Literary Insights

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Here is a summary of the key points from the preface:

Inflation has reemerged as a major issue after decades of low or declining inflation rates in developed economies. This represents a significant shift from more recent focus on risks of deflation.
Central banks initially dismissed rising prices in 2021 as transitory issues in specific sectors like cars and semiconductors due to supply chain disruptions from COVID. But inflation accelerated more broadly across economies.
While the Ukraine war explains some inflation, underlying labor markets were also tight with rising wages, reflecting broader price pressures not captured by initial transitory narratives.
The return of high inflation was widely viewed as unimaginable after a long period focused on Japanification and deflation risks. Central banks are in danger of repeating mistakes of the 1970s by not tightening policy adequately to address inflation.
The preface sets up the book’s examination of how inflation reemerged as a major issue, the historical context for understanding inflation, and lessons policymakers should consider in responding to current high inflation.
Inflation rose significantly in the late 1960s and 1970s but was seen as a relic of the past from the late 1980s onward as central banks achieved price stability.
However, the author began to fear inflation may return due to factors like globalization slowing, potential scarring from the pandemic, and overly loose fiscal and monetary policies despite the recession not being as severe as initially thought.
The author warned in 2021 articles that inflation risks were skewed upward contrary to central banker views it would remain transitory. Inflation has since risen sharply.
The book will explore the history of inflation and its relationship to money, the temptation of money printing, inflation’s undemocratic effects, and challenges of reducing inflation. It will examine recent failures and propose tests and lessons for policymakers to better manage inflation risks.
While inflation has been dormant before, it has never truly died and always threatens to return influenced by economic and political realities rather than just central bank skills. Inflation can offer politicians an “easy way out” in the short-term.

The author argues that inflation is an unpleasant economic force that can damage an economy and political/institutional stability.

They provide a childhood example of experiencing inflation through continually rising book prices, despite the books themselves not changing. This meant the author’s fixed pocket money could purchase less over time.

Others may cope with inflation by hoarding goods like washing machines that retain value better than cash, as some Turks did during a inflationary period. However, this distorts economic decisions and resource allocation.

While some price changes reflect supply and demand shifts, generally inflation represents a loss of purchasing power for money over time. It obscures true economic conditions by distorting all relative prices. The pandemic further complicated measuring inflation by disrupting markets and price data collection.

In conclusion, the author presents inflation as a distorting and damaging economic force that undermines an accurate view of economic conditions through continually rising overall price levels over time.

The author uses the experience of having fluctuating pocket money as a child to illustrate how inflation can create winners and losers in society as prices rise unpredictably relative to incomes.
Inflation undermines trust in the monetary system as some gain arbitrarily while others lose out. It particularly hurts the poor, pensioners, and those with limited savings who cannot protect against inflation.
John Maynard Keynes cited Lenin as claiming that inflating the currency is an effective way for governments to secretly tax citizens by devaluing their savings. While Lenin may not have actually said this, high inflation was a tool used by some governments.
Inflation can benefit governments in the short term by reducing the real value of debt and making interest payments more affordable. However, it erodes trust in the currency over time as people seek to avoid holding money.
Once trust is lost, inflation expectations become self-fulfilling as people rush to spend money before it loses value, fueling further price rises. Hyperinflation can occur in extreme cases when trust in the currency collapses completely.
Several countries, including Argentina under Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, have attempted to “hide” or downplay their true inflation rates by massaging the data, hoping to maintain confidence. However, this undermines trust in monetary and fiscal authorities.
Post-pandemic inflation has surged globally to rates not seen in decades. Central bankers were slow to tighten policy, claiming inflation was “transitory” and supply-driven. However, they underestimated the risk and collective failed to foresee the rapid rise.
Public confidence in currencies and monetary authorities can shift quickly. Central bankers are not infallible and may fall victim to groupthink or pressure to downplay political realities. Their models also rely on assumptions about stable economic behavior that may change.
In the 1970s, policymakers prioritized low unemployment over price stability, believing inflation had non-monetary causes. This created an inflationary cycle as companies and unions had incentive to raise prices without constraint. The lesson is central banks must maintain price stability as their primary objective.
In the years following the Global Financial Crisis, central bankers adopted policies of low/near-zero interest rates and quantitative easing to boost economic growth and meet inflation targets. They believed inflation was permanently low and expectations well-anchored.
However, as shown by past economic shocks like pandemics, uncertainty is always present and we wrongly attribute patterns to our skills. Policy gradualism should apply in all conditions, not just uncertain ones.
When inflation surged during COVID, central banks struggled to respond swiftly as they had dismissed uncertainty. They had compounded errors by:

Providing overconfident “forward guidance” about rates and appearing more informed than markets.
Always forecasting inflation would hit targets, maintaining credibility required no action.
Believing their credibility alone anchored expectations, ignoring possible reactions to shocks.

In sum, central banks lost sight of uncertainty, wrongly thought recent calm would last, and discounted the possibility of an inflation resurgence, leaving them unprepared when it emerged during the pandemic. Gradualism and acknowledging uncertainty should guide policy at all times.

This passage provides a history of inflation through examples from the ancient Roman Empire, 16th century Europe, and other periods. It makes several key points:

Roman inflation in the 3rd century CE greatly devalued the denarius coin (silver content fell from 90% to 5%) but impacted the poor more than the rich. The aureus coin (gold) lost value more modestly.
From 1500-1650 Europe experienced the “price revolution”, with prices rising steadily over 150 years. Explanations include demographic changes, debasement of coinage by rulers like Henry VIII, and a huge influx of silver from New World mines.
The mining boom increased European money supply and purchasing power, notably in Spain. This impacted trade and helped diminish Spain’s later economic dominance as other nations’ manufacturing skills improved.
The inflationary issues in 1500s Prussia and Poland led to early formulations of the quantity theory of money by Nicholas Copernicus, linking excessive coin production to a loss of value relative to bullion content.

In summary, the passage outlines some notable periods of historical inflation and their causes, demonstrating money’s “slippery history” over the centuries in different societies and forms. Early thinkers like Copernicus began linking money supply quantities to price levels.

In the 16th-17th centuries, debates emerged around the concept of price levels and inflation as coins were debased or clipped of their silver. One early observer noted prices had risen excessively compared to gold coins or goods.
Attempts to reduce counterfeiting and clipping led to advanced coin production, but old coins still circulated alongside new ones. People hoarded the more trusted new coins.
John Locke argued silver’s value was fixed by convention, like a ruler’s length. Isaac Newton claimed money was a commodity subject to supply and demand.
Locke and Newton weren’t the only thinkers debating money and prices. Jean Bodin linked rising prices to New World silver. David Hume saw prices lag money changes and “money illusion.”
The quantity theory developed over time, exemplified by Irving Fisher’s equation of exchange. It argued prices moved proportionally to money supply changes, with money causing prices not vice versa.
Keynes objected that in a depression, policy stimulus could affect output more than prices. He questioned assumptions of the quantity theory model. Debates continued around the relationship between money, prices and the real economy.
Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz argued in their work “A Monetary History of the United States” that the Great Depression was caused by a huge contraction in the money supply, exacerbated by bank failures, and that the Fed could have prevented it by printing more money.
They established that while the relationship between money and prices is complex, money plays a causal role in prices and the economy over the medium term. This challenged Keynesian views dominant after WWII.
Their work influenced how the Fed responded to the 2008 financial crisis, with aggressive interest rate cuts and quantitative easing to increase the money supply and offset the destruction of private money.
Looking at historical inflations, some argued they could be explained by monetary influences. But the French Revolution example shows the relationship is more complicated - what counts as money, levels of trust, and counterfeiting issues affected the impact of assignat issuance on prices.
In divided China 1937-1949, separate currencies issued by competing governments led to currency wars and illegal trade, flooding territories with excess cash and contributing to hyperinflation. The situation highlights how public perceptions influence the impact of money on prices.
Historically, periods of rising inflation were often initially driven more by a collapse in trust and rapid increase in the velocity of money circulation, as people tried to get rid of cash due to inflation fears. This reflected a breakdown of trust in monetary and fiscal authorities.
Both the quantity of money and people’s attitudes/trust toward money matter for inflation. The impact of money printing depends on prevailing trust levels.
Until the 20th century, money was usually tied to precious metals like gold, helping to keep it “sound” and inflation/deflation in check. But this link was broken in the early 20th century.
The 20th century saw unprecedented monetary destruction due to the abandonment of gold standards and a strong aversion to any price level declines (deflation), even if moderate “good deflation” could have been acceptable. This led to an inflationary bias.
During periods like the Great Moderation of moderate growth and inflation in the 1980s-2000s, central bankers may have fostered higher inflation than necessary by offsetting disinflation from global trade, preferring inflation targets over possible “good deflation.”
During times of war or crisis, governments often resort to monetary financing (printing money) to fund spending rather than raising taxes or cutting other spending. This can lead to inflation.
The US faced inflation during the Civil War from 1861-1865 as the value of the dollar fell against gold due to increased money supply. However, from 1865-1879 the dollar recovered its lost value as prices fell globally due to increased output.
Washington was worried about facing inflation like the American Revolution or French Revolution after the Civil War. Northern financial interests who had lent to the South benefited from falling prices, as it increased the “real” value of debt repayments from the South.
Restoring the pre-war dollar value to gold helped ensure the economic costs of the war fell more on the former Confederate states in the South through higher debt burdens.
In general, periods of inflation have more to do with government actions than central banks typically acknowledge. Wartime monetary financing and the desire to shift economic costs are major inflationary influences driven by fiscal policy decisions.
After the Civil War, the Confederacy experienced hyperinflation as prices rose 90-fold between 1861-1865. This was partly due to money printing but also a collapse in confidence in the currency. Monetary velocity increased rapidly as Southerners tried to get rid of Confederate dollars.
Prices in the Confederacy rose faster than wages, hurting consumers. Price controls were imposed but failed to control inflation. Confederate soldiers saw the real value of their pay collapse.
In the North, the dollar’s pre-war value was restored, showing trust in the currency preserved value. But for the Confederacy, inflation initially eroded real wages and later deflation increased the real value of debts.
The post-war US government feared money printing would fuel inflation like in the Confederacy and rejected inflationary policies. William Jennings Bryan advocated a silver standard but faced resistance from Washington.
The experience showed that fiscal policies like taxation, spending and money printing have major impacts on prices, inflation, and the distribution of income and wealth. Trust in government finances and ability to control inflation is fragile.
Quantitative easing blurred the lines between monetary and fiscal policy by allowing central banks to provide stimulus while keeping interest rates low through large-scale bond purchases. This removed discipline from bond markets and allowed governments more leeway.
It increased political risk for central banks by connecting monetary policy more closely to fiscal sustainability. Specifically, low interest rates provide windfall gains for public finances, while higher rates necessitate higher interest payments, complicating tightening.
The example is given of the UK, where the Bank of England’s bond purchases replaced long-term gilt liabilities with overnight reserves at the central bank. Low rates save the government money, while tightening increases costs.
Overall, quantitative easing diminished the independence of central banks by linking monetary and fiscal policies more closely, similar to the relationship between Richard Burton and Elizabeth Taylor - often separated but always destined to reconnect due to underlying fiscal pressures.
Quantitative easing (QE) has increased the fiscal sensitivity of monetary policy decisions by shortening the maturity structure of public debt. Periods of low interest rates help fiscal stability, while periods of high rates hurt it when debt is high.
QE demonstrates the connection between monetary and fiscal policy. Even after death, Elizabeth Taylor and Richard Burton’s voices can be heard from beyond the grave to signify this link.
A strong economic recovery with higher growth, revenues, and interest rates would not threaten fiscal sustainability as much as the current high inflation scenario. But economies have failed to truly “build back better” after the pandemic.
Excessive inflation may partly stem from central banks hesitating to raise rates for fear of upsetting governments focused on recovery. Banks prioritized supporting fiscal outcomes over controlling inflation.
The eurozone faces fiscal challenges akin to those the US confronted after the Civil War. Imbalances emerged as northern lenders worried about funds in poorer southern states/countries.
The ECB has taken on roles as inflation fighter, lender of last resort, and bond market backer to preserve the eurozone. But these roles can conflict as inflation rises and bond spreads widen.
Allowing higher inflation could implicitly facilitate fiscal transfers from richer to poorer regions, as happened after the US Civil War, albeit inconsistently with price stability goals in the long run. The ECB has been pulled into fiscal policy matters by this channel.
Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) turns conventional macroeconomic thinking on its head by arguing that fiscal policy, not monetary policy, should be used to regulate the economy. Governments should stimulate the economy through spending and creating jobs rather than relying on central banks and interest rates.
According to MMT, governments with sovereign currencies never need to worry about solvency or default because they can always print money to finance deficits and pay debts. Inflation is not primarily caused by money supply increases.
MMT proposes giving elected officials control over macroeconomic management rather than technocratic central banks. It argues unemployment should not be used to control inflation and central banks should not encourage household/business debt to stimulate recoveries.
The author is skeptical of MMT’s arguments. Historically, governments are very tempted to use money printing as a stealthy way to tax citizens through inflation when other tax options are unpopular. Inflation control is also better left to independent central banks rather than politicians facing election pressures.
When inflation does arise, MMT advocates tend to downplay it or offer unrealistic solutions like waiting for supply increases or negotiations, rather than controlling overall demand. But history shows governments cannot always resist inflationary pressures, especially during wars.

The chapter argues that inflation has profound costs that are often difficult to see from aggregate economic data alone. It uses the example of hyperinflation in Germany after WWI to illustrate how inflation can create extreme winners and losers. Hugo Stinnes became extremely wealthy by borrowing marks that rapidly declined in value, becoming known as the “King of Inflation.”

While aggregate data may hide individual hardships, inflation still impacts people unequally by arbitrarily redistributing wealth. It threatens paper assets but benefits those who can leverage property purchases.

The UK’s high inflation in the 1970s was accompanied by relatively low income/wealth inequality, but this masks changes in individuals’ relative positions. Inflation is just one influence on inequality - others include tax policy.

Contemporary surveys in the UK found “greedy workers” and commodity/oil price rises were most commonly blamed for inflation, though governments were not. The chapter examines how perceived causes varied depending on political narratives.

In summary, the chapter argues inflation has significant individual and social costs beyond what aggregate data shows, and creates unfair winners and losers through arbitrary redistribution of wealth.

In the mid-1970s, the UK Labour government under Harold Wilson wanted to tackle high inflation but didn’t want policies that risked higher unemployment. They pursued a “voluntary social contract” of wage restraint.
The focus on fairness backfired as inflation remained high, wages kept rising to compensate, and the government’s wage guidelines were continually broken. Once some groups achieved higher pay rises, others demanded the same to avoid falling behind.
Inflation expectations became entrenched as pay rises outpaced actual inflation. Monetary policy tightening in 1976 via an IMF bailout caused unemployment to double but was necessary. Wage controls prevented market-driven pay adjustments.
By 1978, strikes erupted as workers rejected the pay guidelines. This “winter of discontent” turned public opinion against Labour and led to a Conservative election victory in 1979. The social contract approach failed as it misdiagnosed inflation’s causes and could not deliver fair outcomes given continued high inflation.
The analysis draws an analogy to difficulties managing expectations in a “supermarket” of wage negotiations, where failing to serve all “customers” equally would understandably anger workers and undermine the targets.
In the 1930s, during the Great Depression and a smaller depression, prices fell by over 12% over the decade. Government bonds had the highest real returns around 70%, while real estate had the lowest returns around 9%.
In contrast, in the highly inflationary 1970s when prices rose over 100%, cash savings and government bonds did the worst with negative real returns over 10% and 35% respectively. Equities and real estate provided modest positive real returns around 5%.
Inflation penalizes savers and wealth accumulators holding cash and bonds. Borrowing and investing in equities, real estate or physical assets would have been better in a high inflation environment.
Data from the UK in the late 1970s showed lower income groups had more savings in cash and bonds that lost value, while higher earners had more homes and stocks. Inflation impacts people unequally based on their assets.
High inflation led to high taxes over 70% on top earners, fueling tax avoidance. While aiming for fairness, inflation itself is unfair and targeting symptoms rather than the cause damages the economy.
UK policymakers were reluctant to tighten monetary policy enough to control inflation in the 1970s, keeping interest rates below inflation rates and fueling more borrowing and inflation. This shows a lack of internal monetary discipline to replace the previous external exchange rate discipline.
Getting rid of inflation is difficult because it is painful to stop, but also harmful to let persist. Politicians are tempted to delay addressing the problem.
In the 1970s, there was much debate about how to deal with inflation. The Phillips curve suggested a trade-off between inflation and unemployment, but economists like Friedman and Phelps argued this was not sustainable long-run.
In the 1980s, there was a shift toward monetarism and “rational expectations” theory. High interest rates under Thatcher reduced UK inflation significantly, though unemployment rose at first. Earlier action may have caused lower costs.
Credibly establishing monetary policy rules is important to control inflation expectations. Price/wage controls don’t work as expectations adjust. Subsidies that add to costs faces a similar problem.
Inflation damages society over time if allowed to persist. It undermines trust and leads to unfair outcomes as some protect themselves better than others. Ultimately it must be dealt with, though stopping it causes short-term pain. The challenge is choosing effective policy solutions.
The Phillips curve model suggested governments could trade off higher inflation for lower unemployment, but this was flawed as expectations of permanently higher inflation would lead to rising wages demands.
Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps independently argued in the late 1960s that policymakers couldn’t “fool” people into accepting higher inflation long-term. Higher inflation expectations would be built into wages over time.
This helped precipitate the “rational expectations” revolution led by Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent, who argued policy effectiveness depended on public expectations formed based on their understanding of how the economy works.
In 1982, Thomas Sargent argued high inflation could be quickly reduced by credibly committing to budget discipline and an independent central bank refusing credit to the government. He used examples from 1920s Europe to argue disinflation could be swift and painless.
However, reducing more moderate inflation is harder due to more groups benefiting from it and fearing costs of its removal. The 1980s disinflation in the US and UK caused recessions and uneven costs, showing rational expectations alone didn’t ensure smooth outcomes. Political will and credibility took time to establish.
Margaret Thatcher’s economic policies in the 1980s greatly reduced industries in parts of the UK like the Midlands, causing high inequality. This led to sustained opposition to her policies for years. This persistence meant the adjustment costs from her reforms were higher than anticipated.
While painful in the short-run, her medicine of reducing the role of government appeared to be working by the 1990s. Inflation became quiescent around the world. Central banks became independent and inflation targeting became standard policy. These were no longer seen as radical policies.
Price and wage controls have a chequered history. While appealing politically, they often don’t work well in practice. Examples include Rome under Diocletian and the US under Nixon in the 1970s. Controls can disrupt markets and lead to shortages, volatile outcomes, and higher permanent inflation.
Recent high inflation led to renewed calls for price controls, especially on goods like natural gas facing supply shocks. Some argued this could target specific prices driving inflation instead of austerity. However, price controls have generally not proven effective lasting solutions to inflation.

This passage summarizes some key arguments regarding government intervention to control inflation:

Price controls and other “targeted” measures to deal with specific inflationary sectors are difficult to implement effectively and can end up needing to target most sectors. They also require broad monetary restraint to be successful.
Controlling energy prices through price ceilings, windfall taxes, or subsidies all have significant downsides and limitations. Subsidies in particular just shift higher costs to the future and could exacerbate inflation in the long run.
While temporary controls may sometimes help in extraordinary circumstances like wartime, they generally require extensive government intervention in the economy and are not a lasting solution to inflation. Relying on them risks fueling expectations of ongoing intervention.
Central bank independence and credible monetary policy are important for anchoring inflation expectations, but are not sufficient on their own to guarantee price stability if inflation returns. The challenges in using expectations data and forecasts to assess monetary policy effectiveness are also acknowledged.

So in summary, it argues targeted or sectoral controls have limited utility for inflation and risks fueling ongoing intervention, while acknowledging central bank focused policies also have limitations to ensure long-term price stability when faced with cost shocks. A balanced approach is needed.

Inflation reemerged in 2021, which some view as simply bad luck from external supply shocks like the pandemic, Russia-Ukraine war, and Chinese lockdowns. However, there is precedent for temporary “inflationary squalls” after major events like WWII.
Lessons from the 1970s suggest policy errors, not just external shocks, can prolong high inflation. Targeting inflation alone without regard to other goals risks instability.
Traditional inflation targeting and Taylor rules are backward-looking and may fail to prevent inflation from taking hold if expectations change.
Central banks need a framework like the “four tests” approach to guide policy in a forward-looking way based on multiple indicators of actual and expected inflation, labor markets, financial conditions, and fiscal policy.
Properly recognizing changes in public perceptions and rules of thumb is important for central banks to maintain credibility and control over inflation expectations. Complacency in the face of rising inflation risks undermining their anti-inflation credibility.

So in summary, the author argues external shocks alone may not explain renewed high inflation, and central banks need a robust, forward-looking policy framework to navigate such circumstances and prevent inflation from becoming entrenched.

Following World War 2, countries experienced temporary inflationary increases during the 1950-1953 Korean War due to higher military spending. However, inflation quickly subsided after the war ended in a stalemate.
In the early 1970s, inflation rose significantly in many countries including the UK and US. The UK Chancellor at the time, Anthony Barber, blamed rising oil prices from the 1973 Arab oil embargo for the higher inflation.
When a new Labor government took over in 1974, the new Chancellor Denis Healey argued that domestic monetary policies like money supply growth also contributed significantly to higher inflation in the UK.
While oil price shocks can trigger temporary inflation increases, they are not always the main driver of higher inflation. Inflation targeting relies on the lag between monetary policies and inflation, but this lag is uncertain which leads to challenges in keeping inflation stable over time.
The Taylor rule provided a simple approach for central banks to set interest rates based on current inflation and output gaps, but output gap estimates are not very forward-looking. Also, the relationship between output gaps and future inflation has weakened over time, making inflation harder to control with interest rates alone.
The author argues that recent events could mark the end of a temporary period of economic calm over the past 15 years and a return to more turbulent times.
The Taylor rule, which ties policy rates to inflation deviations, has become less useful as central banks focus more on forward-looking forecasts. This approach relies on accurate predictions of future conditions rather than reacting to real-time data.
Lars Svensson proposed a “forecast targeting” approach where policy is set based on constructing forecasts and adjusting rates so forecasts meet mandates. However, this assumes the ability to accurately predict obstacles rather than reacting to actual conditions, like driving based on predictions rather than what’s ahead.
When inflation rose in 2021, actual rates set by forecast targeting diverged greatly from what the Taylor rule suggested, highlighting confusion as central banks claimed short-term inflation wouldn’t impact medium-term forecasts.
The author argues central banks failed four “tests” to determine if high inflation was temporary or persistent: institutional bias towards inflation, signs of monetary excess, trivializing inflation risks, and worsening supply conditions. Recent shifts increased bias for higher average inflation.
Central bank independence from governments allowed for loose fiscal policy without inflation constraints. This enabled large government deficits and debt to accumulate.
Quantitative easing by central banks helped “underwrite” government debt by keeping borrowing costs low. This gave governments more freedom to run large deficits.
Institutional changes removed accountability and coordination between monetary and fiscal policies. This introduced instability into the overall macroeconomic policy framework.
Low inflation environment led central banks to take on multiple objectives beyond price stability, which may conflict under different economic conditions.
Signs of monetary excess include asset price bubbles fueled by excessively loose monetary policy. Low interest rates inflated expectations which fueled leverage and risk-taking.
Periods of high inflation correlated with rapid money supply growth, as seen in the US in the late 1960s-1970s. Money supply growth surged during the Covid pandemic, likely fueling the current high inflation.

So in summary, lax monetary and fiscal policies without proper coordination, as enabled by central bank independence, allowed debts and risks to accumulate and laid the groundwork for the high inflation seen today. Loose money fueled asset bubbles and inflation when locked-down money was eventually spent.

Here are the key points made in the passage:

Central bankers downplayed or “trivialized” inflationary risks for too long during the pandemic, refusing to acknowledge that inflation could return on their watch. They were reluctant to accept they may have lost control over inflation.
Bank of England inflation projections consistently showed future inflation returning to target, suggesting heads were stuck in the sand or they had perfectly calibrated time machines. This reflected an unwillingness to see that the economic situation had fundamentally changed.
Supply conditions actually worsened over time, contrary to the assumption that supply is fixed. Economic growth has slowed significantly since the financial crisis and pandemic.
Post-pandemic, supply was constrained both globally due to factors like China’s lockdowns, and locally due to fewer workers available and a tight labor market. This created inflationary pressures as demand rebounded faster than expected supply.
Central bankers were slow to recognize declining supply potential and overestimated slack in economies, risking inflation by keeping demand too high relative to constrained supply. The passage criticizes them for downplaying supply-side drivers of inflation.

Here are 14 key lessons summarized from the passage:

Money supply and monetary policy have a causal link to inflation. Periods of rapid monetary growth often precede inflation surges.
Public attitudes and trust in money are as important as central bank policies. Loss of trust can trigger inflation even without rapid money growth.
Believing inflation is permanently tamed ignores history - models fit recent stability but can’t account for instability during stress periods.
Governments can and will resort to inflation as a way to reduce debt burdens when other options are unavailable. Fiscal policy matters for inflation too.
Reforms aimed solely at deflation risk can inadvertently create a bias toward higher inflation if uncertainty makes other risks seem less likely.
Central bank independence is no guarantee of permanent price stability - political realities still influence inflation outcomes.
Inflation expectations can become unanchored rapidly once credibility is lost, fueling further inflation.
Supply constraints are a major inflation risk, but demand pressures also matter and can prolong high inflation.
International factors like commodity prices and currency movements transmit inflation globally more than models typically account for.
Protecting real wages fuels wage-price spirals that embed higher inflation. Restraining nominal wage growth is important.
Policy tightening is difficult politically and risks recession, but the longer action is delayed, the higher inflation becomes entrenched.
Rules-based frameworks are less reliable guides than recognizing multiple political and economic forces shape inflation outcomes.
Central banks must avoid groupthink and consider multiple perspectives to prevent becoming complacent or myopic.
Past inflationary experiences like the 1970s provide vital historical context even if exact parallels don’t hold - those who forget history risks repeating it.

Emergency monetary policies like quantitative easing became permanent features, reducing the signaling power of bond markets to warn of future inflation. This was made worse in the eurozone where the ECB worried less about inflation and more about euro breakup, blurring monetary and quasi-fiscal policy lines.
Democratically elected governments are tempted by inflation as an alternative to tax hikes or spending cuts. This stealthily robs people’s savings over time by blaming inflation on external forces.
Inflation arbitrarily creates winners and losers in unfair and undemocratic ways. It erodes trust over time as public demands change. The longer it persists, the more painful fixes become.
Addressing the roots of persistent inflation through monetary policy is better than subsidies that don’t solve the problem and risk political capture. Price/wage controls may augment monetary policy but not replace it.
Hyperinflations see widespread impacts, forcing reforms, while modest inflations are easier to rationalize away without solving the issue.
Rules-based frameworks help public anticipate policy responses to changes in growth/inflation.
Monetary policy should dominate fiscal policy, not the reverse, to prevent “printing money” funding deficits.
Heuristics and “rules of thumb” better reflect public behavior than expectations alone.
Distinguishing temporary from persistent inflation is difficult without hindsight. Four tests can help assess inflationary risks.
Coordinating monetary, fiscal and financial policies is important to avoid conflicts between objectives like growth and inflation. The UK experiment showed dangers of uncoordinated tax cuts.
The UK government’s fiscal stimulus measures led to higher government bond (gilt) yields as investors became concerned about rising debt levels and inflation.
This triggered liquidity issues and collateral calls within pension funds, forcing them to sell more gilts and driving yields even higher. Fiscal risks were turning into financial stability risks.
The Bank of England was in a difficult position. It wanted to raise rates to curb inflation fueled by fiscal spending, but also had to intervene in the gilt market to lower yields and prevent a spiral in the pension fund industry.
Quantitative easing policies gave governments moral hazard by creating an expectation of central bank bailouts, encouraging risky fiscal policies. It also tilted the relationship between monetary and fiscal policy by allowing fiscal dominance through the back door.
To prevent such issues, monetary policy should have primacy over fiscal policy. Central banks should comment on fiscal plans and focus solely on inflation, while others focus on financial stability. However, establishing clear priorities is difficult given varying public expectations of central bank roles.
High inflation across Europe in 2022 tested central bank independence. Admitting past policy errors could undermine credibility, so some banks delayed tightening and hoped inflation would fade on its own. But this strategy also put them in the firing line from politicians and the public.
The passage examines the challenges central banks faced in fighting high inflation in the early 1980s by looking at 4 examples: the Bundesbank, Federal Reserve, potential independent Banque de France, and potential independent Bank of England.
The Bundesbank enjoyed strong public support due to Germany’s history with hyperinflation. The Fed was able to raise interest rates significantly under Volcker and import disinflation from other countries experiencing debt crises.
An independent Banque de France likely would have struggled given the inflationary policies of Mitterrand at the time. The UK needed Thatcher’s political legitimacy to withstand the high economic costs of disinflation policies.
This suggests central bank independence is not straightforward - very high inflation may require political validation given the costs of disinflation policies.
By late 2022, inflation had surprisingly become more persistent, suggesting central bank groupthink and lack of dissent in failure to foresee this. Reforms are needed to committees’ composition to reduce groupthink and encourage more independent thought.
Dissent and debate within central bank committees is important for ensuring constructive discussion and good policy decisions, not just unanimity. Diversity of perspectives helps account for uncertainty.
Extended periods without dissent could indicate potential problems like complacency. Oversight bodies should encourage debate and differing views.
Monetary policy has financial consequences. Periods where rates are expected to move in only one direction (like down) can fuel asset bubbles, as seen in dot-com, housing pre-2008, and Japan in late 1980s.
Currently many bets have been made assuming rates will stay low, but rising inflation may force tightening and burst asset bubbles with financial stability risks. Governments have high debt limiting fiscal room to respond.
Inflation is hard to predict but critically impacts asset returns. 1970s high inflation was bad for stocks, while disinflation under Volcker in 1980s was good. Gold gains may reverse sharply once inflation credibility returns.
Investors need to carefully consider the political economy factors shaping inflation and monetary policy responses to manage uncertainty and potential volatility. Outcomes are hard to foresee.
Inflation reduced diversification opportunities during periods of low inflation in recent decades, as most countries and bond markets were stable. However, returning inflation increases risks and threats of financial instability.
Simple recommendations are given for diversification in this environment: don’t invest solely in one country/currency due to higher currency risk; don’t assume equities offer strong inflation protection as in the 1970s; have some exposure to gold as a hedge against high inflation; accept cash/deposits will lose value with inflation.
The essay discusses speeches by former Fed chairs Arthur Burns and Paul Volcker. Burns acknowledged central banks’ failure to control high inflation in the 1970s due to political and economic pressures against harsh measures. Volcker saw perceptions shift as inflation undermined growth, allowing central banks more leeway to tackle inflation.
Lessons from successfully fighting inflation in the 1980s, like acting early against rising prices, are in danger of being forgotten amid post-pandemic efforts to stimulate growth that could fuel inflation. Central banks may need to renew their resolve to control prices despite political pressures.

Here is a summary of the key points from the source material:

Inflation began rising in 2021 after years of low or declining inflation, thanks to population agingeffects, supply chain disruptions, rising commodity prices, and monetary/fiscal stimulus during COVID.
Demographic changes like population aging can cause a “Great Demographic Reversal” and revive inflation as workforce sizes shrink and wages rise.
Money supply and monetary policy influence inflation over the medium-term according to monetarist theories, though quantity of money alone does not determine prices in the short-run.
Ideas about inflation have evolved over time from early theories connecting money supply to prices, to Keynesian views of aggregate demand/supply, and monetarist interpretations emphasizing money’s role.
Historical examples of inflation include periods of high inflation in countries like Turkey in the 1990s, hyperinflation in places like post-WWI Germany and 1940s China, as well as milder “price revolutions” over centuries in places like the Ottoman Empire.
Monetary policies, financial crises, wars, and political events have all contributed to inflation over history in various places and time periods. Understanding these historical precedents provides context for modern inflation dynamics.

Here is a summary of the book “Depression 1919–1939 (NBER Series on Long-term Factors in Economic Development)”, published by Oxford University Press in New York/Oxford in 1992:

The book examines the Great Depression between 1919-1939, focusing on long-term economic factors rather than short-term causes.
It discusses how structural changes after WWI, such as the shift from agriculture to industry, impacted economic stability in the long run and made economies more vulnerable to external shocks and cycles.
Agricultural productivity growth slowed while industrial productivity continued increasing, leading to job and income disruption. This altered spending and investment patterns.
International factors are also analyzed, like the breakdown of the international gold standard in the interwar period and how this affected monetary policies and economic performance across countries.
Macro-level topics covered include debt, fiscal policy, monetary policy, exchange rates and political economies related to the Depression years.
Cross-country comparisons are made between places like the US, Germany and UK to understand different economic trajectories and recovery paths during this time.
The book takes a long-term perspective in examining depression as a cyclical economic phenomenon with deeper structural roots, seeking to understand its origins and prolonged economic malaise in the interwar decades.

Here is a summary of the key papers referenced in the passage:

Alan Barber’s 1974 speech to parliament discussed the challenging trade-off between unemployment and inflation in the UK economy at that time given the fixed exchange rates and limited capital flows internationally.
Milton Friedman’s 1968 paper argued for the role of monetary policy in managing inflation.
Edmund Phelps’ 1967 Economica article analyzed how expectations of inflation impact the Phillips curve relationship between unemployment and inflation over time.
Thomas Sargent’s 1982 paper examined the causes of four major postwar inflationary periods.
Charles Goodhart’s law discusses how statistical relationships break down when used for policy purposes, like targeting monetary aggregates.
John Taylor presented empirical evidence on policy rules outperforming discretion in his influential 1993 paper.
Studies analyzed whether inflation in the post-pandemic period resembled that following WWII, with supply and demand imbalances playing a role.
Papers evaluated the credibility and predictability of inflation targeting frameworks and whether alternative approaches may work better.
Research considered how globalization impacted inflation dynamics and the transmission of monetary policy.
Studies investigated whether structural economic changes altered the relationship between real activity and inflation over time.

So in summary, the passage discusses the UK’s inflation challenges in the 1970s and references several influential papers analyzing the drivers of inflation, policy trade-offs, and the merits of alternative monetary policy strategies and frameworks.

The Bank of England governor, Huw Pill, warned in September 2022 after the Kwarteng “minibudget” that the bank may need to take more aggressive action to deal with potential inflationary consequences of looser fiscal policy. However, the very next day the bank was forced to purchase large amounts of government debt to prevent a meltdown in the gilt market. This showed that while the bank warned of inflation risks from fiscal policy, in practice it had to step in to stabilize markets, limiting its independence in the near term.

Here are summaries of the selected sources:

‘Argentina’s new honest inflation statistics’ (Economist, May 2017) discusses Argentina releasing a new inflation index that more accurately captured rising prices, after prior statistics obscured high inflation.
Eggertsson 2003 IMF working paper discusses how central banks can commit to loose monetary policy to fight deflation in a liquidity trap.
Eggertsson & Woodford 2003 paper analyzes the zero lower bound on interest rates and optimal monetary policy.
Eggleston’s 1875 memoir A Rebel’s Recollections discusses his experiences in the American Civil War.
Eichengreen’s 1992 book Golden Fetters examines the gold standard’s role in the Great Depression.
A 2022 Federal Reserve paper by Figura & Waller discusses what the Beveridge curve can tell us about the likelihood of a soft landing.
Fisher’s 1911 book analyzes the determination of money’s purchasing power and its relation to credit, interest and crisis.
Friedman’s 1968 paper discusses the role of monetary policy.
Friedman & Schwartz’s 1963 book provides a monetary history of the United States from 1867-1960.
A 1991 journal article by Goldstone comments on monetary vs velocity interpretations of the price revolution.
Goodhart & Pradhan’s 2020 book discusses how aging societies could lead to waning inequality and inflation revival.
A 1975 UK government paper lays out its policy for fighting inflation through controlling prices and incomes.
A 1974 article reviews the historical evolution of the quantity theory of money and its role in policy debates.
Kelton’s 2020 book argues modern monetary theory shows how governments can spend to build a better economy.
A 2022 Kelton article says there are collaborative steps to curb inflation.
Keynes 1919 and 1925 essays discuss different aspects of inflation.
Keynes 1940 book proposes a radical plan to pay for WWII costs without inflation.
Various King speeches and articles from the 1990s-2020s analyze monetary policy issues and lessons.
The other sources discuss an assortment of historical and economic aspects of inflation.

Here are summaries of the sources:

Time (1923) - Article discusses hyperinflation in Germany in early 1920s that led to prices doubling every few days. Money became worthless and economic/social turmoil resulted.

Tomlinson (2014) - Analyzes how the British government and public understood high inflation in the mid-1970s. Examines debates around causes and strategies, including emphasis on monetary policies like controls on public spending.

Tucker (2021) - Brief discussing how price controls have been used historically in the US to shape industries and curb inflation. Explores renewed interest due to current high inflation. Cautions they are not a long-term solution and can distort markets.

House of Representatives - Document discusses 1956 law that required the phrase “In God We Trust” to start appearing on US paper currency, coins and government buildings to distinguish US money from “godless communism.”

Vlieghe (2021) - Speech by Bank of England official analyzing economic outlook in early 2021 as UK emerged from COVID lockdowns. Discusses risks from end of fiscal support and possibility of higher inflation in short term.

Volckart (1997) - Academic paper traces early development of quantity theory of money in 16th century Poland and Prussia based on analysis of monetary policies at the time involving coinage.

Volcker (1990) - Speech by former Federal Reserve Chair discussing triumph of central banking in taming high inflation, at least temporarily, through independent monetary policy focused on inflation targets.

Candide - Satirical novel by Voltaire published in 1759 critiquing optimism as portrayed through the travels and tribulations of the main character Candide. Lampoons various philosophies including those related to money, economics and government.

#book-summary

We Need to Talk About Inflation - Stephen D. King;