Literary Insights

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In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine and supported separatist movements in eastern Ukraine, known as the Donbas region. Putin’s exact objectives were unclear but may have included destabilizing the new Ukrainian government or gaining territory.
The conflict risked escalating into a broader war between Russia and NATO. Western countries condemned Russia’s actions but imposed economic sanctions rather than military intervention.
The post-Cold War international order meant Russia could no longer intervene in Ukraine with impunity as it could have in the Soviet era. Ukraine was developing closer ties with Western institutions like NATO and the EU.
The conflict presented an opportunity to evaluate different strategic approaches and performances. Some saw Putin as a skilled strategist who had outmaneuvered the West, while others viewed Western restraint as the wiser strategy to avoid war.
The crisis had major geopolitical consequences, increasing tensions between Russia and the West, affecting security planning in neighboring states, and shaping international perceptions of strategic acumen. It remained an ongoing conflict with no clear resolution.
During the 18th-19th centuries, military strategy focused on decisive battles as the means to achieve policy goals in war. Tactics involved how battles were actually fought.
WWI changed this approach by showing battle was a means, not an end. Military strategy could no longer be separated from policy goals. This led to the concept of “grand strategy” integrating all policy instruments including military, economic, and diplomatic.
Grand strategy focused on preparing for war and prosecuting it effectively across all domains. It also contributed to deterring war by making adversaries reluctant to initiate conflict.
Over time, strategy lost focus as it was applied to scenarios beyond conventional war like counterinsurgency and stabilization. Grand strategy also became less about war preparation and more integrated with overall political strategy.
The hierarchical approach of strategy informing operations and tactics also broke down as limited conflicts depended more on local knowledge. Rigid adherence to levels of strategy became dysfunctional.

In summary, the passage traces the evolution of strategic theory from a battlefield focus pre-WWI to a more complex and integrated concept accounting for all policy tools and scenarios beyond conventional war. It highlights both the development and loss of focus over time as strategy expanded in scope.

This passage discusses crisis management as a key element of strategic theory that emerged during the Cold War. It defines a crisis as a moment of great difficulty or danger that arises when established positions are suddenly challenged, requiring quick responses to unexpected events.

During the Cold War, the concept of “crisis management” came to the fore as a way to think about dealing with political conflicts and resolving tensions, like those over Berlin and Cuba, without resorting to direct war. Effective crisis management requires both having a well-considered strategy but also the flexibility to respond strategically to changing events and information.

Key aspects of crisis management discussed include identifying core interests, providing options to resolve issues without humiliation, and considering how the management of one crisis could impact the next. Overall, the passage argues that successful crisis management relies on clarity of interests, creative diplomacy, wariness of misperceptions, and balancing resolve with prudent caution depending on the specific risks and options in each situation.

Deterrence aims to avoid crises by warning opponents of the consequences of disruptive behavior, especially during the Cold War when nuclear threats were central to deterrence strategies.
Deterrence relies on opponents believing the threats are credible. It’s difficult to know if deterrence is working until a “red line” is crossed.
Reconceiving deterrence after the Cold War was challenging as threats became more diffuse from states, groups, and individuals.
Deterrence aims to stabilize situations by persuading opponents that the costs of action outweigh benefits. It works through denial (blocking action) rather than just punishment.
Crafting effective deterrence requires understanding an opponent’s risk calculus. Deterrence is more difficult in unstable, crisis situations when interests must be clearly defined and threats credibly conveyed.
While stability may result from general inertia, specific deterrent threats aim to stabilize situations. Coercive diplomacy may be needed when deterrence fails or for unexpected, dangerous conflicts.
Coercive diplomacy involves using threats of punishment or force to persuade a target to comply with demands, rather than making threats to prevent them from acting. It requires influencing the target’s decision-making.
Key aspects of coercion include understanding who influences decision-making in the target country, devising persuasive forms of pressure, ensuring the coercer’s demands get the target’s attention despite other pressures, and potentially testing the target through negotiations or threats to show where non-compliance will lead.
Coercion aims to influence voluntarily actions but will not achieve full control, as the target retains options to resist or modify demands. Coercion sits between consent and control on a spectrum.
Deterrence involves threatening consequences for inaction, while compellence demands action. Deterrence works best with long-term preparation, while compellence is used during crises.
Successful coercion requires credible, potent threats proportionate to non-compliance, clear objectives, and flexibility to change approaches as the situation evolves. It is difficult against unpredictable opponents and may require incremental escalation of pressure over time.
Economic sanctions and measures are often the first tools used in a crisis or conflict as they are seen as less violent than military options. However, their effects can still be harsh if they effectively shut down a country’s economy.
Starting in the 1990s after the Cold War ended, the use of economic sanctions as a tool of coercion increased as the West gained more control over international financial and trading systems. However, sanctions often failed to achieve their goals and unintentionally hurt civilian populations.
This led to the concept of “smart sanctions” that are more targeted toward leaders, policies, and economic activities rather than society as a whole. However, there is little evidence that smart sanctions are more effective at changing behavior and coercion.
The effectiveness of sanctions depends on factors like the target country’s costs, how closely aligned the sender and target are, international endorsement, and the type of target government (democracies may be more susceptible). Sanctions generally work better as a deterrent threat than as a tool for actual compellence.
While targeted sanctions aim to minimize unintended consequences, in practice they still often impose broader economic pain and risks are not being able to avoid civilian harm depending on how far sanctions are pushed. Precision has limits as a coercive tool.
The passage discusses strategic theory related to limited wars, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions.
Limited wars are those conducted with self-imposed restraints in terms of violence and means employed. They assume a correspondence between the level of threat/violence used and the interests at stake. However, objectives can shift as fighting occurs and it’s difficult for all parties to agree to and maintain limits.
Coercive diplomacy combines limited force or threats of force with diplomatic communication, seeking to use military pressure to gain concessions while maintaining negotiations. But balancing violence and diplomacy is challenging.
Economic sanctions are another coercive tool but they often have unintended humanitarian consequences that undermine their effectiveness and public support.
The key challenge is maintaining proportionality between the level of action taken and the interests involved, while still having an impact. Escalation is also a risk if limits are not clearly defined and agreed upon by all sides.

The passage discusses two metaphors - escalators and quagmires - that are often used when warning about the potential risks of initiating even modest military actions.

Escalators represent how small initial actions can lead to progressively larger conflicts as events spin out of control. Stepping onto an escalator takes you inexorably to greater heights of violence and calamity.

Quagmires depict becoming bogged down in protracted conflicts where steady losses are incurred without clear progress. Military forces get sucked deeper into an open-ended commitment as they are repeatedly promised the next small step will ensure victory.

Both metaphors suggest conflicts can take on lives of their own through accident, miscalculation or the need to justify prior commitments. However, the passage argues that political decisions remain crucial and that talk of inevitable escalation or entanglement downplays the role of strategic judgment in weighing means against ends. While unintended consequences do occur, military actions are ultimately shaped by the objectives and risk tolerance set by political leaders.

Attrition originally meant accepting heavy losses to wear down the enemy’s forces over time through continual engagements. Victory would go to the side that could sustain losses at a more manageable rate.
It could also refer to attempts to weaken enemy forces prior to a battle through artillery bombardments to allow infantry to overwhelm weakened positions. This was the flawed plan at the Somme in 1916.
Attrition became associated with wanton carnage and inflicting maximum casualties without a clear alternative strategy.
After WWI, theorists sought to avoid attrition and mass slaughter, instead advocating for maneuver and surprise to gain advantage with less bloodshed.
Attrition was viewed as inefficient and callous, tolerating needless casualties instead of finding a smarter approach. It fell out of favor compared to maneuver warfare.
However, attrition sometimes cannot be avoided and involves a variety of tactics to gradually wear down the enemy over time through a protracted conflict. Successful attrition requires conserving one’s own forces.
The summary outlines different views of attrition and exhaustion, and how attrition became a strategy of last resort rather than one willingly adopted. Exhaustion particularly favors the underdog seeking to outlast a stronger opponent.
The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has its origins in developments after the Cold War and breakup of the Soviet Union. This created disputes over territory and national identity for multi-national states like Ukraine.
The conflict over Kosovo in the 1990s shaped these debates and increased Russia’s disenchantment with Western security arrangements as NATO acted without UN authorization.
Putin came to power in Russia in 1999-2000 and viewed further NATO expansion and EU enlargement as threats to Russian security, especially as Russia felt Western countries ignored international rules.
While early US policy sought to keep the Soviet Union together, by the 1990s post-Soviet states sought Western alliances like NATO for protection, and enlargement began in the late 1990s/2004, fueling Russian concerns.
NATO expansion caused growing alarm in Russia, especially regarding former Soviet republics like Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO. Russia saw this as hostile to its interests.
Events like the “color revolutions” in former Soviet states further troubled Putin, as he feared similar uprisings could threaten his leadership. This contributed to a crackdown on political opposition and NGOs in Russia.
Tensions flared over issues like Estonia removing a Soviet war monument. The 2008 NATO summit saying Ukraine and Georgia would join heightened tensions further.
This came to a head when Georgia launched a military offensive to retake South Ossetia. Russia intervened militarily to support South Ossetian forces, gaining control over the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Relations improved somewhat under Medvedev as president, but tensions remained, such as over the NATO intervention in Libya without Russian support. Putin ultimately remained the primary leader behind decisions regarding relations with the West and former Soviet states.
Putin saw the UN intervention in Libya as overstepping its mandate of preventing a massacre in Benghazi to actively supporting rebels in regime change. He felt this allowed an anarchic situation to develop with radicals taking advantage.
Putin was irritated by this move and feared he could be next. Protests erupted in Russia over allegations of election rigging. While not as large as other color revolutions, the dissent was brutally put down.
This reinforced Putin’s view that the West wanted to topple any government it disliked. Relations cooled further as Obama did not invite Putin to summits and sanctioned Russian officials.
Ukraine has a complex history with shifting borders and divisions between western/eastern parts. It declared independence in 1991 but struggled economically, leading to corruption and popular discontent. Yanukovych represented this corruption as a key figure.
The “Orange Revolution” protests in response to a rigged 2004 election brought Yushchenko to power but politics remained unstable, allowing Yanukovych to regain power in 2010.
Yanukovych, as president of Ukraine, pushed for a quasi-presidential system to gain more power after the 2004 revolution that increased parliamentary powers. He also put political rival Yulia Tymoshenko on trial for embezzlement, resulting in a 7-year prison sentence.
Initially, Putin was relatively relaxed about Ukraine’s “Orange” pro-Western leaders but relations soured over issues like energy prices. Relations improved when Yanukovych came to power and NATO membership was no longer pursued by Ukraine. However, the EU still courted Ukraine.
Countries that joined the EU saw economic transformations, unlike Ukraine which saw its economy shrink by 30% compared to growth in countries like Poland. Ukraine hoped EU association could spur prosperity.
Putin saw the EU’s Eastern Partnership as an attempt to extend its sphere of influence. He pursued the Eurasian Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to pull former Soviet states back into Russia’s orbit. Ukraine was essential but might sign an EU association.
Russia pressured Ukraine, Armenia, and Moldova to stop them signing EU agreements. Armenia succumbed but Moldova still signed. Ukraine withdrew from signing at the last minute after Russian economic coercion, including energy export threats.
Russia benefited greatly from high energy prices in the mid-2000s and pursued an energy strategy aimed at promoting foreign policy goals.
Gazprom, the state-owned gas company, shaped deals for political as well as market reasons, using Russia’s leverage over gas supplies to reward favored countries and coerce hostile ones. Over 50 instances of Russian energy blackmail for political ends were identified by 2007.
Ukraine was a regular target of Russian energy pressure. Gas was cut off multiple times, including during disputes in 2006 and 2009 over gas prices. This demonstrated Europe’s dependence on Russian gas and Ukraine as a weak link.
Putin decided in 2013 to force Ukraine to choose the Russian-led Eurasian Customs Union over an EU agreement, knowing Ukraine was vulnerable. Russia imposed trade restrictions and sanctions on key Ukrainian industries.
Neither the EU nor IMF could match Russia’s offer of billions in loans and cheaper gas. Ukraine faced financial collapse without Russian support. The EU was not prepared for Russia’s assertive move to pull Ukraine into its orbit.

The key points are:

The EU failed to adequately respond to Yanukovych’s dilemma of whether to sign an Association Agreement with the EU or build closer ties with Russia. It did not appreciate the pressure Putin was putting on Yanukovych.
Protests (Euromaidan) erupted in November 2013 after Yanukovych walked away from signing the EU agreement and instead secured a Russian bailout package. Massive protests occupied Independence Square in Kyiv and spread to other cities.
Yanukovych responded by trying to suppress the protests with police and passing laws to criminalize protests, fueling more unrest.
The protests drew a wide range of supporters but also some far-right nationalist groups. However, they were never a major political force in the aftermath.
Yanukovych eventually fled in February 2014 as the protests turned violent, leaving a power vacuum that allowed a new government to form. However, Russia claimed this new government was illegitimate.

So in summary, the EU failed to adequately support Ukraine’s interests versus Russian pressure, fueling the popular protests, while Yanukovych’s incompetent handling of the crisis further drove the unrest.

In early March 2014, after Yanukovych fled Ukraine following mass protests, demonstrators found luxury items and lavish properties at his private estate, highlighting the corruption of his regime.
Russia denounced the new Ukrainian government as illegal, citing the need to protect ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Ukraine. However, the new government took steps to accommodate minority language rights.
Russia’s objectives in responding to events in Ukraine seemed to include restoring Yanukovych to power, gaining leverage over Ukraine, causing chaos to prevent it aligning with the EU/NATO, or promoting the fragmentation of Ukraine.
With little planning, Putin decided to seize Crimea on February 23rd, seeing an opportunity to “return” it to Russia. Russian forces swiftly took control of the peninsula.
A referendum was held in Crimea on March 16th to justify annexation, though it was criticized as illegitimate due to Russian military control and flawed process. However, annexation had considerable local support in Crimea.
Putin initially denied intentions for Crimea to join Russia, but carefully qualified his statement to leave that possibility open depending on a referendum.
Russia first used “little green men” - unmarked special forces - to take control of Crimea before later admitting their role.
They waited to see how Ukraine’s military would respond before openly taking steps towards annexation, like allowing talk of unification.
Crimea’s referendum and annexation established a precedent Russia tried to exploit by fomenting unrest in eastern Ukraine and hinting at intervention, but polls showed the public still supported Ukraine’s unity.
Hardliners like Glazyev pushed for unrest and “protecting” ethnic Russians, going as far as ordering mobilization and attacks, but unrest did not spread as Russia hoped at that point. Crimea’s annexation was not replicated in eastern Ukraine without direct Russian military intervention.
Glazyev, an aide to Putin, instructed pro-Russian activists in Ukraine to organize demonstrations and seize control of regional administrations to stir unrest and potentially create a pretext for Russian intervention.
Initially demonstrations fizzled out in eastern Ukraine, but in April rebels led by a former Russian military officer seized buildings in Sloviansk, beginning an insurgency.
Referendums were held in Donetsk and Luhansk in May declaring independence, but Russia did not officially annex the regions as the rebels had hoped. Instead, Russia supported the separatist Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics.
The Ukrainian government was in disarray and unable to respond effectively to the building seizures. Other regions like Odessa saw smaller separatist movements that failed to gain traction after clashes turned deadly.
Polls indicated most residents of the conflict regions preferred autonomy over joining Russia, and pro-unity demonstrations were larger, showing limited popular support for the separatists. Russia backed the separatists but faced challenges fully controlling the situation.
Support for closer ties with Russia was actually down from pre-crisis levels in the Donbas region of Ukraine. Only about 25% said they would attend pro-Russia secessionist rallies.
This lack of strong popular support for separation from Ukraine presented a problem for Russia, as forcibly annexing that territory would mean administering an uncooperative population with contested boundaries.
Even in Crimea, where annexation was more popular, Russia soon faced difficulties with passports, currency conversion, legal systems, supply chains, and economic collapse after taking control.
Russia’s actions raised concerns in other former Soviet states like Moldova, Georgia, the Baltic states, Belarus, and Kazakhstan about whether Russia would claim a right to intervene in their affairs to protect ethnic Russians as well.
The conflict highlighted the ongoing role of hard power in geopolitics and issues like borders and regime change. It challenged assumptions about “soft power” and the EU’s ability to shape neighbors.
Both Ukraine and Western countries viewed agreements like the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and the 1997 Ukraine-Russia Treaty as being ignored by Russia through its annexation of Crimea. This undermined non-proliferation efforts and security assurances.
The EU imposed initial economic sanctions on Russia in response to its annexation of Crimea, targeting individuals and key sectors like arms, banks, and state firms. By September, financial pressure had increased.
Annexations set a challenge as they are difficult to reverse. It would take major military action to liberate occupied territory, as seen with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Russia would not easily abandon Crimea.
Western leaders agreed to impose costs on Russia through sanctions while supporting Ukraine economically via loans and IMF programs. Their focus was deterring further Russian aggression and destabilization of Ukraine.
Sanctions faced opposition from countries with business ties to Russia. Military options were ruled out. Talks between Russia, Ukraine, EU, and US produced an agreement to de-escalate tensions but it lacked enforcement.
NATO responded by reinforcing Eastern Europe members with bases, forces, and exercises while signaling it would not get directly militarily involved in Ukraine. This encouraged further Russian provocations to discourage a strong NATO response.
After the annexation of Crimea, Russia looked to reduce its economic dependence on Western markets by strengthening ties with Asia. An influential Russian foreign policy figure argued that the West misunderstood how important stopping Western expansion was for Russia’s security.
The rebellion in eastern Ukraine struggled at first due to a lack of popular support. Referendums backing separatism had little credibility. Gradually, direct Russian military involvement became more overt as irregular separatist forces could not cope on their own.
As Ukraine’s new president took office in May 2014, the war had united most of Ukraine against Russia. Support for Russia declined sharply in Ukraine even in eastern areas.
Ukraine’s military effort (ATO) to retake territory from separatists began in April. Initial efforts were limited due to Ukraine’s small combat-ready forces, but successes grew with stepped up activity in May.
By July, Ukrainian forces pushed separatists out of the key town of Sloviansk. One separatist leader said this was because Russia did not repeat the “Crimea scenario” of direct military intervention.
Russia responded by providing more advanced weapons like anti-aircraft systems to separatists. One shot down a Malaysian airliner in July, intensifying international sanctions on Russia.
By mid-August, Ukraine recaptured more territory and was close to defeating the insurgency. But Russia then decided to take more direct control, providing direct military support including tanks that crossed into Ukraine. A full-scale war between Ukraine and Russia seemed closer.
The official Russian line was that Russian troops had accidentally crossed the border into Ukraine, but they later acknowledged “volunteers” were joining the fighting in Ukraine.
Ukrainian troops defending Ilovaisk were surrounded and surrendered on August 29, with around 300 soldiers killed. Luhansk airport was also destroyed.
Russia seized the border town of Novoazovsk, threatening the port of Mariupol and potentially creating a land corridor to Crimea.
A ceasefire agreement was reached in Minsk on September 5 between Russia, Ukraine, separatist leaders, and OSCE. This was surprising as Russia appeared to be winning militarily.
Russia was facing casualties, economic sanctions, and a declining oil price. The sanctions threatened its energy trade with Europe. So Russia had incentives to limit its ambitions in Ukraine.
However, the territory held by separatists was too small to be viable but too large for Ukraine to easily recover. Implementing political decentralization as stipulated in Minsk would also be challenging. The separatist leaders did not actually support staying within Ukraine.
Fighting continued in eastern Ukraine despite ceasefire agreements. Key events included the fall of Donetsk airport and battle of Debaltseve, where Ukrainian forces suffered heavy losses.
A new ceasefire agreement was reached in Minsk in February 2015 but it was largely ineffective, with regular clashes continuing. Both sides accused each other of violations.
NATO reported increasing Russian troop and equipment buildups in separatist-held areas, indicating Russia was preparing for a new offensive. However, a separatist attack on Maryinka in June was repelled by Ukrainian forces, showing improvements in their capabilities.
The situation remained tense and unstable with Russia continuing to back separatist forces while resisting Ukrainian efforts to regain control over its borders and territories. A full-scale new Russian invasion was feared but did not materialize. Small clashes and skirmishes continued along the line of contact.
Russia intervened directly in Syria in September 2015 to prop up the Assad regime, which was facing defeat from opposition and rebel groups. The intervention involved airstrikes and military advisors.
Russia’s goals were to maintain its only ally in the region (Assad), counter Islamic extremism, and boost its international standing. The intervention revived Russia’s role as a major global power.
However, there were risks involved like the bombing of a Russian passenger plane and the shooting down of a Russian jet by Turkey. Though tensions rose with Turkey, Russia applied economic pressure and Turkey backed down.
While Russia claimed its goals were counterterrorism, its airstrikes targeted most anti-Assad groups. This forced the US to focus solely on ISIS and leave other groups to Russia.
By 2016, momentum had shifted in favor of Assad. Regime change was unlikely, though progress remained uneven. Russia had succeeded in making itself a major player in Syria and the Middle East.

Here are the key points from the passage:

The military conflict in Syria allowed Russia to introduce new weaponry and refine their tactics in actual combat conditions. Syria presented a real-world testing ground.
Russia utilized private military contractors, like the Wagner Group, to undertake combat operations in Syria. This allowed Russia to pursue its interests while maintaining plausible deniability regarding direct state involvement.
The confrontation between US-backed forces and Russian military contractors in Syria in 2018 highlighted how these private groups were effectively extending Russia’s reach and capabilities on the ground, while giving the Kremlin freedom to disavow their actions when convenient.
Overall, continuing military engagement in Syria distracted from the conflict in Ukraine and reduced Russia’s willingness or capacity to escalate matters further against Kiev. Syria presented an alternative arena for power projection that took attention and resources away from Ukraine.
Russia used propaganda and disinformation campaigns to influence Western governments and undermine their credibility. This included supporting far-right parties in France and Hungary.
They spread fake stories through Russian media outlets and social media, like an incident in Germany about a girl being attacked by migrants that turned out to be false.
The most significant interference was Russian support for Donald Trump in the 2016 US election through social media trolling and hacking of Democratic emails. The goal was to damage Hillary Clinton and help Trump.
The US knew about Russian interference but was uncertain how to respond publicly before the election for fear of further disruption. This interference became a major issue later investigated by Mueller.
Key Trump campaign figures like Paul Manafort had prior connections to pro-Russian Ukrainian politicians, aiding Russian influence. Putin’s gamble on supporting Trump appeared to pay off initially in hopes of better relations.
The context around Ukraine shifted after Donald Trump became US president in 2017. Trump wanted improved relations with Russia but faced pressure from Congress and advisers to continue supporting Ukraine.
The US eventually authorized lethal arms for Ukraine but there was ambiguity around sanctions on Russia. Trump wanted to ease sanctions but Congress and public opinion supported maintaining them.
Sanctions were imposed and modified over incidents like Russian interference in US elections and the Skripal poisoning in the UK. Major new sanctions on oligarchs in 2018 hurt the Russian economy.
The Trump-Putin summit in 2018 was controversial due to Trump supporting Putin’s denials of election interference. Relations between the US and its allies also became strained under Trump.
By this time, Russia had been sanctioned and facing tensions for 4 years since annexing Crimea but had managed to withstand the pressure. The issues now extended beyond just Ukraine.
Ukraine itself became less important against these broader tensions. The conflict had reached a stable stalemate where neither side was willing to make a major military push. But this stalemate did not necessarily make negotiations and a resolution more likely.
Both Ukraine and Russia adapted to an ongoing conflict without a clear end in sight over Ukraine’s eastern territories. Ukraine was frustrated by the territorial losses but could manage the situation. Its economy struggled under the costs of the war but it received some international support.
Russia’s economy deteriorated due to sanctions and falling oil prices. However, it avoided complete collapse by limiting support for the ruble and cutting non-military spending. Living standards in Russia declined as the economy remained dependent on oil/gas and vulnerable to price fluctuations. International sanctions remained in place as Russia did not fully implement the Minsk agreements.
Corruption remained a major issue in Ukraine, undermining investment and economic reform efforts. While some progress was made in areas like energy independence, the momentum for broader reforms slowed and oligarchs maintained political influence. This disappointed international backers calling for stronger anti-corruption measures.

This passage discusses the economic impacts and geostrategic implications of sanctions and countermeasures following Russia’s annexation of Crimea:

The most severe potential sanction was kicking Russia out of the SWIFT financial system, which Russians viewed as tantamount to an act of war.
Russia sought to reduce dependence on Western markets by strengthening economic ties with Asia, particularly China. However, Sino-Russian trade and investment did not significantly increase as China took advantage of Russia’s weakness for favorable deals.
Annexing Crimea added significant costs for Russia in funding the territory as well as separatist enclaves in eastern Ukraine.
Questions remained around the future of Russia’s oil/gas sector, a key economic leverage and revenue source but also impacted by Western efforts to reduce dependence on Russian energy. Ukraine and others took steps to diminish Russia’s ability to use energy as a political tool.
Major pipeline projects like South Stream were casualties of the conflict due to sanctions and political opposition. Germany continued support for Nord Stream 2 despite tensions, seeking to maintain energy ties while not undermining Ukraine.
In response to sanctions, Putin pursued a strategy of weathering the economic downturn while rallying domestic support and maintaining Russia could cope without the West in the long run. However, the overall situation remained more of a struggling great power than an ascendant one.
The separatist territories of Donetsk and Luhansk are in a state of limbo, neither part of Ukraine nor officially joined with Russia. They are run by local leaders who lack legitimacy and experience in administration.
The separatist forces are made up of various factions like Russian mercenaries, militants, and criminals. They are disorganized, factionalized, and engage in criminality. Their leadership faces purges by the Kremlin due to a lack of local support.
Conditions in the separatist territories have deteriorated, with shortages, unrest, and a difficult economic and social situation.
A peacekeeping force is proposed by Putin to deploy along the line of contact, but this would just freeze the conflict without resolving it. A more substantive force along the Russia-Ukraine border could help withdrawal of Russia-backed forces and reintegration of the territories.
Over 10,000 have been killed and 24,778 injured in the conflict so far according to UN estimates. Casualties have decreased but mines and explosives still kill, and human rights abuses continue on both sides. The situation has grown more dire in the separatist territories.

The passage discusses the fallacy of believing a decisive first move can quickly end a conflict. Historically, wars started with early victories are often difficult to conclude because opponents can withstand more pressure than initially expected. Enemies may have reserves, sustain irregular conflict, or get allied support. Over time, people adapt to new circumstances and conflicts can transition to wars of exhaustion.

The conflict in Ukraine provides an example. Russia believed seizing Crimea would decisively shape Ukraine’s political trajectory, but Ukraine proved more resilient than expected. While Russia achieved its goal in Crimea, it struggled more in Donbas where enclaves were not self-sufficient. Conflicts also rarely follow ideal strategic planning - decisions are often rushed based on limited information, leaving much to chance. Both sides had to improvise as situations developed in Ukraine. Doing nothing in response to events can be difficult but may allow time to better assess options, while early actions commit more and shape subsequent conflict in unforeseen ways.

Losing Crimea, the most pro-Russian region of Ukraine, made it even harder for Russia to resist Ukraine’s shift towards the West politically.
Initially, Ukraine lacked a clear strategy to deal with the separatist movements and Russia’s intervention. There were missed opportunities to secure Crimea or make a Russian takeover more difficult.
Western countries imposed limited economic sanctions on Russia in response to Crimea’s annexation but did little direct military assistance to Ukraine. They wanted to signal concern but avoid further escalating tensions with Russia.
The conflict arose from territorial struggles but the sides ascribed much higher strategic stakes to it in their rhetoric. Real commitments and actions on the ground did not match the rhetoric.
While Russia’s approach fit the concept of “hybrid warfare,” it was largely improvised in Ukraine rather than a premeditated test of a new strategy. The separatists depended on support from regular Russian forces once facing serious opposition.
Russia aimed to sustain the separatist enclaves in eastern Ukraine through military and humanitarian support, to deter Ukrainian offensives and regain lost territory.
Bringing together regular Russian troops and local irregular forces like mercenaries proved challenging due to different command structures and interests. Relations within and between the separatist groups also deteriorated over time.
Territorial gains depended mainly on superior military force, rather than complex strategies. Russia supported the separatists to push back Ukrainian forces but avoided directly engaging with its own forces to maintain denial of involvement.
The conflict remained limited because Russia did not want to use its full regular forces and risk a major war, but instead aimed to coerce Ukraine through shows of force near the border and deterring Ukrainian offensives.
Russia combined its military activities with information campaigns to shape narratives about its strength and Ukraine’s weakness, but such narratives were limited by realities on the ground and Russia’s decreasing credibility due to frequent denial and deception.
In late 2015, Turkey shot down a Russian aircraft, in response Russia imposed economic sanctions on Turkey like trade restrictions and travel bans.
In summer 2016, Turkey’s President Erdogan apologized to Russia, and relations returned to normal.
Russia’s approach to economic coercion is to rely on real economic hurt to force a target to change behavior. However, overreaching can backfire as in Ukraine in 2013 when Putin’s actions undermined his ally Yanukovych and led to more opposition.
Similarly, Russia’s dependency on gas exports to Europe encouraged Europe to diversify energy sources, reducing Russia’s influence. Turning economic ties into geopolitical tools risks losing trust and markets.
Western sanctions on Russia after 2014 were intended both to signal disapproval of Russian actions in Ukraine and to coerce a change in behavior. However, Russia did not change course in Ukraine and the sanctions also hurt Western economic interests.
While sanctions impacted Russia, their ability to force a change was limited as Russia found new partnerships. Coercion requires a vulnerable target that knows what it needs to do to ease pressure. Overall, coercion through limited force or sanctions is difficult to calibrate and control.

Here is a summary of the key sources:

aucasus (2017) - Focuses on the Caucasus region between the Black Sea and Caspian Sea, including conflicts over territories like Nagorno-Karabakh. Likely provides historical and geopolitical context for tensions in the region.
The Long Hangover (2018) by Shaun Walker - Analyzes Putin’s consolidation of power in Russia since the 1990s and the legacy of the Soviet past on modern Russian politics and foreign policy. Examines Kremlin decision-making regarding Ukraine.
All the Kremlin’s Men (2016) by Mikhail Zygar - Insider account of Vladimir Putin’s inner circle and the opaque workings of the Kremlin from the perspective of a Russian political journalist. Provides insights into Putin’s leadership style and motives.
Ukraine and Russia (2015) edited by Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska and Richard Sakwa - Academic compilation examining the multifaceted relationship between Ukraine and Russia through political, economic and cultural lenses. Includes diverse perspectives on the origins of the 2014 crisis.
The Ukraine Crisis (2014) by Andrew Wilson - Timely analysis of the causes and implications of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, deemed an effort to subvert Ukraine’s turn toward the West after the 2013-2014 Euromaidan protests. Discusses the crisis’s significance for European security.

Here is a summary of the key points from the sources provided:

Gorbachev was given assurances by Western leaders that NATO would not expand eastward after German reunification. However, some historians argue no definitive promises were made.
After the Cold War, countries like Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, testing cooperation with NATO.
The 2003-2004 Orange Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine reflected public demands for closer integration with the West and frustration with corruption under Russian-backed governments.
During the 2008 Bucharest summit, the US pushed for Ukraine and Georgia to receive a Membership Action Plan despite reservations from Germany and France. This further strained relations with Russia.
The 2007 cyberattacks on Estonia and war between Russia and Georgia that year showed how Russia was willing to use force to resist Western expansion near its borders.
Under Putin, Russia came to see both NATO expansion and Western-backed “color revolutions” as threats to its interests in former Soviet states. This contributed to increasingly tense relations, including over Ukraine’s efforts to strengthen EU ties.
Economic and energy interdependencies gave Russia leverage over neighbors, which it used to pressure countries like Ukraine not to integrate further with the West. This ultimately contributed to the eruption of armed conflict in Ukraine in 2014.

Here is a summary of the key points from the provided references:

The EU missed early warning signs of developing crisis in Ukraine due to failure of persuasion and lack of coherent strategy. A forthcoming book by Meyer, de Franco and Otto analyzes why the EU failed to adequately heed warnings.
On Dec 7, 2013, opposition leader Arseniy Yatseniuk claimed Ukraine would sign an accession deal to join the Russian-led Customs Union on Dec 17. The Kremlin spokesman denied this was discussed between Putin and Yanukovych, though trade and finance issues were being addressed.
Vladimir Putin offered Ukraine financial incentives to join the Eurasian Economic Union instead of signing an association agreement with the EU. However, secret diaries of Yanukovych later published by Serhiy Leshchenko indicated Yanukovych had no intention of ever joining the Customs Union.
An agreement was reached on Feb 21, 2014 to resolve the crisis in Ukraine, but violence continued to escalate, threatening more bloodshed.
Public opinion polls in March 2014 showed a majority of Ukrainians disapproved of Euromaidan protests and supported maintaining neutrality between Russia and the West. However, support for integration with the EU was also high in many western regions.
The references discuss Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and its support for separatist proxies in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, violating Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. This has led to an ongoing conflict now in its sixth year.

Here is a summary of the article:

The article is about Russia’s view that it needs to protect ethnic Russians and Russian speakers living in the NATO Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
Population sizes of ethnic Russians/Russian speakers in the Baltic states range from over 25% in Latvia to under 6% in Lithuania. Russia argues these groups face discrimination.
Baltic states counter that Russians there have equal rights and Russian is an official language in some areas, but they must learn the state language (Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian) to integrate fully.
A Russian foreign ministry official said Moscow would defend the rights of Russian communities in the Baltics using diplomacy, but didn’t threaten military force. However, Russia maintains it has a right to protect Russians abroad.
The Baltic states are wary of Russia’s stance given tensions over Ukraine. They see it as a possible pretext for future intervention. Their increased defense spending indicates they want to deter any aggressive moves from Russia.
In summary, it covers the ongoing disagreement between Russia and the Baltic states over the treatment and rights of ethnic Russian populations there, which remains a sensitive issue fueling tensions.

Here is a summary of the article “Ravaling of Moscow’s ‘Novorossia Dream,’ ” RFE/RL, June 1, 2016:

The article discusses the unraveling of Russia’s plans to create a new state in eastern Ukraine called “Novorossiya” (New Russia). This had been a goal of Russian-backed separatists since the conflict in Ukraine began in 2014.
By mid-2015, the concept of Novorossiya was effectively abandoned as separatist leaders in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions stopped mentioning it. The separatist “republics” they proclaimed were now focused only on the boundaries of their own regions.
Moscow also stopped promoting the idea publicly. Experts say this was due to its overambitious nature and lack of support from the local population in eastern Ukraine. Attempts to expand the conflict were stalled by Ukrainian government forces.
The article argues Russia came to see the separatist entities only as an obstacle in negotiations with Ukraine and the West. Moscow shifted to a more pragmatic approach of seeking a political solution within current borders.
However, some experts say Russia is still pursuing covert goals like maintaining separatist rule in Donbas and blocking Ukraine from integrating with the West. The “Novorossiya dream” may be on hold rather than fully abandoned.

Here is a summary of the article “Vladimir Putin’s Grand Ambitions for Syria Aren’t Working Out Quite as Planned”:

Putin intervened in Syria in 2015 with the goal of strengthening Russian influence and proving Russia’s status as a world power. However, things have not gone exactly as planned.
Russia’s military campaign in support of Assad has succeeded in turning the tide of the war, but Syria remains broken and Russia is now embroiled in a long-term commitment with no clear end.
The human and financial costs have been high, and public support in Russia for continuing the intervention is declining. Maintaining military bases in Syria is also expensive.
Putin wanted to negotiate from a position of strength but has been forced to cooperate with allies like Iran and Turkey. His ambitions of a new sphere of Russian influence have been hampered by other countries asserting themselves.
Russia is now faced with the difficult task of rebuilding Syria without much leverage over how the political process plays out. Putin’s aspirations of emerging as a global leader by ending the Syrian conflict have not been fully achieved.

The passage summarizes that raine passed legislation needed for the next slice of an IMF bailout. It does not provide any additional context or details.

Here are the key points from the provided texts:

Ukrainian president Poroshenko was a judo enthusiast in his youth.
The author explores limited wars and exhaustion strategies in their book The Future of War: A History.
An article analyzes the dynamics of coercion in Europe, Russia and the Ukraine crisis.
Reports discussed Russia following a script by its general staff from a year before the Ukraine conflict.
Sources examined the concept of “hybrid war” and its history in Russian military thought.
Statistics noted the air losses suffered by Ukraine’s air force against Russian-backed rebels.
Analyses proposed ideas like Russia must focus on defending itself from “hybrid wars.”
Notes covered topics such as the use of social media in reshaping conflicts and information warfare tactics.
Ukrainian military operations against pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk, Ukraine included an “Anti-Terrorist Operation” from 2014-2015. There was major fighting at the Donetsk airport during this time.
Economic sanctions were imposed against Russia in response to its actions in Ukraine starting in 2014. Sanctions targeted Russian elites and harmed Russia’s economy. The European Union, United States, and other countries imposed sanctions.
The Minsk Agreements of 2014 and 2015 aimed to establish a ceasefire in the conflict in eastern Ukraine between Ukrainian forces and Russian-backed separatists. However, the agreements had limited success and the conflict continued.
Major events in the conflict included the Malaysian Airlines MH17 jet being shot down over eastern Ukraine in 2014, as well as fighting in cities like Luhansk, Mariupol, and the Kyiv airport. Peace negotiations through the Minsk process attempted to resolve the conflict but faced many challenges.

Here is a summary of the key points about Novorossiya territory (Ukraine) from the provided text:

Novorossiya was a territory in Ukraine that Russia aspired to control, seen as historically part of the Russian Empire from the 18th century conquest.
Putin and Russian separatists supported aspirations for this region, hoping it could break away from Ukraine.
The separatist leader Igor Strelkov was actively involved in attempts to take control of parts of this territory, like Sloviansk and Donetsk, in 2014.
The Minsk Agreements in 2014-15 aimed to resolve the conflict over this region between Ukrainian government forces and pro-Russian separatists, but stalled and a stalemate continued.
Russia still holds ambitions over this territory and sees it as historically tied to Russian control, challenging Ukraine’s sovereignty over the eastern parts of their country. This has been a key flashpoint and driver of tensions since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Here is a summary of the document outline:

The document covers Ukraine and strategy regarding its conflict with Russia. It includes chapters on strategic theory like deterrence and coercion. It provides context on the origins of the Russia-Ukraine conflict stemming from Ukraine’s relationship with the EU vs Russia’s Eurasian union. It describes the wars in Crimea and Donbas region. It analyzes international responses and periods of stalemate. Other chapters discuss how the context has shifted due to events in Syria, cyber operations, Trump effect, and positioning of Ukraine and Russia. The evaluation section critiques notions of decisive first moves and debates options for doing nothing versus something. End matter includes notes and index.

#book-summary

Ukraine and the Art of Strategy - Lawrence Freedman;