.

Strategic regulation and procurement can further drive innovation and commercialization in key technology areas by creating initial markets for emerging innovations.

So in summary, the article argues that an active industrial policy and targeted public investments are vital to maintain US competitiveness in the global innovation race. Both supporting private sector R&D and training workers for the future economy are important roles for government.

Here is a summary of the key points about work from the provided sources:

Work involves productive investment and value creation. Accounting methods need to properly capture this.
There is a Keynes-Schumpeter-Minsky synthesis where productive investment leads to innovation and growth but the financial system is unstable and prone to crisis. Government has a role to stabilize this.
Many innovations come from government funded research at universities, national labs, and public agencies like NIH and DARPA. This public investment spurs private sector commercialization.
Countries and regions compete in innovation through their national innovation systems including levels of research funding, intellectual property laws, entrepreneurship support, etc.
High-growth firms and startups are disproportionately important for jobs and economic growth but face financing gaps, especially in early stages. Venture capital plays an important role.
Industry sectors and technologies develop along trajectories influenced by socio-technical factors and the co-evolution of technologies and industries over time.
Measuring and accounting for innovation is challenging but important for policymaking. Metrics include R&D spending, patents, scientific publications, and economic impacts.

So in summary, the sources discuss the role of public and private investment in innovation, the links between research and commercialization, national and regional innovation systems, challenges faced by startups, and frameworks for understanding technological change over time. Government policy aims to support and stabilize these processes.

#book-summary

The Entrepreneurial State Debunking Public vs Private Sector Myths - Mariana Mazzucato