The Hacker Crackdown Law and Disorder on - Bruce Sterling

• The Hacker Crackdown by Bruce Sterling is about the law enforcement crackdown on hackers in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

• The book provides a brief history of telecommunications and the emergence of the electronic underground. In the 1970s, “phreaks” manipulated the phone system with “blue boxes”. In the 1980s, hackers broke into computer systems and formed an underground community centered around “boards”.

• Law enforcement began seriously cracking down on hackers in 1990. Major arrests were made, including a huge bust of a hacker group called the Legion of Doom. The US Secret Service emerged as the leading agency battling hackers. They launched a nationwide “sting” operation against boards and hackers.

• The crackdown led to a split in the hacker community between the “old guard” focused on technology and freewheeling information exchange, and a new “ideological” element focused more on rebellion and politics. Hackers debated philosophy and the law around issues of technology, privacy, and information freedom.

• The book also profiles major players including hacker groups, key law enforcement agents, and thinkers involved in the computer and civil liberties scene. It provides an inside look into hacker culture and the electronic frontier in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

• Overall, the book is a seminal work on hackers, hacking, and the early culture of cyberspace. It captures a pivotal moment when the boundary between the mainstream and the underground first collided around issues of technology, law, and information that remain relevant today.

• The first personal computer bulletin board system was created in 1978. This allowed individuals to connect their computers and share messages.

• The term “cyberspace” was coined in 1982 by science fiction writer William Gibson. It refers to the virtual space where electronic communication occurs.

•In 1984, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act gave the Secret Service jurisdiction over credit card fraud and computer fraud. The same year, the hacker groups “Legion of Doom” and “414 Gang” were formed.

•In the mid-1980s, the first electronic underground publications were founded, and the first police sting operations on hackers took place. Laws like the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and Electronic Communications Privacy Act were passed.

•In 1988, a hacker known as “Prophet” hacked into BellSouth’s 911 phone network. In 1989, the hacker group NuPrometheus League distributed stolen Apple software, and hackers crashed Florida’s probation office phone line.

•In 1990, the Secret Service conducted a large crackdown called “Operation Sundevil” and arrested many hackers. The Electronic Frontier Foundation was founded to advocate for electronic civil liberties. A large AT&T phone network crash occurred in 1990 that disrupted phone service for millions of people.

•In summary, the 1980s and early 1990s saw the rise of cyberspace, hacker groups, electronic publications, and laws around computer crime. There were also early police crackdowns on hackers, as well as large electronic network crashes that disrupted infrastructure. Advocacy groups formed in response to some of these issues.

• The telephone system crashed in January 15, 1990 due to a software bug, causing massive disruptions. It took AT&T 9 hours to diagnose the issue and weeks to fully understand it.

• The crash was an embarrassment for AT&T but the technical explanation failed to convince law enforcement, who suspected hackers. The crash intensified fears of attacks on critical infrastructure.

• The legal system had been updated to deal with computer crime in the 1980s but still had issues, like the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986.

• Technologies go through stages: question mark/vaporware, goofy prototype, rising star, overhyped technology, triumphant technology, aging technology, and dead technology. The telephone went from an experimental device to a mass medium.

• Alexander Graham Bell originally envisioned the telephone as a mass medium to transmit things like music, speeches, and sermons. This was implemented in Budapest’s Telefon Hirmondo service which provided news and entertainment over the phone. This is similar to modern services like CompuServe and BBS’s.

• The success of the telephone was due to a combination of factors like business decisions, court cases, leadership, conditions, and luck. The telegraph was the dominant system at the time and Western Union dismissed the telephone as a “toy.” The telegraph had advantages like leaving a written record and allowing delayed responses.

• In summary, a minor technology glitch led to a major societal freakout, similar to how the telephone was originally seen as a novelty before becoming a pillar of infrastructure. New technologies go through predictable cycles of development and face obstacles like skepticism before being accepted.

• Alexander Graham Bell invented the telephone in 1876. At first, it was seen as a novelty and faced skepticism compared to the dominant telegraph system.

• The telephone eventually found mainstream success when it was used to coordinate help after a train crash in 1878. This demonstrated its usefulness in connecting people and spread its adoption.

• Bell’s company, American Bell Telephone, grew into a monopoly but faced legal challenges after Bell’s patents expired. It was acquired by AT&T, led by Theodore Vail.

• Vail positioned AT&T as a government-regulated monopoly that would provide universal telephone service to the public. This model ensured AT&T’s dominance for decades.

• The telephone was seen as a quintessentially American technology because of its widespread adoption and the democratic values of universal access that Vail promoted. While started as a for-profit business, the telephone system became a public utility.

• Bell was an eccentric entrepreneur and became very wealthy from the telephone. He continued to experiment and support scientific research and education. The “decibel” unit of sound measurement was named after him.

• The early history of the telephone shows how a new technology transitioned from a novelty to a mature “cash cow” through demonstrating its usefulness, commercialization, and building a dominant business model based around it. Key entrepreneurs like Bell and Vail were able to shape both the spread of the technology as well as its social and political character.

The development and adoption of the telephone was shaped by the social, political and cultural attitudes in each country. In the U.S., the telephone was enthusiastically adopted and became widely accessible. This was aided by the employment of women as telephone operators, after the initial experiment with teenage boys proved disastrous. The telephone became an integral part of American households and communities.

In contrast, other countries like France, Britain and the Soviet Union were more wary about giving open access to telecommunications, seeing it as a threat to security or class structures. The development of telephone networks in these countries was slowed by these attitudes.

Despite initial skepticism, the telephone did eventually become adopted worldwide as it became an essential tool for communication. Like the telephone, computer networks have similarly transitioned from an initial perception of being strange and frightening to becoming integral parts of communities by enabling human connections. However, there were also perceptions of threats to various communities with the rise of computer networks, sparking reactions to defend those communities. Still, community conflict over technology is not new, and similar dynamics were seen with the advent of the telephone.

In summary, new technologies like the telephone and computer networks are initially seen as alien but are eventually accepted and adopted, becoming essential infrastructure for human communities and relationships. However, this process is shaped by the social, cultural and political dynamics in each society which can either aid or hinder acceptance and development. With acceptance also comes conflict between communities, as technology is seen as either empowering or threatening depending on one’s perspective.

• The telephone industry is an old and established industry with a rich history dating back to Alexander Graham Bell. It has developed a strong culture and community.

• For most of its history, the telephone system in the U.S. was dominated by the Bell System or “Ma Bell.” The Bell System cultivated a public service ethos but it was also a powerful monopoly. Bell employees took pride in the technical mastery and power that came with building and operating the nation’s telephone system.

• In 1983, Ma Bell was broken up through antitrust litigation. The regional Bell operating companies (“Baby Bells”) were separated from AT&T which kept Bell Labs and Western Electric. The breakup left the remnants of Bell in a difficult position, still heavily regulated but without the coherence of the old Bell System.

• The people of the telephone industry feel ill-used by the breakup. They don’t have a clear sense of purpose or direction. They seem stuck between being a public service and being for-profit companies. The industry is marked by conflict, with disputes over regulation, competition, and corporate practices. There is bad blood between companies like AT&T and long distance competitors such as Sprint and MCI.

• The U.S. telephone system is a patchwork and foreign observers are surprised it still works. AT&T only controls about 80% of the long distance system now. The battle to end AT&T’s long distance monopoly was bitter and the industry is still plagued by unethical practices as companies fight over customers. AT&T’s “Death Star” logo and harsh ads targeting competitors highlight the tensions.

• In summary, the telephone industry has a proud history but was thrown into upheaval by the breakup of Ma Bell. It remains in a difficult transition, struggling with conflicts over its purpose and direction, competition, and regulation. There is lasting resentment and mistrust between companies. The industry is still grappling with the aftermath of the breakup decades later.

• After a major crash in January 1990, AT&T’s CEO apologized to customers in newspaper ads. He acknowledged the disruption and promised to do better.

• However, police and AT&T’s security suspected hackers might have caused or contributed to the crash. The crash was deeply embarrassing and concerning to AT&T.

• There had long been “thieving and misbehavior” in the phone system, but issues in the core, long-distance network were especially troubling. Telcos felt they had lost control and power in various ways.

• In the late 80s, telcos warned law enforcement about increasingly sophisticated hackers. Rival companies worked together with the government on a secretive “dragnet” to crack down on hackers in 1990.

• Secrecy was important to avoid tipping off hackers and provoking a counter-attack. But publicity was also important to punish and make examples of hackers, and to garner public support. A counter-attack by hackers, while unlikely, was a concern.

• Security officials generally work discreetly, since their job is preventing losses, not generating profits. Publicity of successes allows them to raise their profile. It also helps their allies in law enforcement who rely on public support.

• In summary, the crackdown allowed telcos to assert power, work with government allies, and gain publicity, despite the need for secrecy. But there were risks, and fear of hackers provoked a strong response.

• Telephone systems were originally operated manually by human operators like Leticia Luthor. This was expensive and time-consuming, so telcos invested heavily in automating the system.

• Early automated systems still relied partly on electromechanical parts like crossbars and brushes. They were faster than human operators but still slow, expensive and prone to wear out.

• Today’s telephone systems are fully electronic, relying on silicon chips and computers. They are extremely fast, cheap, and reliable. However, when they break down, they are difficult to diagnose and repair.

• Telcos publicize and boast about the growing sophistication of telephone systems, but they prefer not to draw attention to the actual hackers and crackers who figure out how to exploit the systems. The prosecutors and law enforcement who pursue hackers, on the other hand, gain publicity, funding, promotions and status from high-profile cases.

• There is an inherent tension for telcos between the desire for publicity and the need for security and secrecy. Telcos want publicity for new systems but not for their vulnerabilities. Law enforcement wants publicity for arrests but not for details about hacking techniques. This tension caused problems in the crackdown on hackers.

• The telephone system is a complex hierarchy, from local subsets in homes and offices up through switching stations of increasing size and sophistication. Understanding how telephone systems actually work is key to understanding the battles between telcos and hackers.

In summary, the passage gives an overview of how telephone technology and telco practices have evolved, culminating in the modern electronic systems and the conflicts around hacking and security. The tension between publicity and secrecy in this area has caused issues for both the telcos and law enforcement.

• Computer systems and software are prone to faults and bugs that are hard to detect. These technological flaws can have major societal impacts.

• Computer chips and software are virtual and intangible, so any issues are invisible and hard to diagnose and fix. You can’t easily see what’s wrong by just looking at the hardware.

• Software is complex, with millions of possible states, so it’s impossible to fully test and ensure it’s completely flawless. Subtle issues can arise that cause systems to crash.

• The phone system now relies entirely on software, which introduced vulnerabilities. A minor software update in 1990 caused a nationwide system crash for several hours.

• The issue arose from a subtle software bug - a “break” statement in the code was placed incorrectly, causing a cascade of issues. Though the new software had been extensively tested, this small flaw slipped through.

• There is inherent risk in updating and “improving” software, since you’re introducing new, untested code that could contain bugs. The 1990 crash was caused by a software update intended to improve the system.

• Computers are profoundly “stupid” in that they rigidly follow their programming. They lack human judgment and the ability to “catch the gist” when issues arise. Tiny ambiguities or flaws can trip them up.

• Software is hard to get right because it’s complex, with elements of machines, mathematics, language, thought, and art. It can behave unpredictably when all these pieces interact.

• The phone system software monitors the status of switches across the network. A minor flaw caused switches to erroneously mark other switches as non-functioning, overloading the system.

• Phone switches are designed to quickly reboot in 4-6 seconds to clear any issues, but this couldn’t resolve the cascading software problem, leading to a nationwide outage.

• AT&T’s telephone switching systems were controlled by software called System 7. A tiny flaw in the System 7 software caused intermittent service outages in AT&T’s network.

• On January 15, 1990, one minor hardware problem in a System 7 switch in New York led to a chain reaction that crippled AT&T’s entire phone network for about 10 minutes. Engineers had to cut out parts of the backup system to slow down the spread of “OK” signals that were knocking switches out. They eventual fixed the issue by replacing the new System 7 software with an older version.

• The problem stemmed from the highly automated nature of the digital switches. They lacked the “common sense” that human operators would have to not keep signaling that everything was “OK” when it clearly wasn’t. But automation also enabled advanced phone features that would have been impossible with human operators alone.

• Similar software glitches caused more widespread phone outages on July 1-2, 1991, and September 17, 1991. The July event was traced to a single mistyped character in over 10 million lines of code. The September event was due to a failure of backup batteries and warning systems in New York phone switches.

• These events showed that minor technical mishaps could cause major disruptions in an increasingly complex and automated phone network. They undermined the idea that hackers or saboteurs were solely to blame for such outages. AT&T itself took much of the blame for the September 17 crash, leading to criticism from Congress, regulators, media, and competitors.

• In summary, unforeseen software flaws and infrastructure failures were the main culprits behind a series of catastrophic phone network outages in 1990 and 1991. These highlighted the precariousness of the highly automated systems that enabled advanced telecommunications services. But they also revealed the limits of blaming hackers and external saboteurs for such mishaps. AT&T’s own systems were often the source of the troubles.

• In 1991, AT&T’s telephone network crashed three times in 18 months due to a combination of human and technical failures. The crashes caused major disruptions and financial losses. AT&T was criticized and parodied in the media for the crashes and its failure to prevent them.

• On May 9, 1990, the U.S. government announced “Operation Sundevil,” a nationwide crackdown on illegal computer hacking. The government alleged that hacker groups were engaging in criminal activity and causing millions of dollars in losses. The operation targeted underground hacker groups that communicated on electronic bulletin boards. Government officials said some hackers were highly skilled criminal operators, not just mischievous teenagers.

• The earliest hackers emerged from technical universities like MIT and Stanford in the 1960s. But the modern hacker underground has roots in the Yippie movement of the 1960s, an anarchist anti-war group that engaged in pranks and media manipulation. Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin were leaders of the Yippies.

• Abbie Hoffman advocated subversion, pranks, and petty theft as a form of protest. He wrote “Steal This Book,” which promoted ways to rip off the system, and evaded authorities for years while continuing to publish. Hoffman was a gifted manipulator of media. The FBI amassed a huge file on him.

• In the early 1970s, Yippies and their allies stole phone service and engaged in other forms of petty theft and pranks with a political justification, though the political motivation faded over time. Hoffman and “Al Bell” published a newsletter called Youth International Party Line that spread techniques for stealing phone service and other subversive or prankish acts. After the Vietnam War, these radical groups declined but the knowledge of illegal techniques spread more widely.

So in summary, the roots of hacking and the modern hacker underground lie in the radical anti-war movement of the 1960s, especially the prankish and subversive Yippie group. Leaders like Abbie Hoffman promoted an ethos of pranks, media manipulation, and petty theft targeting the system. Over time, their political motivations faded, but the practices spread more widely and evolved into modern hacking.

• Phone phreaking has been around as long as telephones have made money. Petty phone thieves vastly outnumber “phone phreaks” who explore systems for the intellectual challenge.

• Phone phreaks manipulated systems to connect with other people, often over long periods of time and distances, running up large bills belonging to corporations. They exchanged technical trivia, gossip, rumors, and lies.

• The simplest phreaking was stealing access codes to make free calls. This was often done through “shoulder surfing” or computer dialing of random numbers. Code theft and abuse caused huge losses.

• Before modern security upgrades, “blue boxes” were used to hack into long-distance lines by mimicking 2600Hz tones. Some saw this as harmless if kept quiet, though companies disagreed. Publishing blue box plans led to legal trouble, like for Ramparts magazine.

• New forms of phreaking target cellular phones, PBX systems, etc. Cellular phreaking helps drug dealers avoid billing and tapping. “Call-sell operations” use pirate cells to sell stolen long-distance, moving between cells. Hacking PBX systems runs up company bills.

• While less well-known, phone phreaking remains more vigorous than computer hacking. Phreaking constantly finds new vulnerabilities to exploit as phone technologies evolve.

In summary, phone phreaking has a long, dynamic history of manipulating loopholes in infrastructure for both intellectual reward and criminal profit. Though causing huge losses, some phreaks saw themselves as harmless explorers. The history involves legal controversy over “dangerous” technical information and the balance between utility company control versus free expression. Phone phreaking continues adapting to new technologies, with cellular networks and PBX’s as targets.

The term “hacking” originally referred to intellectual exploration of computers and free access to information. However, it now often refers to illegal computer intrusion and fraud, the theft of phone and internet services. This kind of hacking, known as “phreaking,” can be highly damaging. Phreaks break into telephone and voice mail systems, often just for amusement but sometimes to harass victims or steal personal information and money.

Phreaking and hacking are disturbing because they involve the misuse of technology and violation of privacy. They also represent a form of unchecked power and a threat to authority and order. At the same time, American culture has an anarchic streak that delights in disrupting bureaucracies and defending individual freedom. While phreaking is illegal, “hacking” in the original sense by talented programmers and engineers can also be disruptive and shape society in unforeseen ways.

The term “hacker” has unfortunately become associated with criminal behavior. Originally, hacking referred to playful explorations of computers. But now hackers are defined as those who break into computer and telecom systems illegally. Hackers call themselves hackers, but others consider it a derogatory label synonymous with digital trespassing and fraud. The label obscures the difference between criminals and those who hack in the traditional sense.

Though hacking originally referred to open exploration of systems with little regard for security, breaking into networks was not totally alien to early hacker culture. Early computers and networks had little security, and students and others frequently accessed the core systems. Universities also aim to share knowledge openly rather than control information. However, hacking and phreaking violate the ethical codes of both early hacker culture and academia. They involve theft, trespassing, and manipulation rather than building, creating, or discovering.

So in summary, the terms “hacking” and “phreaking” refer to disruptive and often illegal behavior that exploits technology and threatens order but also expresses a radical impulse for freedom in American culture. They have outgrown their original meanings related to intellectual curiosity and open access to knowledge.

• Hackers and universities believe in free access to information and computing, which clashes with corporations and governments that want to control information.

• In the 1960s, young hackers had to struggle to gain access to mainframe computers, often using unauthorized means. Their efforts helped popularize personal computing.

• Early hackers explored techniques like password cracking and trapdoors that are now considered illegal computer intrusion. At the time, computers and data were not seen as property, so hacking was not criminalized.

• By the 1990s, computers and data became more important and valuable. Society grappled with how to define and regulate hacking. There were many possible interpretations, from harmless browsing to serious crimes like fraud or espionage.

• Hackers see themselves as an elite group with their own rules and ethics. They value freedom of information, distrust authority, and look down on those who don’t share their views. They often boast about their achievements to gain status, even if it means risking getting caught.

• Hackers believe they are pioneers fighting against government and corporate control of technology. They see laws against hacking as unjust persecution of revolutionary thinkers. According to one manifesto, businesses and governments hoard technology and charge high prices to maximize profits and control people. Hackers aim to break this monopoly.

• In summary, there is a conflict between the hacker ethos of open access to information and new technology, and the interests of governments and corporations in controlling information and technology for political, security, and economic reasons.

• Most hackers see credit card theft as immoral and risky, though some do advocate for it as a way to fight businesses and authority.

• Hackers vary in how much they distrust authority and the violence of their rhetoric. But in general, they reject current electronic laws as unjustified restrictions by corporations and governments on people’s freedoms. They see themselves as rebels who should not be judged by “stupid” people like police, journalists, and politicians.

• Hackers are usually young, middle-class, and anti-materialistic, except for their interest in technology. They see mainstream society as corrupt and greedy. Interestingly, police also see themselves as driven by ideals instead of money, and accuse hackers of greed and theft.

• Emmanuel Goldstein, publisher of the hacker magazine 2600, is an example of a hacker dissident. He lives very privately but espouses anti-authority values, believing that individuals should have unrestricted access to technology and information. Though not a hacker himself, he supports hacker actions against corporations and governments. His lifestyle resembles that of dissidents in former communist countries.

• Goldstein is disliked by authorities but seen as a hero by many hackers. He attends hacker events and spreads information from his contacts. Though illegal, his magazine continues publishing as a form of “samizdat.” Goldstein looks and acts the part of a “techno-rat,” with long hair and casual clothes.

• Goldstein is a gadfly to corporations and police, who must monitor his magazine. His readers likely include many security professionals, who pay for the magazine despite disliking its contents. After the 1990 AT&T network crash, Goldstein mocked AT&T and gave them technical advice. He is seen by police as corrupting youth, but continues evading serious legal punishment.

In summary, the passage discusses the general characteristics of hackers, their disdain for authority and greed, and their support for rebels like Emmanuel Goldstein who fight for unlimited access to information. It highlights the tensions between hackers and corporations, governments, and law enforcement.

• The article criticizes AT&T for its failure to have a backup system when its computer network went down, disrupting phone service for many customers. The author argues that phone service is an essential utility and companies should ensure minimal disruptions.

• The article then discusses the magazine 2600, which publishes information about hacking and exploring technical systems. The magazine’s founder, Eric Gordon, is controversial. Law enforcement considers some of the magazine’s content to promote illegal activity, but the magazine has avoided direct legal action due to protections on free speech.

• The article says that the Hacker Crackdown of 1990 primarily targeted computer bulletin board systems (BBSs) and those who operated them. BBSs are community message boards that people accessed over phone lines using modems to connect their personal computers. By 1990, there were an estimated 30,000 BBSs in the U.S. with many more overseas.

• BBSs are unregulated, informal, and cover a wide range. Some are highly moderated and edited, while others are completely open. They also vary in how anonymous they allow users to be. Some require real names while others allow complete anonymity. Some are chatrooms with live conversation while others feature asynchronous messaging.

• In summary, the key targets of the Hacker Crackdown were BBSs and their operators, who authorities saw as enabling illegal hacking and other criminal plans and conversations. However, regulating or shutting them down was challenging given how ubiquitous and informal they were.

• Bulletin board systems or BBSes are online communities that allow people to exchange messages, software, and information.

• BBSes vary widely in their focus, size, accessibility, and degree of community. Some are open and public, some are private. Some cater to beginners, some only allow experienced users. Some have just a few users, some have thousands.

• BBSes can be categorized based on their primary purpose: some focus on public discussions, some on private messaging, some are mainly used for sharing software.

• There is a wide range of topics covered on BBSes, everything from mainstream to fringe interests. Some BBSes are underground and associated with illegal or taboo topics.

• Hackers and phone phreaks were early adopters of BBS technology and BBSes have been important to the development of hacker culture. There were many hacker groups that organized themselves around BBSes in the 1980s.

• The names of hacker groups often employed parody, mockery, and distinctive hacker orthography, using numbers and “ph” in place of letters. The names frequently referenced corporations, governments, criminals, and computer topics.

• Members of hacker groups used pseudonyms to obscure their real identities. Groups were often referred to by initials or acronyms.

• In summary, BBSes were an important precursor to today’s online communities and enabled the emergence of hacker culture and other tech-focused subcultures. Though limited by the technology of the time, BBSes fostered new forms of community and collaboration for those with access.

• The digital underground refers to hackers, phone phreaks, software pirates, and other tech-savvy individuals who engage in illegal or questionable technological activities.

• It is difficult to estimate the size of the digital underground. The population is constantly changing as people join, leave, or get arrested. However, estimates range from as little as 1,000 to as many as 50,000 people. The most skilled and active members number perhaps only around 100.

• The digital underground declined in the U.S. in the 1990s as laws and enforcement increased. However, electronic fraud and other tech-based crimes have grown. The underground is comparable to the evolution of the drug underground from free-wheeling hippie culture to large criminal networks.

• Underground boards contain files that teach hacking and phreaking techniques. They also contain other topics like science, politics, movies, etc. The files, known as “philes,” spread forbidden knowledge and are highly valued.

• Many philes on underground boards contain information about building explosives and other dangerous devices. However, most were written by teenagers, and the information is unreliable and very unlikely to be acted upon. Still, the willingness to spread this knowledge shows the underground’s lust for forbidden information and rejection of mainstream values.

• The rise of underground boards has allowed many isolated technically-minded teenagers to network and reinforce each other’s interests in hacking, phreaking, and other questionable tech activities. This can accelerate the process by which casual interest develops into actual illegal behavior.

• In summary, while small, the digital underground consists of dedicated individuals willing to spread and act upon forbidden knowledge. The rise of digital communication has allowed them to network in new ways that strengthen their community and values. Although direct illegal action may be limited, their defiance poses a challenge to mainstream society and values.

• Computer software, games and access to underground pirate bulletin boards were cheap or free for teenagers to access in the 1980s. While illegal, the likelihood of prosecution for small-scale piracy was very low. Once copy protection was removed from software, it could be infinitely reproduced and shared.

• Underground BBSes were anonymous and allowed teens to connect with adults and pretend to be anyone they wanted. They provided access to pirated software, codes to make free long-distance calls, and connected users to BBSes across the country. The charges for accessing these faraway BBSes could be huge, spurring interest in stolen phone codes to access them for free.

• Hacking and phreaking (telephone hacking) were seen as an exciting game by teenagers. Because it took place in the virtual world of computers and cyberspace rather than the physical world, it didn’t feel “real” and the consequences didn’t seem as serious. Nine-year-old kids had computers and modems, so how bad could it really be? Underground BBSes fostered a sense of community and liberation from mainstream rules and values.

• Some early notorious underground BBSes included 8BBS, Plovernet, and Pirate-80. They spread information about phreaking and hacking, and in some cases directly facilitated illegal activities. In a few cases, members turned in other members who went too far, leading to arrests. But in general, there was a sense of community loyalty in the underground BBS world.

• Manifestos like “The Conscience of a Hacker” conveyed the sense of curiosity, liberation, and anti-establishment values common in the early hacker community. Hackers saw themselves as explorers rather than criminals, fighting against mainstream greed, incompetence, and prejudice.

That covers the key highlights and themes around early underground hacking and pirate BBS culture according to the passage. Please let me know if you would like me to explain or expand on any part of the summary.

• Private S-80 board was popular but some suspected “Scan Man”, its operator, had ties to corporate security. He denied this.

• The “414 Gang” broke into Sloan-Kettering and Los Alamos computers in 1982, gaining notoriety.

• 1983’s War Games movie led to increased interest in hacking and underground BBS’s proliferated. Prominent ones included ShadowSpawn Elite, Sherwood Forest, Digital Logic Data Service, Legion of Doom, Neon Knights, Free World II, Dr. Ripco, Metal Shop.

• The St. Louis scene produced journalists “Knight Lightning” and “Taran King” who compiled gossip and news into Phrack, which spread widely.

• Underground boards often featured Phrack, Legion of Doom Technical Journal, Cult of the Dead Cow files, and other publications. Police also operated “sting” boards to catch hackers.

• The “Legion of Doom” (LoD) group took its name from a group of comic book villains. Originally focused on phone phreaking, they absorbed computer intrusion groups and became experts, distributing information widely.

• LoD members like “The Mentor” aimed to spread their knowledge. Their Legion of Doom Technical Journal parodied AT&T’s journal but contained sinister and dangerous information according to some.

• Summary: There was an explosion of hacker BBS’s and groups in the 1980s. LoD stood out as one of the earliest and most flagrant, spreading phreaking and hacking information widely through their electronic publications. Police responded with sting operations to catch hackers.

• A Bellcore project called GARDEN allows programmers to develop new phone services like call forwarding quickly using a keypad. Announcing this publicly, Bellcore expects a positive reaction, not speculation about security risks.

• Two fictional accounts describe the GARDEN project differently:

Message A, in a boring technical style, describes the project neutrally.

Message B, in an exaggerated hacker style, suggests the project could allow hackers to access phone switches and create vulnerabilities.

• Law enforcement may see Message B as threatening and want to track down its authors and sources. However, the information in both messages is public. The style and attitude make them seem very different, although the facts are the same.

• The hacker group Legion of Doom, or LoD, was notorious in the 1980s and known for spreading information about hacking and vulnerabilities. They ran online bulletin boards and were frequently discussed in the hacking community.

• Although many hackers admired LoD, actual membership in the group was small. It was more of an attitude than a real organization. Turnover in supposed membership was high.

• The most technically skilled hackers were not usually involved in obvious illegal activity like theft or fraud. They were more interested in accessing and exploring systems. Some even worked for phone companies. According to legend, the best hackers never get caught because they don’t boast or brag about their activities.

• There were rumors that professional phone technicians used their insider access to monitor calls or give themselves free long distance, but there was no evidence this actually happened.

• Hackers believed that if caught, confessing how they hacked a system would allow them to escape punishment. Sometimes this was true, as in the case of a hacker named Control-C, who avoided jail time by helping Michigan Bell fix vulnerabilities.

In summary, while law enforcement targeted hacker groups like LoD, membership in these groups was diffuse, and the most technically adept hackers were difficult to identify and catch. Their motivations were complex, not always clearly criminal. Hacker culture promoted the belief that hacks could be excused if hackers helped organizations fix security issues.

• Control-C was a hacker who worked with the Legion of Doom (LoD) hacker group. He hacked into Michigan Bell’s systems but was not prosecuted and instead was hired by them as a security consultant. He helped catch other hackers and acted as a deterrent.

• The LoD hacker group worked together to hack systems and catch other hackers. They hacked into phone systems of BellSouth, an RBOC in the Southern US. At first, BellSouth did not believe LoD had hacked their systems since nothing seemed damaged or dysfunctional.

• In June 1989, LoD hackers reprogrammed a BellSouth central office switching station as a prank, forwarding calls to a porn line. This revealed to BellSouth that their systems had been hacked.

• BellSouth then conducted an investigation and found that LoD had been hacking their systems since 1987. They found hacked databases, manipulated phone numbers, and tampered diagnostic systems that allowed hacking into people’s calls.

• This shocked BellSouth since they believed their systems were secure and different from normal computer systems. The public relied on these systems, so hacking was a major threat. Law enforcement worried the hackers could spy on them and began using secured communications.

• The threat was heightened by fears of foreign hackers and spies, as shown in the case of Cliff Stoll catching German hackers in the pay of the KGB. The Secret Service took major interest in the case.

• The hacking of 911 emergency systems was a huge concern since it was critical infrastructure. This pushed law enforcement into action against the hackers.

In summary, Control-C and the LoD hacker group had persistently hacked BellSouth’s critical phone infrastructure for years before being detected. When revealed, this caused shock and high concern from both BellSouth and law enforcement due to the sensitive nature of the systems and possibilities of spying and foreign agents. Law enforcement mobilized against the hackers, who had highlighted major security deficiencies.

• Hackers had attacked 911 systems before and crashed them by overloading them with calls. This showed that hacking into critical infrastructure was possible and dangerous.

• In 1989, the authorities started seriously investigating hackers and the digital underground. They picked up on braggadocio and boasts from hackers and started putting cases together.

• The first big break was the arrest of a 16-year-old hacker named “Fry Guy” in July 1989. Fry Guy had stolen credit card numbers and phone codes, and scammed money from Western Union by spoofing calls. He bragged about his exploits to other hackers.

• Fry Guy learned techniques from the Legion of Doom, a notorious hacker group. He threatened to help them crash the phone system on July 4. He was arrested shortly after.

• Fry Guy confessed and blamed the Legion of Doom. Although there was no evidence they actually crashed the phone system, investigators believed they had accessed phone switches and intended to do harm. However, they could not be charged as they had not actually stolen anything or crashed any systems.

• Fry Guy pleaded guilty and was given probation and community service. Although less skilled than the Legion of Doom, he had caused more financial harm through fraud and theft. The Legion of Doom did not crash systems or steal money according to their rules.

• The case showed that hackers could access critical infrastructure, and it allowed authorities to start seriously clamping down on hacker groups that had previously felt untouchable.

• The Atlanta Three hackers followed rough rules of thumb to justify their actions, but these were dubious principles. They told themselves that if they didn’t hack for money or disrupt systems, then no real harm was done. However, law enforcement viewed them as dangerous due to their technical skills and potential for harm.

• Although “Fry Guy” committed crimes that were attributed to the Legion of Doom (LoD) hacker group, the Atlanta Three themselves did not actually steal money or property. However, prosecutors wanted to crack down on the core members of LoD to send a strong message to hackers.

• The Computer Fraud and Abuse Task Force in Chicago, led by prosecutor William Cook, took an aggressive approach to prosecuting cybercriminals. They worked closely with the Secret Service to find ways to legally prosecute hackers they knew were committing crimes, like LoD and the editors of the hacker magazine Phrack.

• The Atlanta Three were under investigation from multiple sources: their own hacking had led the phone company to monitor them, they were known to telco security and private investigators, they had published in Phrack, a hacker friend of theirs had been arrested, and they had passed stolen phone company files to Phrack.

• In July 1989, a massive raid by Secret Service and law enforcement arrested the Atlanta hacker known as “The Leftist” at his parents’ house. His parents were traumatized and he was stunned, not expecting such an extreme response. The other Atlanta Three hackers were also arrested around the same time.

So in summary, although the Atlanta Three did not commit theft, law enforcement saw them as a threat due to their skills and ties to LoD. Aggressive prosecutors and investigators had been building cases against them from multiple angles, and ultimately conducted a series of raids that led to their arrests, despite their belief that they had not caused any real harm.

• Leftist, Urvile, and Prophet were three members of the Legion of Doom hacker group based in Atlanta.

• Leftist was arrested and interrogated after Secret Service agents searched his home and seized his computers and hacking documents. He confessed to hacking during the interrogation, which he later regretted.

• Urvile was a 21-year-old Georgia Tech student who was more interested in simulation games than reality. He kept detailed notes about hacking and games that were hard to distinguish. Hacking was a game to him, and he did not seem to grasp the seriousness of his crimes.

• Prophet had previously been convicted of hacking at age 18. After trying to reform, he had returned to hacking with Leftist and Urvile, recently breaking into BellSouth’s AIMSX system.

• The three hackers seemed confident in their ability to monitor or disrupt phone systems and emergency services. However, their logic and reasoning concerned and annoyed law enforcement officials.

• In summary, three members of the Legion of Doom hacked various systems, did not seem to take their crimes very seriously, and frustrated officials with their cavalier attitudes. But their overconfidence ultimately contributed to their being caught.

Prophet accessed a computer system called AIMSX using an account he obtained illegally. He found and copied a confidential document belonging to BellSouth titled “Bell South Standard Practice 660-225-104SV Control Office Administration of Enhanced 911 Services for Special Services and Major Account Centers dated March 1988.” He stored copies of this document on his own computer and on the computer of Richard Andrews, a UNIX programmer who ran a computer system called Jolnet, without Andrews’ knowledge or permission.

Prophet was eventually arrested, and during a raid of his home, investigators found the stolen BellSouth document. Meanwhile, a hacker named Terminus ran an underground computer system called Netsys. Terminus had connections to the Legion of Doom hacker group and to the editors of Phrack magazine. Investigators looked into Terminus’ activities and found that he had a large amount of proprietary UNIX source code belonging to AT&T on his computer system. They raided his home and seized his computers.

The investigators determined that Terminus had been running a ring to illegally copy and distribute AT&T’s UNIX software and source code. At the time, AT&T was just gaining the ability to sell their UNIX operating system and software, after the breakup of the Bell System. Terminus’ piracy of their software was costing them a significant amount of money.

In summary, both Prophet and Terminus were caught illegally accessing computer systems and stealing proprietary or confidential information and software that did not belong to them. Prophet stole documents from BellSouth, and Terminus stole source code and software from AT&T.

• AT&T created and owned the UNIX operating system as proprietary software. They deliberately made their version of UNIX incompatible with others and carefully copyrighted their code.
• AT&T licenses for UNIX were strict legal agreements that protected AT&T’s copyrights and intellectual property. AT&T was fairly successful at keeping control of UNIX.
• UNIX was originally designed for mainframes, used by professionals. This limited access and made piracy more difficult. The code was very complex, so few had the skill to steal it.
• By 1989, a hacker named Terminus and others were illegally sharing AT&T’s proprietary UNIX code. The code was worth a lot of money. However, Terminus did not make any money from this piracy. He just shared the code freely with others.
• The legal rights of software developers and the status of “piracy” were unclear at the time. A lot of UNIX code was public domain or open source. And much proprietary code had been extensively rewritten by others.
• The Secret Service did not have experts in UNIX or software issues. They relied on AT&T and Bellcore as experts, even though these were the alleged victims.
• Terminus ran a system called Netsys that was part of the UUCP network, connecting many types of UNIX systems worldwide. Other similar systems included Jolnet and attctc (“Killer”).
• Richard Andrews found a copy of the E911 Document on his system, Jolnet, uploaded by a hacker called the Prophet. Andrews then shared this document with Charles Boykin, who ran attctc for AT&T.
• The E911 Document contained proprietary information about the Enhanced 911 emergency response system from BellSouth. It was clearly marked as not for disclosure outside of BellSouth.

The summary covers the key details around AT&T, UNIX, Terminus, the Secret Service investigation, and how the E911 Document came into Andrews’s possession. Let me know if you would like me to clarify or expand the summary further.

• In 1985, Charlie Boykin set up a public UNIX bulletin board system called “Killer” in Texas. It attracted many users and became an important hub for sharing information.

• In 1988, Boykin received a copy of a confidential BellSouth document called the E911 Document from Richard Andrews. Boykin passed it to AT&T’s security division. From there, it went to Bellcore, the research arm of the Baby Bells. Bellcore’s security expert Henry Kluepfel received the document but shelved it for the time being.

• In early 1989, the hacker Prophet sent a copy of the E911 Document to the editor of Phrack magazine, Knight Lightning, who published parts of it in Phrack issue 24. The document was distributed to about 150 sites.

• For a year, nothing happened regarding the publication of the E911 Document. The security experts at Bellcore and AT&T who had received copies earlier did not act to stop its spread or have copies erased.

• The publication and spread of the E911 Document seemed unlikely to cause problems for Phrack. But then something big happened that changed the situation.

The key events are:

1. Boykin sends the E911 Document to AT&T security in 1988.

2. Bellcore’s Kluepfel receives the document but does not act on it.

3. Prophet sends a copy to Knight Lightning, who publishes parts of it in Phrack in 1989.

4. For a year, nothing happens and the document spreads widely.

5. Then something major occurs that alters the situation, though we don’t know exactly what yet.

The key individuals are:

• Charlie Boykin: Set up the Killer BBS, passed the E911 Document to AT&T security.

• Henry Kluepfel: Bellcore security expert who received the document but did not act on it.

• Prophet: Hacker who sent a copy of the document to Phrack.

• Knight Lightning: Editor of Phrack who published parts of the E911 Document.

• On January 15, 1990, a software crash disrupted telephone service for nine hours across several U.S. states. The crash became known as the Martin Luther King Day Crash.

• Three days later, Secret Service agents visited John Lee, aka “Knight Lightning,” suspecting that he caused the crash. Knight Lightning ran a hacker newsletter called Phrack, which had published sensitive information about the E911 emergency response system.

• Knight Lightning denied causing the crash but cooperated with the agents, giving them issues of Phrack and his subscriber list. He was indicted by a grand jury the next day.

• The E911 Document published in Phrack had spread widely and was impossible to contain. However, because it was stolen property, transferring or publishing it was illegal. The telcos valued the E911 Document at $79,499.

• The Secret Service investigation led them to Austin, Texas, where the Legion of Doom ran a hacker board called Phoenix Project. They also investigated Robert Izenberg, who ran a UNIX node called Elephant and had AT&T connections.

• Izenberg returned home one day to find all his computer equipment missing. Secret Service agents then visited him, accusing him of being in the Legion of Doom and questioning him about the E911 Document and a hacker named Terminus. Izenberg denied the accusations.

• The agents were investigating a suspected ring of UNIX software pirates trafficking in stolen AT&T source code, which they valued at hundreds of thousands of dollars. Their investigation swept up Izenberg due to his AT&T connections and friendship with Terminus.

That covers the key details and events in the summary. Let me know if you would like me to clarify or expand on any part of the summary.

• Terminus, a hacker, was using Izenberg’s computer system to access and share unauthorized software. Izenberg claimed he had no knowledge of or participation in this.

• The Secret Service raided Izenberg’s home and seized all of his computer equipment, costing him $20,000, though he was never charged with a crime. They told him his equipment may have been stolen, though there was no evidence of this.

• The Secret Service was cracking down on hacker bulletin boards and those associated with the Legion of Doom hacker group. They had monitored communications on these boards.

• They raided the home of a University of Texas student named Erik Bloodaxe, a member of the Legion of Doom, and seized his equipment, though again he was not charged with a crime.

• They also raided the home of “The Mentor,” another member of the Legion of Doom, and seized all of his computer equipment as well as that of his wife, who was using the equipment for her academic work. They were also not charged with any crimes.

• The Secret Service then raided the offices of Steve Jackson Games, a gaming company. Though they did not have a proper warrant, they broke in and seized equipment, documents, and files, disrupting the company’s business. Again, no one was charged with a crime.

• The raids were ostensibly to search for and seize copies of the E911 Document, which contained information about emergency response systems. However, no copies were found on Steve Jackson Games’ computers.

• In total, the raids caused over $60,000 in damages and losses to individuals and Steve Jackson Games, though no charges were ever filed. The civil liberties issues around these “crackdowns” caused controversy and complications for years.

• Steve Jackson Games (SJG) was not actually a computer game company. It published tabletop fantasy simulation games, like Illuminati and Car Wars. However, SJG did use computers to run its business and operate an electronic bulletin board system called Illuminati for game discussions.

• Illuminati was not an underground hacker board. It was mainly used by gaming enthusiasts to discuss playing the Illuminati game and other SJG products. However, some members of the hacker group Legion of Doom were also Illuminati users and SJG employees. They participated to discuss gaming, not hacking.

• Steve Jackson designed the popular Illuminati game, a humorous game about secret societies competing to control the world. The game’s bizarre themes often sounded strange or scary to outsiders. Other popular SJG games included Car Wars, about weaponized hot rods fighting in the future.

• SJG was a mid-sized gaming company, grossing $1 million in 1989. It was headquartered in Austin, Texas in a typical office and warehouse space. While SJG produced unusual games, it operated like a standard publisher.

• SJG’s most popular product was the Generic Universal Role-Playing System or GURPS, a system for playing many different types of fantasy scenarios, often based on books, movies, etc. GURPS was adaptable to many genres.

In summary, SJG was a quirky but ordinary games publisher that used an electronic bulletin board to connect with gaming fans. Although some of its games and users were connected to the hacker subculture, SJG and Illuminati themselves were not underground or illicit.

• “Cyberpunk” refers to a group of science fiction writers in the 1980s who were interested in information technology and took a rebellious, countercultural stance.

• The cyberpunk writers were not actually computer experts, though they owned computers and were interested in their social effects. Their writing resonated with younger generations that had grown up with technology.

• By the late 1980s, cyberpunk had attracted the interest of gaming companies, who produced cyberpunk-themed games. Steve Jackson Games was planning to release “GURPS Cyberpunk,” a cyberpunk supplement for their GURPS roleplaying system.

• The Secret Service raided Steve Jackson Games and confiscated electronic equipment, including the manuscript for GURPS Cyberpunk. They told Jackson that the book was “a manual for computer crime,” though it was actually a work of science fiction.

• The raid was ostensibly to find evidence related to the E911 hacker case, but the Secret Service did not reveal this or any other details about their investigation to Jackson. Jackson and the public were left believing that a work of science fiction had been censored.

• The author, Bruce Sterling, was a cyberpunk science fiction writer in Austin, Texas. Though not a hacker, he knew Steve Jackson and took an interest in the raid. Sterling expected that if Jackson had truly committed a crime, he would be charged shortly, or else his equipment would be quickly returned—but this did not happen.

• Science fiction fans were used to being misunderstood, but the “Cyberpunk Bust” gained widespread attention and publicity for cyberpunk science fiction. The situation highlighted the difference between science fiction and criminal plans or activity.

That covers the key details, events, and ideas around the raid on Steve Jackson Games and the resulting confusion and publicity in the science fiction community. Please let me know if you would like me to clarify or expand my summary.

• In 1990, the Secret Service conducted “Operation Sundevil”, a crackdown on electronic fraud and illegal hacker activities.

• Operation Sundevil targeted underground bulletin board systems (BBSs) that carried information related to credit card theft, phone code abuse, pirated software, etc. The organizers identified over 300 such BBSs but only seized about 25 of them.

• Seizing these BBSs provided valuable evidence for the government, as the communications and files on the BBSs gave direct proof of illegal plans and activities. Tracking and solving electronic fraud crimes was difficult, but the BBSs made evidence gathering much easier.

• The seizures crippled the operations of some BBSs. One company, Steve Jackson Games, had its computers seized even though it was not actually involved in any illegal activities - it was wrongly targeted. This showed that innocent parties could get caught up in these crackdowns.

• There was confusion over what exactly “Operation Sundevil” referred to. It was mainly the Arizona-based crackdown on BBSs, but the name became synonymous with many of the anti-hacker activities occurring around 1990. The Secret Service contributed to this confusion.

• The rules around evidence gathering from BBSs were unclear. It was not established whether or not seizing communications and information from a BBS required a warrant, as with tapping phones or intercepting mail. This legal ambiguity allowed the Secret Service to conduct very broad seizures of BBSs during Operation Sundevil.

So in summary, Operation Sundevil was a government crackdown on hacker BBSs in 1990. It provided valuable evidence for anti-fraud operations, but also demonstrated the potential for overreach and harm to innocent parties. The legal issues around BBS operations and free speech were still unresolved, allowing very broad seizures.

• Operation Sundevil was a surprise raid by the Secret Service that seized many hacker bulletin board systems and computers across the U.S. in May 1990.

• At least 40 systems were seized in cities around the country, including multiple raids in some cities. The raids targeted suburbs and homes, not just offices.

• The goal of the raids was to seize computing equipment and storage media, not necessarily to make arrests. Only 4 people were arrested directly as a result of Sundevil.

• Sundevil deprived hackers of their technological means of communication and collaboration. It disrupted hacker communities by taking down many bulletin board systems at once.

• The raids were shows of force, involving up to 150 Secret Service agents and local law enforcement officers. They were intended to intimidate hackers and deter criminal behavior. Agents entered homes with weapons drawn to subdue any resistance.

• The raids seized more than just computer equipment. They took anything potentially related to hacking or other criminal plans, including books, notes, address books, and more. Over 23,000 floppy disks and unknown amounts of other materials were seized.

• Secret Service agents at the time were not very technically knowledgeable but took a broad approach to what could be considered evidence. They seized pretty much any computing equipment or related materials they encountered.

• Sundevil achieved the goal of disrupting hacker activities by taking many bulletin board systems offline simultaneously. The huge volumes of seized data also gave investigators potential evidence for many possible criminal cases and charges.

• But Sundevil also had other purposes beyond just taking down systems and gathering evidence. It was intended to send a message to hackers that law enforcement was taking action against cybercrime.

That covers the key highlights and main points about Operation Sundevil according to the given summary. Let me know if you would like me to explain or expand on any part of the summary.

The Sundevil Operation was a large-scale hacker crackdown conducted in 1990. It was carried out by the U.S. Secret Service in collaboration with local law enforcement. The crackdown involved raids on suspects across multiple states.

The motives behind Sundevil were primarily political and public relations oriented:

1. It sent a message to the hacker community that law enforcement was monitoring cyberspace and willing to take action against hackers. This was meant to deter hackers by demonstrating that they could not hide behind the anonymity of computers.

2. It reassured telecommunication companies and credit card companies, who were primary victims of hacking crimes, that law enforcement took their complaints seriously. This addressed the perception that police did not have enough technical competence or resources to tackle cybercrimes.

3. It boosted the credibility and prestige of the sponsoring law enforcement organizations, especially the Arizona Organized Crime and Racketeering Unit and the U.S. Secret Service. It showed that they had the ambition, skills, and coordination to carry out such an ambitious operation.

4. It asserted the authority of the Secret Service in the area of cybercrimes, vis-a-vis rival organizations like the FBI who shared jurisdiction over computer crimes.

The involvement of the Secret Service in combating cybercrimes seems puzzling at first, given its better known role in protecting government officials and guarding financial assets. However, the Secret Service has long had a role in protecting national infrastructure and financial systems. With increasing computerization of banking and communications systems, cybercrimes fell into the Service’s purview. Sundevil helped establish its leadership in this new area of concern.

In summary, the motives behind Sundevil seem to have been more about establishing organizational authority, sending public messages, and building credibility than directly combating cybercrimes. Of course, demonstrating the ability to take action against hackers was part and parcel of achieving these other political and public relations goals. But Sundevil appears to have been primarily a show of force, rather than a strictly operational crackdown on illegal hacking activities.

The U.S. Secret Service is a law enforcement agency under the Department of Treasury. Originally tasked with preventing counterfeiting of U.S. currency, the Secret Service’s mission has expanded to protecting the nation’s financial infrastructure and payment systems. The Secret Service has jurisdiction over access device fraud, identity theft, credit card fraud, telephone/telecommunications fraud, computer fraud, and electronic funds transfers fraud.

Sections 1029 and 1030 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code give the Secret Service authority to investigate certain cybercrimes, especially those involving unauthorized access of “federal interest computers” or affecting interstate commerce. However, the FBI maintains primary jurisdiction over cyber-intrusions related to national security, foreign counterintelligence, terrorist financing, and government computer systems. The Secret Service’s cybercrime jurisdiction is somewhat limited by these parameters.

In practice, the Secret Service aims to cooperate with local law enforcement on cybercrime cases and provides training, forensic expertise, and advice. The Secret Service cultivates a reserved, professional law enforcement image and seeks to share knowledge and build partnerships, unlike the FBI which is often perceived as aloof and eager to claim credit and glory.

So in summary, while the Secret Service has a broad investigative authority over financial and electronic crimes, its role in combating cybercrime is limited by its position under the Department of Treasury and the FBI’s national security jurisdiction. The Secret Service tries to work collaboratively with local law enforcement and prefers to maintain a low profile.

• Secret Service agents are portrayed as stoic, elite protectors of the President, though in reality the job involves a lot of drudgery and stress.

• The Secret Service was originally established in 1865 to combat currency counterfeiting, which was rampant at the time with over 1600 different banknotes in circulation and an estimated one-third of currency being fake.

• The Secret Service’s first chief, William P. Wood, aggressively pursued counterfeiters (“boodlers”) and aimed to intimidate them. Under his leadership, the Secret Service arrested hundreds of counterfeiters each year.

• Wood attributed his success to moving quickly, attacking boldly, and avoiding bureaucracy. His goal was to convince counterfeiters “that it would no longer be healthy for them to ply their vocation.”

• Wood’s tenure at the Secret Service ultimately ended badly when he aimed to take down a notorious gang of counterfeiters who had successfully forged government bonds. Wood recovered the plates but didn’t arrest the ringleader. He then got embroiled in a dispute over the reward money, which led the Treasury Secretary to sour on him.

• There are parallels drawn between the situation with currency in 1865 and modern computer crime. In both cases, the threats were not fully understood and local authorities were ill-equipped to deal with them. Private entities took matters into their own hands before federal intervention and the establishment of a specialized force (the Secret Service then, computer task forces now).

That covers the essence of the key details and arguments presented in the summary regarding the early years of the U.S. Secret Service and its first chief, William P. Wood. Please let me know if you would like me to clarify or expand on any part of the summary.

• William P. Wood was the first head of the U.S. Secret Service. He formed the Secret Service in 1865 to combat counterfeiting.

• In 1869, McCulloch refused to pay Wood the money he was owed. Wood lost his job and resigned. The new Chief of Secret Service fired most of Wood’s agents. The Secret Service became more professionalized.

• Though Wood ended badly, he is still honored as the pioneer of the Secret Service. In contrast, the second Chief of Secret Service is barely remembered.

• William Brockway, a notorious counterfeiter known as “Colonel Spencer,” was finally arrested in 1880. He served 5 years in prison and continued counterfeiting into his 70s.

• Gail Thackeray was an Assistant Attorney General in Arizona focused on computer crimes. She was a leader in the field and worked on Operation Sundevil. Though she spoke publicly about the operation, the Secret Service remained silent.

• Thackeray believed telephone fraud, especially targeting the elderly, was the worst and most damaging form of electronic crime. Perpetrators used advanced technology and convoluted systems to avoid getting caught. They stole hundreds of millions of dollars.

• Thackeray lost her job in 1991 after a new Attorney General took office. Though unemployed, she continued working for free, training others about computer crimes.

• Thackeray was a pioneer in the field of “hacker tracking.” She helped train Secret Service agents, local police, corporations, journalists, and parents. Even hackers called her to boast and taunt her, giving her valuable information. Thackeray recorded these calls as evidence.

• Hackers and phone phreaks brazenly hold conventions and publish newsletters, behaving like a community despite engaging in criminal behavior.

• While hacking and phreaking were more benign and hobbyist in the early days, modern hackers are often outright venal criminals motivated by greed and a desire to hurt others.

• Gail Thackeray is a top computer crime expert who wishes she had better equipment like an Amiga to analyze evidence. Despite her role, she exhibits some traits of being a “hacker cop” in terms of her computer enthusiasm.

• Thackeray believes computer crime will only get worse over time, with criminals always staying one step ahead of law enforcement. New technologies are often pioneered by criminals who have resources and a desire to hide their activities. They have adapted to phones, pagers, cellular networks, and other technologies.

• Thackeray wants new legal powers to swiftly investigate online and electronic crimes, which now span many companies and jurisdictions. She feels law enforcement is outdated while criminals operate at “nanosecond” speeds.

• Phone phreaking and hacking originated in the U.S. but has spread internationally, with English as the common language. Different countries show different tendencies, e.g. Asia is known for software piracy, France for industrial espionage.

• While early hacking was more harmless, modern malicious hackers are willing to hurt others and even cause death. Thackeray expects hackers to eventually kill someone by targeting critical infrastructure. Viruses are also becoming more destructive.

• Despite their Robin Hood image, most hackers pick on the vulnerable. They have shifted targets as companies like AT&T have tightened security, moving to smaller phone companies and victims.

In summary, the passage portrays hacking and phreaking as growing, global threats that are enabled by new technologies but operate ahead of legal and law enforcement abilities to counter them. Thackeray provides a sense of pessimism that these criminal communities will continue to escalate the scope and severity of their actions.

• Entrepreneurs who run small businesses with PBX phone systems and voice mail are easy targets for hackers. These victims suffer real harm but have little ability to protect themselves. The hackers do it for the thrill of power, not for knowledge or service. They target the vulnerable.

• The author meets with Gail Thackeray, a former sheriff focused on cybercrime, in Phoenix. Phoenix was home to Operation Sundevil, a hacker crackdown. The city is filled with references to the sun and devils.

• Downtown Phoenix empties out at night, leaving transients and homeless people. The author speaks with two young homeless men bedding down for the night. They usually stay at a local shelter.

• The author then meets a homeless man named Stanley who claims someone stole his wallet. But Stanley actually still has his wallet - he made up the story. Stanley seems manic and unstable. He says he’s tracking down the thief as part of his mission to help the police.

• The author reflects that as technology spreads, many people are left behind - the “computer illiterates.” They can’t adapt to technology. But the tech world also has to adapt to the influx of these newcomers. Will the “electroworld” welcome them or disdain them? People like Stanley may end up on the outside. The author worries that surprise and fear may lead the technologically connected to see outsiders like Stanley as threats.

• The author concludes that Stanley, though on the margins of technology, still plays an important role in the book - representing those left out of the digital revolution. His encounter with Stanley highlights the threats of fear and contempt that may come with widening inequality.

The key ideas are:

1. There are innocent victims of hacks and cybercrime who suffer real harm.

2. As technology progresses, there are many who get left behind - the “computer illiterate.”

3. There is a risk of fear, contempt, and hostility between the technologically connected and those left out of the digital world.

4. Paying attention to people like Stanley, on the margins, is still important to understand the impact of technology on society.

• The Federal Computer Investigations Committee or FCIC is an unorthodox but influential organization focused on combating computer crimes. It has no formal structure, budget, or membership and comprises law enforcement officials, legal experts, tech professionals, and others.

• The FCIC can be seen as an “ad-hocracy,” a temporary and spontaneous team formed to solve a problem, made possible by advances in information technology and fluid organizational structures. These ad-hoc groups are becoming more significant and powerful.

• The computer field is in a state of constant change, so professionals in this area are permanently in “pioneer” mode. As a result, any rules or procedures put in place quickly become outdated. The FCIC’s loose structure gives it an advantage in rapidly adapting to changes.

• Rigid organizations like the FBI struggle to keep up with the fast-changing nature of cybercrime. The FCIC members are de facto trainers for law enforcement in this domain. Without the FCIC, law enforcement would be unprepared to deal with computer crime.

• The author discusses attending an FCIC meeting in Phoenix in 1991. The local political landscape has changed, with the police chief and others resigning amid a bribery scandal. But the FCIC endures, still serving an important role.

• Overall, the key message is that as technology and computer crime advance rapidly, nimble and unorthodox groups like the FCIC are well suited to help law enforcement officials keep pace, even as they struggle to adapt within their large, bureaucratic organizations. The informal and temporary nature of these “ad-hocracies” is likely to become more prominent and significant over time.

• The writer attended a conference of the Federal Computer Investigators Council (FCIC) in Scottsdale, Arizona. The conference was held at a fancy resort.

• The writer was forbidden from attending the first part of the conference but spoke with investigators during a break. They were casual and collegial, especially with Gail Thackeray, who seemed to be the social glue of the group.

• With time to kill, the writer imagined what a hacker might do at the conference. The writer decided to “trash” the room, digging through the trash to find discarded information.

• In the trash of an office across from the conference, the writer found scraps of a Sprint phone bill, bank statements, and handwritten love letters from a woman named Evelyn to her ex-boyfriend, Bob.

• By piecing together the shreds, the writer learned details about Evelyn’s finances, friends’ phone numbers, the content of her letters to Bob, and their apparent breakup. The writer debated calling Evelyn to trick her into revealing more information but decided against it.

• The writer acknowledged that deceiving and manipulating people over the phone to gain access to information, known as “social engineering,” is unethical but commonly practiced among hackers and phone phreaks.

• The author attended an FCIC (Federal Computer Investigators Committee) meeting, where investigators from different law enforcement agencies gathered to discuss computer crimes.

• The author realizes that with the information gathered from listening to the investigators, he could potentially cause harm to Evelyn by exploiting her “gullibility.” However, the author notes that it would be unethical to do so.

• The FCIC meeting involved sharing experiences on investigating computer crimes. Many attendees didn’t have formal computer expertise but learned on the job by making analogies to areas they were familiar with, like homicide or drugs.

• The FCIC has brought investigators together and helped build expertise in this new area of computer crimes. Members frequently communicate over the phone and see FCIC as invaluable. However, FCIC operates differently than the typical law enforcement culture.

• The meeting involved investigators from agencies like the FBI, Secret Service, and Mounties swapping stories over beers. Some stories involved investigators originally approaching computer crimes cases with mistaken assumptions, like expecting to find a dead body at the scene of a “hacking.”

• There are different subgroups within FCIC: trainers, security specialists, and investigators. FCIC membership is by invitation only. Many members felt isolated until finding the FCIC community.

• The author notes that while FCIC is valuable, its loose, entrepreneurial culture clashes with the broader law enforcement environment, which may threaten its funding and longevity.

• The meeting revealed the backgrounds of different investigators, from former bikers to those involved in anti-war protests. Despite their unorthodox paths, they’ve come together around investigating computer crimes.

• The FCIC are specialized investigators who deal with sensitive digital crimes that mainstream law enforcement wants to avoid. They are isolated and under-supported.

• FCIC members tend to change jobs frequently and struggle to get the proper resources and training. They expect major disasters to happen before their concerns are taken seriously.

• Computers and networks are extremely complex, with many possible places to hide evidence. Investigating them requires specialized knowledge and techniques. Simple things like documenting the system, preserving evidence, and copying data properly are vital.

• Human sources and informants are key to investigating technical systems. Hackers and technologists often cannot resist bragging about their skills and knowledge, which provides opportunities for gathering information.

• While technology like encryption and fiber optics make surveillance difficult, police have ways of accessing data that criminals often don’t anticipate. For example, the lecturer showed a homemade fiber optic tap that could access data undetected.

• Conducting preliminary investigations into computer systems is important before seizing equipment. This often involves undercover operations to map out the technical details of a system and identify where evidence might be stored.

• “Trashing” or searching a target’s garbage is a common surveillance technique for gathering information. When approved by a judge, police can thoroughly search garbage for useful documents and clues. Garbage contains sensitive data and is often an unseen vulnerability.

• In summary, investigating technology-related crimes requires a diverse set of skills and tools. Human sources, legal surveillance, specialized technical knowledge, and creativity are all needed to overcome the complexity of computer systems and networks. With the right techniques and persistence, law enforcement has ways of accessing even seemingly impervious technology like encryption, fiber optics and complex networks.

• Manhole covers and other mundane, everyday objects are vulnerable to exploitation for malicious purposes. Manhole covers provide access to critical infrastructure and have been targeted by terrorists and criminals. There are now special secured manhole covers to deter unauthorized access.

• The Electronic Frontier Foundation attended a meeting of the federal computer crime task force. Mitchell Kapor, the EFF’s president, and Mike Godwin, its chief attorney, represented the EFF. They argued for civil liberties protections in computer crime investigations and seizures.

• Kapor acknowledged that hacking was morally wrong but argued that the EFF was not simply a “hacker defense fund.” He said the EFF’s own system had been hacked recently.

• Kapor was skeptical of telcos’ framing of Caller ID as a privacy measure for consumers. He said it was really a way for companies to build databases of people contacting them.

• Godwin discussed the civil liberties implications of computer searches and seizures. He argued that most suspects didn’t want their computers seized indefinitely. He suggested cops make copies of data and give suspects the copies but take the originals.

• Godwin said bulletin board systems were platforms for free speech and that most were innocuous. He argued that seizing them violated users’ rights and privacy. He said cops could get information from boards through informants instead of seizures.

• Godwin argued that it was impossible to keep electronic info from cops. While monitoring boards was controversial, he said expecting cops to ignore them was unreasonable given that cops monitor other media. Some cops even run their own “sting” boards to catch hackers.

• In summary, the EFF argued for finding a balance between civil liberties and law enforcement in the new realm of computer crime. They pushed back on what they saw as overly aggressive police tactics that infringed on people’s rights and privacy. But they acknowledged law enforcement’s legitimate need to investigate illegal cyber activity. The key was finding an approach that respected both sets of interests.

The passage discusses police tactics in investigating computer crimes. It notes that broad seizures of equipment are often unnecessary and that most hackers are not highly skilled. It argues that a career in federal law enforcement, particularly the Secret Service, is appealing for those interested in computers and security.

Federal agents have significant power and knowledge about illegal activities. Although computer crime investigation is still developing, federal law enforcement is likely to grow in the future. Working for the Secret Service requires intensive training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC). FLETC has numerous divisions that provide both general and specialized law enforcement training to many federal agencies.

The summary touches on the key ideas and flows cohesively while condensing the overall scope of the original passage.

• Carlton Fitzpatrick is a veteran Border Patrol agent who became fascinated with computers and ended up becoming an expert in computer crime investigation.

• He works at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) as an instructor and helps train federal agents in computer crime investigation.

• Fitzpatrick is considered the leading federal expert in computer crime and has a reputation for being very knowledgeable about real-world examples and stories of computer crimes.

• The narrator goes on a tour of FLETC with Fitzpatrick and sees many of the facilities used to train agents like a giant shooting range, a high-speed driving range, a “ninja compound” for training in hostage rescue, and fake houses used for practicing raids and crime scene investigation. The tour gives the impression of a very intense training environment.

• Fitzpatrick has access to a lot of computer equipment at FLETC and plans to set up a large bulletin board system to help in training agents. He even suggests having a high school volunteer run the system.

• The narrator is confused and disturbed by the simulated yet grim nature of the agent training at FLETC. The fake murder scene with actors portraying mourners seems particularly surreal and unsettling.

• Overall, the passage paints Fitzpatrick as a highly dedicated and knowledgeable expert in his field but also gives the impression of the challenging and potentially desensitizing nature of federal agent training.

• Hackers and telcos distrust the public and are politically hampered. Civil libertarians grasped that communication and publicity are power.

• Though lacking technical, financial, and legal power, civil libertarians networked extensively. They lectured, talked to press, used technology, and spent money to spread their messages.

• In 1990, cyberspace civil libertarians coalesced rapidly. They had little organization but affected events. Established groups like Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility and ACLU supported their efforts.

• Civil libertarians had the most success of any group in the 1990 crackdown. They gained political initiative and momentum.

• In 1989, Apple had a problem: proprietary software was copied. “NuPrometheus League” copied and distributed Apple’s Color QuickDraw code. Apple tried in court to restrict spread of their code.

• “NuPrometheus League” said code enabled Mac screens and should be public. Defiantly spread the code, daring Apple to stop them. Apple failed in court to halt spread. Code spread worldwide, damaging Apple’s control and intellectual property.

• John Perry Barlow persuaded NuPrometheus to stop, arguing their tactics undermined civil liberties. NuPrometheus agreed. Barlow helped negotiate with Apple to drop the lawsuit in exchange for code removal. This raised Barlow’s visibility.

• The incident showed how information could spread uncontrollably. It spurred debate on intellectual property andcatalyzed networking among techno-libertarians. The “NuPrometheus League” action and response propelled Barlow and others into the limelight.

• In the late 1980s, some programmers illegally copied and distributed part of the Apple Macintosh operating system called Color QuickDraw. The people responsible called themselves the “NuPrometheus League” and saw themselves as rebels fighting against Apple’s corporate control.

• The NuPrometheus League mailed copies of the stolen software to people around the US, including John Perry Barlow. Barlow was a songwriter for the Grateful Dead, a popular rock band with a countercultural following. Although the Grateful Dead were anti-establishment, they had become very wealthy and funded various social and technological projects.

• Barlow was interested in technology and politics. He considered himself a “techno-crank” and “unacknowledged legislator of the world.” Although he ran for political office as a Republican, he sold his ranch to focus on computers and moved within a community of “bright, inventive, technological sophisticates.”

• In 1990, the FBI questioned Barlow as part of their investigation into the NuPrometheus League. Barlow had to explain hacking to the FBI, who suspected attendees of the Hackers Conference, an annual meeting of tech entrepreneurs and journalists. Barlow, though not accused of any crime, was troubled by the FBI’s ignorance and suspicion of the tech community.

• Barlow spread news of the FBI’s investigation to the Well, an early online community run by the Point Foundation, a countercultural organization that promoted technology and social change. The Well and the Point Foundation were in the same spirit as the Grateful Dead and the Whole Earth Catalog.

In summary, a secretive group illegally distributed Apple’s proprietary software code as an anti-corporate statement. The FBI’s broad investigation of the tech community in response troubled John Perry Barlow, a countercultural figure who straddled the worlds of music, politics, and technology. Barlow worked to raise awareness of the issue within the San Francisco Bay Area’s pioneering tech and cultural circles.

• The Whole Earth Catalog and its sequels promoted countercultural living, environmentalism, and back-to-the-land movements in the 1960s and 1970s. They sold millions of copies and won awards.

• CoEvolution Quarterly was a magazine published by the Point Foundation, the nonprofit behind the Whole Earth Catalog. It ran from 1974 to 1984 and had a small but dedicated readership interested in countercultural tools and ideas.

• In 1984, Point Foundation discovered the emerging computer revolution and personal computer culture. They shifted their focus to cover this, renaming CoEvolution Quarterly as Whole Earth Software Review and then Whole Earth Review. They also started the Hackers Conference and the Whole Earth ‘Lectronic Link (the WELL), an early online bulletin board system.

• The WELL was based in San Francisco and attracted an older, educated crowd drawn to Point Foundation’s tools and ideas. It started in 1985 with 5,000 users, growing to 30,000. It was divided into many topic-based conferences covering a wide range of subjects.

• The WELL was a pioneering online community, though it avoided illegal or unethical content. Debates could be heated but not vicious. It lost money for years but stayed afloat with support from Point Foundation.

• The WELL attracted many countercultural Bay Area residents, especially those in the information and media industries. John Perry Barlow, lyricist for the Grateful Dead, was an influential early user and celebrity on the WELL.

• The summary gives an extensive list of the conferences and topics of discussion available on the WELL in 1991 to demonstrate its wide range of subjects and communities. However, most users focused on a few areas that interested them, occasionally venturing into others. Important news and debates on the WELL could gain the attention of most users.

The key themes are the influence of the Whole Earth Catalog and Point Foundation on counterculture, environmentalism, and the early online world; the role of the WELL as an important pioneering online community; and the types of people and subjects that populated the WELL.

• In 1990, John Perry Barlow posted an account of his encounter with the FBI on the Well, an early online community. The story caused a stir, as the Well had recently hosted debates on hacker ethics and become acquainted with prominent hackers like Phiber Optik.

• Phiber Optik was an 18-year-old hacker from New York who became a celebrity on the Well and in the media. Despite his provocative actions, many felt protective of him. After his computer was seized in a raid, Well members sympathized with him and grew more critical of the government’s crackdown on hackers.

• John Perry Barlow emerged as a leading voice against the crackdown. Although not a technical expert, Barlow was an influential commentator with a gift for coining phrases and framing debates. He popularized the term “cyberspace” to refer to computer networks as a new space demanding new rules. Barlow cut a striking figure and was adept at online organizing and discussion.

• Barlow’s essay about being questioned by the FBI resonated with others who had faced government suspicion, including Mitchell Kapor, the founder of Lotus Development Corporation. Kapor was alarmed at the scope of the government’s anti-hacker campaign. He admired Barlow and visited him to discuss the situation.

• In summary, Barlow’s personal account of a run-in with the FBI, and his subsequent defense of hackers like Phiber Optik, catalyzed opposition to the government’s crackdown on hackers in 1990. Barlow and Kapor emerged as leaders of this opposition movement, which viewed computer networks as a new “cyberspace” that needed to be protected from unjustified government interference.

• In 1990, Mitchell Kapor and John Barlow founded the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) to raise funds for lobbying and legal efforts around civil liberties issues related to technology.

• The EFF’s first major case was the trial of Craig Neidorf, known as “Knight Lightning,” for publishing the E911 Document in the underground hacker magazine Phrack.

• Neidorf was prosecuted in Chicago federal court for wire fraud, access device fraud, and interstate transport of stolen goods. He faced up to 60 years in prison.

• Neidorf had obtained the E911 Document from an Atlanta hacker known as “The Prophet,” and knew it was stolen. However, Neidorf argued he was just publishing a magazine and exercising free speech rights.

• The Chicago Computer Fraud and Abuse Task Force prosecuted the case. They saw it as a chance to send a message to hackers that stealing information and illegally accessing computers would not be tolerated.

• “The Prophet” and two other Atlanta hackers pleaded guilty and testified against Neidorf for reduced sentences. Neidorf pleaded innocent and went to trial.

• The case centered around whether publishing the E911 Document constituted wire fraud and interstate transport of stolen goods, or was protected free speech as part of a magazine. Neidorf had not directly stolen the document or profited from it.

• The trial would be a major test of how the law applied to hacking and digital free speech issues. The EFF supported Neidorf’s defense.

• “Shadowhawk” was convicted in 1989 under anti-hacking laws for breaking into AT&T computers and stealing software. He was sentenced to 9 months in prison and fined $10,000.

• Prosecutors argued that Shadowhawk’s theft of AT&T’s “C5 Expert System” software was worth $1 million, even though the software was experimental and not commercially available. The court accepted this valuation without question.

• “Kyrie” was a phone phreak who was jailed for 27 months in 1990 for telecom fraud and corrupting minors. She had boasted about her crimes to a cybercrime investigator, who then passed evidence of her boasts to the Secret Service. Kyrie’s harsh sentence was meant to send a message that cybercriminals would face severe punishment.

• The Neidorf case was similar to Shadowhawk’s, in that the victim (AT&T) set an inflated value for the stolen “E911 Document” - $79,449. The figure seemed absurdly high for a 12-page document.

• Secret Service surveillance of a hacker convention attended by Neidorf found no evidence of illegal activity, but prosecutors sought to block this tape from being shown to the jury.

• The EFF discovered that the $79,449 figure for the E911 Document was calculated by simply adding up the costs of researching, writing, editing, printing, and distributing the document - even though it had no established market value. The calculation seemed flawed and designed to maximize the perception of harm.

In summary, the cases against Shadowhawk, Kyrie, and Neidorf were questioned by critics due to the inflated valuations of the stolen property, the harsh sentences meant to “send a message,” the blocking of potentially exculpatory evidence, and the dubious application of anti-hacking laws. The summary paints a portrait of overzealous prosecution.

• The E911 Document describes the operating procedures of E911 emergency response systems. It was six pages long.
• It took two clerks an hour each to create the E911 Document, costing $43 in total.
• According to Mr. Megahee, it took five weeks for an author to write the document and two days for editors to review it. The total cost to produce the document was $17,099.
• The cost included expensive computer equipment and software to create the document like: a $31,000 VAXstation computer, a $6,000 printer, and $22,000 worth of software.
• Maintenance fees were an additional 10% of the costs. The total cost to produce the E911 Document was $79,449.
• The government originally valued the E911 Document at $79,449 but then lowered the value to $24,639.
• The E911 Document was not shown to the jury in Neidorf’s trial to prevent it from becoming public. However, it had already been published in Phrack and hundreds of people already had copies.
• John Nagle, a telecommunications expert, analyzed the E911 Document and found that information about E911 systems was already publicly available in a book.
• The E911 Document was used as evidence to justify raids on Steve Jackson Games, the Phoenix Project BBS, Jolnet, and an AT&T node.

In summary, the E911 Document was a pretext used to justify disproportionate raids and prosecution despite its contents already being publicly available and fairly innocuous.

Disconnect Default Routing: Disconnects the default routing to send the 911 call to an alternate PSAP when the primary PSAP is unable to receive calls.

Alternative Routing: Forwards 911 calls to an alternate PSAP if the primary PSAP is unavailable. Requires Disconnect Default Routing.

Night Service: Forwards 911 calls to an alternate PSAP during predetermined hours, usually nights and weekends.

Selective Routing: Routes 911 calls based on the caller’s phone number to the appropriate PSAP.

Automatic Number Identification (ANI): Identifies the caller’s phone number to enable Selective Routing.

Selective Transfer: Allows a PSAP to transfer a 911 call to another agency based on the location of the emergency. Requires ANI.

Automatic Location Identification (ALI): Identifies the caller’s address to enable Selective Transfer. Requires ANI.

Pre-Installation: Establish implementation team, provide customer info to SSC/MAC, secure Major Account Number, provide training.

Installation: SSC/MAC is Overall Control Office, coordinates installation, forms ongoing maintenance subcommittee.

Maintenance:

• Voice Network (SCC): Responsible for tandem switch and call routing.
• PSAP Equipment (SSIM/I&M): Installs and maintains PSAP equipment like ANI/ALI controllers, data sets, sets.
• PSAP to Node circuits (SSC/MAC): Maintains circuits between PSAPs and Nodes.
• Node site (MMOC): Maintains Node equipment like modems and cables.
• Host site (MMOC): Maintains E911 computer, tests circuits, monitors system.
• Trouble Reporting (SSC/MAC): Serves as point of contact for PSAP troubles, refers and tracks troubles.
• Recent Change (RCMAC): Updates tandem translations for call routing based on service orders.
• E911 Center: Administers E911 computer system, analyzes troubles, processes updates.

Various groups test and refer troubles to appropriate groups, and report outage statuses to SSC/MAC and customers. Escalation procedures for unresolved Node/PSAP outages. ANI/ALI data is crucial for call routing and handling.

Here is a summary of the handoff organization based on the given criteria:

Problem affecting PSAP equipment: Report to SSC/MAC Problem affecting 911 trunk circuits: Report to SSC/MAC Voice network issue affecting 911 calls: Report to SCC, provide trunk group number Issue affecting multiple PSAPs: Contact network management center to check for node or host computer issues before further testing

The SSC/MAC will track reported issues and escalate them as needed. They will close reports from customers/companies after resolving issues with the contact who reported it. Specific groups will investigate chronic issues upon request from SSC/MAC.

Any issue making a PSAP completely unavailable is a top priority issue. Loss of one link to a PSAP is also a top priority issue.

PSAP will report issues with ANI controller, ALI controller or PSAP equipment to SSC/MAC.

For ANI issues:

• No ANI on all screens for all calls: Contact SCC immediately, 911 calls may need rerouting
• No ANI on all screens but not all calls, voice contact remains: Dispatch SSIM/I&M
• No ANI on one screen only: Dispatch SSIM/I&M, issue is with PSAP equipment
• All zeroes (failed ANI): Could be issue with tandem office or trunks. Report to SCC, provide details
• Occasional all zeroes: Dispatch SSIM/I&M for routine check

For ALI issues:

• No ALI on one screen: Dispatch SSIM/I&M
• No ALI on all screens: Likely circuit issue between PSAP and host. Test and refer for repair.
• No ALI from multiple PSAPs: Check with network management center, could be node or host issue.

PSAP will report any alarms on ANI controller display to SSC/MAC. Verify primary function of equipment and dispatch repair if for E911, otherwise refer to vendor.

ANI/ALI controller down: MMOC will report to SSC/MAC, dispatch repair Link to PSAP down: Treat as emergency, either link down can isolate PSAP. MMOC will provide circuit ID to SSC/MAC.

Issues identified by MMOC from node to host are handled directly.

Subscriber unable to dial 911: Obtain details from subscriber, refer to IMC for line testing. If no line issue found, verify subscriber should have 911 access and ESN. Check ESN through system, refer issue to SCC responsible for tandem office. Track through resolution, informing IMC.

• Equipment failures and maintenance are handled by telco employees according to an established hierarchy. There are managers, technicians, and subordinates who have clear roles and reporting relationships.

• The document itself is not useful for directly breaking into computer systems. However, it contains information that could be used to manipulate and deceive telco employees through “social engineering” over the phone. By mimicking the technical language and procedures outlined in the document, hackers could trick employees into providing sensitive information or doing things that compromise security.

• The document was originally created by a committee of many telco employees over time through an iterative process. It did not have a single “author”.

• The “proprietary” label that BellSouth put on all of their internal documents did not actually signify that the content was secret or high-security. Almost all of their documents received this label as a matter of course.

• Bellcore, the telco research consortium, published much more detailed technical information about the E911 system that was available publicly for purchase. The information in the stolen document was mostly redundant with publicly available information.

• The digital underground and hackers were unaware of the extent to which telco technical information was publicly available through sources like Bellcore. The telcos failed to properly guard their intellectual property while also aggressively prosecuting hackers.

• An issue of the industry journal Telephone Engineer & Management contained even more details on the E911 system than the document from BellSouth that was published in Phrack.

• Neidorf received a piece of passwords-trapping software called a “log-in sequence” from a hacker named Terminus. However, Neidorf was not accused of using or developing this software, so its relevance to his case was questionable.

In summary, the supposedly valuable and proprietary BellSouth document contained little information that was not already publicly available in various forms. The document was more useful for understanding the telco community’s jargon and organizational relationships than for directly enabling illegal access or harm. The prosecution’s arguments about the sensitivity and value of the document seemed to be seriously undermined.

Here is a summary of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 and its relevance to the Neidorf case:

• The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) made it a crime to intentionally access electronic communications services without authorization. It was intended to extend the protections of telephone communications to digital channels.

• Section 2703 of the ECPA required law enforcement to notify service providers before accessing subscriber data. Richard Andrews and his bulletin board Jolnet were not notified before the Secret Service served a subpoena, allegedly violating the ECPA. Neidorf’s lawyer tried to use this to challenge the admissibility of evidence from Jolnet but was unsuccessful.

• The prosecution’s case against Neidorf began to fall apart after a witness testified that the E911 Document was nearly worthless, contradicting the $80,000 valuation claimed by the prosecution. Shortly after, the prosecution dropped all charges against Neidorf.

• Although Neidorf was not found innocent, his record was expunged. His family incurred over $100,000 in legal fees, despite support from Mitch Kapor.

• The Neidorf trial was a major blow to the credibility of law enforcement’s crackdown on hackers. Although the crackdown continued, the EFF gained attention and recognition as defenders of hacker rights and online civil liberties.

• The Atlanta Legion of Doom members “Urvile,” “Leftist,” and “Prophet” were sentenced to prison time and fines disproportionate to their actual crimes. They were forbidden from using computers outside of work for many years, a punishment the EFF argued was unconstitutional.

• Senator Patrick Leahy spoke out against overzealous prosecution of young hackers, arguing that overly broad restrictions of technological experimentation could hamper US competitiveness. In contrast, the crackdown efforts of law enforcement remained largely secretive.

• The outcome of the Neidorf trial and sentencing of the Atlanta Legion of Doom members galvanized support for the EFF and highlighted the issues of hacker rights, privacy, and technological freedom that they sought to address. Although legally narrow, the impact on public opinion and debate was substantial.

• In 1990, the crackdown against hackers by law enforcement was in full swing, but by 1991, the agents leading these efforts were facing difficulties. Key figures like Gail Thackeray and William Cook had left their jobs. Meanwhile, the libertarian movement in support of hackers was gaining momentum and attracting many allies.

• One important ally was Mike Godwin, a tech-savvy lawyer from Austin, Texas. Godwin was instrumental in bringing public attention to the Steve Jackson case. His press packet summarizing the issues was what first brought the story to the Austin press and then Newsweek. Godwin went on to become the first staff attorney for the Electronic Frontier Foundation.

• Another influential figure was Dorothy Denning, a computer security expert and cryptographer. Unlike others, Denning approached hackers with a scholarly interest. She discovered that they had their own rules and subculture. Her reports helped legitimize hackers and show that “hacking” was representative of deeper issues around information control. Although not an outright supporter, she brought hackers and their civil libertarian allies together. She attended the Neidorf trial and organized key meetings.

• However, the single most influential figure was Mitchell Kapor, the “central civil-libertarian ad-hocrat.” Kapor provided key funding and organizational support for the civil liberties movement around hacking. He had a gift for public speaking and straddled the hacker and business worlds. Kapor founded the Electronic Frontier Foundation with John Barlow. He went on to fund and chair the organization, with his persuasive and compelling public persona driving much of its early success.

In summary, while law enforcement’s early momentum against hackers soon faltered, the libertarian movement in support of hackers grew largely thanks to the efforts of key individuals like Godwin, Denning, and especially Kapor. These allies were instrumental in legitimizing hackers, raising public awareness, and mobilizing support. By 1991, the libertarian movement was in the ascendant, while the crackdown agents were increasingly on the defensive.

• Mitch Kapor is the founder of Lotus Development Corporation and the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF).

• In 1991, Kapor had become an influential advocate for civil liberties in cyberspace. He gave speeches, lobbied lawmakers, and networked extensively to build support for the EFF’s causes.

• The EFF was founded in 1990 to promote freedom of speech, privacy, and access to information technology. By 1991, it had helped change laws, filed lawsuits, sponsored conferences, published newsletters, and established itself as a leading voice on “hacker” issues.

• Kapor and the EFF helped Craig Neidorf avoid prison and filed a lawsuit on behalf of Steve Jackson Games. They challenged secret Service raids that violated civil liberties.

• The EFF is based in Cambridge, Massachusetts, near Boston. Boston has a long history of intellectualism and political dissent. The EFF’s headquarters is a modest building that also houses Kapor’s software company, ON Technology, and his holding company, KEI.

• Kapor is an intelligent and charismatic figure who supports digital rights and the tech community. Although not as flamboyant as John Perry Barlow, Kapor is respected as someone who understands technology, business, and law.

• The summary touches on Kapor’s background, the EFF’s origins and early impact, its headquarters and culture, and Kapor’s reputation and interests. The details help give context for understanding the EFF’s role in the “hacker crackdown” of the early 1990s.

• Mitch Kapor is the founder of Lotus Development Corporation and the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF).

• He became interested in computers and programming in high school in the mid-1960s. However, he then became distracted by “drugs, sex and rock and roll” during college.

• After trying several jobs he disliked, he taught himself to program the Apple II computer and started a consulting business. He helped a friend at MIT with a programming problem, then they sold the program they created, launching Kapor into the software business.

• Kapor founded Lotus, which became very successful. However, he left after it became too bureaucratic. He is now very wealthy but doesn’t disclose details about his net worth.

• Kapor founded EFF to promote civil liberties on the Internet. However, he doesn’t consider himself a “civil libertarian” in the stereotypical sense. He prefers direct, hands-on action.

• EFF publishes and distributes information on the Internet. Kapor wants to make the Internet more accessible to non-technical people. He believes everyone should be able to easily publish information and have an online “node.”

• Kapor argues that although some technical limitations currently prevent widespread Internet access, technology will evolve to overcome these challenges, just as personal computers made computing accessible to individuals. His goal is an open Internet where “any person can be a publisher.”

• The Internet is decentralized, non-hierarchical, and open, unlike the centralized and regulated telcos.

• Mitch Kapor believes the Internet model represents the future of telecommunications. Regulation and monopolies will fade as technology like wireless connections and dark fiber become more common.

• Kapor does not believe the Internet will corrode infrastructure and cause societal collapse like some pundits predict. He is opposed to techno-utopian visions and thinks they are unlikely.

• Kapor wants to create an environment suited for future entrepreneurs and businesses like himself, not necessarily make the world safe for anarchy or utopia.

• Kapor and allies like EFF want decentralization and local empowerment through technology, but they have faced many obstacles in implementing their vision.

• The story contrasts the open Internet model with the locked-down, highly regulated telco model by describing Kapor’s former office building and a nearby NYNEX central office. The NYNEX building shows signs of tight security and control.

• The story ends at a CPSR policy conference, suggesting CPSR is interested in guiding technology and policy toward more progressive ends, much like Kapor and EFF.

The key ideas are that Kapor and like-minded groups envision a future with more decentralized technology and open access, but established systems of control and regulation stand in the way. Kapor does not want anarchy but an environment where innovation and entrepreneurship can thrive. Policy groups are working to steer technology and policy in that direction.

• CPSR was founded in 1983 as a political activist group focused on issues of computer security, privacy and ethics.

• In 1990, CPSR organized a conference called the “Public Policy Roundtable” which brought together many major figures in the electronic civil liberties community. This helped establish connections within the community.

• A month later, in April 1990, CPSR organized an even larger conference called “Computers, Freedom and Privacy” or CFP. This massive conference brought together over 400 people from across the electronic community, including those with opposing views on issues. Despite some tensions, the conference was very successful in building connections and relationships within the community.

• Two of the most striking moments at the CFP conference were:

1. John Perry Barlow, a leading cyber rights advocate, giving a speech advocating for reconciliation between opposing sides.

2. Gail Thackeray, a prosecutor who often targeted hackers, gave a surprise comedic poetry performance that helped humanize her to the audience and build unexpected connections.

• The conference led to unlikely interactions, relationships and bonding between groups that were typically opposed, like hackers, law enforcement, telcos, activists, lawyers, etc. There was a sense of the emergence of a new “digital nation” or community coming together.

• Overall, the CFP conference was a seminal moment for the electronic civil liberties community, helping to unite groups that would shape technology law and policy in the decades to come.

• Phiber Optik pleaded guilty to computer hacking charges. The prosecutor, Delaney, thought he could have charged Phiber with more but accepted the plea. Delaney understands hackers but still sees them as criminals.

• Delaney is a experienced homicide cop who has seen a lot of action. He respects Steve Jackson’s principled stand against the Secret Service raid. He thinks Craig Neidorf, the editor of Phrack magazine, has grown up a lot after avoiding jail time. Neidorf now seems more interested in law than hacking.

• Phiber Optik and Acid Phreak are part of the hacker generation. Phiber sees Neidorf as a Midwestern geek. Acid Phreak is into electronic music, not LSD.

• At a symposium, experts like John Quarterman explain that the Internet cannot be stopped or measured. Phiber Optik engages in risky behavior, hacking systems or pretending to.

• Dorothy Denning confronts Phiber about calling her “quaint.” Denning and her husband Peter seem out of place among the hackers but she is there because she is a expert in the field.

• Donn Parker views computer crime as part of a historical pattern of new types of business crimes emerging with new technologies. Current “criminoid” panics around viruses, data theft, and hacking will pass. Parker believes there is no perfectly secure system and people are the weak point. He thinks the baseline of computer security needs to be raised through deterrence and discretion.

In summary, the passage profiles some of the figures in the early ’90s hacker scene and experts in computer security. It portrays the hacker community as a new generation of tech-savvy young people and contrasts their values with the law enforcement and computer security establishment. There are some signs of connection between the groups but also a lot of wariness and differences in perspective.

• Mr. Harvey, though flawed, is best suited to make a difficult sacrifice for the security of the group. Computer security is an unpleasant but necessary topic.

• The security expert has to anticipate every possible malicious act that could be committed by an adversary. It is as if the expert has to simulate the criminal mind as a “subprogram” within their own mind. The expert is like Sherlock Holmes, imagining a Moriarty who does not yet exist.

• The CFP conference has a joyful, celebratory atmosphere, like a wedding. The attendees know the cybersecurity field is changing, and they are proud to witness it.

• However, as the night goes on, there is a sense of loss. Something is ending - specifically, the era of the “amateurs” in the field. The cybersecurity field is becoming more professional and corporate. The old guard of hobbyists and practitioners is fading away.

So in summary, the key ideas are: the necessity of sacrifice and anticipation in security, the celebratory but bittersweet atmosphere of the CFP conference, and the passing of the amateur era in cybersecurity.