Literary Insights

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Here is a summary of the key points from the introduction and summaries of some chapters:

The book aims to quantify and compare social development in the Eastern and Western worlds over the past 15,000 years. It develops a Social Development Index based on measures of energy capture, social organization, war-making capacity, and information technology.
Chapter 2 outlines the methodology, including defining the Eastern and Western cores, estimating populations, choosing appropriate time periods, and assigning quantitative scores for each social development factor. It acknowledges many assumptions and limitations.
Chapter 3 examines estimates of energy capture (food production and consumption) over time for the West and East. It relies on archaeological data as well as historical estimates of things like GDP per capita. Major topics include the rise of agriculture, population growth, the Industrial Revolution.
Chapter 4 analyzes trends in maximum city size as a proxy for social organization and centralized control. It compares data on largest settlements in different eras and regions.
Chapter 5 quantifies military capacities by considering factors like tools/weapons, organization, mobility. It compares trends in the West and East and how technological and organizational changes impacted the military balance over centuries.
Chapter 6 develops scores for information technology by looking at developments in literacy, record-keeping, printing, and other areas. It examines how these drove or lagged broader social changes.
Chapter 7 discusses the overall results, limitations, implications and projected future trends. It analyzes how different modeling assumptions would affect the relative trajectories of social development in the Eastern and Western worlds.

So in summary, the book develops a systematic, quantitative approach to comparing socio-economic complexity in major world regions from prehistory to modern times based on key social development factors.

The author aims to quantify the concept of “social development” to better compare societies across history and address debates about why the West dominates. Social development refers to a society’s ability to master its environment and accomplish goals.
There are competing theories about whether Western social development has been higher for hundreds/thousands of years, or only pulled ahead recently in the past few centuries. Quantification could help evaluate these claims by making comparisons more explicit.
The book follows the model of Time on the Cross by Fogel and Engerman, providing a broad overview and interpretation, as well as detailed discussion of statistical sources and techniques.
The goals are to allow critics to systematically analyze claims made in the author’s previous book Why the West Rules, and to contribute to making comparative history more quantitative using numerical indices tailored to specific questions.
Defining and measuring social development in a comparative framework could help turn comparative history into a more mature, quantitative social science discipline.

Here is a summary of the key ideas in the passage:

Herbert Spencer popularized the concept of “social evolution” in the mid-19th century, arguing that societies progressed from simple/homogeneous to complex/heterogeneous through a process of differentiation and increased organization.
Other theorists like Edward Tylor and Lewis Henry Morgan developed stage models of social evolution, from savagery to barbarism to civilization.
These “classical evolutionists” relied heavily on observations of colonized peoples, assuming they represented earlier stages of development. However, anthropologists later found many of their factual claims were wrong.
By the early 20th century, Franz Boas and Bronislaw Malinowski led a backlash, convincing anthropologists that cultural evolution could not be understood through universal stages and that each society needed to be understood on its own terms.
Despite periods of falling out of favor, ideas of social/cultural evolution have remained influential frameworks for understanding patterns of societal change over long periods of time. The author aims to develop a new “social development index” that draws on but also addresses criticisms of these evolutionary approaches.

So in summary, the passage outlines the intellectual history of social/cultural evolution theories from Herbert Spencer in the mid-19th century through the early 20th century critiques, setting the stage for the author’s proposed new social development index.

In the early 20th century, anthropology focused on understanding each culture as a unique whole system (functionalism). This made cross-cultural comparison and explaining cultural change over time more difficult.
Evolutionism, or the idea that societies progressed along a spectrum from primitive to civilized, declined in popularity except among Marxists. Most social scientists instead viewed each culture as a unique system.
In the 1930s-50s, increased archaeological data allowed for broader syntheses and comparisons across cultures. Thinkers like V. Gordon Childe and Leslie White developed evolutionary frameworks to explain societal changes like the independent development of agriculture.
Talcott Parsons proposed a complex framework to explain social evolution through accumulating differentials like stratification, bureaucracy, and universalistic values. However, his theory was criticized for circular reasoning.
“Neo-evolutionism” emerged after WWII, emphasizing differentiation and specialization as key outcomes of societal evolution. Thinkers developed numerical scales to better compare levels of differentiation across societies. Raoul Naroll’s 1963 index used traits like settlement size, craft specialization, and social subgroups.
Robert Carneiro developed an alternative index of social complexity to Parsons’ based on the presence/absence of 8 traits like stratification, pottery, agriculture, etc.
He applied this to 9 South American societies and arranged them in a “scalogram” ranking their complexity from 0 (Yahgan) to 9 (Inca). He argued this showed the traits acted as functional prerequisites for increasing social complexity.
In the 1970s, neo-evolutionism became a coherent research program thanks to works like Service’s and Fried’s which classified societies into bands, tribes, chiefdoms, and states.
However, critiques emerged arguing social evolutionism supported Western dominance and was not scientifically rigorous. Debates became politically charged.
Since 2000, a new interest in social evolution has emerged driven by theories of biological and social coevolution, exemplified by Jared Diamond’s influential book Guns, Germs and Steel. However, academic debates over social evolutionism continue.
Sociologists argue that premodern “archaic states” were often more complex and differentiated than modern nation-states, with their complicated webs of social ranks and orders. Progressive differentiation over time is not a coherent process.
Athens in the 5th century BCE also became less differentiated legally despite growing in size and wealth, like modern homogeneous citizen communities.
If differentiation cannot form the basis of a theory of social evolution, complexity must also be abandoned as traditionally defined.
Complexity theorists draw on concepts from natural sciences to argue complexity can emerge from micro-level agent behaviors without central planning or ideas.
Social evolution is distinct from biological evolution and lacks key mechanisms like random mutation and inheritance of acquired traits.
Approaches like Darwinian archaeology focus on artifacts as extensions of the human phenotype subjected to natural selection over time.
Stage theories of social evolution were common but tend to oversimplify continuous variation between societies and blur between categories in practice. “Society” itself lacks clear boundaries.
The author aims to build a quantitative social development index to facilitate comparisons over long periods of time and address criticisms of past evolutionary approaches.
Nine core assumptions underpin the index approach:

Social development must be quantifiable.
Analysis should aim for parsimony and simplicity per Einstein’s maxim.
Social development can be broken down into directly measurable traits.

The UN’s Human Development Index provides a model, using 3 traits: life expectancy, education, and income.
While imperfect, the HDI is useful despite criticisms of its specific measures and calculations.
A social development index differs from the HDI in seeking to measure change over time rather than ranking countries synchronically.
The key is identifying the minimum number of traits needed to fully capture the definition of social development, thereby balancing simplicity and complexity. Judgments are required in selecting and defining the traits.

Here is a summary of the key points about development levels from the passage:

The social development index aims to measure social development over time using a small number of quantifiable traits as proxies.
Traits should be relevant to social development, culture-independent, independent of each other, adequately documented, have reliable evidence, and be convenient to measure.
To answer questions about why the West rules, the analysis focuses on comparing social development in East and West rather than examining every region globally.
The “West” is defined as societies developing from the original domestication core in the Euphrates/Tigris region, while the “East” develops from the Yellow/Yangtze rivers core.
Measurement intervals are chosen to balance illustrating broad patterns of change over time without unnecessary detail: every 1000 years from 14,000-4000 BCE, 500 years from 4000-2500 BCE, 250 years from 2500-1500 BCE, and then every century.
Units of analysis must be appropriately comparable regions rather than inappropriate comparisons like all of China vs parts of Europe.
The passage discusses how to appropriately define the analytic units (i.e. geographic and temporal boundaries) for comparing social development between the Eastern and Western zones.
Taking the whole Eastern and Western zones as defined would bundle together diverse regions, making comparisons too complex.
Instead, it focuses on comparing the most developed “cores” of each region that were most interconnected politically, economically, etc.
It acknowledges the cores shifted locations over time, and provides a table showing its approximations of the boundary locations of the Eastern and Western cores from 14,000 BCE to 2000 CE.
The Western core remained in SW Asia until 1400 CE when it started moving north and west, eventually including North America by 2000 CE.
The Eastern core remained in China’s Yellow-Yangzi River valleys until expanding to include Japan by 1900 CE and southeast China by 2000 CE.
The passage establishes using these shifting core regions as the appropriate spatial and temporal units for meaningful comparison of social development levels between the Eastern and Western zones.
Social development cannot be adequately measured by energy capture alone. It requires looking at how energy is used.
The author breaks technology into three further traits: social organization, information technology, and war-making capacity.
Social organization is measured using population size of the largest permanent settlement, as a proxy for organizational capacity. Larger cities require greater organization.
Information technology looks at systems for writing, counting, and transmitting information through various media.
War-making capacity considers how societies direct cooperative activities toward competing violently with other groups through weapons and fortifications.
These four traits (energy capture, organization, information technology, war-making capacity) are used to create a social development index from 14,000 BCE to 2000 CE. Each trait is given an equal weighting out of 1000 total points.
Cities and populations are used as examples to illustrate how scores are assigned to each trait based on the highest values recorded. Tokyo receives the full 250 points for organization in 2000 CE. Scores decrease proportionately for lower values in other places and times.
The author proposes an index to measure and compare social development across different societies over time. Social development is defined based on four traits: energy capture, organization/urbanization, information technology, and war-making capacity.
Scores are calculated for each trait based on the highest-scoring society, with points assigned proportional to performance levels. The total index score adds up the four trait scores.
Potential objections to this approach are addressed. Quantification does not dehumanize if used appropriately for large-scale comparative questions. The four traits chosen are defended as the minimum set needed to cover social development.
Using fewer traits like just energy capture would oversimplify, as developments since 1800 show the traits are not completely redundant. Factual errors in measurements are addressable by evaluating the plausibility and systematic nature of any errors.
In summarizing the response to objections, the author argues their approach and index provides a useful comparative framework to answer questions about large-scale social and historical trends over long periods.

Here is a summary of the key points from the conclusion section:

The social development index proposed focuses specifically on why Western societies came to dominate the world in the 19th century, rather than trying to explain all aspects of social evolution. This narrow focus allows it to define social development clearly and choose measurable traits that are directly relevant to the core concept.
By focusing on a specific question, the index avoids some of the issues that plagued broader neo-evolutionist indices, such as having an overly broad and difficult to operationalize concept of social differentiation.
The index is not wedded to any particular social evolution theory, allowing it to test different theories rather than assuming one is correct.
The methods used provide more flexibility in defining the “core” regions being compared over time and between societies, while also making the assumptions about core regions explicit and open to challenge.
Quantification is important for answering questions about relative social development over time, though some questions may also require qualitative approaches.
In summary, the proposed index is argued to have advantages over previous attempts by having a narrow, clearly defined focus on the key question being addressed through measurable traits, while also exposing its assumptions to testing and critique.
Calories refer to kilocalories, which is the unit used to measure nutritional energy content on food labels. Physicists would use kilojoules instead.
Historically, diets have shifted between “cheap” calories from grains and “expensive” calories from meat. It takes about 10 calories of plants to produce 1 calorie of meat.
Hunter-gatherers consume few non-food calories, while modern societies consume vast amounts of non-food energy in goods and infrastructure.
Total (food + non-food) energy capture has increased dramatically over time, from just 4,000-5,000 kcal/capita/day for hunter-gatherers to 230,000 kcal/capita/day in the US currently.
Non-food energy capture allowed slightly looser constraints on food supply historically by enabling processes like manure production, transportation, and food processing.
Only in the 19th century did revolutions in transport, fertilizers, processing and science drastically increase the global food supply by converting non-food energy into food.
Estimates are provided for levels of food and non-food energy capture over human history, ranging from early hunter-gatherers to modern societies. Reliable data is limited, so estimates rely on archaeological evidence and comparisons to known societies.
The author will discuss Western energy capture over time in three periods - the present (2000 CE) back to 1700 CE, a jump back to Classical Mediterranean (500 BCE - 200 CE), and finally a jump back to Late Ice Age hunter-gatherers (14,000 BCE).
In 2000 CE, per capita energy capture in the Western core (US) was approximately 230,000 kcal/day. This level sets the maximum score on the author’s index.
Estimates put per capita energy capture in the Western core at around 92,000 kcal/day in 1900 and 38,000 kcal/day in 1800 based on combining data on fossil fuels, food/animal feed, and nonfood biomass.
Per capita energy capture is estimated to be around 32,000 kcal/day in 1700 CE based on evidence of rising living standards compared to earlier estimates of 26,000 kcal/day in 1400 CE.
For Classical Antiquity, estimates based on real wage data put per capita energy access from wages alone at over 22,000 kcal/day in Athens before 400 BCE and between 33,500-40,000 kcal/day in the 320s BCE. Wage-based estimates for Rome vary more from 12,000-43,000 kcal/day.
While helpful, real wage data only provides a partial picture of total per capita energy capture and has limitations due to variability and limited data points.
In classical Athens, wage data is dominated by state employment like military pay and public offices. It’s difficult to say how these wages compared to the private sector, as the state acted as a monopsonist.
Roman wage data has fewer issues with state pay dominance, but information is still limited. We don’t know how undocumented professions compared to documented ones or what other income sources families typically had besides wages.
Estimates of GDP per capita in the Roman Empire range widely, from around 7,300 to over 12,600 calories per capita per workday. These estimates depend on many assumptions about food needs, non-food consumption, government spending, and workdays.
Comparing GDP estimates to real wage data implies energy capture was underestimated, likely due to focusing on the entire Empire rather than just Italy. Biomass fuel and other energy sources were also likely underestimated.
Archaeological evidence provides a finer-grained perspective. Classical Greeks seem to have had relatively high energy intake of 4,000-5,000 calories per day. Their diet, homes, and abundant artifacts imply a high level of economic development. However, estimates still likely underestimated total energy usage.
Archaeological evidence suggests classical Greeks enjoyed a high material standard of living compared to medieval and early modern Northern European settlements. Population densities in Greece were not reached again until the 20th century, indicating high energy capture.
Estimates place Greek energy capture between 20,000-25,000 kcal/capita/day in the 4th century BCE, up from around 16,000 kcal in 1000-800 BCE following a “dark age.”
Roman evidence indicates even higher energy capture, perhaps peaking between 100 BCE-200 CE. Quantitative studies point to increased agricultural yields, trade, industrial activity, consumption, and deforestation.
Housing evidence suggests typical Romans lived better than 18th century Britons. Material goods and trade networks expanded greatly.
Estimates put Roman energy capture in the core around 31,000 kcal/capita/day in the 1st century CE, similar to Northwest Europe in 1700 CE. This is higher than some GDP/cap estimates but aligned with archaeological evidence of unprecedented non-food consumption.
Debate surrounds the precise levels, but evidence suggests Roman energy capture was significantly higher than some estimates like Smil’s 2,600-5,700 kcal and more in line with Northwest European levels in 1500-1700 CE.
The passage discusses differences between the author and Malanima in how they estimate historical energy consumption levels.
Malanima defines energy capture more narrowly, excluding things like construction, industry, and transport energy. This leads to significantly lower estimates than the author’s figures, which are more comprehensive.
Comparing the author’s Roman estimate to Malanima’s 1800 CE figure produces an absurd outcome that energy was cheaper in ancient Rome than later periods. But this only results from comparing estimates using different methodologies.
Looking at the long-term archaeological record, the author argues Malanima’s approach underestimates the gulf between ancient societies like Rome and prehistoric ones. The author’s estimates suggest a seven-fold increase in energy capture over 10,000 years, while Malanima sees only a doubling.
Between ancient Rome and the early modern period, energy capture likely fell after 200 CE, reaching a low point between 700-1300 CE, before growing again leading up to 1700 CE. The archaeological evidence supports a long-term decline in economic activity and standards of living during this intermediate period.

So in summary, the key debate is around methodological differences that lead to divergent estimates of historical energy consumption levels, particularly when comparing ancient societies to more recent periods.

Around 160 CE, population movements across Eurasian steppes merged microbes from eastern and western disease pools, contributing to disruptions like the Antonine Plague. Archaeological evidence suggests energy capture was declining before 200 CE.
The 3rd century saw declines in the western Roman Empire as climate deteriorated. A second wave of collapse from the 5th-7th centuries had more profound effects, with declines seen first in Britain by 450 CE, then Gaul by 500 CE, Italy/Spain by 600 CE, and North Africa/Byzantine areas by 700 CE.
Declines were not uniform or catastrophic, but overall energy capture probably fell 10% from 200-500 CE and another 10% from 500-700 CE based on various archaeological analyses. Egypt/Iraq fared better with less decline.
Debate emerged over whether this constituted “decline” or new beginnings, with historians increasingly downplaying decline narratives. However, comparisons of sites pre-700 CE and post-700 CE show clear drops in material standards and energy capture.
From 700-1300 CE, energy capture slowly increased overall in the western core regions. Levels may have remained stable or declined slightly in parts of the Middle East but recovered or increased in others like Spain and Byzantium by 1000 CE.
Estimates suggest energy capture averaged 26,000 kcal/capita/day in Byzantium and western core by 1000 CE, up from 25,000 kcal in 700 CE but still below the Roman-era peak of 31,000 kcal.
From 1300-1700 CE, energy capture likely increased further, with northern Italy possibly surpassing even Egypt by 1400 CE based on real wage comparisons.
Between 14,000-10,800 BCE (Late Ice Age), hunter-gatherers like those at Ohalo in Southwest Asia captured around 4,000 kcal/cap/day on average, including 2,000 kcal/cap/day of food and 2,000 kcal/cap/day of non-food energy from shelters, clothing, etc.
From 10,800-8,000 BCE, as settlements became more sedentary, energy capture increased to around 5,000 kcal/cap/day as people began farming and investing more in structures.
Between 8,000-6,000 BCE, the development of irrigation and animal domestication allowed energy capture to rise further to around 6,500 kcal/cap/day.
From 6,000-4,000 BCE, urbanization emerged in Mesopotamia and Egypt, driving energy capture up to an estimated 8,000 kcal/cap/day by 4,000 BCE.
Between 4,000-2,000 BCE, as literate centralized states developed, energy capture grew to around 14,000 kcal/cap/day.
By 500 BCE, with expansive empires, energy capture in city dwellers had reached 23,000 kcal/cap/day, close to the Roman peak of 24,000-31,000 kcal/cap/day between 400 BCE-1 CE.

So in summary, energy capture gradually increased from 4,000 kcal/cap/day for Late Ice Age hunter-gatherers to 23,000 kcal/cap/day for city dwellers by 500 BCE, reflecting the transition from foraging to literate centralized states and empires.

Around 11,000 BCE, settlements in Southwest Asia grew larger with bigger and more elaborate huts. Cultivation of rye was beginning to select for larger seeds. Diets were improving but people remained hunter-gatherers.
Between 10,800-9600 BCE, during the Younger Dryas mini ice age, some villages were abandoned and energy capture likely remained flat rather than increasing.
From 9600-3500 BCE, domestication of plants and animals began (cereals by 8500 BCE) which increased food production but population growth outpaced this, keeping per capita food levels stagnant. It was a drawn out agricultural transition period over 2000 years.
A “secondary products revolution” then saw intensification of farming practices over many centuries, improving yields. The full package of dry-grain agriculture emerged by 4000 BCE.
During this period, non-food energy capture clearly increased, seen through larger settlements, houses, and public monuments over time.
Between 3500-1200 BCE, with the rise of states, the increase in energy capture accelerated. While diets changed little, metal tools and technologies spread widely in the Bronze Age, significantly raising non-food energy levels.
Stone tools largely disappeared from Western Europe by 1200 BCE as metal tools became widespread during the Bronze Age.
Major Bronze Age constructions like pyramids and temples required massive amounts of resources and energy to build. The scale of long-distance trade also increased after 1600 BCE.
Population growth drove higher energy consumption across the region between 3500-1200 BCE, as housing and goods improved.
There were regional variations and some local collapses. Crete experienced wealth in 1800-1600 BCE but then declined, while Greece continued increasing.
Major collapses occurred in Mesopotamia after 3100 BCE and across the region from 2200-2000 BCE, though the impact on energy capture is unclear since many sites continued or expanded.
By 1250 BCE, urbanism was common and states had centralized governments in Western Eurasia, though energy levels had not surpassed classical Greece yet.
The 1200-1000 BCE collapse saw cities disappear and elites decline sharply in affected areas like Greece and Turkey, with standards of living also falling.
Energy capture likely increased substantially from 1000-500 BCE to reach classical Greek levels, driven by expanding states, trade, technology like iron, and territorial growth in the Mediterranean.
Estimating energy growth is challenging without fixed datapoints, and simple curves do not capture regional and temporal variations in the archaeological record.
Between 14,000-10,800 BCE, energy capture increased very slowly, estimated at around 1,000 kcal/capita/day, from 4,000 to 5,000 kcal/capita/day.
From 10,800-9600 BCE (Younger Dryas period), evidence is conflicting so energy capture is assumed to be flat.
Between 9600-3500 BCE, energy capture increased significantly faster than the previous period, roughly doubling from 5,500 to 11,000 kcal/capita/day.
Between 3500-1300 BCE (from Uruk to Ramses), energy capture roughly doubled again from 11,000 to 21,500 kcal/capita/day.
Between 1300-1000 BCE there was a decline, with energy capture falling to around 20,000 kcal/capita/day by 1000 BCE.
Between 1000-500 BCE, energy capture rose by around 15% to 23,000 kcal/capita/day.
Between 500 BCE-1 CE, it rose a further 35% to 31,000 kcal/capita/day.

The estimates involve approximation but are argued to represent the general shape and order of magnitude of changes in energy capture over this time period in Western Eurasia.

Between 1500 BCE and 2000 CE, estimated energy capture (food and non-food calories) in the Eastern core (East Asia) generally trended upward, but was lower than the Western core (Europe) for most of this period.
The exception was the period from around the mid-1st millennium CE through the mid-2nd millennium CE, often called the Middle Ages and early modern period in the West, where Eastern energy capture is estimated to have been higher than the West.
In 1800, Eastern energy capture was slightly lower than the West (around 38,000 kcal/cap/day in the West), as the East had high agriculture but no steam power yet and real wages suggested overall lower living standards.
By 1900, Eastern capture was over 40,000 kcal/cap/day but still lower than most of the West. It continued growing rapidly in the 19th-20th centuries to approach Western levels by 2000.
Overall the estimates show Eastern capture generally trending up over time but interrupted by occasional collapses, and being lower than the West except for the period from around 1000-1500 CE.
The Song Dynasty in China (960-1279 CE) likely saw the peak of premodern energy capture and economic growth. Population grew rapidly, as did living standards and productivity.
Metallurgy production soared, with iron output estimated to be 20-40 times larger than previously thought. Copper production also increased fivefold. This level of metal production likely required large-scale use of coal.
Trade, commerce, manufacturing and use of technology like water mills expanded greatly. Cities grew larger with multi-story buildings.
Estimates place Song era energy capture per capita slightly below Roman levels of around 30,000 kcal/capita/day, possibly nudging over that figure by 1200.
In the early modern period from 1300-1700, some historians argued Chinese productivity stagnated or declined due to war, mismanagement and Western imperialism. Others suggested best practices continued spreading, increasing overall output.
Productivity in major rice growing regions like the Yangzi Delta was very high by 1300 at over double English levels.
The author’s estimate is that energy capture per capita in China increased 15-20% between 1200-1700, from just over 30,000 kcal to around 36,000 kcal/capita/day.

This passage discusses energy capture in China from ancient times through the medieval period and compares it to estimates of energy capture in the Western world. Some key points:

Energy capture in ancient China (Han dynasty, 200 BCE-200 CE) was estimated at 27,000 kcal/capita/day, lower than peak Roman levels but higher than post-Roman Western declines. Debate remains as archaeological evidence is limited.
A decline to 26,000 kcal/capita/day occurred by 200 CE as Han infrastructure broke down.
The period from 200-1000 CE is very obscure with few quantitative studies. Agriculture likely improved but infrastructure declined after 200 CE.
Energy capture gradually increased between 200-1000 CE as rice farming techniques spread and economic infrastructure like water mills and trade developed, though stayed below Song dynasty peaks.
Comparisons are made to Western energy capture curves, showing the West led slightly in antiquity while the East led slightly in medieval/early modern periods before the industrial revolution.

So in summary, the evidence suggests Eastern energy capture grew steadily from 1200-1800 CE but remained below Western levels until the early modern period, supporting the Perkins/Elvin/Maddison view over Pomeranz/Wong. However, details remain uncertain given limited archaeological data.

Between the 4th-6th centuries AD, ped (land tax system) helped keep farmers on the land despite upheavals, maintaining agricultural production.
The economy recovered after the reunification of China in 589 AD and opening of the Grand Canal in the 7th century, allowing wider trade. Irrigation and large markets expanded.
Most historians agree China saw rapid economic growth between 600-1000 AD compared to the West, though we have little direct evidence of changes in individual energy consumption. Estimates suggest a 15% increase from 26,000 to 30,000 kcal/person/day during this period.
The economic revival was disrupted after 755 AD with An Lushan’s rebellion weakening imperial control, but merchants gained freedom boosting some local economies, especially in the south.
Archaeologically, focus has been on art and architecture rather than quantifying economic changes. Estimates partition the increase in estimated energy capture into different time periods within this span.

So in summary, this passage discusses the post-Han economic recovery in China from the 4th-10th centuries AD, notably following political and infrastructural reforms, though quantifying the impacts on individual living standards remains difficult based on available evidence. Estimates suggest moderate growth in per capita energy consumption during this period.

The dispersal of agriculture and domesticated animals across East Asia took place over millennia and involved both emulation through cultural diffusion as well as migration. This dispersal was accompanied by a “secondary products revolution” - the development of agricultural technologies and practices focused on extracting secondary products from domesticated animals like dairy and wool.

In China, archaeological evidence from sites like Banpo and Miaodigou show clear changes in agricultural tool types and uses over time, such as an increase in the proportion of harvesting knives and stone blades compared to less effective pottery blades. Tool dimensions also increased, suggesting deeper soil turning and improvement. Additional evidence like isotopic analyses of plant remains and increasing animal domestication in sites also reflect this gradual secondary products revolution.

However, the development and spread of agriculture began around 2000 years earlier in Western Eurasia compared to East Asia. Fully domesticated wheat and barley were established in Western Asia by 7500 BCE, while domestication of millet and rice lagged behind in China, not becoming widespread until around 5500-4500 BCE. The secondary products revolution was also more drawn out in China, still ongoing in the 3rd millennium BCE compared to being largely complete in Western Asia by 4000 BCE.

The textual evidence suggests multicropping of two main crops (wheat/millet in the north, millet/rice in the south) became normal by 200 BCE, with occasional legumes allowing for 3 crops every 2 years. Some argue draft animals also became more widespread among elites by this time.
There is certain evidence of massive state involvement in irrigation projects beginning in the 430s BCE in the state of Wei under Minister Ximen Bao. All Warring States invested heavily in canals to boost agricultural output, culminating in Li Bing’s large project for the state of Qin in Sichuan around 300 BCE.
Metal tools likely began being used on significant scales only after 800 BCE. Bronze tools may have become more important in the lower Yangzi region between 800-500 BCE, though some archaeologists remain skeptical. By 500 BCE, iron was in use in China, with Chinese smiths developing cast iron and true steel. By 200 BCE iron tools and weapons had replaced bronze.
Commerce also accelerated, with states abolishing customs posts in the 6th century BCE and coins being minted from the 5th century BCE. By 200 BCE millions of coins were in circulation. Trade between 800-200 BCE seems to have greatly increased based on archaeological evidence, though not yet quantified like in the West.
The estimates of city sizes are based on sources like archaeology, historical analogies, density measures, contemporary accounts, food import records, government statistics, and expert opinions from historians and urban scholars.
Estimates become more uncertain the further back in time, as sources are more limited. Densities also varied more in the past.
Larger city sizes correlate with greater social complexity on the index. The maximum score required a population of over 26 million (Tokyo in 2000 CE).
Key transitional points of increased social organization included the beginnings of cultivation/domestication, rise of states/empires, and industrial revolution.
Between ancient empires and 1800 CE, energy capture and likely city sizes were trapped under a “hard ceiling” of around 30,000 kcal/capita/day, reflecting limits of agrarian societies. This helped shape perceptions of history.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 provide population estimates and scores for the largest Western and Eastern cities respectively at each time period considered, along with sources and comments on issues with the estimates.
The evidence for population estimates between 500-1500 CE comes from sources like military registers, contemporary descriptions, and estimates of urban area, but there is debate around interpreting this evidence. Historians also sometimes use different methods, leading to differing estimates.
Population estimates are provided for several major cities over time, ranging from the 3rd millennium BCE up to 1400 CE. The estimates come from diverse sources and methods, and there is uncertainty around many of them. Cairo, Rome, Constantinople, Baghdad, and Thebes are some of the cities discussed.
Population densities are important for deriving estimates but are not well understood for early periods. Estimates vary widely among scholars. In general, earlier estimates are seen as more speculative due to poorer source material and archaeological evidence. Interpretations of sources also differ, leading to a range of proposed population figures.
The evidence and estimates are intended to show likely population trends and the largest urban populations over time, but many numbers should be viewed as approximations rather than definitive due to challenges in interpretation and methodology. Scholars do not always agree on population levels, especially for earlier centuries and cities.

Here is a summary of the key points regarding 42 points under 2000 BCE:

42 points refers to the estimated population size that would earn that number of points on the author’s index system for measuring city size in history.
Under 2000 BCE, the largest settlement was Uruk, with an estimated population of 8,000 people in 3500 BCE. This would earn 0.09 points on the index.
Other population estimates and points earned for notable settlements in Mesopotamia and elsewhere in the period 3500-8000 BCE are provided, with the largest settlements growing from around 1,000 people in 7000 BCE to perhaps 5,000 people in 4000 BCE.
The estimates provided are acknowledged to be imprecise due to limitations in the available archaeological evidence from this early period in history. In general, it is suggested that no sites likely reached a population of 500 people before 7500 BCE.

So in summary, 42 points would have been a very large city size not reached according to the available estimates until well after 2000 BCE in the early urban settlements of Mesopotamia. The key context is the author’s system for measuring city size over time based on population estimates.

Around 300 CE, the large cities in China included Pingyang, Chang’an, Luoyang, Xuchang, and Ye. They were probably somewhat larger than the largest cities around 200 CE and somewhat smaller than the largest cities would be in 400 CE.
200 CE: Estimated population of Chang’an was 120,000. Cities were smaller after upheaval in late 100s CE.
100 CE: Estimated population of Luoyang was 420,000, making it the largest city. Chang’an’s estimated peak population around 1 CE was 500,000.
Earlier populations were estimated to grow steadily from around 35,000 in Luoyi and Feng in 1000 BCE to 80,000 in Linzi in 500 BCE as Chinese cities increased in size over time. Estimates are uncertain due to limited archaeological evidence.
In the Western Zhou period starting 1200 BCE, city populations like Anyang and Zhengzhou were estimated in the range of 35,000-50,000, though definitions of “city” boundaries were unclear given dispersed settlement patterns.

So in summary, the passage estimated the growth of major Chinese city populations over time from around 35,000-50,000 in the early 1st millennium BCE to hundreds of thousands between 1 CE and 300 CE, with uncertainties due to limited archaeological data.

Zhengzhou, a city located in medieval China, is estimated to have had a population of around 35,000 people based on excavation evidence. This would make it about half the size of cities like Babylon or Thebes during the same time period (13th-11th centuries BCE).
Population estimates are given for several other ancient Chinese cities between 2500 BCE-1500 BCE based on excavated site area and assumed population densities. These include Erlitou (24,000 people in phase III), Fengcheng-Nanshui (11,000), Taosi/Liangchengzhen/Yaowangcheng (14,000), and Taosi/Liangchengzhen/Yaowangcheng (10,000 in 2500 BCE).
City size is proposed as a proxy measure for social organization. Throughout history, the largest city in a region has typically been an administrative capital that reflects the scale of political organization.
City size and organizational capacity are presented as functions of energy capture levels. Settlement size generally started increasing significantly once energy capture reached 7,000-8,000 kcal/capita/day and larger cities emerged above 11,000-12,000 kcal/capita/day levels. Higher energy capture thresholds are associated with larger maximum city sizes.
The size of cities remained relatively small (under 1 million people) prior to the Industrial Revolution, even for large agrarian empires. Pre-state societies had settlements under 10,000 people, agrarian states under 100,000, and agrarian empires under 1 million.
Measuring war-making capacity across different historical periods and geographic contexts is challenging due to varying warfare technologies, tactics, and military organization over time.
However, comparisons can focus on quantifying the destructive power available to societies, considering factors like number of fighters, range/power of weapons, logistics capabilities, morale, leadership skills, and understanding of military principles.
War games have attempted to simulate and compare warfare across various historical periods using numerical values and ratings, though comparisons become more difficult as differences in military systems grow more pronounced over time.
Even extremely destructive modern weapons like nuclear arms can still be measured and compared to conventional weapons, just on a much larger scale, showing that comparisons of destructive potential remain possible across disparate contexts.
Nuclear weapons have been integrated into modern military systems, but the reliance on conventional weaponry that predated 1945 continues.
Measuring war-making capacity is difficult due to the enormous leap between pre-1900 and post-1900 military forces. Assigning a maximum score to 2000 Western forces means large margins of error for earlier estimates.
The author assigns Western forces in 2000 a score of 250, and in 1900 a score of 5, representing a 50:1 ratio between the two periods. This ratio is uncertain but helps illustrate the vast difference.
Scores before 1800 would be tiny fractions of a point, accurately reflecting the enormous gap between modern and premodern destructive power. Halving or doubling pre-2000 scores makes little difference to the overall index.
The 20th century revolution in warfare included enormous advances in weapons firepower, range, accuracy and mobility across land, sea and air that dwarf differences within earlier periods. Quantifying this transformation relative to earlier eras is difficult but illustrates modernity’s unprecedented war-making capacity.

Here is a summary of the provided text:

The passage describes the significant growth in Western war-making capacity between 1800-1900 CE and 1900-2000 CE. Some key developments included larger armies, more accurate and rapidly firing weapons, explosive shells, faster transport, and larger scale logistics.

However, the increases between 1800-1900 CE were still smaller than between 1900-2000 CE. Tactics also improved to minimize troop exposure to direct fire, paradoxically decreasing battle deaths despite more advanced weapons.

Between 1800-1900 CE, weapons ranged further but were less accurate than by 1900 CE. Muskets had slow rates of fire compared to rifles by 1900. Cannons were also less effective than by 1900. Ships in 1800 were much slower than by later centuries.

Overall, the passage estimates Western war-making capacity increased roughly 10 times between 1800-1900 CE compared to only about 2-5 times between 1500-1800 CE, known as the European military revolution period. Developments in this time included more widespread gunpowder use, organizational changes to field larger armies, and tactical innovations. But overall increases were much smaller than after 1800.

NCOs (non-commissioned officers) were important for the Roman army, even if senior officers sometimes lacked ability, particularly under the Roman Republic.
After crises in the 3rd century CE, the army expanded to around 500,000 men by the middle of the 4th century CE. There is debate about the later army’s quality, with some arguing its role shifted to defense in depth rather than frontier defense.
While some claims of garrison troops’ ineffectiveness may be overstated, Roman military capacity likely declined seriously between the Antonine Plague (160s CE) and Battle of Adrianople (378 CE).
Between 378 CE and the Persian invasion of 609 CE, army size and fighting power fell further in the Western Empire due to declining populations and administrative collapse. By the 7th century, armies shrank to tens of thousands and rapid Arab conquests owed more to imperial collapse than Arab military strength.
Medieval European armies remained small, disorganized, and poorly supplied compared to Roman armies, rarely reaching one-tenth their size or matching effectiveness. Byzantine and Muslim forces likely remained more powerful through the early medieval period.
Western crusaders took Jerusalem in 1099 but military advantage generally lay with Turkish armies, which could field tens of thousands of mounted archers, through the 10th-15th centuries. The Ottoman Empire under Suleiman I could field over 100,000 troops and remained a powerful rival into the 17th century.
The passage discusses estimated growth rates in war-making capacity in the East and West from 3000 BCE to 1 BCE. It posits slower growth in the third millennium BCE, a decline in the 1200-1000 BCE “dark age”, and faster growth in the early first millennium BCE.
Figures 5.13 and 5.14 show estimated curves for war-making capacity in the East and West over this time period, as well as alternative quantitative estimates of the East-West military balance in 2000 CE.
In 2000 CE, Western war-making capacity greatly exceeded the East’s, likely with a ratio of around 20:1. This would have been the highest gap in history.
The passage then describes the East’s adoption and growth of modern Western-style militaries beginning in the mid-19th century, noting Japan adapted more successfully than China. By the early 20th century, Japan had built significant armed forces and proven capable of defeating China militarily.
In the late 19th-early 20th century, Japan established itself as an emerging regional power in East Asia through military victories. It played a key role in relieving diplomats in Beijing during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900.
Japan won a significant victory over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War from 1904-1905, despite the financial toll. This cemented Japan as a regional military power.
However, Japan’s military capacity remained below that of major European powers until the early 20th century. It was only able to defeat Western opponents when they were distracted by conflicts in Europe.
Japan achieved notable victories over Western forces in 1914-1915 and 1941-1942 when European powers were engaged in World War I and II. But when directly resisting the US from 1942-1945, the persisting East-West military gap became clear.
China also revived as an East Asian military power after 1949, intervening in Korea in 1950 and defeating India and Vietnam in smaller conflicts. But weaknesses remained until after military modernization programs from the 1970s onward.
Overall, Eastern military power lagged the West through the 20th century. Victories over Europeans occurred when they faced more pressing threats elsewhere. The capacity gap narrowed in the early 20th century but widened again from the mid-century point.
Between 200 BCE and 1500 CE, steppe nomads like the Xiongnu and Mongols periodically had greater military power than China’s agricultural states, despite generally scoring poorly on social development indices. This was due to their skill with cavalry.
The Han Dynasty was usually dominant from 100 BCE to 100 CE. Tang armies were also powerful from the 7th century CE. It was not until the 17th century that the Qing truly controlled the steppes with gunpowder weapons.
In 1400, the Ming Dynasty’s warmaking capacity scored around 0.12 points, comparable to Mongols at their 1300 peak but less than Mongols’ mid-13th century height.
Song Dynasty armies numbered over 300,000 in the 11th century despite antimilitary policies, scoring around 0.08-0.09 points in 1000-1200 CE.
Tang Dynasty armies in the early 8th century may have numbered over 500,000, approaching Rome’s capacity, scoring around 0.1 points. Their cavalry-infantry synthesis drew on developments from the Northern Wei and Sui Dynasties.
Chinese military strength fluctuated during the Period of Disunion from 200-600 CE but significant developments in cavalry and weapons occurred and major armies remained common. Precise scores are difficult to assign for this period.
Military capacity in southern China remained relatively strong between 200-400 CE, estimated at around 0.07 points on the index.
Capacity likely rose faster after 400 CE than before, estimated at 0.08 points in 500 CE and 0.09 points in 600 CE under the Sui dynasty.
Estimates are subjective but aim to show capacity above levels seen in Western states in early 6th and 10th-11th centuries but below peak Roman levels.
Military capacity was higher under the Western Han dynasty (206 BCE-9 CE), with large infantry armies of hundreds of thousands using siege craft and advanced logistics/theory.
Estimates were 0.08 points in 100 BCE/1 CE declining to 0.07 points in 100-200 CE, still potentially higher than presented.
Military changes between 200-400 CE were not large enough to significantly impact the social development index unless 600 CE estimates are increased.
The passage then discusses differences between Eastern and Western military capacity trends over time.
Information technology scores need to measure both the sophistication of available technologies and the extent of their use.
Quantifying literacy/numeracy rates is important although difficult, as there are different types of literacy/numeracy and estimating historical rates relies on fragmentary evidence open to interpretation.
Calculating information technology scores is more subjective than other traits due to the dramatic leap in technological sophistication over time, especially since the 1950s. Simply assigning linear or exponential increases does not account for how new technologies overlap with and build upon old ones rather than replace them entirely.
The approach taken is to score technologies and skills separately, with skills divided into 4 categories - none, basic, intermediate, advanced - and technologies assigned points based on characteristics. The two scores are then multiplied to generate overall information technology scores for East and West over time.
This aims to capture changes in a nuanced way while still allowing comparison, though subjective elements limit the precision of premodern scores in particular.

Here is a summary of the skill levels and their descriptions of using information technology in different historical periods:

Basic skill level:

Ability to read and write a name or record simple numbers.

Medium skill level:

Ability to read or write a simple sentence or use basic arithmetic like addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division.

Full skill level:

Ability to read or write more complex prose or use more advanced mathematical techniques.

The author then estimates the percentage of adult males possessing basic, medium, and full skills in different historical periods based on available scholarship. Scores are assigned as follows:

0.5 points for each 1% of population at full skill level
0.25 points for each 1% at medium skill level
0.15 points for each 1% at basic skill level

These scores are then combined to calculate an overall “male ITP” or information technology points for each period. The author acknowledges the estimates are arbitrary but aims for consistency over accuracy. A similar process is done to estimate skills for females, although evidence is more limited.

The author also assigns multipliers to account for changes in the speed and reach of information technologies over time, from pre-electrical, to electrical, to modern electronic age. Higher multipliers are given to more advanced eras. The scores are plotted on graphs to show the increases in information technology capabilities over 4000 BCE to 2000 CE.

The period (presumably the introduction of printing) makes no visible changes to a linear-linear representation (Figure 6.3) and very little change on a log-linear scale (Figure 6.4).
This is because the method of calculation assumes that the adoption of systems for recording information visually (writing, notation) is an important development. Pre-literate societies are assigned a score of zero, even though they preserved and shared large amounts of information orally.
There is no way to quantitatively compare information processing capabilities between pre-literate societies. But the consequences of using visible symbols to record ideas are well established.
The figures presented in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 and Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show the author’s estimates of information technology development scores over time for Western and Eastern societies.

Here are the key points from the passage:

The social development index presented in the book aims to be an analytical tool, not to make definitive conclusions.
Two potential problems with the index are discussed: margins of error and falsification, and how the data is displayed.
Margins of error depend on the specific questions being asked. For the “why the West rules” question, it’s possible to be reasonably precise about how much error can be tolerated before the index is misleading.
There is no neutral way to display statistical information - each format emphasizes different dimensions of the index. The author chose simple linear-linear graphs but other formats have merits too.
The author is optimistic the index can contribute to a unified evolutionary theory of history, as Spencer claimed, but acknowledges every detail of constructing the index can be challenged due to alternative interpretations of evidence and definitions.
Long chains of argument and inference are involved in generating scores at every stage, so the index necessarily involves approximations and ambiguities.

In summary, the passage discusses the limitations of the social development index presented in weighing different ways of calculating and displaying results, while expressing optimism it can still aid in developing a unified theory of historical evolution.

The author created a social development index by scoring different societies on traits like social organization, energy capture, war-making ability, and information technology.
The scoring is necessarily subjective and other researchers may come up with different scores. The scores are unlikely to be exactly right.
Rather than debate if the scores are ‘right’, it’s more useful to discuss how wrong they may be and if the overall patterns would still hold.
If the scores are typically within 10% of other researchers’ scores, the overall historical patterns would remain the same. Greater differences of 15-20% could challenge the patterns.
Graphs show how the patterns would change with 10-20% differences in scoring. 10% differences still support the overall conclusions, but 20% differences would falsify the arguments.
The author argues the margins of error are likely less than 10% based on inconsistencies in scenarios with larger differences.
The choice to graph the data in a log-linear scale privileges some interpretations over others. Alternative visual representations could show different patterns.
Most of the early social development scores were driven by increases in energy capture ability rather than other traits like organization or technology.
The author developed a social development index in his previous work “Why the West Rules - For Now” which measured traits like energy capture, organization, war-making capacity, and technology across regions over time.
One criticism is that the energy capture trait dominates the other traits in the index, swamping out smaller changes.
Isaac Opper proposed a simpler way to analyze the data - take the logarithm of each trait score and sum the logs, rather than taking the logarithm of the sum of all trait scores.
Summing the logs makes the graph more sensitive to even small pre-modern changes in the non-energy traits like organization, war-making, and technology.
This helps visualize social changes and declines that were previously drowned out by the energy capture scores, like collapses of early civilizations in Mesopotamia and China.
It also slightly changes the shape of development curves, showing the West pulling ahead of the East later, around 7000 BCE rather than 12500 BCE at the end of the Ice Age.
The author argues this analysis supports their previous conclusions about development trajectories in different regions.
The domestication of plants and the beginning of agriculture typically took about 2,000 years in the Old World, but 4,000 years in the New World due to less adaptable crops like turning teosinte into corn.
However, the lag between domestication and the rise of cities/states was shorter in the New World (about 3,000 years) than the Old World (3,000-4,000 years).
In the Old World, it took another 1,500-3,000 years after cities/states for true empires to emerge, ruling large areas and populations. In the New World, the conquistadors arrived 1,500 years after the first states, cutting off further development.
Compared to Old World practices like those in ancient Egypt/Mesopotamia and China around 1500 BCE and 500 BCE, New World uses of writing/numbers around 1500 CE seem limited.
Some war techniques spread slower in the Americas over 1,500 years compared to Eurasia. Horses and the bow/arrow were never domesticated/developed to the same level.
Geography and available species may explain differences - Eurasia had richer domesticable resources and layout allowed easier spread of ideas, while Americas ran north-south limiting spread. Jared Diamond’s explanation focuses on these geographic advantages.

Environments that could not support farming or herding include:

Areas with very sparse vegetation that could not sustain grazing animals or provide enough materials for construction, tools, etc. Forests and jungles may have been too dense.
Very dry or desert areas with insufficient rainfall to support crops or pasture lands.
Very cold arctic or alpine regions with short growing seasons that made agriculture difficult.
Swampy or marshy lands that were too wet and lacked dry land suitable for farming.
Steep mountainous regions with thin soils and little flat land.
Coastal and island environments with limited space and resources for large-scale herding or farming.

So in summary, environments that lacked sufficient natural resources like land, water, vegetation or had climatic or geographical conditions unsuitable for reliable farming or animal domestication would not have supported the development of agricultural or pastoral lifestyles. Hunter-gatherer ways of life may have persisted longer in such marginal or inhospitable regions.

Here is a summary of the key points from the passages:

There have been ongoing debates about the origins and development of Western civilization. Scholars have proposed roots in Greco-Roman cultures, Indo-European influences, and medieval developments.
One influential argument is that certain environmental and geographic factors in Europe enabled economic and technological progress, as proposed by Eric Jones in The European Miracle.
Some scholars point to genetic or evolutionary explanations for the rise of the West, such as the work of Cochran, Harpending, Clark and others.
Alternative arguments emphasize factors like Chinese state structures, physical geography, intellectual trends, or developments in other Asian societies.
Measuring human development has involved indices from the UN’s Human Development Reports.
Studies of slavery and economic history also fed into debates, such as the influential Time on the Cross by Fogel and Engerman.
Theoretical approaches have included ecological, institutional, geographic and evolutionary frameworks, as seen in the works of scholars like Morris, Turchin, Ray and others.
The passages trace the history of theoretical perspectives in archaeology and anthropology from social evolutionism in 19th century thinkers like Spencer and Morgan to more modern analyses by Childe, Rostow, Parsons, White and others.
Methodological approaches included scale analysis, cross-cultural comparison, and studies of factors like complexity, technology and mortuary practices.

Here is a summary of the sources provided:

Joseph Tainter published two articles on inferring social organization from mortuary practices: “Social Inference and Mortuary Practices: An Experiment in Numerical Classification” (1975) and “Mortuary Practices and the Study of Prehistoric Social Systems” (1978).
On early settlement patterns, important sources include Kent Flannery’s “The Cultural Evolution of Civilizations” (1972), Gregory Johnson’s Local Exchange and Early State Development in Southwest Iran (1973), and Wright and Johnson’s “Population, Exchange, an Early State Formation in Southwestern Iran” (1975).
The sources discuss evolutionary approaches to understanding culture and society, including Service’s Primitive Social Organization (1962), Fried’s The Evolution of Political Society (1967), and works by North, Boyd and Richerson, Durham, and Diamond.
Subsequent works applied evolutionary thinking across various disciplines like political science, economics, religion, psychology, archaeology, and history.
Important theoretical developments include ideas of complex adaptive systems, emergence, self-organized criticality, and evolutionary dimensions of culture.
Archaeological works discussed mortuary patterns, scale of analysis, ranking/stratification, chiefdoms, and classifying pre-state societies. Sources synthesized social theory with evolutionary perspectives.

Here is a summary of Method and Theory 7 (1984): 77:

The article discusses some issues related to the measurement and comparison of socioeconomic development across societies. It notes that while various indices of development have been proposed, such as the Human Development Index, there are limitations to these approaches. Development indices must meet criteria such as being comprehensive, easily quantifiable, and applicable cross-culturally. However, perfectly meeting all criteria is challenging. The article also discusses debates around conceptualizing development, levels of analysis (individual vs. societal), and the balance between objectivity and subjectivity in measurements. Overall, it examines some of the methodological challenges involved in comparing and analyzing socioeconomic development in a meaningful yet rigorous way.

Here is a summary of the key points across the nineteenth century:

Housing and living standards improved, with more and better quality household goods becoming available. However, wages in northwestern Europe remained low and food/calories expensive compared to later periods.
Working hours were long, though there were signs of the “Industrious Revolution” with more efficient work patterns emerging.
Estimates of global GDP growth vary but most show a substantial increase in economic activity and standards of living over the century as the Industrial Revolution took hold in Europe and spread.
Public health measures and advances in medicine led to declining mortality rates, especially among infants and children, indicating improved nutrition and living conditions.
There were significant regional differences within Europe in wages, prices, and standards of living. Wealth tended to concentrate more in northwest Europe and parts of central Europe that industrialized earliest.

So in summary, the 19th century saw global economic growth, higher populations, improving health outcomes, and rising living standards in Europe and North America driven by industrialization, while many regions still lagged behind. Working hours remained long and food costly for many.

Here is a summary of the work:

The Work of the Boeotia Survey (1989–1991) in the Southern Approaches to the City of Thespiai (Cambridge, UK: McDonald Institute, 2008) describes archaeological fieldwork conducted in the region south of the ancient Greek city of Thespiai in Boeotia. The survey aimed to document and study the landscape evolution and settlement patterns in the area from the Neolithic to Roman periods. Fieldwalking, test excavations, and remote sensing were used to identify and characterize sites. A large quantity of surface pottery and other finds were collected to determine chronologies.

The survey results show intensive occupation of the area from the Neolithic through the Classical periods, with the peak in the Late Classical-Hellenistic periods. The landscape appears to have been extensively cultivated and settled. Sites range from small farmsteads to medium-sized villages. Settlement patterns shift over time, suggesting changes in land use and ownership. The survey enhances understanding of the occupation and land use around Thespiai from prehistory through antiquity.

Here is a summary of 8,500 kcal/cap/day:

8,500 kcal/cap/day refers to estimated daily caloric intake per person.
Caloric intake, or calories consumed, is a measure of how many calories a person eats in a day through food.
8,500 kcal/cap/day indicates a very high daily caloric intake of 8,500 calories per person on average.
For context, the average daily caloric needs for an adult male are around 2,500 calories, while for an adult female it is around 2,000 calories.
So 8,500 kcal/cap/day suggests an extraordinarily high level of daily food consumption and available calories per person, well above typical modern daily caloric requirements.
It implies that the population whose intake is being estimated had an abundant food supply and high economic productivity to support such a large daily caloric consumption on average.

This entry cites and summarizes several sources related to human evolutionary history and the development of agriculture and sedentism. It discusses key topics like increases in human energy use and activity levels, the origins and evolution of cooking fire use, dietary changes in Neanderthals and early modern humans, the origins of clothing and shelters, the beginnings of sedentary village life and food storage/surplus in the Near East, early domestication of plants and animals, and the emergence of cities and specialized craft production. A wide range of archaeological, ecological and biological evidence is analyzed from studiesdating back several decades.

#book-summary

The Measure of Civilization - Morris, Ian