Literary Insights

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Here is a summary of the key points from the introduction to the book “Why Leaders Lie”:

The author was first introduced to the topic of lying in international politics in an interview with a New York Times journalist in 2003. He has since given several talks and developed his ideas on this topic over the past 6-7 years.
The subject of international lying generates a lot of interest from audiences as it deals with an inherently wicked behavior (lying) but argues there can be strategic reasons for leaders to lie to other countries or their own people.
One of the most controversial claims the author makes is that statesmen and diplomats do not lie to each other very often, contrary to common perceptions. Most people believe inter-state lying is common.
The lack of existing literature on lying in international politics leaves much room for new theoretical thinking and frameworks on this topic.
The book aims to provide analytical frameworks and theoretical arguments to help organize how we think about lying between states and its various dimensions.
The author received important feedback and input from various audiences where he presented, as well as from colleagues, editors, and anonymous peer reviewers to help improve and finalize the book manuscript.
The book explores why leaders sometimes lie about foreign policy matters. Specifically, it examines why key figures in the Bush administration claimed Iraq had WMD before the 2003 invasion, even though they turned out to be wrong.
In contrast, Saddam Hussein told the truth that Iraq did not have WMD. Leaders generally don’t lie much to other countries, but are more inclined to lie to their own publics, especially when pursuing ambitious foreign policies like wars of choice.
American presidents have historically lied to the public about foreign policy issues, like FDR before WWII and LBJ regarding the Gulf of Tonkin incident. While lying is seen as wrong domestically, it is more accepted in international relations due to strategic considerations.
Leaders think they are acting in their country’s interests by lying to the public, even if not always wisely. Practical concerns of national security typically outweigh moral rules against lying. Publics also tend to accept such foreign policy lies unless they produce bad outcomes.
In summary, the book examines why leaders sometimes lie to their own people about foreign affairs and war, using the Iraq WMD issue and Bush administration as a case study. It argues strategic interests drive more lying to domestic audiences over foreign ones.
In international politics, there is no higher authority to enforce rules, so states must provide for their own security. Lying and deception are sometimes seen as necessary to survive in this anarchic system.
Within states, lying threatens order and efficiency since there is a higher authority (the state) that can compel truth-telling. International politics lacks this enforcement mechanism.
The book aims to theorize about strategic lying by states for national interests, not selfish lying. It will examine types of lies, reasons for lying, circumstances influencing lying, and costs of lying.
The main types of lies are those between states and those leaders tell their domestic publics.
Leaders usually lie for strategic reasons related to statecraft, not due to corruption. Some “noble lies” can be justified if they serve the right objective.
While lying is part of international politics, it is not routine. The examples used make it seem more common than evidence shows. Finding cases of states bluffing each other in bargaining was especially difficult.
The analysis takes a utilitarian perspective on lying, seeing when it can serve useful strategic purposes, rather than an absolute prohibition on lying. It considers both benefits and costs of different types of international lies.
The passage argues that leaders are more likely to lie to their own people than to rival states, and this tendency is particularly true for democracies like the U.S.
The most dangerous international lies are those told to a leader’s own citizens, as they are more likely to backfire and damage the state’s strategic position. They also risk corrupting domestic political and social life.
As a powerful globally engaged country, U.S. leaders often face incentives to lie either to other states or American people. This risk of lying is a serious concern, especially for democracies.
Lying involves making or denying untrue factual statements to deceive others. Spinning emphasizes some facts while ignoring others to portray an interpretation favorably. Concealment withholds relevant information to avoid undermining one’s position.
Lying is considered most unacceptable as it is hardest to detect, whereas spinning and concealment allow targets to potentially discern deception by filling in gaps or asking clarifying questions.

So in summary, the passage argues international lies to one’s own public are most dangerous and democracies like the U.S. are particularly at risk due to their global power and engagement.

States do sometimes lie to each other in international politics when they think it serves their national interest. However, lying directly is not very common between states.
Diplomats and political leaders tell the truth to each other far more often than they lie. When trying to deceive another state, concealment and withholding information are more typical approaches than outright lying.
It is very difficult to systematically measure how often lying has occurred between states historically compared to truthful exchanges. The records are incomplete and interactions vast.
The author claims inter-state lying has not been very common based on difficulty finding clear examples and because concealment is usually a safer approach than lying, which risks exposure.
Concealment allows states to secretly develop weapons or strategies without admitting deception, whereas lying risks immediate credibility loss if exposed. So concealment tends to be preferred over direct lies between states.

In summary, the passage argues that while inter-state lying does happen at times, concealment and non-disclosure are more common approaches for states to deceive each other, as lying risks swift loss of credibility if exposed. Records also make the true historical frequency difficult to measure.

The author and other scholars struggled to find clear-cut examples of statesmen and diplomats openly lying to each other between countries. This suggests inter-state lying may not be as common as initially thought.
The definition of lying affects assessments of how prevalent it is. A broad definition including deception, spinning, and omission would classify more instances as lying. But a narrower definition focusing on intentional untruths finds lying is less widespread.
Some inter-state lying may be undiscovered due to lack of transparency in decision-making and incomplete historical records. However, the author argues major lies would be difficult to conceal given extensive documentation of many policy decisions over the past two centuries.
Inter-state lying is challenging because countries have incentives to verify each other’s claims, especially regarding important strategic issues like intentions and national security, due to lack of trust in an anarchic system. This makes devastatingly effective lies rare.
Lying is less likely regarding low politics issues with limited consequences, but gains are small and frequent lying risks undermining future cooperation and credibility.
The main reasons for inter-state lying are to gain strategic advantages like deterring adversaries through exaggerating capabilities or concealment regarding intentions and actions. But lying also has limitations as a foreign policy tool.

States sometimes lie to other states for strategic military advantages. Some key reasons for inter-state lying include:

To mislead an adversary about one’s own military capabilities in order to deter attack or coercion. Stalin exaggerated the strength of the Soviet military to deter Nazi Germany. Khrushchev lied about Soviet ICBM capabilities during the Cold War.
To conceal new military technologies or programs from adversaries to avoid provoking countermeasures. Britain hid the development of tanks during WWI. Israel concealed its nuclear weapons program from the US.
To disguise hostile intentions or impending attacks. Hitler lied about German intentions prior to wars. Japan lied about maintaining neutrality with the Soviets before they invaded.
To avoid needlessly provoking rivals, like how Western states lied about the purpose of post-WWII defense pacts being to contain Germany, not the Soviets.
To coerce adversaries through empty threats of attack to influence their behavior, even if attack was not actually planned. Germany threatened but did not plan to attack France in the 1905 Moroccan crisis.
To deter adversaries through threats of attacks that were not seriously intended to be carried out, like the US threatening but not planning to attack Gaddafi in 1986.

NATO’s nuclear policy during the Cold War involved threatening nuclear retaliation if the Warsaw Pact invaded Western Europe, but some American officials like Kissinger and McNamara privately acknowledged they would not actually use nuclear weapons first. However, maintaining the threat of nuclear retaliation significantly enhanced deterrence against the Soviet Union. Similarly, when the US threatened strikes on Libya in the 1980s, the actual intent was not to bomb Libya but to credibly threaten military action in hopes that Gaddafi would abandon supporting terrorism. In both cases, an empty threat was strategically used for deterrence through maintained ambiguity about how the threat might be carried out.

The passage discusses fearmongering as a strategy that governments sometimes use to build public support for policies relating to perceived security threats. It describes how fearmongering involves exaggerating or hyping threats to scare the population into backing measures like increased defense spending, conscription, or war.

Three specific examples of American presidents using fearmongering are provided:

Franklin Roosevelt in 1941 lied about a German submarine attack on the USS Greer to mobilize public opinion against Germany and push the US into WWII. He omitted key context to make the attack seem unprovoked when it was not.
The Eisenhower administration in the 1950s exaggerated the Soviet threat to Western Europe to persuade allies to ratify the European Defense Community treaty and enable a US troop withdrawal. Allies suspected the real goal was withdrawal, which they opposed.
The George W. Bush administration used inflated threats about Iraq’s WMDs and ties to Al-Qaeda to build support for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Subsequent investigations found these claims were unsupported or fabricated.

In summary, the passage describes fearmongering as a strategy some leaders use to manipulate public perceptions of threats in order to gain support for preferred foreign policies, including war. It provides historical examples suggesting fearmongering has been part of American statecraft for decades.

Like FDR in the lead up to WWII, LBJ wanted to escalate US involvement in Vietnam but needed congressional approval. He seized on the Gulf of Tonkin incident to get this approval.
However, the Johnson administration told two lies about the Gulf of Tonkin incident. First, they implied there was no doubt that North Vietnam attacked US ships when in fact doubts existed from the beginning. Second, they claimed the US ships were on a “routine patrol” when they may have been trying to provoke an attack.
Similarly, the Bush administration exaggerated the threat from Iraq to gain support for the 2003 invasion. They lied about:

Evidence of links between Iraq and Al Qaeda when none really existed.
Claiming certain knowledge of Iraq’s WMD capabilities when evidence was weak or nonexistent.
Making definitive statements about Iraq possessing WMD that turned out to be false.

In both cases, the administrations misled the public and Congress to garner support for escalating military involvement that they wanted but lacked clear justification for at the time. Deception was used to manufacture consent for the wars.

The Bush administration implied, but did not explicitly state, that Saddam Hussein was linked to the 9/11 attacks in order to lead the American public to connect the two without directly saying so. This was done to build support for the war in Iraq.
There is no evidence Saddam was involved in 9/11, as Bush administration officials later admitted. However, they continued messaging that reinforced the false connection between Iraq and 9/11.
Leaders engage in fearmongering when they believe a threat exists that the public does not recognize or appreciate. They feel mobilizing public support through deception is necessary for national security.
Reasons cited for public not comprehending threats include ignorance of foreign affairs, collective lack of intelligence, and susceptibility to “weak knees.” Leaders argue frightening the public into supporting policy is therefore justified.
Fearmongering can also be used to isolate dissenting experts and mobilize public hostility towards them, pressuring them to modify or silence their criticisms.
An alternative view is that governmental paralysis on threats justifies leaders using fearmongering to cut through red tape and motivate timely response.

The political system may not take action to address looming dangers without pressure from the public. Policymakers can easily mislead the public because they control intelligence and information flow. Lying is also easy because the public trusts their leaders to protect them. Fearmongering seems justified to leaders if it exposes a real threat, even if they exaggerate details. Getting caught later may not matter if the threat was addressed. Leaders engaging in preventive wars are especially likely to fearmonger to convince the public an imminent threat exists when it’s actually future risk. Geographic factors and regime type also influence fearmongering - it’s more common for offshore democracies facing distant threats. In summary, public pressure may be needed to force action on threats the political system is reluctant to acknowledge or address openly due to incentives for strategic misinformation.

Strategic cover-ups are lies told by leaders to conceal a failed or controversial policy from both domestic and foreign audiences. They aim to deceive the public and other countries.
Leaders engage in strategic cover-ups for strategic reasons, believing it is in the national interest to hide incompetence, failures, or policies that may arouse opposition. Examples include concealing an inept general during WWI and Israel covering up the Qibya massacre.
Kennedy lied about aspects of the Cuban Missile Crisis deal to get it approved, as the public may have opposed concessions to the Soviets.
Cover-ups are more likely when:
- A country faces threats and needs to project strength/unity
- During a crisis or war when failures could undermine morale/support
- Dealing with rivals where admissions of weakness could be exploited
Domestically, cover-ups are used more during wartime to preserve morale and support for the leadership/effort. Admitting failures at such times could be politically damaging.

So in summary, strategic cover-ups involve lying to domestic and foreign audiences to conceal failures or controversies that leaders believe could undermine strategic interests or goals if revealed. They do so when circumstances demand projecting unity, strength or avoiding any signs of weakness or division.

Nationalist myths created by elites play an important role in building a sense of nationhood and solidarity. They do this by portraying the national group in a favorable, heroic light while casting rival groups in a negative light. Myths often involve self-glorifying, self-whitewashing, and other-maligning historical narratives that require lying about and distorting the factual historical record.

Elites construct myths both to strengthen group identity and pride, motivating people to support the nation, as well as to gain some degree of international legitimacy. Myths are also driven from below, as common people desire positive stories about their own group. Elites may successfully export myths to close allies or diaspora communities abroad.

Nations continuously propagate core myths over time, but intensity of mythmaking increases during wars or incidents requiring new myths to frame key events. Myths also need periodic updating as historical facts emerge. Overall, nationalist mythmaking through distorted narratives is a regular and strategic practice by elites to politically shape national identity and discourse both domestically and internationally.

There are often serious disputes between countries that can trigger renewed controversy over past issues. In these cases, political elites will work to portray their own nation in a very positive light and rival nations in the harshest possible light.

Nationalist mythmaking is also especially intense when a country’s founding is disputed. States want to portray themselves as legitimate and do not want their founding to seem “born in sin.” The more brutal a state-building process was and the more recently it occurred, the more lying will take place to cover up wrongdoing. Elites will fabricate stories portraying their side positively and others negatively.

For example, Israeli and American elites have worked hard to whitewash the brutal founding processes that involved violence against indigenous peoples. Israel’s founding is still controversial due to its recency. Similarly, elites from the 15 former Soviet states did not need to fabricate myths given the relatively peaceful USSR breakup.

Leaders also sometimes violate international norms and law when they believe it serves national interests. They then invent lies to mask their behavior and portray it in a positive light, even if the acts include targeting civilians, imposing economic sanctions, or allying with tyrants. Western allies falsely portrayed Stalin positively during WWII despite his tyranny. Elites also lied about the intent of British bombing campaigns against Germany. Leaders tell liberal lies to portray themselves as law-abiding while casting adversaries negatively, even as they act ruthlessly behind the scenes.

Political theorist Michael Walzer argues that the values leaders invoke to justify their actions reveal the “lineaments of justice.” Leaders tell liberal lies to gain legitimacy at home and abroad by portraying their actions as aligned with liberal norms.
Liberal lies are hard to sell abroad, especially about recent events, as outsiders likely have a good grasp of what actually happened and will be difficult to deceive. Occasionally it may be possible to fool friendly countries with strong ideological or strategic incentives to believe certain liberal falsehoods.
Problems arise when realist and liberal imperatives clash, and leaders act realistically but speak liberally, necessitating deception and lying.
Inter-state lying between leaders has minimal risk of blowback domestically, as the public understands international politics requires different rules than domestic politics, including occasional lying to adversaries. Lying is compartmentalized such that it is not seen as legitimizing lying at home. Reasonable boundaries can be drawn around when lying is acceptable internationally versus domestically.
Some limited lying is considered acceptable in certain constrained social situations, like claiming a bad meal is good, but this does not justify lying in other contexts.
Similarly, limited lying is expected in negotiations over things like houses or cars, but does not enable broader deception.
Inter-state politics also involves some accepted level of deception, as states strategically misrepresent information. However, this can still backfire if the lies are exposed.
Exposed inter-state lies typically have minor consequences, as state behavior is understood to involve deception. Retaliation would not be severe, and the main damage would be to relations for unrelated reasons.
Getting caught telling an inter-state lie rarely meaningfully damages reputation, as states cannot fully trust each other even with a good reputation due to security stakes.
Fearmongering is riskier than strategic inter-state lies, as it threatens to undermine the relationship between leaders and citizens. It indicates distrust in the public and risks pushing misguided policies due to distorted debates. This can lead to serious foreign policy failures if the threat is actually misperceived.

Strategic cover-ups and misinformation in foreign policy can backfire both domestically and internationally. When leaders lie to their own citizens about policies, it suggests they don’t trust the public to understand important issues. This lack of transparency breeds further lack of accountability.

Covering up failed policies is particularly risky. It means flawed policies may persist, incompetent leaders may remain in place, and lessons cannot be learned. More broadly, secrecy hinders accountability and meaningful discussions about what went wrong.

Nationalist mythmaking poses less risk of backfire, as most people believe their own country’s myths. However, foreign policy drives the creation of myths, not the other way around. Myths are tailored to justify actions rather than causing them.

Similarly, liberal lies told by leaders likely have little effect on actual foreign policy. States primarily act in their perceived security interests regardless of rhetoric. Liberal language is adapted to explain past actions rather than shaping new ones.

In summary, while some deception may be seen as necessary, strategic cover-ups carry real dangers of decreased accountability, perpetuating failed approaches, and hindering progress through open debate. Transparency is generally preferable when possible.

Here is a summary of the key points from the inclusion:

Leaders of all countries sometimes lie for strategic reasons, both to other nations and their own people. Lying can be useful in wartime, as in Bismarck’s lies that helped start a war benefiting Germany.
However, lying does not always work and can backfire. It is difficult to deceive adversaries or citizens who are skeptical. Roosevelt’s lying about the Greer incident had little effect.
Eisenhower’s lies about the U-2 spy plane were exposed, undermining the US. Khrushchev exaggerated Soviet ICBM strength, fueling an arms race not in the USSR’s interest.
Johnson’s Gulf of Tonkin lies helped start the Vietnam War, and Bush’s Iraq war lies led to strategic disaster. Fearmongering and cover-ups carry the greatest risks of blowback by undermining political trust.
Given continued global ambitions, the US is likely to engage in fearmongering to justify intervention. As the most powerful state, the US will be deeply involved internationally, creating situations where leaders feel compelled to lie. Ongoing wars may curb but not stop this inclination.
The passage discusses a historical example from the 17th century of a Baptist minister who was questioning whether it was right to lie to protect his family from harm. Specifically, he was questioning if it was right to lie to marauding Indians about whether he had a wife and children in order to prevent them from being killed.
This issue divided the Baptist congregation, with some taking the view that it was acceptable to lie in this situation (“lying Baptists”) and others arguing it was never right to lie (“truthful Baptists”).
The passage then lists 10 scholarly references on the topics of lying, integrity, cooperation, moral lying, deception in international politics, Hobbes’ view of lying, and the prevalence of deception.
It discusses how lying can be a morally complex issue with reasonable arguments on both sides around protecting life versus always telling the truth. The historical example illustrates how this issue divided views even within a religious community.

Here is a summary of the quotes:

A British diplomat stated that leadership of a nation requires honesty and sincerity, which he lacked, so he was unsuited for leading Israel.
Scholars discuss how Stalin foolishly dismissed warnings from Churchill in 1941 about an impending German invasion of the Soviet Union due to paranoid assumptions that foreign diplomats were always lying.
An article discusses international cooperation in economic and security affairs.
A journalist acknowledged that government sometimes has a right to lie in the public interest.
A White House aide admitted he lied to the press twice during his tenure but regretted it.
Historians recounted how Hitler threatened to send more troops to the Rhineland in 1936 even though he only had four small brigades, and it succeeded due to his boldness.
Scholars analyzed how the Soviet Union lied about the strength of its missiles to gain strategic advantage during the Cold War.
Nixon acknowledged lying to the public during the Cuban Missile Crisis for reasons of state.
Kissinger expressed concern about honestly reassurances to NATO could not be fulfilled due to nuclear parity with the Soviets.

In summary, the quotes discuss examples of political leaders lying or misleading for strategic reasons, as well as the costs and ethical implications of such deception. They covered cases from Hitler in the 1930s to the Cold War era.

Here are summaries of the provided sources:

The sources examine Bismarck’s role in the creation and development of the German Empire in the late 19th century, focusing on his political maneuvers, strategic decisions, and impact on modern Germany.
The sources discuss news reports that uncovered issues with the U.S. sharing of nuclear technology with other countries and its misleading of allies.
Eisenhower’s memoir discusses the 1960 U-2 incident and international fallout from the downing of the reconnaissance plane over Soviet territory. Other sources provide additional context on the incident, the captivity of pilot Gary Powers, and diplomacy between Eisenhower and Khrushchev.
The sources relate the story of Zionist terror attacks against British forces in Mandatory Palestine in the 1940s-1950s, including debates around their necessity and effectiveness.
The sources discuss deception tactics used by Allied forces during World War II, including double agents, disinformation campaigns, and the cultivation of a “bodyguard of lies” to mislead the enemy.
The quote indicates FDR’s willingness to employ deceptive rhetoric strategically during wartime.
The summary argues that while deception has a place between adversaries, truthfulness is essential within military organizations for success.
Thomas Schelling’s work explores the logic and ethics of bargaining and coercion, including the practice and limits of deception and bluffing in negotiations.
The summary notes limited evidence of deception in the bargaining that created the European Union, likely because agreements required open information sharing and mutual gains.
The sources outline Greece’s admission of deceiving EU partners about its economic data to qualify for the eurozone.
The sources discuss the U.S. use of deception regarding its long-term policy toward post-WWII Germany to prevent backsliding in European integration.
In closing, a quote suggests the ubiquity and ethical complexity of deception.

The passage discusses misleading and false statements made by the US government in the lead up to the Iraq war. It examines claims made about links between Iraq and Al Qaeda, Iraq possessing weapons of mass destruction, and the urgency of an invasion. Key points made include:

Officials like Rumsfeld and Powell made definitive claims of links between Iraq and Al Qaeda that were later contradicted or walked back.
Intelligence assessments cautioned there was no direct evidence of WMD stockpiles but this nuance was omitted in public statements.
Polls showed many Americans continued to believe Saddam was involved in 9/11 despite officials privately acknowledging no evidence of a link.
The Bush administration pressed an agenda for war despite intelligence contradicting their public claims about Iraq’s threats.
False claims were made about Iraq denying inspectors and the need for immediate action that avoided diplomatic options.

The passage examines how misleading public statements deviated from private intelligence assessments to build support for the invasion of Iraq.

Here are the key points from the sources:

A New Yorker article from 2003 and Richard Haass’s memoir discuss evidence that Bush had decided to invade Iraq before the end of January 2003, despite publicly claiming he had not made a decision.
The 2005 Downing Street Memo and additional sources provide evidence Bush decided to remove Saddam Hussein by force as early as 2002.
The Bush administration exaggerated the threat from Iraq and linked Iraq to 9/11 despite lack of evidence, engaging in fearmongering and inter-state lying.
Past examples like NSC-68 show how administrations inflate threats to shape public opinion and enable policies. Inflating threats was irresponsible in the case of Iraq.
The failure to find WMDs in Iraq and ensuing insurgency showed that Bush’s policy assumptions and planning for postwar Iraq were seriously flawed.
Leaders may mask incompetence through lying in democracies due to accountability to the public, though this serves selfish interests, not the public good. Hiding the truth allows flawed policies to continue without correction.

In summary, the sources provide evidence that Bush had decided on war with Iraq earlier than claimed, and that his administration exaggerated the Iraqi threat and linked it to 9/11 through strategic lying, even as the intelligence did not support these claims. This led to a flawed policy that failed to achieve its objectives.

Master narratives about a country’s past may contain some truthful stories as well as myths. Nationalist myths can help bolster the power of incumbent political elites but lies told solely for selfish purposes are outside the scope of the book.
Countries often propagate myths about their role and their enemies’ roles in past conflicts. Examples discussed include myths in Germany, the US and elsewhere downplaying their own war crimes and exaggerating enemies’ crimes.
The targeting of civilians in war is discussed, as well as debate around civilian deaths from sanctions and famines under authoritarian rulers like Stalin and Mao.
Roosevelt and Churchill did not want to acknowledge Soviet responsibility for the Katyn forest massacre of Polish officers to maintain the alliance against Germany.
Lying erodes trust within societies and between governments, undermining prosperity, cooperation and functioning democracies over the long run according to various scholars discussed.

Here are summaries of the sources:

Demise of American Liberalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005) - This book examines the decline of liberalism in America in the post-WWII era.
“Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, no. 4 (November 1997) - This article investigates whether social capital, defined as trust in others and social networks, has an economic benefit at the country level. It finds some evidence that higher social capital is associated with higher economic growth.
“Trust in Large Organizations,” American Economic Review 87, no. 2 (May 1997) - This article examines survey data on trust in large organizations like government and finds that trust is lower in countries with more interventionist governments and less developed market economies.
Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993) - This book analyzes why democracy works better in some regions of Italy than others, attributing differences to longstanding civic traditions of community participation and trust.
Trust and Rule (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) - This book by Charles Tilly examines the relationship between trust and forms of government or “rule” throughout history.

The other summaries ask for details on specific news articles, books, speeches, or academic works. Let me know if you would like me to summarize any of those sources.

Franco-Prussian War in 1870 involved lies by both sides about intentions and military capabilities.
French government engaged in fearmongering and strategic cover-ups in the early 1970s.
General Tommy Franks noted the benefits that could come from spinning or concealing facts from the enemy.
Leslie Gelb discussed how geography can enable strategic cover-ups.
Germany violated the Versailles Treaty by secretly rearming its military in the 1930s under the Nazis. Nazi elites promoted nationalist myths.
The Greer incident in 1941 involved Roosevelt lying about it to draw the U.S. into WWII.
The Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964 saw Johnson’s administration lie about it to escalate the Vietnam War.
Fearmongering by governments can enable false pretenses for military action or restricting civil liberties.
Greece lied about its budget deficits during the Moroccan Crisis and has strategically benefited from lies at times.
Israel engaged in a covert operation called the Lavon Affair and lied about its nascent nuclear program.
Saddam Hussein was not found to have WMDs, contrary to claims by the Bush administration before the Iraq War.
International lies can backfire due to reduced trust and legitimacy over time if revealed. They also riskNegative consequences for the home front populace. Nationalist mythmaking also carries risks if not backed by facts.
Ons refers to lies or deceptions that occur during wartime. Nationalist myths are commonly propagated during wartime to increase support for the war effort.
Strategic cover-ups often occur during wartime to conceal military plans or capabilities from the enemy.
The Wehrmacht, the armed forces of Nazi Germany, engaged in efforts to blame Poland for starting World War II as a form of nationalist mythmaking.
During World War II, Britain conducted an extensive deception campaign against Nazi Germany to conceal military plans and intentions. There were also liberal lies promoted during WWII.
Bush administration officials like Paul Wolfowitz promoted myths about Iraq’s WMD capabilities in the lead-up to the Iraq War. However, their claims were not supported by solid evidence.
In general, the passage discusses different types of lies and deceptions that occur during wartime, including nationalist myths, strategic cover-ups, liberal lies, and attempts to conceal military intelligence from adversaries. Wartime is seen as a period where official deception is commonly practiced.

#book-summary

Why Leaders Lie - Mearsheimer, John J_