DEEP SUMMARY - Political Cleavages and Social Inequalities - Amory Gethin & Clara Martínez-Toledano & Thomas Piketty

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Here is a summary of the key points from the introduction:

  • The book analyzes political cleavages and social inequalities in 50 electoral democracies from 1948 to 2020 based on electoral survey data.

  • Electoral surveys conducted after elections collect information on voter behavior and socioeconomic characteristics, providing a window into the relationship between political alignments and social structures.

  • The research examines how different dimensions of social inequality (income, education, wealth, occupation, gender, age, origin, identity) correlate with voter preferences and patterns of political mobilization.

  • A central question is the relative importance of "class-based" versus "identity-based" factors in shaping political cleavages and votes. These factors interact in complex ways that vary over time and space.

  • Examples are given of changing political alignments in the US, Europe, and other regions to show how class and identity cleavages can reconfigure electoral politics in different democracy contexts.

  • The goal is a global and historical mapping of how social inequalities are or are not commonly politicized within existing electoral blocs across 50 democracies from 1948 to the present.

    Here is a summary of the key points:

  • The volume examines political cleavages and social inequalities in 50 democracies between 1948-2020. It analyzes case studies across Western/Eastern Europe, North America, Oceania, Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East.

  • Recent decades have seen rising income/wealth inequality globally since the 1980s after a more egalitarian 1950-1980 period. However, this has not necessarily revived class conflicts or redistribution demands.

  • Instead, identity-based political divisions have risen in many countries. But class-based conflicts have also intensified in some Latin American, Asian or African nations.

  • The analysis reveals common patterns across Western democracies like reversals of the education cleavage, emergence of "multi-elite" systems, and evolving identity cleavages.

  • It aims to establish factual patterns and transformations in the socioeconomic structure of electoral coalitions, cleavages and inequalities using historical, global and transnational analysis.

  • The volume explores potential hypotheses for observed evolutions but does not claim to perfectly explain voting reasons. The goal is descriptive analysis to further collective understanding of the documented political transformations.

    Here are the key points from the summary:

  • The chapter examines the relationship between social inequalities and the evolution of political cleavages in 50 democracies using a new dataset of electoral surveys spanning over 60 years.

  • It documents how income, education and other social characteristics like religion, identity, geography correlate with voting patterns, and how these relationships have changed over time.

  • In Western democracies, class-based voting patterns (lower income/education voters supporting left, higher supporting right) weakened as higher-educated shifted left, making systems more "multi-elite." This disconnected economic status from political behaviors.

  • Religious divisions have been strong cross-cutting cleavages, but their influence is waning in the West. Religion also structures politics in majority-Muslim and Hindu-majority countries.

  • Identity issues like immigration have risen in importance, correlating with support for parties on the left or far-right depending on country. Ethnic minorities strongly allied with certain parties.

  • Spatial inequalities also matter - rural areas historically voted more conservative in the West, while parties of low-income urban voters did better in non-Western countries. Regionalism has also intensified in some places.

So in summary, it analyzes how political cleavages have evolved in relation to various social divisions like class, religion, identity and geography, finding both common trends but also variations across democracies.

Here is a summary:

  • Political cleavages play an important role in determining how economic inequalities are addressed or neglected in democracies. Cleavages influence party strategies and representation of citizens' views.

  • Contrary to expectations, democracies have not inevitably led the poor to expropriate the rich. Three factors help explain this: collective beliefs about inequality; unequal political representation favoring the wealthy; and multi-dimensional politics involving other issues besides economics.

  • Unequal political representation, through lobbying, campaign finance, unequal participation, shapes parties' incentives and programs. Left parties only shift left on economics when voter turnout is high.

  • Politics involves diverse issues beyond economics, like culture, identity, and integration. Parties may emphasize these issues to attract voters, weakening economic solidarity. Conflicts over immigration can reduce redistribution support.

  • Political cleavages, as defined by Lipset and Rokkan, emerge from major social transformations like nation-building and industrialization. They define fundamental divisions in democracies around sectors, classes, religion and center-periphery relations.

  • Understanding political cleavages is important to analyze how social conflicts are expressed in democratic politics and party systems, and how this impacts inequality. Multi-dimensional politics complicates a simple rich-poor dynamic.

    Here is a summary:

The concept of political cleavages is useful for understanding how social inequalities and interests are represented in democratic politics. In Western democracies, scholars have documented a process of dealignment from traditional class- and religion-based cleavages over the 20th century, as well as a realignment along a new cultural/societal dimension.

Dealignment involved factors like secularization, economic restructuring, and the decline of unions weakening traditional working-class voting patterns. At the same time, new issues around gender, minorities, and the environment emerged and aligned some voters with green and new left parties. While class identities remain, class voting has declined.

Analyzing cleavages in non-Western democracies is more complicated due to weaker institutions, high volatility, and different historical influences. The church-state and center-periphery cleavages must be expanded to include ethnicity and religion. National liberation movements also shaped cleavages. Latin America most resembles the Western model, while ethnicity, valence issues, and candidates play a bigger role in Africa. Clientelism also influences elections in many non-Western countries. Extending beyond the traditional Western cleavages is needed to understand political representation of inequalities in different country contexts.

Here is a summary:

  • The chapter aims to systematically analyze the roles of income, education, and other sociopolitical identities in generating durable electoral divides, especially in non-Western democracies.

  • It introduces a conceptual framework using income and education as the main measures of social class/inequality, as they are more straightforward and comparable than occupational categories. Some other dimensions like wealth and self-identified class are also considered when available.

  • The interaction between social inequalities and political cleavages is explored, distinguishing between reinforcing cleavages that enhance class divides, and cross-cutting cleavages that blur class divides.

  • A new comparative database is presented covering approximately 500 elections in 50 democracies from 1948-2020. Surveys were harmonized to make income, education and voting data comparable across countries and time periods.

  • The analysis focuses on broad income and education groups to overcome comparability issues. Surveys are also reweighted to match official election results.

  • The chapter aims to systematically document the relationship between inequality and political alignments using this cross-national dataset, while acknowledging limitations of the case studies as not all countries are fully consolidated democracies.

    Here is a summary of the key points:

  • The data covers elections in 50 democracies around the world since the 1940s-1950s for many Western countries and later start dates for other regions as democratic elections began later in places like Africa, Asia, Latin America.

  • Data quality varies significantly, with high quality exit poll/post-election survey data available for many Western democracies and some large non-Western ones like India, Brazil, Indonesia. Data is lower quality for other countries.

  • The analysis focuses on identifying the main party or coalition that disproportionately receives support from the bottom 50% of income earners in each country. This is done to simplify cross-country comparisons but has limitations since voter preferences can change over time.

  • In Western democracies, social democratic, socialist, labor and green parties are typically identified as receiving more support from low-income voters, though this has varied some over the decades. Identifying these "left" or "pro-poor" parties is more complex in non-Western societies.

  • Table 1.1 lists the main left-leaning or pro-poor party identified for each of the 50 countries based on the most recent available election data to provide a starting point for understanding who low-income voters support cross-nationally.

    Here is a summary:

  • Traditionally, party systems in Western democracies were more "class-based", with social democratic parties representing lower-income and lower-educated voters, and conservative parties representing higher-income and higher-educated voters.

  • Over time, these systems have transitioned to "multi-elite" systems, where social democratic parties have become the parties of higher-educated elites, while conservative parties remain the parties of high-income elites.

  • This transition occurred through two processes - the income divide has attenuated somewhat, while the education divide has reversed completely, with higher-educated voters becoming more likely to vote for social democratic parties.

  • However, the speed and extent of this transition varied across countries. Countries with stronger historical class-based systems like Norway, Sweden and Finland saw a slower reversal.

  • Southern Europe and newer democracies also witnessed a delayed reversal, while countries like the US, Netherlands and Switzerland saw the strongest association between higher education and social democratic voting today.

  • Income continues to influence voting preferences, with top-income voters still favoring conservative parties. But the strength of this impact has declined over time across Western democracies.

    Here is a summary:

  • Over the past decades, Western democracies have seen a shift toward multi-elite party systems, with income and education playing increasingly important but reversed roles in determining vote choice.

  • Traditionally, higher-income voters supported right-wing parties while lower-income voters supported left-wing parties. However, there has been a shift where higher-educated voters now tend to support left-wing and green parties while lower-educated support right-wing populist parties.

  • This reversal is driven by the rise of new issue dimensions around immigration and cultural/identity politics since the 1960s. Educational expansion has also contributed, as more educated citizens feel social democratic parties only defend elite interests.

  • The decline of communism and embrace of neoliberal economic policies weakened traditional left parties and class cleavages. This opened space for new right-wing populist and anti-immigration parties.

  • Two-party systems like the US saw this play out within existing parties. In multiparty systems, traditional socialist and Christian democratic parties have declined as green and populist right parties have emerged and grown. Income now divides left from right, while education divides green from populist right. This marks a transformation in the structure of political cleavages.

    Here is a summary of the key points:

  • In the 1960-1980 period in Western democracies, socialist and social democratic parties were generally supported by both lower-income and lower-educated voters, while conservative, Christian, and liberal parties attracted higher-income and higher-educated voters. This represented a period of strong class-based cleavage structures.

  • From 2000-2020, cleavage structures fragmented further. Education most clearly distinguished anti-immigration parties from green parties, while income most clearly separated conservative/Christian parties from socialist/social democratic parties.

  • Self-perceived class identities (working class vs middle/upper class) also showed a gradual decline in influence on party support over recent decades in Western countries where data is available.

  • In non-Western democracies, education and income cleavages tended to be more closely aligned, with lower-educated and lower-income voters supporting the same "pro-poor" parties. Notable exceptions were postwar Japan and 1990s Turkey.

  • There is significant cross-national variation, influenced by other political cleavages intersecting with socioeconomic structures, such as racial divides in South Africa or generational cleavages in Hong Kong.

So in summary, it describes the erosion of traditional class-based cleavage structures in Western democracies since 1960 and provides a comparison to patterns observed in non-Western countries.

Here is a summary:

  • The chapter analyzes how economic concerns interact with other political and social identities, focusing on ethnoreligious and sociocultural cleavages.

  • It first discusses religious-secular cleavages and the voting behavior of religious minorities in Western and non-Western democracies. Historically in Western countries, religious voters were less likely to vote for left-wing parties compared to non-religious voters. This gap has declined over time but remains.

  • It then analyzes political cleavages relating to immigration and new minorities in Western countries.

  • Religious-secular cleavages also exist in Latin America, India, Israel, Turkey and other Muslim-majority countries. But the dynamics vary - in some like India, the cleavage has risen sharply in recent decades.

  • Religion interacts with class cleavages - in countries with strong Christian democratic parties like Italy, religion was a bigger neutralizer of class divides.

  • Religious minorities were also less likely to vote for conservative parties historically in Western democracies, though there are some exceptions like Ireland.

  • The chapter examines how these sociocultural cleavages based on religion, identity and culture shape voting patterns and political representation across different country contexts.

    Here is a summary:

  • In many Western democracies, religious-secular cleavages emerged after the formation of the modern nation-state and have proven highly resilient over time. Social democratic and centrist parties have attracted 30-40% more votes from left-wing and centrist voters since the 1960s.

  • Starting in the late 20th century, a new nativist cleavage emerged related to national identity and immigration. This coincided with the rise of anti-immigration parties. Countries with more powerful anti-immigration parties like Austria, Denmark, France and Switzerland saw larger differences in voting behaviors between natives and immigrants.

  • After 9/11, anti-immigration parties emphasized threats from Islam and Muslim minorities. Data shows Muslims are far more likely than others to vote for social democratic parties across Western countries. This new cleavage intersects with class.

  • Sociocultural cleavages vary across countries with disadvantaged minorities, historically dominant minorities, and high sociocultural fragmentation. Figures show how these identities intersect with class divisions and partisan support in different national contexts.

    Here is a summary of the key points:

  • Sociocultural cleavages (divisions along ethnic, religious, linguistic lines) vary significantly across countries and over time in terms of how aligned they are with class cleavages.

  • In some countries like South Africa and Malaysia, sociocultural cleavages strongly correlate with economic inequalities, so class and ethnic divides reinforce each other.

  • In other countries like Taiwan, sociocultural cleavages are more cross-cutting and independent of economic status.

  • Countries with high ethnic/religious diversity like India, Nigeria, and Ghana generally have sociocultural identities that structure class cleavages to some degree.

  • However, lower-income parties in these countries still attract voters across sociocultural groups, not just from disadvantaged groups.

  • Rural-urban cleavages often correlate with economic divides, as urban areas tend to be wealthier. Left parties have historically been stronger in cities than rural areas in Western democracies.

  • Regional divides within countries can emerge from socioeconomic, cultural, or historical factors and sometimes fuel separatist movements. This varies significantly across countries.

    Here is a summary:

  • Social democratic and similar center-left parties in Western democracies struggled to attract voters beyond the working class, particularly low-income and lower-educated non-manual workers. This limited their success over the 20th century.

  • Class divides were stronger in countries like the UK and Sweden where industrialization peaked earlier, as rural-urban cleavages were less significant when agriculture still dominated (Italy, Ireland, Japan).

  • Rural areas remain about 5-15 percentage points more likely to vote right-wing across most Western democracies, though support is fragmenting within blocs (e.g. greens in cities, far-right in rural areas).

  • Rural-urban cleavages generally align with class cleavages in non-Western democracies, with low-income parties performing better in rural areas. Exceptions include Western democracies and Argentina.

  • Some countries have weak rural-urban divides politically (Japan, Brazil, India) or multiple competing pro-poor coalitions in rural and urban areas (Indonesia, Peru).

  • Dominant parties in one-party systems see much stronger support in rural areas due to patronage networks, while cities mobilize opposition.

  • Strongest regional cleavages involve ethnic diversity clustered regionally (Iraq, Nigeria, South Africa, etc.), interacting with sociospatial inequalities.

    Here is a summary of the key points:

  • Thailand stands out as having one of the highest levels of regional voting polarization, driven by extreme wealth disparities between Bangkok and northern territories from unequal economic growth.

  • Regional cleavages have increased significantly in several democracies like India, Pakistan, Belgium, Spain, and the UK in recent decades. Regional parties have gained prominence.

  • Socioeconomic factors like disparities between rich and poor regions have contributed to the strength of regional identities and separatist movements in countries like Belgium, Spain, Canada, and the UK.

  • Generational cleavages can lead to party system transformation as new cohorts replace old ones and prioritize different values like post-materialist issues for those socialized in more affluent times.

  • Differences between age groups are often not due to aging effects but rather reflect lasting opinions formed during one's formative years (across cohort effects rather than within cohort effects).

  • In Western democracies, generational cleavages have contributed to the emergence of multi-elite party systems that better represent specific demographic groups.

    Here is a summary:

The passage discusses generational cleavages and differences in voting patterns across age groups in Western democracies. While the overall left-right divide between younger and older generations has remained stable over time, some key points are made:

  • Green and new left parties receive disproportionately more youth support, indicating young people place more importance on environmental and social issues.

  • However, there is no clear pattern of youth increasingly supporting anti-immigration parties more or less than older generations across countries. Support has both increased and decreased for such parties among youth in different places.

  • Replacement of older generations has led to a reversal of the educational cleavage, with higher-educated youth now more likely to support social democratic parties compared to lower-educated youth.

  • In one-party dominant systems, dominant post-independence parties receive more support from older generations with stronger collective memories, while youth form the base of rising opposition movements.

  • Some parties seen strong generational divides where issues of political integration, national identity, foreign policy and war memory are most contentious.

So in summary, it questions the idea of a uniform youth backlash but finds key variations in intergenerational voting patterns depending on country and issue. Replacement effects and new social issues are also reshaping some political cleavages over time.

Here is a summary:

  • Younger generations in the UK have been more supportive of EU integration compared to older generations, which can be partly explained by higher education levels among the young leading to a stronger sense of European identity and more progressive stances on issues like the environment and immigration.

  • Generational divisions over political integration into supranational bodies like the EU produce some of the deepest generational cleavages observed, as they question national sovereignty and identities.

  • Traditionally, women were more likely to vote conservatively while men leaned left, but this "traditional gender cleavage" disappeared in western democracies after the 1980s as women shifted toward social democratic parties.

  • Reasons for the modern gender gap include women's increased economic independence, exposure to labor market inequalities, non-traditional family structures, declining religiosity, and embrace of post-materialist and feminist values among women.

  • Gender politics vary across countries, with some seeing candidate effects and others patterned more like traditional/modern western gender cleavages associated with certain parties.

  • Cleavage structures differ widely but generally class divides are stronger when religion/values cleavages are weaker, though identities linked to inequality can reinforce class divisions in some plural societies.

    Here is a summary of the key points:

  • Party systems can be classified into four ideal types based on how social divisions and inequalities structure electoral competition: class-based, identity-based, multidimensional, and unstable/depolarized.

  • Class-based systems see socioeconomic divisions like income and education strongly determine voting behaviors. identity-based systems are dominated by other identities like ethnicity, religion, age that are weakly linked to class.

  • Multidimensional systems have both socioeconomic and secondary identity dimensions shaping votes. Unstable systems have weak partisan affiliations and floating voters.

  • Examples of tending toward identity-based include Iraq (ethnoreligious), South Korea/Taiwan (age, ethnicity). Class remains important in one-party dominant systems like Botswana, Senegal, India, Japan, Mexico.

  • Most democracies have multidimensional systems blending class and other identities to varying degrees. Some Latin American and Asian countries have unstable/depolarized systems.

  • Party systems can transition between types over time due to critical events or social transformations weakening or strengthening divisions. Representation of social cleavages depends on how political actors embody these divisions.

    Here is a summary of the key sources:

  • Social Class,” International Sociology 8, no. 3 (1993): 293–316 by R. Erikson and J. H. Goldthorpe examines class mobility in industrial societies.

  • Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Eonomic, and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton University Press, 1997) by R. Inglehart studies how values and political styles have changed among Western publics.

  • The Political Mobilization of the European Left, 1860–1980 (Cambridge University Press, 2000) by S. Bartolini examines the political mobilization of the left in Europe from 1860-1980.

  • Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries (Cambridge University Press, 1992) edited by M. Franklin, T. Hackie, H. Valen, et al. looks at electoral change in response to changing attitudes in Western countries.

  • Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies (Oxford University Press, 2002) by R. J. Dalton and M. P. Wattenberg and other sources examine electoral dealignment and changes to party systems in advanced democracies.

    Here is a summary:

  • The author analyzes changing political cleavages in France, Britain, and the US from 1948-2020 using post-electoral surveys.

  • In the 1950s-1960s, left-wing parties (socialist, labor, democratic) were most associated with lower-education and lower-income voters, representing a "class-based" party system.

  • Since the 1970s-1980s, there has been a gradual shift such that left-wing parties have become most associated with higher-education voters.

  • By the 2000s-2010s, the author argues this has given rise to a "multi-elite" party system where high-education voters support the left ("Brahmin left") while high-income/wealth voters still support the right ("merchant right").

  • The same transformation occurred in the party systems of France, the US, and Britain, despite differences in their political histories.

  • The author suggests this structural evolution may help explain rising inequality, lack of democratic response to inequality, and rise of "populism" as low-education, low-income voters feel left behind.

    Here is a summary:

  • The author analyzes changing political cleavages in France by examining voting patterns and survey data over time, from 1946-2017.

  • They find that education, income, and wealth cleavages have reversed, with more educated and affluent voters now supporting right-wing parties. This has led to a "multi-elite" party system.

  • Cleavages have also emerged along lines of religion and foreign origins. Survey data shows the development of two-dimensional political cleavages defined by education and income.

  • Three main mechanisms are proposed to explain these changes: the rise of identity politics, expansion of higher education, and shift toward market ideology/private property since the 1980s.

  • Educational expansion made it harder for left parties to present as pro-lower classes. Globalization increased inequality dimensions and conflict beyond simple class.

  • Future evolutions could include further elite polarization, a nativist vs globalist divide, or return to redistributive class politics from an internationalist or nationalist perspective.

    Here is a summary of the key points about center left and center right based on the provided text:

  • Historically in the 1950s-1960s, more educated voters tended to vote more for center-right parties. Higher levels of education correlated with higher levels of support for right-wing parties.

  • However, beginning in the late 20th century, there was a complete reversal of this relationship. Starting in the 2000s-2010s, higher levels of education began correlating with higher levels of support for center-left parties instead of center-right.

  • This shift from education favoring the right to favoring the left represented a massive change over the course of several decades. It indicates education went from being a predictor of right-leaning votes to left-leaning votes.

  • The reversal held across all education levels - those with primary education, secondary education, and tertiary education. It also held among graduates with different levels of advanced degrees.

  • This transformation appears very robust even when controlling for other variables like age, income, wealth, and family background. The education trend is the same regardless of controls.

  • As a result of educational expansion, center-left parties have become more associated with "winners" in higher education, while center-right still draws more support from those without university degrees.

So in summary, there was a complete reversal over the 20th century where education became a strong predictor of support for center-left rather than center-right political parties in France.

Here is a summary:

  • The article analyzes political cleavages in France based on wealth, income, education level, and voting attitudes over time (1974-2012).

  • It finds that wealth is a stronger determinant of voting attitude than income. Previous research had not established this.

  • Looking at left-wing vote by wealth decile, it was much higher among the bottom 10% and much lower among the top 10% and 1% in earlier years like 1978.

  • Over time, the gap in left-wing vote between top 10% and bottom 90% of wealth/income declined to some extent, though wealth remained a stronger factor.

  • In 2017, the left-wing vote gap by income became slightly positive without controls but back to zero with controls, making the results unclear.

  • Gradually the left-wing vote became more associated with higher-educated voters, moving toward a "multi-elite" system with education vs wealth divisions.

  • Potentially in the future, the left-wing vote could become associated with high-income voters as well, indicating a complete realignment of the party system. But the future stability of this transformation remains uncertain.

    Here is a summary of the key differences between "globalists" (high income, high education) and "nativists" (low income, low education) based on the passage:

  • Globalists tend to be higher educated and have higher incomes than nativists. Their careers and choices are more focused on accumulating human capital through education.

  • Nativists' careers and choices are more focused on accumulating wealth through non-human capital means rather than education.

  • Education has become a strongly positive predictor of left-wing voting preferences, while wealth remains a strongly negative predictor of support for right-wing parties. Income falls in between and is a moderately negative predictor of left-wing vote.

  • This reflects how income is determined by a combination of education, wealth, and other factors. Some individuals and families specialize more in education vs wealth accumulation.

  • Globalists with high education are more likely to support multi-cultural, pro-immigration stances compared to nativists with low education who are more likely to support nationalist, anti-immigration positions.

  • Views on migration and immigration have become more divisive politically over time, splitting the population almost evenly but with a slight majority still believing there are too many immigrants. The voting cleavage on this issue between the two sides has also increased.

So in summary, the key dividing lines appear to be levels of education, sources of income/wealth, and stances on cultural globalism vs nationalism including views on immigration.

Here is a summary:

  • The passage examines changing political cleavages in the US using post-election survey data from ANES (American National Election Studies) and NEP (National Exit Polls) from 1948-2020.

  • It briefly describes the two-party system in the US with the Democrats and Republicans receiving around 40-60% of the popular vote each election.

  • ANES is the primary data source due to its longest consistent series beginning in 1948, but it lacks detailed wealth data. NEP from 1972-2016 has bigger sample sizes but less variables.

  • The passage will analyze breakdowns of votes by education, income, wealth and show the shift to a "multi-elite" party system over time. It will also examine breakdowns by ethnic and foreign origins.

  • The goal is to better understand the historical trajectory of the Democratic party in the US and how multidimensional political cleavages have evolved, which may provide insights for analyzing changes in other countries.

    Here is a summary:

  • The education cleavage between voters with university degrees and without has reversed in the US over time. It used to be negative (university grads voted more Republican) but is now strongly positive.

  • Looking at different education levels in more detail, the relationship between education and Democratic vote has changed from decreasing to close to monotonically increasing by 2016.

  • Controls for factors like income, gender and race explain some but not all of this reversal. The top 10% vs bottom 90% education gap has also fully reversed.

  • The income cleavage has been relatively stable until 2016, when for the first time high-income voters slightly supported Democrats over Republicans. This gap widened further in 2020.

  • Wealth seems to be an even stronger predictor of Republican vote than income, based on limited US wealth data.

  • Combining the education and income trends, the author argues the US party system has undergone a "great reversal" similar to France, with Democrats becoming the party of more educated and higher-income voters over time.

    Here are the key points:

  • In the 1940s-1960s, the US party system was class-based, with low-income/education voters supporting Democrats and high-income/education supporting Republicans.

  • It has gradually shifted to a "multi-elite" system, where high-education vote Democrat and high-income vote Republican.

  • Racial cleavages have also transformed - Black voters overwhelmingly support Democrats (80-95% since 1964) similar to Muslim voters in France.

  • Latino/non-Black minority vote has also strongly favored Democrats (55-70% since 1972) but to a lesser extent than Black vote. This is a big difference from France where those with foreign origins vote the same as those without.

  • Racial issues are argued to have contributed to weakening the New Deal Democratic coalition as Souther white workers defected after civil rights era. This helped drive the transition to a multi-elite system.

  • However, the extent of "racism" is related to actual race relations and social policies that can unify or divide identities. Segmented US policies may have made developing common interests harder.

    Here is a summary:

  • Based on post-electoral survey data from 1955-2017, the education cleavage for votes between the Labour party and Conservative party in Britain has reversed over time. Labor used to receive much lower votes from university graduates compared to non-graduates (25 points lower in 1955), but now receives higher votes from graduates (13 points higher in 2017).

  • Britain has gradually moved from a "class-based" party system where low education/income voters supported Labour, to a "multi-elite" system where high education voters strongly support Labour but high income/wealth voters strongly support the Conservatives.

  • Unlike in France and the US, there is no sign in Britain that high-income voters may shift support to Labour in the future. The 2015-2017 elections saw high education voters increase Labour support and high income voters increase Conservative support, reinforcing the "multi-elite" nature of the British system.

  • In summary, while the education cleavage reversal trend is similar across countries, Britain's system has always been more class-based and the educated elite shifted to Labour later and to a lesser extent than in other countries. But it has still transitioned to a multi-elite system.

    This passage discusses the transformation of religious and ethnic-based political cleavages in Britain over time based on analysis of post-election survey data from 1955-2017. Some key points:

  • Britain has seen a large decline in voters identifying as Christian from 96% in 1964 to 43% in 2017, similar to trends in France. Non-religious identification has risen from 3% to 48% over this period.

  • Muslim identification was less than 1% in 1979 and rose to 5% by 2017, comparable to levels in France. British Muslims have consistently voted strongly (80-95%) for the Labour Party, similar to Muslim voting patterns in France.

  • Ethnic minority identifications have risen, with white identification declining from 98% in 1979 to 89% in 2017. Those with non-European ethnic origins strongly support Labour, independent of religious identity.

  • Issues of immigration emerged as divisive in the 1970s and contributed to the Conservative victory in 1979. Labour was seen as more sympathetic to immigrants while Conservatives favored stopping immigration.

  • The author argues these trends point to a transformation from a class-based to a "multi-elite" party system divided along lines of education and ethnicity/culture, rather than a simple realignment along economic lines. The evolution occurred within Britain's existing two-party framework.

So in summary, the passage analyzes evidence that Britain has seen a "great reversal" or transformation of its party cleavages from class to ethnicity/culture/religion, similar to trends identified in France and the U.S. but occurring within longstanding party structures.

Here is a summary:

  • The research documents a long-term evolution in the structure of political cleavages in France, the US, and Britain from 1948-2020.

  • In the 1950s-1960s, left-wing parties were associated with lower education/income voters. Gradually, it became associated with higher education voters, creating a "multi-elite" system by 2000s-2010s.

  • High education elites now vote left, while high income/wealth elites still vote right (though less so). This can help explain rising inequality and lack of democratic response.

  • Globalization and education expansion created new dimensions of conflict, weakening previous class-based coalitions and breakdown of postwar left-right system.

  • Open questions remain about how much identity/migration cleavages drove this transition, and if multi-elite systems can persist stably or are inherently unstable.

  • The analysis aims to test if multi-elite cleavages also emerge in countries with little migration exposure, to better understand these issues through comparative research.

In summary, the research documents a transition in political cleavages across countries from class-based to a "multi-elite" system divided along both education and economic lines, which may help explain issues like rising inequality. It aims to better understand the causes and persistence of this phenomenon.

Here is a summary:

  • The chapter examines electoral cleavages and socioeconomic inequality in Germany from 1949 to 2017 using political attitude survey data.

  • Germany's political system is characterized by stability due to institutions designed after the Weimar Republic to avoid instability. This includes a mixed electoral system and 5% threshold for parliamentary representation.

  • The analysis focuses on voting behavior in federal elections, which determine the Bundestag composition and Chancellor. Germany can be described as a "Chancellor democracy" due to the powerful role of the Chancellor.

  • Traditionally, the political space was occupied by the center-left SPD and center-right CDU/CSU parties, which have led all governments. However, voting patterns in relation to socioeconomic factors have changed substantially since the 1980s with the rise of new parties.

  • The evolution shares similarities with the "multi-elite" cleavage structure seen in other countries, but Germany also has its own specific trajectory and party dynamics that could lead to further realignments in the future.

    Here is a summary:

  • The passage discusses the historical development of political parties represented in the Bundestag (German parliament) since 1949.

  • It outlines the major parties that have had consistent representation - CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, along with newer parties like Greens and Left entering in the 1980s-1990s.

  • In early decades, conservative coalitions led by CDU/CSU governed, but SPD also rose and first led a government in 1969 under Willy Brandt in coalition with FDP.

  • Greens first entered parliament in 1983 and established themselves, while Eastern successor party Left entered in 1990 following reunification.

  • Since 2005, Angela Merkel of CDU/CSU has led various coalitions with SPD and FDP. New right party AfD entered parliament in 2017.

  • It analyzes trends in vote shares over time showing a decline for CDU/CSU and SPD as parliamentary representation has become more fragmented with 6 parties now.

  • It also discusses analyzing voting behavior through surveys to explore changing political cleavages like the reversal of higher education correlating more with left voting now than historically favoring conservative parties.

    Here is a summary:

  • The education cleavage in Germany has reversed over time, similar to other Western democracies. Highly educated voters have become more left-leaning.

  • Much of this reversal occurred in the 1980s, driven by the emergence and establishment of the Green party (B90/Grüne). Their voter base has always been strongly left-leaning and highly educated.

  • Younger voters and women have also become more left-leaning over time. The income gap between left and right has declined but remained significant, with left parties attracting fewer high-income voters.

  • Religious differences persist, with left support higher among Protestants, other religions, and no religion compared to Catholics. Muslim voters recently had the highest left support.

  • The concurrent rise of the SPD and AfD, both attracting less educated and lower income voters, suggests new issues like redistribution and migration have disrupted previous class-based political alignments.

  • Future unification of intellectual and economic elites within a single party, as seen in France and US, remains a possibility in Germany but uncertain.

    Here is a summary:

  • The Nordic countries (Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Iceland) have historically had relatively stable multi-party systems with strong class cleavages.

  • They have shown varying degrees of transition toward a multi-elite party system, as in other Western democracies, with left-wing votes becoming associated with higher education levels since the 1970s-1980s.

  • This transition has occurred faster in Norway and Denmark, where traditional left support among lower education levels has declined to the benefit of right and far-right parties. Sweden and Finland have managed to retain more traditional left support among working classes.

  • Populist and nationalist parties have risen with some blaming globalization for leaving lower classes behind. In Norway and Denmark, anti-immigrant parties emerged, while in Finland nationalism focused more on taxation issues initially.

  • Swedish exceptionalism declined with far-right success in 2010s. Iceland's main right party adopted a centrist line, limiting new nationalist emergence.

  • Increased migration led to some signs of a new religious cleavage consistent with other Western nations, with Muslim voters leaning somewhat left.

    Here is a summary:

  • In the 1970s, Norway rejected EU membership in a referendum, leading to an 11% drop in votes for the Labour Party in the 1973 election. The winners were anti-EU factions that split from Labour.

  • In the 1980s, Norway saw a rightward shift in line with Europe. The Conservative Party formed minority governments in 1981 and 1983.

  • By 1994, divergent views within the center-right coalition allowed Labour to return to power. The Progress Party gained support among the right-wing electorate, surpassing the Conservatives in popularity.

  • From 2005-2013 the country was governed by a Red-Green coalition of Labour, Center, and Socialist Left parties.

  • Norway has transitioned to a multi-elite party system where support for left-wing parties is now associated more with higher education than lower income/class. The Labour party has lost support among lower-educated voters.

  • Traditional cleavages like class and gender have declined in importance, while other factors like occupation (public vs private sector) and immigration stance have taken on more significance. Muslims now disproportionately support left-wing parties.

    Here is a summary:

  • The passage discusses the emerging political cleavages in Norway based on data from 2013-2017.

  • It shows that educational attainment, income level, gender, age, and religious affiliation all correlate with support for different political parties in Norway.

  • For example, voters with higher levels of education were more likely to support left-leaning parties like the Socialist Left Party and Labour Party. Higher-income voters tended to support right-leaning parties like the Conservative Party.

  • No religious cleavage seems to have emerged as both the largest party (Labour) and second largest party (Conservative) receive similar shares of votes across religious groups. Overall, the data indicates Norway has developed cleavages along socioeconomic lines like education and income.

    Here is a summary:

  • In Denmark, class polarization has sharply declined over the last decade due to a sharp drop in working class support for left parties. Educational level has become a more important indicator of voting behavior.

  • Denmark also has significant sectoral (public vs private sector) and immigration-related cleavages. Support for left parties among private sector workers has declined significantly since the 1980s. The anti-immigration Danish People's Party has attracted voters from disadvantaged backgrounds since emerging in the late 1990s.

  • Sweden had a stable five-party system for many years dominated by the Social Democratic Party. However, the system began to change in the 1970s/80s with new parties emerging. Support for the Social Democrats has gradually declined from over 40% historically to 28% in 2018. The left/right bloc structure also weakened over time.

    Here is a summary:

  • Sweden historically had a stable party system dominated by social democrats and moderates. However, it has undergone a gradual transition to a multi-elite party system in recent decades, though at a slower pace than Norway and Denmark.

  • Educational voting gaps have closed, with left-leaning parties gaining more support from higher educated voters over time. However, social democrats retained much of the lower-educated vote until recently.

  • Class remains an important cleavage, and union membership strongly correlates with left-wing voting. A gender gap also emerged favoring left parties among public sector (vs private sector) women.

  • Attitudes toward immigration increased in the late 20th century, but parties did not address it until the rise of the anti-immigration Sweden Democrats after 2010. Their popularity among young, low-income, and lower-educated voters suggests Sweden has lost its "exceptional" position regarding immigration politics.

  • Data from 2010-2014 shows Sweden Democrats draw most support from those with primary education and lower incomes, while social democrats rely more on similar demographics. Elite parties now dominate among higher education and income groups.

So in summary, it analyzes the evolution of Sweden's political landscape and voting patterns, noting a transition to a multi-elite system and the end of its exceptional stance on immigration with the Sweden Democrats' rise. Class, education, gender and other socioeconomic factors influenced voting trends over time.

Here's a summary:

  • Finland's parliament (Eduskunta) was historically dominated by four main parties: the Social Democratic Party, the Agrarian League/Center Party, the liberal-conservative National Coalition Party, and the Finnish People's Democratic League uniting left-wing forces under the Communist Party.

  • No single party has ever gained a majority, leading to many short-lived coalition governments between the 1940s-1960s. Cross-bloc coalitions were also more common than in other Nordic countries.

  • In the 1990s, Finland faced an economic crisis. A center-right government pursued austerity, while the Social Democrats led a five-party coalition in 1995.

  • A 2000 constitutional reform reduced the president's role in government formation.

  • The True Finns emerged in the 2000s as a far-right populist party, becoming the 3rd largest party in 2011 and enabling it to join a center-right coalition government.

  • Finnish politics has seen gradual multipartism, with class remaining an important cleavage and the Social Democrats receiving most working-class support. Education levels have impacted support for left and green parties more than in Norway/Denmark. Regional and rural-urban divides also influence voting patterns.

    Here is a summary of the key points about Finnish and Icelandic politics since the 1960s:

  • In Finland, the Agrarian Party was founded in 1959 to represent rural Finns and gained support in the 1970s-1980s. It declined and was succeeded by the True Finns party in 1995.

  • The True Finns gained parliamentary seats in 1999 and peaked in 2007. It differed from similar Nordic far-right parties in having a more moderate profile and advocating progressive taxation rather than lower taxes.

  • However, the True Finns aligned with other European far-right parties in opposition to immigration and multiculturalism. It attracted mainly rural, lower-educated, and lower-income voters.

  • Iceland's main parties since the 1940s have been the center-left Social Democratic Alliance, left-wing Left-Green Movement, right-wing Independence Party, and center-right Progressive Party.

  • The 2008 financial crisis led to left-wing government from 2009-2013. Subsequent elections saw increased support for new parties like the Pirate Party.

  • Iceland uniquely had a stable multi-elite party system from the 1980s, with left parties supported by highly educated voters rather than lower-educated as in other Nordic states.

  • The Progressive Party attracted most lower-educated voters while left parties gained support from the highly educated. This contrasted with trends elsewhere in Northern Europe.

    Here is a summary:

  • Iceland has historically had a stable multi-elite party system with social democratic/left-wing parties receiving support from higher-educated voters and right-wing parties receiving support from high-income voters.

  • Class cleavages are not as pronounced in Iceland compared to other Nordic countries. Workers are not substantially more left-wing than higher-level employees/business owners.

  • There is a strong rural-urban cleavage, with the formerly agrarian Progressive Party retaining support in rural areas. This helps explain the stability of the education gradient.

  • Iceland lacks strong far-right nationalist parties captured by lower-educated voters, unlike other European countries. The Progressive Party has adopted a more nationalist, anti-immigration stance but remains rooted in rural areas.

  • Gender and public/private sector cleavages have also emerged since the 1980s. The Pirate Party is closer to the social left while promoting civil liberties and digital rights.

So in summary, Iceland's multi-elite party system and weak class cleavage have contributed to stability, while new cleavages like gender and urban/rural have influenced voter alignments over time. The Progressive Party fills some of the niche of far-right parties elsewhere.

Here is a summary of the key points from the chapter:

  • The politics of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand have been shaped by different patterns of religious, linguistic and ethnic diversity arising from their histories of settler colonialism in the 19th century.

  • In the postwar era, class politics structured conflicts along a left-right axis in Australia and New Zealand more clearly than in Canada. However, education is now increasingly impacting voter behavior in all three countries.

  • There has been a long-run decline in class-based voting in Australia and New Zealand, but not in Canada where class cleavages were never as strong. Higher educated voters have increasingly supported labor, green, liberal and social democratic parties across the countries.

  • This has led to the emergence of "multi-elite" party systems where top income voters support conservative parties but most educated voters back labor, green, liberal options.

  • The political representation of religious and ethnic minorities has intersected with class politics differently in each country. In New Zealand, the Māori-European cleavage remains salient due to Treaty obligations.

  • Immigration and integration of old and new minorities have taken different forms in these countries compared to Western Europe, providing insights into factors shaping the new educational divide.

    Here is a summary:

  • Australia historically had a two-party system dominated by the center-left Labor Party and center-right Liberal/National coalition.

  • New minor parties have emerged since the 1950s like Democratic Labor, Australian Democrats, and One Nation. Greens support has also increased.

  • Labor took a more moderate economic stance under Hawke and Keating in the 1980s-90s, embracing free trade and privatization.

  • Class voting, with the working-class strongly supporting Labor, declined significantly from the 1960s. This matches a global trend of dealignment.

  • Australia historically had a religious divide between Catholic and Protestant voters. Catholics strongly supported Labor.

  • Since the 1960s, the number of non-religious voters has risen greatly in Australia. Support for Labor among Catholics has declined correspondingly.

  • A new secular-religious divide has emerged to replace the old Catholic-Protestant cleavage in Australian politics.

    Here is a summary:

  • In New Zealand, a two-party system emerged in the early 20th century between the Liberal Party and Reform Party, which later consolidated into the National Party. From the 1930s to the 1980s, politics was dominated by Labor and National in a fairly stable two-party system.

  • Starting in the 1990s, electoral reforms allowed smaller parties to gain more representation. The Green Party and New Zealand First (NZF) emerged as sustained minor parties winning 5-10% of votes each election. NZF has worked with both Labor and National in government coalitions.

  • Ideologically, both major parties have moderated over time. Labor implemented modest social reforms initially but pursued deregulation and privatization in the 1980s, while National also liberalized the economy and labor markets.

  • Surveys show political cleavages in New Zealand have declined along class lines as education and income have become more influential determinants of voting patterns. This trend parallels changes seen in Australia's multi-party system.

    Here is a summary:

  • The analysis focuses on three key transformations in New Zealand politics: the evolution of class voting, the vote of minorities, and the emergence of a multi-elite party system.

  • Class voting has significantly declined since the 1970s, with those identifying as working class or lower class becoming less likely to vote for Labour and other left parties over time. This stands in contrast to subjective class identifications remaining stable.

  • Māori and Pacific people have consistently been more likely to vote for Labour and the left since the 1970s, indicating a strong Māori-Pākehā ethnic cleavage. Asian voters have been about as likely as Europeans to vote left.

  • A multi-elite party system has emerged, with highest-educated voters becoming more likely to vote Labour/Greens since the 1970s, while top-income earners' support for the left has stabilized.

  • Today Labour receives a hybrid vote from working class/low-income and highly educated voters. Greens receive middle-class/educated support. New Zealand First resembles far-right parties in receiving lower-educated, low-income support but not primarily from the ethnic majority.

  • Asians have been slightly more likely to vote National than Labour, contrasting with trends in Western Europe where immigrants support social democratic parties.

    Here is a summary of the key points:

  • Canada has had a relatively stable two-party system, dominated by the Liberal Party and Conservative Party. The NDP plays a secondary role but has never exceeded 20% of the vote nationally.

  • Regional, linguistic, and religious identities have greatly shaped Canadian politics and inhibited the emergence of a strong class cleavage. Quebec, language divisions, and Catholicism have been tightly linked.

  • The Liberals have shifted ideologically over time, moving left after WWII and becoming more economically liberal in the 1990s. Conservatives also shifted right in the 1980s under Mulroney.

  • The NDP has moved toward the center from its socialist roots to promote social democracy, welfare, and liberal values.

  • Religion remains a strong predictor of vote choice - Protestants support Conservatives while non-religious voters back the NDP and Greens. Language and region also correlate with party support.

  • Class is a poor predictor of voting in Canada compared to these other identities, which has strengthened the two-party system dominated by Liberals and Conservatives. Regionalism inhibits a unified left coalition.

    Here is a summary of the key points:

  • Religious divisions in Canada have historically been split between nonreligious voters supporting the NDP, Protestants supporting conservative parties, and Catholics/new religious minorities supporting the Liberals.

  • There is no clear class cleavage in Canada like in other Western countries. Top income earners have traditionally supported Conservatives more while the NDP draws more from low-income voters. Liberals are in the middle.

  • In recent decades, the NDP has become more oriented toward low-income constituencies while the Liberals draw more support from economic elites, resembling Conservatives on economic issues.

  • An educational divide has emerged with Liberals, NDP, and Greens drawing more support from highly educated voters, while Conservatives draw relatively less support.

  • Regional and linguistic identities were historically important but class politics in Canada now resemble other Western countries.

  • Liberals draw broader support across income, education and religious groups while Conservatives rely more on low-education, high-income Christians. NDP draws more non-religious and low-income voters.

  • Language and religion still strongly influence votes, with Bloc Quebecois drawing mainly French votes and Liberals finding most support among new religious minorities.

    Here is a summary:

  • The chapter analyzes the changing relationship between party choice and socioeconomic conflicts in Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland over the last decades.

  • These four countries experienced late industrialization and were deeply impacted by the 2008 global recession, leading to the emergence of challenger parties that transformed their party systems.

  • However, socioeconomic cleavages have not followed the same patterns in each country due to different political histories.

  • In Italy and Spain, class cleavages have progressively disappeared as new challenger, liberal, and nationalist anti-immigration parties emerged and attracted the young vote. The highest educated increasingly voted for new left parties.

  • In contrast, in Portugal class divisions deepened after 2008 as the two mainstream parties took more extreme positions.

  • Ireland has also seen a rise in class divides following the recession with increased popularity of the "workers' party" Sinn Féin.

  • The chapter examines how post-recession austerity policies impacted national elections and socioeconomic conflicts differently across these four European countries.

    Here is a summary:

  • Italy has witnessed the emergence of a weak "multi-elite party system" in recent decades, with some trends similar to other Western democracies.

  • The highest educated voters have become increasingly likely to vote for the historical left (the "Brahmin left"), while top-income voters have remained more faithful to the right (the "merchant right"), but the differences are not as stark as in other countries.

  • Religious cleavages and the decoupling of class and Catholicism have weakened the "merchant right" in Italy compared to other places.

  • Spain is transitioning to a multi-elite system more slowly due to its authoritarian past preventing a strong far-right, and regional nationalist parties emphasizing identity over class.

  • Portugal and Ireland have not shown signs of transitioning to a multi-elite system due to lack of value-based conflicts, weak party polarization, strength of communist and Sinn Féin votes respectively.

So in summary, Italy exhibits a weak multi-elite system emergence like other Western democracies, but religious and national identity cleavages have attenuated the differences compared to peer countries.

Here is a summary:

  • In Italy, the relationship between education level and vote choice shifted significantly between the 1970s-1980s. As the Communist Party moved away from Soviet obedience toward Eurocommunism, higher-educated voters became more likely to support left-wing parties. This led to the emergence of a "multi-elite" party system.

  • The exclusion of the Five Star Movement (M5S) from analyses of the left vote exacerbates the education gap, indicating M5S does not disproportionately attract highly educated voters.

  • Italy historically had weak relationships between social class, education, income and partisanship compared to other countries. This was reinforced by the decoupling of class and religion - voters may support different parties based on these factors.

  • The 2018 elections confirmed Italy's multi-elite system, with social democratic parties dominating among high-education voters and the far-right League strongest among low-education. M5S appealed to a broader base.

  • Regional divides have given Italy's party system a unique shape, as new regional parties like League and M5S emerged strongly in certain areas. Overall, Italy has transitioned to a system defined more by education than social class.

    Here is a summary:

  • In the late 2010s, Spain's traditional two-party system transformed into a multi-polar system with fragile majorities. Three new challenger parties emerged - Ciudadanos (center-liberal), VOX (far-right nationalist/conservative), and Podemos (radical left).

  • Ciudadanos originated in Catalonia and expanded across Spain by addressing demands for political renewal and opposing Catalan independence. VOX entered parliament for the first time in 2019.

  • Spain has been moving toward a "multi-elite" party system where education and income are less strongly correlated with voting preferences. However, religious and regional identities like Catalan nationalism have hindered this transition.

  • The nationalist vote in Catalonia is disproportionately from higher-income and educated voters, likely wanting to retain fiscal receipts regionally. But cultural/identity factors also contribute.

  • The new parties resemble systems in other Western European countries, with Podemos representing the radical left, Ciudadanos as center-liberal, and VOX as far-right. But VOX has not strongly appealed to low-income/education groups as in some other countries.

  • Overall the emergence of new parties has realigned voter preferences within ideological blocs rather than completely transforming the party system.

    Here is a summary:

  • Portugal transitioned to democracy in the 1970s after nearly five decades of dictatorship. A new constitution was approved in 1976 establishing a semi-presidential system.

  • Elections use a proportional representation formula that biases results in favor of large parties due to the closed-list D'Hondt method used to allocate seats.

  • The party system evolved in three periods: 1973-1987 saw a multiparty system with short-lived governments; 1987-2015 consolidated a two-party system dominated by PS (left) and PSD (right); 2015-present saw both main parties adopt more extreme positions on austerity.

  • Portugal is characterized by a stable "single-elite party system" with higher-educated and higher-income voters predominantly supporting right-wing parties. This is exceptional in Western Europe where education is usually correlated with left support.

  • Class cleavages have risen since the 2000s as the two main parties adopted more polarized positions, though this is explained by education and income trends rather than subjective class identity.

  • Other factors like age, region, religion, and nativism also influence voting patterns but do not significantly challenge the single-elite nature of the Portuguese party system.

    Here is a summary of the key points:

  • Before controls, self-identified working-class voters in Portugal were 13 percentage points more likely to vote for left-wing parties like the Left Bloc, Socialist Party, Greens, and Communists compared to other groups.

  • Table 6.3 shows the partisan alignments in Portugal based on individual characteristics like education, income, religion, etc. It shows left-wing parties generally received more support from lower-income, less educated, non-religious voters.

  • In contrast to Italy and Spain, Portugal does not have strong regional political conflicts, although left-wing support is higher in urban areas like Lisbon and the Alentejo region, which has a strong industrial and labor history. Left votes are also concentrated among voters from Portugal's ex-colonies.

  • The Irish party system developed from its struggle for independence from the UK and civil war divisions. The mainstream parties of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael historically dominated Irish politics.

  • Sinn Féin was traditionally a more hardline nationalist party that excluded itself from mainstream politics for decades. More recently it has grown on the left amid dissatisfaction with the mainstream parties.

  • Ideological divisions in Ireland have been relatively narrow, facilitated by its PR-STV electoral system and the historic dominance of centrist Fianna Fáil. The influence of the Catholic church also limited the growth of left-wing politics.

    Here is a summary:

  • Ireland has not developed a true multi-elite party system like many Western democracies, where high-income and highly-educated voters tend to support left-wing or new parties. In Ireland, these groups have consistently been less likely to vote for Fianna Fáil and left-wing parties.

  • The 2020 election saw Sinn Féin make major gains and emerge as the party attracting the most support from disadvantaged groups like lower-income and lower-educated voters. This represented a change from Fianna Fáil traditionally dominating these voter blocs.

  • Class divisions in voting have become more pronounced in recent years in Ireland, though religion, age, and urban/rural divides still distinguish parties to some degree as well.

  • The growth of Sinn Féin as a "workers' party" focusing on redistribution, combined with the effects of austerity after the financial crisis, may help explain the rise in left-wing voting among underprivileged groups rather than an extreme right alternative emerging in Ireland.

    Here is a summary of the key points from the reading:

  • Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, and Switzerland provide case studies to understand political change in advanced democracies, as their party systems have undergone deep realignment and fragmentation over the past 50 years.

  • They share a history of consensus decision-making and consociational democracy, where antagonistic "pillars" were mediated by power-sharing agreements between parties. This cooperative dimension remains but historical cleavages have weakened.

  • New political parties and streams have emerged since the 1980s, complexifying the political landscape. Green parties on the left and anti-immigration parties on the right have challenged traditional Christian democratic, conservative, liberal, social democratic, and socialist forces.

  • Switzerland experienced the most radical transformation, with the far-right Swiss People's Party and green parties now topping the polls. While not to this extent, the other countries also saw disintegration of historical party systems.

  • One of the most striking changes has been the transformation of socioeconomic conflicts, as new divisions linked to cultural issues, lifestyle choices, and attitudes toward European integration and immigration have gained prominence.

In summary, the reading discusses how party systems in four Western European countries have fragmented over time due to weakened historical cleavages and the rise of new political parties and ideological divides, most radically in Switzerland. It focuses on the transformation of socioeconomic conflicts and emergence of new cultural and identity-based divisions.

Here is a summary of the key points about the democratization process and evolution of the party system in Belgium:

  • Belgium gained independence from the Netherlands in 1830 after the Belgian Revolution led by the French-speaking Catholic bourgeoisie against Dutch rule.

  • The two main early parliamentary groups were the liberals and Catholics. A socialist party emerged in 1885 and universal male suffrage was introduced in 1894.

  • After WWII, the Communist Party grew briefly but declined due to anti-Communist sentiment. Christian democrats, liberals and socialists alternated in power, often in coalition.

  • A Flemish nationalist movement emerged seeking equal status for Dutch speakers. New Flemish nationalist parties were formed within the Christian democrats and liberals.

  • Linguistic divisions deepened as economic disparities grew between Flanders and Wallonia in the postwar period. A linguistic border was established in 1962.

  • Federalization progressed in the 1970s-1990s, culminating in recognition of Flanders and Wallonia as federated entities in the 1994 constitution.

  • Starting in the 1960s-1980s, the traditional parties split along linguistic lines and new Green and Flemish nationalist parties emerged, fragmenting the party system.

    Here is a summary:

  • A new coalition government made up of Walloon and Flemish parties finally took power in Belgium in 2008, ending a period of political deadlock.

  • Elections were held again in 2010 following the withdrawal of Flemish liberals/democrats from the coalition. The biggest winners were the separatist New Flemish Alliance and French-speaking socialists, but they could not form a coalition.

  • In 2011, a large coalition of Christian democrats, liberals, and socialists was formed, with Elio Di Rupo becoming the first Francophone PM in over 30 years. This brought some political stability.

  • However, tensions between Flanders and Wallonia remained. In 2014, a Flanders-focused center-right coalition excluded the socialists.

  • The 2018 election saw gains for Flemish separatist and nationalist parties like N-VA and Vlaams Belang in Flanders, while far-left and green parties rose in Wallonia. Traditional parties declined in both regions.

So in summary, Belgium has struggled with political deadlocks, the regional divide between Flanders and Wallonia, and the rise of separatist parties, though periods of stability are achieved through broad coalition governments. The tension between the north and south remains an ongoing issue.

Here is a summary:

  • Dutch political system traditionally reflected deep religious and class cleavages in society, with Catholics, Protestants, socialists, and liberals each having their own pillars/subcultures.

  • Parties were aligned with these pillars, like the Catholic People's Party and Labor Party. Fragmentation was high but consensus politics emerged.

  • Starting in the 1960s, Dutch society underwent depillarization due to secularization. New parties emerged around social liberal and New Left issues.

  • Anti-immigration parties also arose in response to discontent with multiculturalism, like Pim Fortuyn List and Party for Freedom led by Geert Wilders.

  • The traditional religious and class divides declined, and Netherlands transitioned to a multi-elite party system where higher-educated voters support social democratic, liberal, green parties more than others. However, some left parties still find more support among lower-educated voters.

    Here is a summary:

  • The modern Swiss political system emerged in 1848 after a brief civil war between Catholic and Protestant cantons. This led to the creation of a federal constitution and centralized state.

  • Two main political movements formed - radicals (liberals) who supported a tighter union, and Catholic conservatives who supported cantonal autonomy. These later became the Free Democratic Party and Christian Democratic Party.

  • In addition to religious divisions, there was also a rural-urban cleavage between cities and countryside. In the late 19th century, the labor movement and farmers' parties emerged.

  • The four main political forces that dominated were the Free Democratic Party, Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, and Farmers' Party. Vote shares remained stable and split with no party over 30%.

  • In 1959 the "Magic Formula" was adopted to allocate the 7 seats on the Federal Council according to a fixed rule giving 2 seats each to the Social Democrats, Free Democrats, and Christian Democrats, and 1 to the Farmers' Party. This created a permanent grand coalition across the left-right spectrum.

    Here is a summary:

  • Far-right parties in Switzerland have seen rising support over time, receiving 26% of votes in the 2019 federal election.

  • The Swiss People's Party underwent an ideological transformation in the late 1970s under Christoph Blocher, shifting from a moderate rural party to a radical anti-immigration, anti-EU party. This helped propel it to become the largest party by 2007.

  • Swiss politics has polarized with the left concentrating around the Social Democrats and Greens, and the right forming around the Swiss People's Party. This broken the long-standing "magic formula" power-sharing agreement.

  • Educational cleavages have reversed, with higher-educated voters now more likely to support left-wing and green parties. However, income is less predictive of vote choice.

  • The Swiss People's Party draws much of its support from rural, German-speaking, lower-educated and lower-income voters, perpetuating historical divides. Politics remains polarized around new cultural issues.

    Here is a summary:

  • In the late 19th century, there were two main political forces in Austria - social democrats on the left who appealed to class struggle and nationalization, and Christian socialists on the right supported by the Catholic Church.

  • German nationalists formed a third movement in the early 20th century pushing for unification with Germany, anti-clericalism, and antisemitism. Many later joined Hitler's Nazi party after Germany annexed Austria in 1938.

  • After World War 2, the main political parties were direct continuations of pre-war movements. The Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) replaced the Christian Social Party and won the first election in 1945. A tradition of coalition governments between the ÖVP and Socialist Party (SPÖ) emerged.

  • Austria had a stable party system from 1945-1980s dominated by the ÖVP and SPÖ alternating in power. The Freedom Party (FPÖ) represented remnants of German nationalism but shifted to more centrist positions.

  • In the 1980s, Jörg Haider transformed the FPÖ into a radical anti-establishment party opposing immigration and the EU, gaining support. Other new parties like the Greens also emerged.

  • Educational and class divides that historically split voters have reversed, creating a new "multi-elite" system with higher education voters supporting left, green and liberal parties more than right-wing ones like the FPÖ.

    Here is a summary:

  • The chapter analyzes political conflicts, social inequality, and electoral cleavages in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland from 1990 to 2018.

  • It examines how the legacy of communism, the transition to democracy and a market economy, economic growth, and rising inequality have impacted party politics in these countries.

  • Under communism, all three countries were part of the Soviet bloc. After the fall of communism in the late 1980s, they transitioned to democracy and capitalism.

  • This transition had significant impacts on access to opportunities and social identities, challenging the left and aiding the rise of populism/nationalism.

  • Since 1990, left-wing parties like social democrats have declined in support, while populist and nativist movements have emerged and grown more popular.

  • The chapter aims to understand the role of post-communist factors in driving these political changes, and the social and ideological coalitions underpinning shifts in party dynamics, especially the rise of populism.

  • By analyzing survey data from elections since 1990, it sheds light on changing relationships between economic inequality and party support in these post-communist Central European democracies.

    Here is a summary:

  • After transitioning from communism to democracy in 1989-1991, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland developed multiparty systems with evolving party competition.

  • In the Czech Republic, right-wing parties initially dominated but left parties gained ground in the 1990s. The two main parties alternated in power until recent corruption scandals led to new parties emerging.

  • Hungary's first election saw a fragmented system that consolidated into a two-party system dividing along left-liberal and right-wing lines. These parties alternated in power until 2010 when Fidesz gained a supermajority.

  • Poland experienced economic hardship after transition and saw the successors of the communist party dominate through the 1990s before new parties emerged on the right and left.

  • All three countries joined NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004, integrating into key Western institutions after overcoming political cleavages from their communist pasts. But economic inequality increased following market reforms.

    Here is a summary:

  • In Hungary, the center-right party Fidesz came to power in 2010 elections, receiving over 50% of votes. This was after the center-left MSZP party that was in power from 2002-2010 collapsed due to economic hardship from the Great Recession and perceptions of failed austerity policies.

  • Two new political forces emerged in 2010 - Jobbik, which attracted far-right and dissatisfied voters, and LMP, formed around green issues. They opposed Fidesz but also distanced themselves from the previous left-wing parties.

  • Fidesz was able to win supermajorities in 2010, 2014, and 2018 due to the electoral system. This gave Orbán unprecedented power to reshape institutions and adopt increasingly Eurosceptic and populist policies.

  • In Poland, the period after 1989 saw alternating right and left governments as the economy transitioned. But since 2005, elections have been dominated by the right-wing PO and PiS parties amid a decline in communist vs dissident cleavages and rise of economic-redistributive issues.

  • Support for traditional left parties collapsed in all three countries toward the end of the period, often due to pursuing austerity. This shakeup of political institutions opened the way for populist, nativist parties like Fidesz, PiS and ANO to rise to power.

    Here is a summary:

  • The figures show the relationship between social class/income and party vote choice in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland from the 1990s onwards, based on post-election survey data.

  • In the Czech Republic, a clear left-right divide based on class emerged in the 1990s, but this has weakened over time, particularly in the 2017 election. Cultural issues now seem to play a bigger role.

  • Hungary showed little class voting initially, as the main left party pursued market-friendly policies. But the 2018 election saw a pattern more like traditional class voting.

  • Poland also had limited class voting in early elections. But from 2005, Law and Justice was associated with lower-income voters while Civic Platform drew more support from higher-income groups, indicating the emergence of a clearer left-right dynamic.

  • Overall, the trends suggest class voting has become more pronounced in recent years in some countries like the Czech Republic and Poland, while cultural issues may be playing a growing role particularly in the Czech case. Hungary was more of an outlier in earlier periods.

    Here is a summary:

  • In 1996, university graduates in Hungary were slightly more likely to vote for right-wing parties compared to non-university graduates. However, by 2017 this gap had widened significantly, with university graduates 11 percentage points less likely to vote for right-wing parties.

  • This reversal of the education cleavage, where left-wing parties attract more educated voters and right-wing parties less educated voters, occurred in Hungary but not in the Czech Republic or Poland over this time period.

  • In the Czech Republic, right-wing parties consistently attracted more educated voters while left-wing parties attracted less educated voters. There was no reversal of this educational cleavage.

  • In Poland, left-wing parties did not clearly attract less educated voters, unlike patterns seen in Western Europe. Over time, the right-wing PiS party drew more less educated voters while the centrist Civic Platform attracted more educated ones.

  • Hungary and Poland saw the emergence of right-wing populist parties appealing to less educated, rural voters, while the main left parties lost this base. The Czech Republic did not see a similar populist alternative rise.

So in summary, Hungary uniquely experienced a reversal of its educational cleavage where left parties gained more educated support and right parties less, converging with patterns in Western Europe. This did not occur in the Czech Republic or Poland.

Here is a summary:

  • The electoral competition observed in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic since the fall of communism has displayed differences in the ideological positions of pro-EU and pro-redistribution parties.

  • In Poland and the Czech Republic, the pro-EU vote is associated with market-liberal parties, while in Hungary it is associated with egalitarian left-wing parties.

  • In Hungary, the left-wing parties collapsed after mishandling the economic recession, creating space for Fidesz to position itself as an alternative. As Fidesz had market-liberal roots, it did not implement redistributive policies like PiS did in Poland.

  • PiS in Poland came to power after the main center-right party handled the recession well, allowing PiS to appeal to low-income voters through redistribution.

  • Populism has taken different forms in each country. In Poland it has been more egalitarian, while in Hungary it has been more inegalitarian. In the Czech Republic, where left-wing parties long represented the low-income groups, populism has been more centrist and less nativist.

  • The differences can be explained by whether a left-right economic cleavage existed during the transition period. Where it did (Czech Republic), populism was less redistributive, while where it did not (Poland, Hungary), populists filled that gap later on.

So in summary, the nature of populism and positioning of pro-EU vs pro-redistribution stances has varied across these countries based on factors like the performance of left-wing parties and existence of economic cleavages during democratic transition.

Here is a summary:

  • India's political system has transformed since independence, with the dominance of the Indian National Congress declining and the rise of caste-based, religious, and regional parties. Specifically, the Congress lost support from social groups other than lower castes and Muslims.

  • Religious and caste cleavages in politics have increased, as challenges from Hindu nationalist groups like the BJP and other parties have eaten into the Congress's support base. However, class cleavages have not increased and remain intermediated by caste and religious identities.

  • At the state level, the results are similar but with variations. Upper castes tend to favor the BJP across states, while socioeconomic status has little direct impact once caste is accounted for. Caste polarization is lower in Tamil Nadu and West Bengal where regional parties are strong.

  • Caste remains a multidimensional structure of hierarchy and inequality in India that is linked to religion, power dynamics, the state system, economics, and culture. It has become less determinative of economic status over time as inequalities have grown sharply, but caste groups have also become more differentiated socioeconomically.

So in summary, the chapter analyzes the changing nature of political cleavages in India as the party system transformed, with religious and caste identities playing a greater role in politics compared to class, both at the national and state levels.

Here is a summary of the key points:

  • Caste divisions in support for political parties in India have grown over time, particularly between upper castes and lower castes. The Congress party used to receive similar levels of support across castes in the 1960s but support fragmented by 2014.

  • Upper castes have increasingly shifted their support away from the centrist Congress party towards right-wing Hindu nationalist parties like the BJP and its predecessor the BJS. Support for right-wing parties among upper castes is around 20 percentage points higher than other groups.

  • When controlling for other factors, the gap in support for right-wing parties between upper castes and other groups has risen from 5-10 points in the 1960s-1970s to 12-16 points in recent years, indicating growing caste cleavage.

  • Religious divisions have also increased sharply, with Muslims becoming much more inclined to vote for centrist or left-wing parties compared to non-Muslims. The disparity in voting for right-wing parties between Muslims and non-Muslims has grown from 5 points in the early 1960s to 30 points in 2014.

  • In summary, there has been a long-term trend of growing caste and religious polarization in Indian electoral politics, with upper castes and Hindus gravitating towards Hindu nationalist BJP and lower castes/Muslims supporting other parties. This has fragmented the once-dominant Congress party's governing coalition.

    Here is a summary of the key points:

  • Indian electoral surveys show the BJP performs much better among upper castes compared to other groups, and this gap has widened over time. They also perform much better among non-Muslims than Muslims.

  • This indicates India is becoming a more fractured democracy along caste and religious lines, with upper castes and non-Muslims more likely to vote BJP and affiliated parties.

  • Educational and class divides have also structured electoral cleavages historically, but these effects have weakened as caste and religion have become less intertwined with class.

  • Class does not independently predict BJP voting once other factors are controlled for. However, caste and class can interact locally, with poorer OBCs and upper castes more likely to vote BJP.

  • The BJP's support has expanded greatly at the state level over time. They ruled 3 states in 1990 but 11 states by 2020, indicating growing hegemony nationally but also divergence across states.

So in summary, it analyzes how caste, religious, educational and class divisions have structured India's electoral cleavages over time, with a growing dominance of caste and religious identities and weakening of class divides. It also discusses the BJP's rising influence at the national and state levels.

Here is a summary of the key points from the passage:

  • State election results in India have diverged somewhat from national Lok Sabha election results over time. While the BJP formed a national government in the 1990s, it was only recently that it ruled a majority of states.

  • The BJP's growing success has mostly come at the expense of the INC (Indian National Congress). The share of states ruled by left-wing and regional parties has remained stable since the 1990s.

  • Three main factors have driven divergence in Indian party systems across states: the long-term decline of Congress, the rise of the BJP in northern Hindi-speaking states, and the regionalization of politics.

  • This has led to different types of party systems emerging in different states, from two-party BJP-Congress systems to regional party dominance.

  • Caste strongly shapes voter support - the BJP receives more support from upper castes, while lower castes and Muslims are less likely to vote for it. Support is more polarized where the BJP competes with Congress.

  • States like Tamil Nadu and West Bengal have seen less polarized politics along caste lines, as regional or left parties have dominated without the BJP as a major player.

  • The emergence of the BJP has been associated with growing caste and religious polarization in India's electoral politics.

    Here are the key points from the summaries:

  • N. Dirks, Castes of Mind: Analyzes how colonialism shaped the modern Indian caste system. Colonial policies promoted and legitimized the caste hierarchy.

  • G. Cassan: Examines how the British in Punjab used identity-based policies to manipulate census data and exacerbate intergroup differences, entrenching the caste system.

  • D. Mosse: Discusses how caste continues to shape social discrimination and advantage in India today through access to resources, economic opportunities, and social capital.

  • Piketty, Capital and Ideology, chapter 8: Analyzes the rise of lower castes in Indian politics and the emergence of caste-based political parties.

  • Jaffrelot, India’s Silent Revolution: Traces the political rise of lower castes in North India and emergence of caste parties representing their interests.

  • Jodhka and Naudet: Introduction discusses the ongoing importance of caste in shaping Indian society.

  • The chapter analyzes the changing political dynamics and cleavages in Pakistan since independence, including ethnicity/language, economic class divisions, and secular vs religious visions of the nation. It discusses the transformation from left-wing populism under PPP to right-wing Islamization under Zia-ul-Haq's regime and the recent rise of Imran Khan's PTI party.

    Here is a summary:

  • In the 1970s, East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) saw unrest that escalated into civil war and led to Indian intervention and East Pakistan gaining independence as Bangladesh in 1971.

  • Following the 1971 defeat, Pakistan's military leadership resigned and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto took over as the first civilian head of state. Bhutto passed a new constitution in 1973.

  • Bhutto was removed in a 1977 military coup led by General Zia-ul-Haq. He was later convicted of conspiracy and executed in 1979 under Zia's regime.

  • Zia established a coalition with Islamists and conservative parties and ruled until 1988 without being elected. His rule increased political repression and Islamization reforms.

  • After Zia's death in 1988, Benazir Bhutto and the PPP came to power through elections. The 1990s saw alternating power between the center-left PPP led by Bhutto and the center-right PML led by Nawaz Sharif.

  • General Pervez Musharraf seized power in a 1999 coup, ruling militarily until resigning in 2008 amid political opposition and the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.

  • main political parties since 1970 have been the center-left PPP, center-right PML, and more recently the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party which won elections in 2018.

    Here is a summary:

  • Pakistan is divided into 4 provinces based on linguistic groups - Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Baluchistan. Regional boundaries closely correspond to languages spoken.

  • From 1970-2018, the PPP traditionally received overwhelming support from Sindhi speakers in Sindh province, around 95% in early elections. This gap has remained stable over time.

  • Muslim League parties like PML-N traditionally received greater support from Punjabi and Saraiki speakers in Punjab province. However, their voter base has become increasingly restricted to these groups over time.

  • The emergence of PTI under Imran Khan in 2018 elections showed it was able to receive substantial votes across ethnic groups, though it gained over half the Pashtun vote given Khan's Pashtun heritage.

  • Pakistan's party system remains closely correlated with linguistic divisions, with PPP representing Sindhis, PML representing Punjabis/Saraikis, and MQM representing Urdu speakers. PTI was unique in appealing more broadly.

  • Economic divisions have also been important, with PPP originally representing poorer laborers and farmers, though this dimension declined over time.

    Here is a summary:

  • The PPP saw early success in West Pakistan in the 1970 elections by portraying itself as championing socialist workers against large landowners, despite the party itself including many landowners like Bhutto.

  • Following military rule, Benazir Bhutto's government pursued more market-oriented policies and did not renationalize industries, though it launched a large transfer program. The PML-N also moderated from backing conservative alliances to having its own centrist agenda.

  • The PTI saw the biggest shift, from limited urban middle class support to gaining rural Punjab by pandering to Islamists using religious rhetoric while also courting industrialists and landowners, facilitated by the military.

  • Only the 1970 PPP won rural areas solely on a popular reform agenda; later parties like PML-N and PTI relied on coalitions including elites.

  • The PPP consistently garnered more support from lower-income groups from 1970-2018, showing the role of class divisions. Support for other parties was more fluctuating.

  • In recent elections, the PTI obtained significantly more support from higher-income and educated groups, signaling a new elite-based cleavage cutting across other identities.

  • The PPP also received much stronger backing from religious minorities like Shias and non-Muslims, demonstrating another historical cleavage along with class and ethnicity.

  • Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization policies from the 1970s adversely impacted minorities and fanned extremism, transforming Pakistan's party system from domination by the secular, mass-based PPP.

    Here is a summary:

  • The political party system that emerged in Japan in the 1950s differed from Western Europe due to US occupation and foreign policy issues like remilitarization. Conservative parties opposed socialists/communists more than class divisions.

  • Cleavages included rural vs urban educated elites, and generational divides over war memory and Southeast Asia colonization.

  • The LDP dominated from 1955-1993 by aggregating diverse groups like low-income rural, lower-education, and business elites.

  • Economic turmoil in the 1990s ended LDP hegemony and transformed the party system.

  • However, over the long run the structure of political cleavages in Japan profoundly changed. Education remained significant but income, union membership, age, and rural-urban location lost explanatory power.

  • This "depolarization" of Japan's political space is paradoxical given slowing growth and rising inequalities, suggesting new social divisions have not been politically represented.

    Here is a summary:

The passage discusses the transformation of Japan's party system since the 1990s from dominance by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to a more fragmented system. It first overviewed Japan's democratization process following World War 2, noting how factors like land reforms and late industrialization limited the development of class cleavages. The LDP was able to dominate for decades by emphasizing economic development, but its control ended in 1993 amid economic crisis.

This led to the formation of new reformist parties and a period of political instability with constant party splits and mergers. While the Democratic Party of Japan gained power briefly in 2009, opposition to the LDP remained unstable. Key differences in the new postwar party system include electoral reforms introducing single-member districts, and all governments since 1993 being coalitions. Overall, the decline of the LDP has been associated with changes to the class, rural-urban, and generational divides that once structured Japanese politics.

Here is a summary:

  • The Komeito party in Japan promotes the interests of the Soka Gakkai Buddhist religious movement. It has received a stable 10-15% of votes in most elections since the 1970s.

  • Though the LDP and Komeito hold vastly different positions on issues like defense spending and revising Article 9 of Japan's constitution, they formed an alliance based on electoral coordination to gain enough seats to form governments.

  • Japan has seen a surge in floating voters with no clear party affiliation, making outcomes more uncertain. The share of nonpartisans increased from 16% in 1966 to 60% in the early 2000s. Parties have also converged somewhat in their policy proposals.

  • Education has been a strong and persistent determinant of voting patterns in Japan. University-educated voters have consistently supported progressive opposition to the LDP since the 1950s, unlike in many Western democracies where lower-educated voters once supported left parties.

  • Japan has seen significant changes in its electorate structure with massive education expansion, aging population, and urbanization over the postwar period summarized in the table. It has also become a more unequal society economically since the 1990s.

    Here is a summary:

  • In the 1953 university graduates were 20 percentage points less likely to vote conservative compared to the general population, but by 2012-2017 that gap had narrowed to only 8 percentage points.

  • Partisan identities in Japan have historically been determined by issues related to war memory and foreign policy, such as visits by prime ministers to the Yasukuni Shrine where war criminals are enshrined. Opposition parties tend to support more recognition of Japan's war crimes.

  • Rural areas were once the heart of conservative domination in postwar Japan, but this rural-urban divide has gradually faded as the LDP adapted to gain more urban support. Figures show the gap in conservative voting between rural and urban areas declined from about 18 points in the 1960s to 6 points in the 2010s.

  • Economic inequalities were also once more strongly linked to voting preferences, but this has declined. In the 1960s the LDP had stronger support from low-income and high-income groups, but by the 2010s income showed little consistent relationship to conservative voting. Other measures like union membership, job types, and wealth also show diminished differences in conservative support over time.

  • Generational differences were also once a major divide, with those over 60 much more likely to support conservatives in 1953 due to differing wartime experiences. But this generational gap has also narrowed over the decades.

    Here is a summary:

  • Japan's transition from a dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) system to a more fragmented party system was driven not only by factors like urbanization and education expansion, but also by generational change.

  • Originally, supporters of the old imperial and military order tended to vote LDP, but as this group aged and eventually disappeared, the generational cleavage shifted.

  • Younger generations born in the 1970s onward were much more likely to vote for conservative parties like the LDP compared to those born in the 1940s-1950s.

  • This reversal of the generational cleavage helped reinforce the decline of other political cleavages as well, contributing to more political "dealignment" among newer cohorts.

  • The transition resulted from both changing socioeconomic conditions that eroded benefits for younger voters, as well as perceptions of parties - newer generations saw the LDP as agents of reform rather than based on foreign policy ideology.

  • In summary, demographic changes like generational replacement were a major driver in Japan's transition from a dominant-party to a more fragmented and unstable multi-party system.

    Here is a summary:

  • The analysis focuses on the voting-age population, which explains why the share of university graduates mentioned may be lower than international figures from organizations like the OECD. These organizations look at the overall population, including those not old enough to vote.

  • Thailand experienced a process of democratization in the 2000s after decades of military rule. However, economic growth primarily benefited a small elite, while most of the population worked in agriculture.

  • The 1997 Asian financial crisis increased public discontent with the economic situation and military government. This helped fuel demands for political and economic reforms.

  • Thailand has particularly large regional inequalities in socioeconomic development. This played a key role in generating strong class polarization along regional lines during democratization.

  • Thaksin Shinawatra mobilized the large poor population through redistributive policies, trumping other political divides. This led to a democratic backlash as the middle and upper classes united against him.

So in summary, it analyzes the emergence of class cleavages in Thai politics during democratization, driven particularly by regional inequalities and Thaksin's mobilization of the poor populations.

The key points are:

  • Thailand instituted reforms to move towards a fully elected house and improve separation of executive and legislative powers.

  • Thaksin Shinawatra was elected prime minister in 2001 on promises of economic growth. He implemented universal healthcare, debt relief for farmers, affordable housing, and microcredit schemes.

  • Thaksin was ousted in a 2006 coup but his sister was elected prime minister in 2011 continuing his policies like raising the minimum wage. Another coup in 2014 established more military control over the political system.

  • Thailand has very high regional inequalities, with Bangkok far richer than rural northeast region. This spatial divide has contributed to the emergence of class cleavages in political support.

  • Lower educated and rural voters became much more likely to support pro-Thaksin parties after 2001 as his policies benefitted poorer regions, showing the link between regional inequalities and class politics.

    Here is a summary:

  • Presidential elections in the Philippines since 1986 have pushed individuals to form new parties and run for president, as no single candidate typically wins an outright majority.

  • Elections showed increasing class polarization, starting in 1998 when Joseph Estrada won with support from lower classes campaigning as "Erap for the Poor." However, he did not implement significant redistributive policies.

  • Rodrigo Duterte was elected in 2016 with a platform focused on fighting drugs and crime, appealing to an "angry new middle class."

  • The country can be divided into three regions - Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. Regional inequalities exist but are not as large as in Thailand.

  • Class polarization persisted in elections, with less educated voters more likely to support "pro-poor" candidates by 10-22 percentage points.

  • Regional divisions also emerged as an independent cleavage, though support for pro-poor candidates came from both poorer and richer areas previously.

  • Duterte uniquely appealed to urban middle classes but also peripheral Mindanao region and Muslim minority, winning over 60% in Mindanao.

  • The 2016 election showed both persisting class polarization and an emerging center-periphery divide split between different candidates.

    Here is a summary:

  • Malaysia established a federal constitutional monarchy after gaining independence in 1963, with the National Front (BN) emerging as the dominant coalition through agreements between Malay, Chinese, and Indian elites.

  • The 1997 Asian financial crisis weakened the BN's dominance and opposition grew, culminating in the first transfer of power in 2018 when the reformist Alliance of Hope defeated the BN.

  • Ethnic inequalities have historically divided Malays/Bumiputeras and Chinese/Indians, though government policies reduced gaps over time. Still, Chinese are overrepresented among the wealthy today.

  • Political cleavages have grown more ethnic in recent decades, with Chinese voters becoming much less likely to support the BN. However, class has also become important, as top-income and educated voters from all ethnic groups have shifted toward the opposition. The BN retains more support among poorer, rural, and older voters.

    Here is a summary:

  • Income inequality has grown in Malaysia, with Chinese/Indians enjoying above-average income growth and urban elites concerned about issues like corruption. However, the ruling coalition BN has continued winning support from lower-income groups, especially Muslims.

  • Survey data from 2004-2013 shows the BN winning a smaller share of the vote from lower-income groups compared to higher-income groups. But controlling for other factors reduces this gap, suggesting ethnoreligious identity remains an important factor for lower-income voters.

  • In the future, the BN may succeed in regaining votes from minorities by reinventing itself as the advocate for disadvantaged citizens across ethnicities. Or non-Malay voters could increasingly support the opposition due to UMNO's alignment with Malay interests and uncertain political outcomes.

  • In contrast to other Southeast Asian countries,Indonesia did not experience polarization along religious or income lines after democratizing in 1999. Its party system has shown increasing dealignment,with no party securing over 20% of the vote recently.

  • Historical divides like the 1955 election's religious and nationalist cleavages still influence votes for traditional parties like PDI-P and Golkar. But new "catch-all" and personalistic parties have emerged, blurring these divides. Ethnicity also does not strongly determine votes due to inclusive early movements and electoral rules.

    Here is a summary:

  • In Indonesia, religion has been a strong determinant of partisan affiliations. Muslims who participate often in collective prayers are more likely to support Islamic parties, while non-practicing Muslims and religious minorities tend to support secular parties like PDI-P and Nasdem.

  • However, this religious cleavage has decreased significantly from 1999 to 2014. By 2014, there was only a marginal difference in voting behaviors between practicing and non-practicing Muslims.

  • Historically secular parties have had to form coalitions with Islamic parties, weakening conflicts over religious matters. Inequalities between Muslims and non-Muslims are also low in Indonesia.

  • While the national trends show declining religious cleavages, local politics have seen a greater influence of ethnic and religious divides in recent years, as seen by protests in 2016-2017 accusing the Christian governor of Jakarta of blasphemy.

  • Economic cleavages have also declined. Parties like PDI-P once attracted more low-income voters, while Islamic parties did better with high-income groups, but this difference disappeared by 2014.

  • In summary, Indonesia has seen a gradual decline in political cleavages since 1999, due to factors like personalization, fragmentation of the party system, and the rise of swing voters.

    Here is a summary of the key points about political cleavages and democratization in Indonesia from the source text:

  • Indonesia transitioned to democracy after the fall of the Suharto dictatorship in 1998, allowing competitive elections. However, Golkar, the former ruling party under Suharto, remained very influential.

  • Early on, political parties were formed along ideological lines, but have since evolved based more on personality and patronage networks than clear policy platforms.

  • Significant regional cleavages persist, with parties continuing to draw much of their support from particular areas of Indonesia, especially Java. However, some national parties have emerged as well.

  • Religious divides also remain important, as Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world. Some parties have an explicitly Islamic agenda while others are more secular.

  • Socio-economic issues like inequality, development, and labor rights are becoming more salient issues as Indonesia's economy has grown. However, parties have not fully sorted along clear left-right ideological lines on these issues.

  • Golkar reinvents itself after 1998 but remains tied to its history from the Suharto era, blending populist and technocratic appeals. It competes with other large national parties like PDI-P and Gerindra for the non-Islamist vote.

So in summary, the text discusses how regionalism, religiosity and personality politics still shape Indonesia's political cleavages, though issues and identities are gradually becoming more national in scope since the democratic transition following Suharto's fall from power.

Here is a summary:

  • South Korea has transitioned to democracy since 1987, but faced challenges like authoritarian legacies, corruption, and weak party institutionalization.

  • It has become a fairly stable two-party system, with conservatives descended from past military regimes facing progressives from the democratic opposition.

  • Economic inequality has risen significantly since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, disproportionately impacting the elderly. This has fueled concerns about redistribution.

  • The conflict over North Korea policy is a major political cleavage, structured along generational lines. Older voters oppose engagement with North Korea but favor reunification, while younger people see North Korea as a foreign entity but favor pragmatic relations.

  • Regional divides have declined somewhat compared to the authoritarian era, when certain regions faced more marginalization, but still structure some political differences.

  • Key ongoing issues include resolving the North Korean issue, tackling corruption, curbing chaebol power, and addressing socioeconomic inequality, particularly for the elderly. Democracy is still widely supported but faces ongoing challenges.

    Here is a summary:

  • South Korea has seen the emergence of potential class cleavages in recent years as economic polarization has increased and redistributive issues have become more salient politically. However, strong overlaps between age and income make analyzing class voting difficult.

  • When controlling for age, conservative voting is slightly lower among lower income groups compared to middle income groups, suggesting income may play a growing role. Lower income voters and university graduates have both increasingly supported liberal parties.

  • Taiwan transitioned to democracy in the 1990s after lifting its authoritarian rule. It has stabilized into a two-party system between the KMT and DPP.

  • Taiwan has strong ethnic cleavages, with mainlander descendants generally supporting the KMT and native Taiwanese supporting the DPP. This cleavage has remained very stable. Ethnicity is now disconnected from social class.

  • Taiwan also has some regional cleavages, with northern areas generally wealthier and more supportive of engagement with China compared to poorer southern areas.

    Here is a summary:

  • Hong Kong has experienced growing political polarization since its handover to China in 1997, culminating in large protests in 2019 over Beijing's growing influence.

  • There are extremely large generational divides in Hong Kong, with younger generations much more likely to support democratic and independence movements. This is largely due to differences in identity but also economic prospects.

  • Those born in mainland China are more likely to support pro-Beijing political camps, but this effect is smaller than expected.

  • The most divisive issues across generations relate to Hong Kong's relationship with China - debates around integration, identity, and democratization. These institutional and sovereignty issues are more polarized than economic or immigration issues.

  • Hong Kong's electoral system has benefited pro-Beijing political forces, allowing them to retain control despite democratic forces typically receiving over 55% of the popular vote. This, along with Beijing's growing material resources in Hong Kong, has contributed to political polarization.

    Here is a summary:

  • In recent years in Hong Kong, there has been growing anti-government sentiment and demands for greater self-determination and democracy. New localist political movements have emerged that directly question the "one country, two systems" principle of Hong Kong's relationship with China.

  • Electorally, there is a large and growing generational divide. Younger generations, especially those born in the 1990s, overwhelmingly support pro-democracy parties, while support has declined among older generations born in the 1940s-1960s. Nearly 90% of voters born in the 1990s supported pro-democracy in 2016.

  • There is also a native-mainlander divide, as mainland Chinese immigrants make up about 1/7 of Hong Kong's population. However, this cleavage is not as large as the generational one, and differences decrease when controlling for age and education. Young immigrants are also more likely to support pro-democracy.

  • Generational differences extend beyond the political to issues of identity, immigration, economic inequality, and Hong Kong's relationship with mainland China. Younger voters are much more likely to identify as "Hong Konger" and oppose greater integration with China.

So in summary, politics in Hong Kong have become increasingly polarized along generational and native-immigrant lines, with younger generations driving the rise of the pro-democracy movement.

Here is a summary:

  • Generational differences and debates around democratization and autonomy have structured political divides in Hong Kong. Support for the pro-democracy camp grew significantly after the 2015 survey, especially among younger voters in the 2019 local elections.

  • This suggests the generational cleavage may deepen further. Mainland Chinese immigration is also a contentious issue, with anti-immigrant sentiment strongest among the young and those with Hong Kong identity.

  • Income inequality has risen in Hong Kong but seems less politically divisive than identity issues relating to autonomy, democracy, and immigration from mainland China. Localism has emerged as a political force expressing concerns over preserving Hong Kong culture and political system.

    Here is a summary of the key points:

  • Brazil has a long history of extreme electoral inequality, restricting voting rights to a small elite class until the late 20th century. Literacy requirements and economic thresholds excluded the vast majority of the population from voting for over a century.

  • The rise of populist leaders like Getulio Vargas in the 1930s expanded participation somewhat, but rates remained relatively low compared to other Latin American countries through the 1950s.

  • The 1964 military coup suppressed democracy for over 20 years. When it returned in the 1980s, literacy had expanded significantly, paving the way for truly universal suffrage and vastly higher voter turnout.

  • The 1988 constitution formalized this, removing the final literacy requirement. This set the stage for competitive democratic elections in 1989, won by Fernando Collor. Lula da Silva of the leftist Workers' Party came in second, signifying their rise.

  • The article analyzes how political cleavages have developed since this transition, as inequality and the Workers' Party's electoral base changed significantly over time. It examines explanations for both the PT's decline in the 2010s and Bolsonaro's victory in 2018.

    Here is a summary:

  • Following Brazil's return to democracy in the 1980s, programs aimed at curbing hyperinflation were implemented under presidents Collor de Mello and Cardoso, including privatization, trade liberalization, and spending cuts. Cardoso was successful in reducing inflation.

  • In 2002, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the left-wing Workers' Party (PT) won the presidential election, advocating for new social policies. Under Lula and later Dilma Rousseff, the PT implemented welfare programs like Bolsa Escola and Bolsa Família.

  • Support for the PT shifted over time. In early elections, income was not correlated with voting, but by 2006, lower-income groups increasingly supported the PT due to its welfare programs. However, corruption scandals and an economic recession eroded PT support.

  • In 2018, far-right populist Jair Bolsonaro was elected on promises of conservative social values and economic liberalism. His victory reflected polarization amid the PT's involvement in scandals and the jailing of Lula on corruption charges.

  • Inequality remains high in Brazil but education levels have risen significantly since redemocratization. Educational inequalities persist in generating unequal political representation.

    The key points are:

  • In early elections, the PT received more support from higher-income, more educated, urban voters. Over time, support increasingly came from poorer, less educated, rural, and northeastern voters.

  • By 2018, there was almost a complete reversal - the poor and less educated were much more likely to vote PT than in the past, while the wealthy and educated were more biased against the PT.

  • Support for the PT became highly concentrated in the northeast region, which saw the most benefits from PT social programs. The northeast vote for PT peaked at 76% in 2006 and remained above 65% through 2018. Other regions notably declined in PT support over this period.

  • This represents a unique case of policy-driven shifts in class cleavages and voter alignments in Brazil, with the PT coalition moving from more elite urban supporters to predominantly poorer, less educated, rural, and northeastern voters.

    Here is a summary of the key points about electoral allegiances in Brazil:

  • Historically, there has been a rural-urban cleavage, with rural voters less likely to support the left-leaning Workers' Party (PT). This gap has narrowed over time.

  • Race also impacts voting behavior, with non-white voters more inclined to support the PT. However, racial differences are moderate compared to other countries and reduced when controlling for socioeconomic factors.

  • Occupation has weak links to voting patterns, unlike in some developed countries. Differences are mostly due to income, education, location factors.

  • Growing religious divide, with evangelical Protestants less likely to back the PT in recent elections.

  • Women shifted to supporting the PT more strongly after initially favoring other parties.

  • Bolsonaro appealed to both poorer voters focused on economic issues like health and jobs, and middle/upper classes worried about corruption and violence. He capitalized on discontent with the recession and incumbent government. Geographic support shows northeast remained loyal to PT.

    Here is a summary of key points about political divisions and inequality in Brazil:

  • Brazil has a long history of political divisions along class lines, with voting patterns increasingly defined by socioeconomic status rather than other factors.

  • During its time in power from 2002-2014, the Workers' Party (PT) oversaw significant economic growth and income gains, especially for the poorest half and richest segments of society. However, middle-income groups saw weaker growth.

  • This fueled resentment among middle classes who felt squeezed and benefited less from PT policies than other groups. They became skeptical of the PT.

  • Economic slowdown after 2014 further strained the middle class and heightened discontent with the PT.

  • Corruption scandals also eroded trust in the PT, while an invigorated opposition targeted the party's base among the poor.

  • These factors contributed to the rise of Jair Bolsonaro in 2018 elections, as he appealed to middle and higher-income voters who had rejected the PT.

  • Overall, political divisions in Brazil have increasingly come to be defined along class lines, with the PT representing the interests of the poor and marginalized versus the opposition backed by middle and higher income groups. Geography also plays a role, as the PT retains strong support in the poorer Northeast region.

    Here is a summary of the key points about political cleavages in Argentina based on the passage:

  • Peronism, established by Juan Peron in the 1940s, has dominated Argentinian politics for much of the period since then and created a major cleavage between Peronists and anti-Peronists.

  • Although Peronism draws support across classes, low-income and low-education voters are consistently more likely to vote Peronist. Class cleavages are thus prominent.

  • Before Peronism, the main cleavage was between the center-left Radical Civic Union and conservatives.

  • Periods of military rule and exile of Peron banned Peronism temporarily in the 1950s-60s, allowing other parties like the UCR to govern.

  • Political tensions and repression in the 1960s-70s led to increased violence and emergence of guerrilla groups, as Peronism organized opposition from exile.

  • Peronism's mix of social policies, labor rights, nationalism, and populist rhetoric has enabled it to maintain hegemony, developing a partisan identity that structures Argentinian politics along pro- and anti-Peronist lines to the present day.

    Here is a summary:

  • Argentina experienced periods of military dictatorship in the 1970s and 1980s, which suppressed left-wing political parties and activism.

  • Democracy was restored in 1983 and elections were won by the anti-Peronist party UCR. However, economic struggles like hyperinflation persisted.

  • Carlos Menem of the Peronist party was elected in 1989, instituting neoliberal economic policies. This led to stabilization but also more inequality.

  • The 1990s saw the consolidation of elections and liberties but also the rise of new issues like corruption as the economy improved.

  • The 2001-2002 economic crisis ended Fernando de la Rúa's presidency and led to political instability again.

  • Néstor Kirchner and then his wife Cristina Fernández led Argentina for three consecutive terms from 2003-2015 as Peronists, reducing inequality through social programs.

  • Mauricio Macri then became president in 2015 as a center-right candidate but was defeated by Peronist Alberto Fernández in 2019 amid another economic crisis.

  • Peronism consistently draws most support from lower-income and less educated Argentines, showing the persistence of class cleavages in political divisions. Other socioeconomic factors like occupation also correlate with Peronist versus non-Peronist voting tendencies.

    Here is a summary:

  • In 1973, a military coup led by Augusto Pinochet ousted Chile's democratically elected socialist president Salvador Allende and instituted an authoritarian dictatorship.

  • Pinochet's regime lasted nearly two decades and was characterized by repression of left-wing groups, economic reforms promoting free market policies, and high levels of inequality.

  • By 1988, political and economic demands from social groups led to a national plebiscite where Chileans rejected extending Pinochet's term, paving the way for a return to democracy in 1990.

  • The dictatorship established an electoral system that favored two coalitions - a center-left Coalition of Parties for Democracy and a right-wing Democracy and Progress coalition that supported Pinochet.

  • Center-left candidates won elections from 1990-2000, enacting some reforms but failing to significantly reduce inequality, fueling social tensions. Protests from students demanding education reform emerged.

  • In 2009, Chile elected its first right-wing post-dictatorship government led by Sebastián Piñera. Protests against inequality continued under his administration as well.

  • Reforms in 2013 and 2015 saw the electoral system change and coalitions splinter, leading to more polarization between left and right-wing blocs.

  • Sebastián Piñera won again in 2017 but faced massive protests in 2019 over inequality, triggering constitutional reforms for a new charter.

    Here is a summary:

  • The political system in Costa Rica was dominated by two main parties, the center-left National Liberation Party (PLN) and the center-right Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC), from the 1950s to the 1980s. They traditionally alternated in power.

  • By the 1990s, dissatisfaction was growing with the political system due to economic problems and convergence of the major parties toward the center. This led to increasing abstention rates.

  • A new party, the center-left Citizens' Action Party (PAC), emerged in 2002. It appealed to many former PLN supporters and intellectuals, winning the presidency in 2014.

  • The traditional cleavage was between supporters of the PLN and its opponents. However, the system fragmented over time, with the PLN losing support and new parties like the PAC and evangelical Christian National Restoration Party (PRN) emerging.

  • By the 2000s, different parties appealed to different socioeconomic groups - the PLN and PRN aimed at lower-income voters, while the PUSC and PAC attracted higher-income groups. Regional voting patterns also changed over time.

    Here is a summary of the provided text:

  • Costa Rica has historically had a two-party system, dominated by the center-left PLN and the center-right PUSC. In the 2000s, a new party called PAC emerged supporting more progressive policies.

  • Costa Rican voting patterns show divisions along socioeconomic lines. PAC attracts more support from higher-income, better educated, and urban voters. PLN and conservative PRN attract more support from rural, poorer, and less educated voters.

  • Table 15.3 analyzes vote shares of the main parties according to various demographic factors like education, income, region, occupation, etc. It shows PAC receives stronger support from groups with higher education and income.

  • Colombia also had a historic two-party system dominated by the Conservatives and Liberals. This led to periodic bouts of violence. The National Front power-sharing agreement from 1958-1974 excluded other factions.

  • In the 2000s, Colombia saw the emergence of a new political dichotomy organized around Uribism vs anti-Uribism. Uribe attracted more support from rural, poorer voters through social programs while anti-Uribists attracted higher-educated, urban voters.

    Here is a summary:

  • This analysis looks at the relationship between socioeconomic factors and left-right party choice in Mexico from 1952 to 2018, as Mexico transitioned from a one-party system dominated by the PRI to a multiparty democracy.

  • Key factors studied include education, income, rural-urban divide, age, gender, religion, ethnicity, and sector of employment.

  • In Colombia, the education and income gradients initially favored the conservative Uribist party but reversed in 2014 when Santos adopted a more progressive peace platform. However, the gradients returned to previous patterns in 2018 after Santos left office.

  • Class divisions in Colombia were also aligned with rural-urban, generational, and sectoral cleavages. The anti-Uribist vote was highest among young, urban, public sector voters.

  • Religion, gender gaps, and ethnic cleavages also historically correlated with political preferences in Colombia but these differences declined over time.

  • Mexico similarly transitioned from the one-party PRI rule to a multiparty system with the left consolidating behind parties like the PRD and MORENA. The analysis examines how socioeconomic factors correlate with support for left-right parties in Mexico's changing political landscape.

    Here is a summary:

  • Peru had a turbulent political history dating back to 300 years of Spanish colonial rule, which established economic, ethnic, and geographic divisions still present today. Independence was declared in 1821.

  • The early post-independence constitutions envisioned a culturally homogeneous nation but excluded the indigenous majority from full citizenship and participation. Indigenous peoples faced discrimination and limited political rights.

  • Stable democratic and economic development took longer in Peru compared to other Latin American countries. The period after independence saw alternating democratic and authoritarian governments.

  • A real multiparty system emerged in the late 20th century as more inclusive constitutions granted illiterates the right to vote for the first time in 1979. However, territorial disputes, aristocratic rule, and authoritarianism persisted for much of the 19th and 20th centuries, hindering stable state-building.

  • Ethnic and geographic divisions established under colonial rule remained major obstacles to fully integrating Peruvian society and establishing a stable democratic system throughout the 19th-20th centuries. Indigenous participation and rights continued to lag those of other ethnic groups.

    Here is a summary:

  • Left-wing ideologies emerged in Peru in the early 20th century with the founding of two main parties - the Peruvian Aprista Party (APRA) in 1924 and the Socialist Party of Peru/Peruvian Communist Party in 1928. These parties aimed to address Peru's social and economic problems.

  • In the 1950s-1960s, two important right-wing parties were founded - Popular Action in 1956 and the Christian People's Party in 1966. Meanwhile, factions emerged from APRA and the Communist Party, including the Shining Path guerrilla group in the late 1960s.

  • Peru transitioned to democracy in 1980 after over a decade of military rule. It experienced a period of authoritarianism under Fujimori in the 1990s before returning to democracy. Elections since then have seen continued political instability and corruption scandals.

  • Socioeconomic cleavages emerged in voting patterns in the 1980s. Support for right-wing parties, especially Fujimorism, has tended to be higher among the lower educated and income groups. But significant fluctuations have occurred depending on specific leaders and scandals. Class identities do not seem as deeply entrenched as support for individual figures.

    Here is a summary of key points about arty ideology:

  • Arty refers to artistic or creative ideologies that prioritize individual expression, aesthetic values, and anti-establishment views.

  • Arty ideologies are often associated with bohemian or counterculture movements that reject mainstream cultural and social norms.

  • They emphasize subjective experience, imagination, unconventional thinking, and authentically expressing one's inner creativity and individuality.

  • There is a rejection of rigid social structures, rules, and conformity in favor of fluidity, spontaneity, and following one's passions.

  • Politically, arty views tend to be liberal or libertarian, supporting civil liberties like freedom of expression and individual autonomy.

  • There is skepticism of authorities and institutions seen as inhibiting free thought and creativity. However, arty ideologies are not centered around any particular economic or governance models.

  • Proponents see art, culture, and creative/aesthetic pursuits as intrinsically valuable ways of pursuing truth and meaning, in contrast to rationalism or pragmatism.

  • Community and social bonding is often emphasized, but informally rather than through formal organizations, parties, or centralized control.

    Here is a summary of the key points from the coding proposed by E. Huber and J. D. Stephens, and other sources cited:

  • Huber and Stephens proposed a common dataset on Latin American and Caribbean elections from 1945-2012 to enable comparative analysis.

  • They coded election results, including votes and seats for major political parties in each country. This allows analysis of changes in party systems over time.

  • For the most recent period for Chile (2013 and 2017 elections), they draw on analyses by Bunker.

  • Their dataset has been widely used and built upon by other scholars analyzing political cleavages, alignments, and changes in party systems in countries like Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru over the 20th century.

  • Subsequent studies analyzed issues like the decline of the center in Chile using this dataset, examined shifts in social cleavages structuring Costa Rica's party system, and traced the evolution of one-party dominance in Mexico.

  • The coding proposed by Huber and Stephens provides a common framework and comparable data for examining dynamics of electoral politics, political parties, and changes in party systems across Latin American democracies over the 20th century. It has enabled important scholarly analyses on these topics.

    Here is a summary:

  • The analysis examines the changing relationships between party support, economic inequality, and racial cleavages in democratic South Africa since 1994.

  • The legacy of apartheid has left a strong imprint, with the ANC mainly supported by Black voters and the DA mainly supported by White voters.

  • However, rising inequalities, a stagnating economy, and the emergence of a new Black middle class have opened possibilities for voter realignment.

  • Intraparty factionalism, corruption, and difficulties containing regional/ideological tensions have also posed threats to the ANC's dominance.

  • The chapter utilizes survey data to analyze the social and ideological coalitions underlying the ANC's strength and recent decline, and the configurations of ethnicity, class, and competition that may shape South Africa's future party system.

  • Comparing South Africa to other dominant party systems provides insights into adapting appeals to changing social structures while avoiding tensions that could break parties apart.

    Here is a summary:

  • The Democratic Alliance (DA) is South Africa's main opposition party after the ANC. It has positioned itself ideologically as centrist, promoting balanced social and economic policies.

  • Other opposition parties include the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), which campaigns on Zulu identity, and the Congress of the People (COPE), which split from the ANC.

  • In recent years, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) emerged as a new far-left opposition. Led by Julius Malema, it advocates for socialism, nationalization, and empowering the Black majority.

  • South Africa has historically had high economic inequality, divided along racial lines under apartheid. Inequality has increased further since the democratic transition, with the top 1% gaining the most.

  • Racial gaps in incomes have declined but within-group inequality is rising, resulting in a more racially diverse elite class but unchanged overall structure. The Black middle class is growing.

  • However, the intersections of race and social class have complex political effects, with studies finding diverging attitudes toward the ruling ANC among different socioeconomic groups of Black South Africans.

    Here is a summary of the key points:

  • Population groups in South Africa, including Black/African, White/European, Coloured, and Indian/Asian, were historically constructed under apartheid and should be understood as social constructs rather than rigid identities.

  • The category of 'n' essentially captures the residual population not classified into the other three groups.

  • Racial identification remains an exceptionally strong predictor of voting behavior in South Africa, with over 70% of Black voters consistently supporting the ANC compared to under 10% of White voters.

  • Support for the ANC is correlated with income, declining linearly from over 70% among the poorest to under 35% among the top 10% of earners. However, this relationship is largely explained by the racial divide in inequality.

  • Some evidence suggests the ANC may be gaining slightly more support from the bottom 50% of earners in recent years when controlling for race and other factors, indicating potential changes in class identities and alignments.

  • Overall, the racial cleavage in South African politics has proven very resilient since the end of apartheid, reflecting the historically constructed nature of racial categories inherited from the apartheid regime.

    Here is a summary of the key points about racial and linguistic inequalities in South Africa based on the information provided:

  • Racial inequalities have largely driven political divides in South Africa, as Africans who make up the lowest income groups overwhelmingly vote for the ANC while other racial groups are more split.

  • However, class divides are emerging within the African population as wealthier Africans have become less likely to support the ANC over time, dropping from 87% support in 1994 to 51% in 2019.

  • Linguistic divides also used to play a role, but support for the ANC among different African language groups has converged over time as ethnic-based parties like Inkatha lost support.

  • Xhosa speakers previously favored the ANC much more but support has declined, while Zulu speakers shifted closer to high ANC support as Inkatha declined in Zulu areas.

  • Overall the ANC has been very successful at unifying the majority of black South Africans across ethnic lines, reducing the potential for ethnic cleavages to emerge politically despite linguistic diversity.

  • Class divides now appear to be a more significant driver of political realignment as a black middle class emerges with different priorities than lower-income blacks.

    Here is a summary of the key points from the passage:

  • South Africa remains divided along racial lines socially and economically, with blacks and whites largely living separately with different living standards. This has contributed to electoral divisions being structured along racial affiliations.

  • The ANC's strength relies paradoxically on the racial contextualization of social experiences, which has reinforced voters' perceptions of parties' racial exclusivism. Greater social equality could lead to realignment of voters along other lines of political conflict.

  • Unlike some other dominant parties, the ANC dominates through racial exclusivism rather than by building cross-cutting coalitions. Transformation of South Africa's social structure may be needed for party system transformation.

  • Voter turnout has declined significantly since 1994, especially among lower-educated citizens, suggesting growing political inequality. Opposition parties have failed to mobilize disenchanted poor voters. Future transformation depends on ANC or new parties responding to poor aspirations.

  • In summary, racial divisions persist in South African society and politics despite political reforms. Greater social equality and mobilization of poor, dissatisfied voters may be needed for political realignment away from racial affiliations.

    Here is a summary of the key points regarding the electoral politics and political cleavages in Botswana based on the excerpt:

  • Botswana has experienced democracy and fair elections since independence in 1966, but has been dominated by a single party, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP).

  • The BDP was formed with the support of colonial elites and emerged as the dominant party post-independence, receiving widespread support from rural areas and the elite classes.

  • Other early opposition parties like the Bechuanaland People's Party (BPP) received more support from urban areas and the working class, but remained a minority.

  • While there were no major ideological divisions between parties historically, the BDP benefited from its establishment with colonial backing and connections to elites.

  • Recent elections have seen the BDP's dominance gradually declining, with growing political cleavages around rural-urban divides, education levels, and occupation. Higher educated and urban voters have increasingly supported the opposition.

  • Socioeconomic status appears to be playing a growing role in electoral politics in Botswana beyond ethnic affiliations, though ethnic cleavages have remained relatively weak.

    Here is a summary of the key points about political parties in Botswana from 1965 to 2019:

  • The main political parties have been the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) and the opposition Botswana National Front (BNF).

  • In 1965, the first post-independence election, the BDP won 80% of votes compared to 14% for the opposition Botswana People's Party (BPP).

  • The BNF emerged later as the leading opposition party, advocating against the "neo-colonial" BDP government.

  • The BDP maintained dominance nationally while opposition held more regional support. This changed in 1994 with increased urbanization.

  • Despite declining BDP support, it has remained in power over 50 years due to the first-past-the-post electoral system favoring it.

  • Opposition has faced challenges like internal splits while the BDP benefits from stronger funding and ties to the diamond industry.

  • Unlike other countries, Botswana has not seen strong ethnic divisions politically. The BDP promoted non-ethnic policies.

  • More recently, divisions have emerged along rural/urban and education lines, with urban/educated voters less likely to support the BDP.

  • This suggests the BDP is increasingly reliant on rural, less educated supporters as its dominance weakens.

    Here is a summary:

  • Ghana has developed a two-party system dominated by the NDC and NPP parties. The NDC traces its origins to Kwame Nkrumah's pro-state intervention vision, while the NPP is linked to the Danquah-Busia tradition favoring liberalization.

  • Ethnic divisions exist, with the NPP perceived as representing the Ashanti and NDC the Ewe. However, ethnic identities alone cannot explain voting patterns, as coalitions are needed to win elections.

  • Regional cleavages overlap with ethnicity, as the Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo regions strongly support the NPP while the Volta region backs the NDC. But some regions are swing areas.

  • Socioeconomic factors like rural-urban and educational divides also influence vote choices. Historically the NDC did better in rural areas due to its development policies, while the NPP gained more urban support, though these cleavages have narrowed.

  • Overall, a combination of ethnic, regional, rural-urban and class elements have contributed to political competition between the two dominant parties in Ghana's democracy.

    Here is a summary:

  • Nigeria has experienced political instability since independence in 1960, including military coups and a civil war. Democracy was restored in 1999 with the 4th Republic.

  • Ethnic, regional, and religious divisions in Nigeria date back to the colonial period. The north is poorer, mostly Muslim and Hausa/Fulani speaking. The south is more prosperous and split between the mainly Christian Igbo east and Yoruba west.

  • These social cleavages overlap with deep inequalities. The British pursued policies that intentionally underdeveloped the north and prevented national integration. Regional disparities in income and development have persisted or worsened since democracy.

  • Politically, early parties were ethnically based in the three main regions. The dominant PDP governed 1999-2015 through alliances and patronage but lost support over corruption, insecurity like Boko Haram, and a perception it was not addressing northern concerns after a southern president in 2011.

  • The APC won in 2015 under a northern Muslim candidate seen as better able to handle security issues like Boko Haram. However, underlying social cleavages along ethnic, religious and regional lines continue to structure Nigerian politics.

    Here is a summary:

  • Nigeria has experienced a rise in ethnoreligious cleavages since the early 2000s, fueled by regional inequalities in resources and opportunities. Muslims have become much less likely to vote for the People's Democratic Party compared to Christians.

  • This polarization is linked to the widening of regional development gaps, with northern states like the Northeast and Northwest lagging behind. This has contributed to the rise of extremist groups like Boko Haram.

  • However, data also shows an emerging educational cleavage, with higher-educated voters becoming more likely to support the PDP in recent elections, even after controlling for other factors. This suggests class divisions may be developing beyond religious and ethnic lines.

  • The opposition APC party seems to represent not only Muslims but also poorer voters across religious groups, reflecting ideological differences between the parties on issues like welfare policy. Future elections will show whether Nigeria moves to an entrenched religious divide or if new socioeconomic cleavages could allow for non-sectarian issues.

  • In contrast, Senegal has experienced comparatively less dominance of ethnic or religious divisions in politics. Its main cleavage divides the capital Dakar region from the rest of the country, with rural populations preferring the incumbent party's patronage networks.

    Here is a summary:

  • The proliferation of political parties in Senegal has led to fragmentation of the opposition and parties being used more for gaining reputation/access to power than policy or ideology.

  • Ethnic and religious cleavages play a limited role in Senegalese politics compared to countries like Ghana and Nigeria. Educational inequalities between ethnic groups are relatively small.

  • Incumbency provides strong advantages, particularly in rural areas where clientsim is more effective due to less information/oversight. Rural voters support incumbents out of fear clientelistic networks will end.

  • The main political cleavage is rural-urban, with incumbents performing better in rural areas dependent on patronage. They do worse in more independent urban Dakar.

  • Overall, Senegalese politics revolves more around maintaining power through patronage networks than ideological or religious/ethnic divisions. Incumbency is the strongest predictor of electoral success.

    Here are the key points about surveys from the passage:

  • Educational level is a major political cleavage/division in Senegal and other West African countries. University/higher educated voters are much less likely to vote for incumbent parties than lower educated voters.

  • Rural areas tend to be less educated and benefit more from patronage networks of political elites, so they prefer continuity with incumbent parties they know. Urban/higher educated youth are more likely to back opposition forces calling for democratic change.

  • This educational/urban-rural cleavage has been a deciding factor in several Senegalese elections. The 2019 election saw university graduates 27 percentage points less likely to vote for the ruling APR party than non-graduates.

  • Similarly in Ghana, the more developed/educated southern regions vote less for incumbent parties than northern/rural regions which are poorer and benefit more from patronage. This regional divide often decides election outcomes.

  • In Botswana the opposition remains weak and fragmented, allowing the BDP incumbent to dominate elections due to dependence of rural base on state resources and lack of coherent alternative. Educational outcomes do not seem to significantly determine vote choice.

So in summary, educational level and urban/rural divides shape political competition in West African democracies like Senegal and Ghana, but not as much in more developmental state-like Botswana.

Here is a summary of the key points from the passage:

  • The chapter examines the long-run evolution of voting patterns and political cleavages in Israel from 1949 to 2019, looking at how they have been shaped by factors like ethnicity, religion, education, and socioeconomic context.

  • Some unique aspects of Israel compared to other wealthy democracies include the influence of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the dominance of the labor party for 30 years after 1948, high inequality, and its immigration patterns. However, the core shift in voting patterns is similar to places like France and the U.S.

  • From 1948-1977, the Mapai/Labor party was dominant. Since 1977, the Likud liberal-right party has also risen to power regularly. Coalitions have been necessary to govern.

  • Political cleavages originated from Israel's demographic history - Eastern European Jews initially, then Arabs/Palestinians and Jews from Muslim countries. Religious, economic and educational differences persist.

  • Over time, the socialist left has gradually been replaced by the dominance of the right wing, as the Labor party has not won an election since 1999 and currently holds a minority.

    Here is a summary:

  • The Labor Party, which dominated Israeli politics for decades, has seen a major decline. In the 2020 election it only won 3 out of 120 Knesset seats.

  • Centers parties have become more influential, appealing to former Labor voters. For example, Kadima was the largest party after 2006/2009 elections and Blue and White was largest in 2019.

  • Ideological differences between left, right, and center have narrowed over time. For example, on economic and foreign policy issues.

  • Income inequality in Israel rose significantly from the 1970s onward as the economy liberalized. However, the impact of political changes on inequality is unclear as major reforms occurred under governments of both left and right.

  • Reforms in 2001-2002 to address an economic crisis hurt lower income groups but did not seem to significantly impact voting patterns in the 2006 election.

  • Over the long term, lower income groups have become more right-leaning while higher income groups have moved left, indicating a shift from Labor representing the "people's party" to greater elitism.

    Here is a summary:

The data show that in recent Israeli elections, self-identified middle-class respondents were almost as likely to vote for left-leaning parties as the entire population. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, there was a transition where the traditionally dominant left bloc gradually lost dominance to right-leaning parties among the general population. However, among the economic elite and highly educated groups, the trend was opposite - they became more likely to vote for left parties over this period. By the 2019 election, those with higher social class and education levels were significantly more left-leaning in their votes than the average voter. So while right-leaning parties gained overall, the middle and upper classes remained closely aligned with the left.

Here are the key points from the passage:

  • Religiosity has a large impact on voting in Israel, with religious voters being much more likely to vote for right-wing parties over time. This trend is unaffected by other demographic controls.

  • Gender differences in voting are present but small in Israel compared to other countries. Women tend to be slightly more left-leaning than men after controlling for other factors.

  • The Ashkenazi/Mizrahi ethnic divide also impacts voting, with Mizrahim historically more likely to vote right and Ashkenazim left. This polarization increased from the 1970s-2000s.

  • Tel Aviv voters have shifted from more right-leaning historically to more left-leaning in line with trends in other global cities like New York.

  • Class also impacts voting, with elites/upper classes becoming more left-leaning over the long run in Israel as in other countries.

  • Inequality does not seem to have a strong direct electoral impact in Israel based on the evidence around economic reforms in the early 2000s.

  • Overall, political cleavages in Israel resemble trends in other high-income nations, indicating deeper socioeconomic drivers may be at play beyond Israel's unique context.

    Here is a summary of the key points from the article:

  • The article analyzes political cleavages and social inequalities in Algeria, Iraq, and Turkey from 1990-2019 based on election data and surveys.

  • It finds that income plays a differentiated role in voting divides, dependent on historical and institutional context. In Algeria and Turkey, ruling parties have cross-class support uniting poorest and richest voters, explaining their stability. In Iraq, sectarian divides overwhelm intra-sect inequalities but recent protests question this.

  • Significant ethnic minorities like Kurds in Turkey and Berbers in Algeria vote differently than majorities, though only class dimensions matter for Kurds. Sociospatial inequalities do not fully overlap with ethnic divides.

  • Other identity dimensions like religion in Turkey (pitting more educated secular voters vs less educated religious voters) and generation in Algeria and Iraq (where youth discontent outlets through abstention) shape cleavages.

  • Recent mass protests in these countries exhibited interclass and cross-sectarian dynamics, inviting study of political participation beyond just voting.

  • The article finds multidimensional aspects of political cleavages in these countries and hopes to spur more data collection to better understand evolving electoral dynamics.

    Here is a summary:

  • From its founding until 1946, Turkey had a single-party system led by the Republican People's Party (CHP). Political opposition and minority movements were heavily repressed under this system.

  • The first free elections in 1950 marked the success of an opposition party and the emergence of Turkey's original political dynamic between the CHP establishment and center-right challengers representing rural and conservative sectors. Alternation between these blocs occurred over three decades.

  • The military constitutes a third major actor, intervening directly via coups in 1960 and 1980 and indirectly through memorandums in 1971 and 1997 to change governments and uphold secularism. The 1980 coup in particular banned existing parties and introduced barriers preventing extremist parties.

  • In the 1980s, a multiparty system emerged dominated by center-right parties governing through coalitions. In 1995, an Islamic party became the largest and Kurdish parties also entered.

  • Despite bans, the AKP came to power in 2002 following an economic crisis. It initially pursued EU integration and Kurdish dialogue but later shifted toward nationalism and political Islam amid regional changes.

  • Religiosity has consistently impacted vote choice but support for Islamic/right parties predates the AKP, indicating an existing religious cleavage. The AKP also appealed across classes, relying on networks and delivering growth, housing, and credit. Higher education correlates with support for the secular CHP.

    Here is a summary of the key points about ical attitudes surveys in Turkey and Iraq:

  • In Turkey, surveys show higher educated voters are less likely to vote for the AKP party, indicating a class divide. The education gap widened in 2018. Youth also voted less for AKP than older voters initially but controlling for education showed youth were not massively rejecting the party.

  • There is also an ethnoregional divide, with Kurdish speakers less likely to vote AKP, reaching a peak difference of 32 percentage points in 2015. A new Kurdish party, HDP, appealed to voters beyond just the Kurdish ethnic group.

  • In Iraq, elections since 2005 have been dominated by parties organized along ethnic and sectarian lines between Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish groups. The Shiite population being larger, Shiite coalitions received the most votes. However, secular and anti-sectarian alliances have grown in importance over time.

  • Spatial inequalities exist, with the north traditionally Kurdish, center Sunni dominated, and south Shiite populated. However, the semiautonomous Kurdish region has experienced an economic reversal compared to historically more deprived Shiite and Sunni regions affected by conflict. Surveys track voting patterns along these ethnoregional cleavages.

    Here is a summary:

  • Algeria gained independence from France in 1962, establishing an authoritarian one-party system led by the National Liberation Front (FLN). This state socialist system prevailed for decades.

  • Mass protests in 1988 calling for an end to corruption and deteriorating economic conditions forced reforms toward democratization.

  • The first pluralistic elections in 1991 were won by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), triggering a military intervention that dissolved the National Assembly and banned FIS.

  • This led to a period of civil war and state repression as Islamists radicalized. Only after the "Black Decade" was there a second attempt at democratization.

  • In 1999, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, a long-standing FLN member backed by the military, was elected president. He remained in power for nearly two decades, establishing an "electoral autocracy" that maintained the dominance of the military-FLN alliance while holding regular elections.

So in summary, Algeria transitioned from postcolonial authoritarian one-party rule to brief democratization, then a violent civil war period, before establishing a new system of regular elections but continued military-backed authoritarian control under Bouteflika. Geographical, ethnic and religious divisions were not major factors in Algerian politics.

Here is a summary:

The political landscape in Algeria has remained dominated by the alliance between the FLN party and the RND party, despite lack of strong public support in elections. Elections were criticized for perpetuating the status quo with limited democratization. Constitutional changes strengthening the executive also occurred.

The Arab Spring protests in 2011 had relatively little impact in Algeria due to subsidies, pay raises, and unemployment programs. New political parties formed but remained marginalized. Opposition overall remained weak and divided with high voter abstention over 50%.

More localized protests against socioeconomic issues grew and took on a national scale in 2019 in response to Bouteflika's bid for a fifth term as president. Protests continued for over a year, with unclear political consequences.

Spatial disparities exist between the wealthier northern coast and poorer southern regions, though regional claims have not found resonance electorally. The Berber/Amazigh population in Kabylia supports secular opposition more due to potential exclusion from power networks.

The FLN and RND ruling parties drew support from different classes, reconciling class cleavages and maintaining the status quo. Hydrocarbon wealth was distributed through subsidies maintaining popular support.

Younger generations rejected the historical legitimacy of the FLN while older voters supported it, showing a generational cleavage. High youth unemployment fueled thoughts of emigration. Abstention and protests became new forms of political participation among disadvantaged groups.

Here is a summary of the key points about political parties in Algeria:

  • The main political party has been the National Liberation Front (FLN), which has ruled Algeria since independence in 1962. However, its dominance has declined in recent years.

  • Islamist parties gained popularity in the 1990s, particularly the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), but the military intervened in 1992 to prevent FIS from winning elections. This led to a civil war in the 1990s.

  • In the 2000s, Islamist parties have declined as the regime restricted political Islam. The main legal Islamist party now is the Movement for a Society of Peace (MSP).

  • Younger generations are less likely to support the FLN compared to older generations. Support for the FLN has also declined among the poorer segments of society.

  • Protests in 2019-2020 indicated growing dissatisfaction with the ruling elite and calls for political reforms, but the military-backed regime has remained firmly in control with no major changes to the political system so far.

    Here is a summary of the key points from the conclusion:

  • The authors acknowledge the limitations of their study, which relied primarily on electoral survey data from 48 countries over the period 1948-2020. They hope it will inspire further research from other social science perspectives.

  • They note the declining relevance of simplistic class-based models of electoral competition from post-war Western democracies. Today's world involves more complex interactions between class, identity, and post-colonial dynamics.

  • While identity-based cleavages are more difficult to resolve, the authors argue they should not be dismissed and policies respecting diversity are needed. Class conflicts also remain important due to their link to issues of inequality, participation, and redistribution.

  • Environmental issues are likely to become an increasingly important cleavage, with the potential to reshape political coalitions going forward.

  • To build on this study, they call for assembling additional sources like party platforms, policies, funding, and mobilization strategies to provide more context. Broadening the historical and geographic scope is also important.

  • Electoral surveys have limitations like retrospective self-reporting biases and small sample sizes that prevent fine-grained regional or election-level analysis. Other data sources could help address some of these limitations.

    Here is a summary of the perceptions of various groups of voters based on the analyses in the manuscript:

  • Class cleavages: Studies electoral behaviors and socioeconomic characteristics across different classes (working, middle, upper class). Shows divisions between classes in some countries.

  • Educational cleavages: Analyzes voting patterns according to levels of educational attainment. More educated voters often have different preferences than less educated voters.

  • Ethnic/racial cleavages: Examines divisions along ethnic or racial lines. Some minority groups vote differently than the general population in certain nations.

  • Gender cleavages: Investigates differences in how men and women vote. In some places, gender is a significant factor in political preferences.

  • Generational cleavages: Looks at voting trends across age groups and younger vs. older generations. Priorities and parties of choice can vary significantly.

  • Income/wealth cleavages: Compares electoral behaviors across income and wealth levels. Political views sometimes correlate strongly with economic status.

  • Regional cleavages: Analyzes variations in voting based on geographic region within countries. Regional identities influence the vote in some polities.

  • Religious cleavages: Studies the impact of religious beliefs and denomination on partisanship. Religion continues shaping voting patterns globally.

  • Rural-urban cleavages: Compares preferences of rural vs. urban residents. Lifestyles and issues of urban vs. rural constituencies pull voting in divergent directions.

The analyses provide insights on the many societal divisions that underlie political dynamics in different electoral democracies around the world.

Here is a summary of the sections on Pakistan, Belgium, and Botswana:

Pakistan (284–286):

-Multiparty system emerged in the 1980s and 1990s (281-284)

-Muslim vote is important factor (54f, 257, 285t, 286)

-Nationalism and sectarianism shape politics (257)

-Rural-urban and religious-secular cleavages are significant (62f, 283, 285t, 286)

-Party system has transformed and election results have varied over time (280-284, 282f)

Belgium (257-263):

-Democratization process in post-WWII period, election results varied (257-260, 258f)

-Linguistic and regional cleavages are major factors (257, 259, 262-263, 264t)

-Catholic-Protestant and conservative-social democratic divides also important (257, 263, 264t)

-Educational and income cleavages correlate with linguistic divides (35f, 260-261, 261f, 263, 264t)

-Sub-state nationalism in Flanders region (257-258, 260)

Botswana (534-541):

-Dominant ruling party despite being multi-party system (31, 64, 65f, 75f, 82, 534-541)

-Ethnicity and rural-urban residence correlate with political preferences (56f, 57, 533, 537-539, 538f)

-Higher levels of education correlate with opposition party support (45f, 533-534, 538f, 540-541, 541f)

-Class divisions but limited systemic effect on voting (82, 533-534, 539-541)

-Clientelist practices reinforce dominant party's position (533, 539)

Here is a summary of the key points:

  • The passage discusses political cleavages in several Western democracies, including Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, and others.

  • It examines various types of cleavages like class, educational, ethnic/racial, gender, generational, income/wealth, religious, rural-urban, among others.

  • For each country, it discusses the dominant cleavages and how they shape voting patterns, party systems, and election outcomes. It analyzes trends over time.

  • Some common cleavages discussed across countries include educational cleavages, income/wealth cleavages, religious cleavages, immigration/nativist cleavages, and social democratic versus conservative voter bases.

  • Factors like economic liberalization, diversity, the rise of new elites, and globalization are noted as shaping the evolution of cleavages in these societies over decades.

  • Electoral surveys and data are referenced to empirically demonstrate changes in cleavages and their political impacts in countries like Finland, France, Germany, and Iceland.

In summary, the passage provides a comparative analysis of the various types of political cleavages that have existed in several Western democracies, how they have changed over time, and their influence on voting patterns, party competition and electoral outcomes. It examines these phenomena through both conceptual and empirical lenses.

Here is a summary of the key points about political cleavages in India:

  • India has experienced deep educational, income/wealth, regional, religious, and rural-urban cleavages. There are also generational differences.

  • The Hindu vote and Muslim vote are divided along religious lines, though it is a complex relationship with some cross-cutting cleavages. Religious identity plays a strong role in Indian politics.

  • Regionalism is a major factor, with different parties dominating in different states. State-level politics are very influential.

  • The party system is multi-elite, with several large national parties competing. Election results show change over time among the major parties.

  • Social democratic/left-leaning voters and more right-leaning Hindu nationalist voters are the two main groups. Recognition of ethnic/religious groups and redistribution issues are salient.

  • Cleavages are complex, with some voters crossing traditional lines based on factors like education level, income, region, and generation. Identity politics remain important.

  • Indian democracy and party system have become institutionalized, though cleavages still shape political dynamics and competition. Diversity of society produces ongoing cleavages.

In summary, India has experienced deep and enduring social, economic, regional and religious cleavages that structure its competitive multi-party democracy and shape changing voting patterns over time. Both diversity and complexity of cleavages are defining political features.

Here is a summary of the information provided:

  • Sweden has a multi-elite party system with class, income/wealth, educational, rural-urban, and generational cleavages.

  • There are social democratic, conservative, and new right voters. Religious-secular cleavages have declined significantly.

  • Immigration and integration of immigrant populations have introduced some nativist-immigrant cleavages.

  • Political cleavages include socioeconomic factors like class, income, education as well as demographic factors like age, place of residence. Religious cleavages are less prominent now.

  • Election results show a dominance of social democratic and conservative parties, though new right parties have gained influence recently as well.

  • Sweden has maintained a independent multiparty system with multiple competitive parties representing different cleavages in society. Overall political cleavages stem from socioeconomic divides as well as some new divides around immigration and integration issues.

    Here is a summary of the key sections:

  • Rural-urban cleavages are discussed in several countries including South Africa (63f, 64, 65f, 530), Spain (62f, 236, 237t), Sweden (61, 62f), Switzerland (62, 62f, 274, 278-279, 279t), and the UK (61). Rural voters often have different social, economic, and policy preferences than urban voters.

  • Regional cleavages within countries are discussed for South Africa (66f, 518t, 528), South Korea (66f, 407-408, 413-415, 414f), Spain (66f-67f, 67-68, 230, 231f, 232, 234-236), Switzerland (256, 279-280, 279t), Thailand (66-67, 66f, 376, 377, 379-383, 380f), Turkey (66f-67f, 597-599), and the UK (66f-67f, 67-68). There are often significant cultural, economic, or political differences between regions within a country.

  • Educational cleavages, with less educated voters preferring different parties, are discussed for several countries including South Africa (45f, 530), South Korea (45f, 406, 408, 413, 416f), Spain (35f, 36, 234f, 235, 236f, 237t, 238), Sweden (34, 35f, 36, 151, 169-171, 170f, 172, 174t), Switzerland (35f, 36, 255, 256, 277-278, 277f, 279t), Taiwan (45f, 417, 422-423, 423f), and the UK (35f, 126-130, 127f, 129f, 304).

  • Income/wealth cleavages are also present in many countries, such as South Africa (45f, 46, 508, 514-516, 521-526, 522f-524f, 525t, 529-530), South Korea (45f, 406, 407, 408, 410-411, 415, 416f), Spain (37f, 234f, 235, 236f, 237t, 238), Sweden (37f, 170-171, 170f, 174t), Switzerland (37f, 277f, 278, 279t), Taiwan (45f, 406, 407, 417, 421, 422-424, 423f), and the UK (36, 37f, 117, 118n42, 128-130, 129f). Poorer voters often favor redistributive policies.

    Here is a summary of the key points:

  • Scotland had a separatist movement and sub-state nationalism seeking independence from the UK.

  • In the UK, social democratic voters (those supporting Labour and Liberal parties) were found among lower-income groups and education levels.

  • In the US, political cleavages exist along lines of class, race, ethnicity, education, income, religion, urban/rural divides.

  • Conservative voters in the US tended to support the Republican party and be of higher incomes and education.

  • Disadvantaged racial/ethnic minorities in the US supported the Democratic party.

  • Educational cleavages strongly predicted vote choice in the US, with those of lower education supporting Democrats and higher education backing Republicans.

  • Gender cleavages showed women in the US were more likely to support Democrats than Republicans.

  • The US had a multi-elite party system with Democrats receiving support from lower-income, minority, less educated groups and Republicans from higher incomes and more educated voters.

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